Upgrade dependencies to latest stable

zip 0.6.6 -> 8.6.0 (the 0.6 line is unmaintained), aes 0.8 -> 0.9 (BlockCipherDecrypt trait replaces BlockDecrypt), sha2 0.10 -> 0.11 (Array no longer formats as hex; local hex_digest helpers). Outputs are byte-identical across the upgrade: full golden corpus and Android corpus sidecars all pass.
Merge Android (AArch64) shared-library restoration, bump to 1.2.0
2026-09-19 03:57:59 -04:00 · 2026-09-02 03:19:06 +08:00 · 2026-09-02 03:09:21 +08:00 · 2026-08-30 22:44:15 +08:00 · 2026-08-30 22:31:21 +08:00 · 2026-08-16 03:49:11 +08:00
85 changed files with 13619 additions and 4400 deletions
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
    runs-on: windows-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
+      - run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings

  test:
    # The test suite exercises Windows path semantics, so it runs on Windows.
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
    runs-on: windows-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - run: cargo test --release
+      - run: cargo test --release --workspace

  check-portable:
    # Build-only portability gate: non-Windows host and the wasm target the
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ jobs:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
-      - run: cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown
+      - run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+      - run: cargo check --workspace --target wasm32-unknown-unknown

  cli:
    strategy:
@@ -82,11 +82,12 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - run: cargo install wasm-pack --locked
-      # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: web/Cargo.lock is committed on
+      # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: senbei-wasm/Cargo.lock is committed on
      # purpose, so the wasm build must be pinned by it rather than silently
      # re-resolving (which is how it drifted out of sync with the manifest).
-      - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release -- --locked
-        working-directory: web
+      # --out-dir emits the JS/wasm package into the static frontend's web/pkg/.
+      - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release --out-dir ../web/pkg -- --locked
+        working-directory: senbei-wasm
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: senbei-web
@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - run: cargo install wasm-pack --locked
-      # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: web/Cargo.lock is committed on
+      # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: senbei-wasm/Cargo.lock is committed on
      # purpose, so the wasm build must be pinned by it rather than silently
      # re-resolving (which is how it drifted out of sync with the manifest).
-      - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release -- --locked
-        working-directory: web
+      # --out-dir emits the JS/wasm package into the static frontend's web/pkg/.
+      - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release --out-dir ../web/pkg -- --locked
+        working-directory: senbei-wasm
      - name: Stage static site
        run: |
          mkdir dist
@@ -153,6 +153,8 @@ target/
 !/samples/README.md

 ### senbei web build ###
+# The wasm crate builds out-of-workspace in senbei-wasm/ and wasm-pack emits
+# the JS/wasm package into web/pkg/ for the static frontend.
+/senbei-wasm/target/
 /web/pkg/
-/web/target/
 /web/.playwright-cli
@@ -4,32 +4,51 @@ Guidance for AI coding agents (and human contributors) working in this repo.

 ## Project

-Senbei is a static unpacker for Crackproof-protected PE files: a pure,
-panic-free, no-I/O unpacker core (`src/unpacker/`) plus a thin CLI shell
-(`src/`), an il2cpp metadata de-obfuscator (`src/metadata.rs`), and a
-WebAssembly browser frontend (`web/`). Read `docs/design.md` first.
+Senbei is a static unpacker for Crackproof-protected PE files and protected
+Android (AArch64) shared libraries: a Cargo workspace with a pure, panic-free,
+no-I/O PE unpacker core (`senbei-pe/`, built on `senbei-crypto/`), il2cpp
+metadata de-obfuscators (`senbei-metadata/` for the Windows structural
+variant, `senbei-android-metadata/` for the Android seeded-permutation and
+embedded-blob variants), the native-only Android pipeline
+(`senbei-android-crypto/`, `senbei-android-engine/`, `senbei-android-elf/`),
+filesystem/CLI orchestration (`senbei-io/`, including the Android
+single-library/package glue in `senbei-io/src/android.rs`), the `senbei`
+binary (`senbei-cli/`), WebAssembly bindings (`senbei-wasm/`, outside the
+workspace; builds into `web/pkg/`), and the static browser frontend assets
+(`web/`). Read `docs/design.md` first.

 ## Commands

 ```cmd
-cargo build --release            :: CLI
-cargo test --release             :: full suite (golden corpus: samples/, git-ignored)
-cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
+cargo build --release            :: CLI (default member: senbei-cli)
+cargo test --release --workspace :: full suite (golden corpus: samples/, git-ignored)
+cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 cargo fmt --all
-cd web && wasm-pack build --target web --release   :: browser build
+cd senbei-wasm && wasm-pack build --target web --release --out-dir ../web/pkg   :: browser build
 ```

 The `samples/` corpus is user-managed and absent on CI; without it the
 samples test is a no-op pass. `SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES=1` makes an absent
-corpus fail (use this on a private CI that *does* have the corpus). Do not
+corpus fail (use this on a private CI that *does* have the corpus). The
+Android corpus lives in `samples/android/` (one extracted app tree per
+subdirectory) and is covered by `tests/android_samples.rs`;
+`SENBEI_ANDROID_SAMPLES` overrides that location. Do not
 delete `samples/` with `rm -rf` — it may be a junction; use git
 worktree-aware cleanup.

 ## Hard rules

- **The unpacker core stays pure**: no file I/O, no `unsafe`, no panics across
-  the public boundary, no platform-specific code. It must keep compiling to
-  `wasm32-unknown-unknown` (`cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown`).
+- **The PE unpacker core stays pure**: `senbei-pe` and `senbei-crypto` have no
+  file I/O, no `unsafe`, no panics across the public boundary, no
+  platform-specific code. Everything `senbei-wasm` compiles must keep building
+  for `wasm32-unknown-unknown` (`cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown`
+  at the workspace root covers it — the Android crates do compile to wasm, but
+  nothing on the wasm path calls them).
+- **The Android crates are native-only orchestration-style crates**:
+  `senbei-android-engine`/`senbei-android-elf` memory-map inputs and write a
+  module workspace to disk (the restore is a two-phase design consuming that
+  workspace). Keep them off the web app's code paths; `senbei-io`'s
+  `android.rs` is the only caller the CLI uses.
 - **`catch_unwind` does not work on wasm** (the prebuilt std can't unwind; a
  caught panic becomes a fatal `unreachable` trap). Native code may rely on
  `catch_unpack`, but any routing decision must also work without a catchable
@@ -2,6 +2,23 @@
 # It is not intended for manual editing.
 version = 4

+[[package]]
+name = "adler2"
+version = "2.0.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "320119579fcad9c21884f5c4861d16174d0e06250625266f50fe6898340abefa"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "aes"
+version = "0.9.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "35f0f96ce78e38c3dc6d8948aa8163d06385be74000f3c7a95bf1eef35d3ea32"
+dependencies = [
+ "cipher",
+ "cpubits",
+ "cpufeatures",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "anyhow"
 version = "1.0.104"
@@ -14,6 +31,15 @@ version = "2.13.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b588b76d00fde79687d7646a9b5bdf3cc0f655e0bbd080335a95d7e96f3587da"

+[[package]]
+name = "block-buffer"
+version = "0.12.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d2f6c7dbe95a6ed67ad9f18e57daf93a2f034c524b99fd2b76d18fdfeb6660aa"
+dependencies = [
+ "hybrid-array",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "bumpalo"
 version = "3.20.3"
@@ -26,6 +52,16 @@ version = "1.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801"

+[[package]]
+name = "cipher"
+version = "0.5.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e8cf2a2c93cd704877c0858356ed03480ff301ee950b43f1cbe4573b088bfa6c"
+dependencies = [
+ "crypto-common",
+ "inout",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "console"
 version = "0.16.4"
@@ -38,12 +74,68 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "const-oid"
+version = "0.10.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a6ef517f0926dd24a1582492c791b6a4818a4d94e789a334894aa15b0d12f55c"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "cpubits"
+version = "0.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "15b85f9c39137c3a891689859392b1bd49812121d0d61c9caf00d46ed5ce06ae"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "cpufeatures"
+version = "0.3.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5ca28b0ae3115b884660db4118d803791fd6756b6e88f39c0f3f7859060d7566"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "crc32fast"
+version = "1.5.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8498c871161e1742aaa9d52551b2d6ebdd4c3d45a3be423e3728f33b955be550"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "crypto-common"
+version = "0.2.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ce6e4c961d6cd6c9a86db418387425e8bdeaf05b3c8bc1411e6dca4c252f1453"
+dependencies = [
+ "hybrid-array",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "digest"
+version = "0.11.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f1dd6dbb5841937940781866fa1281a1ff7bd3bf827091440879f9994983d5c2"
+dependencies = [
+ "block-buffer",
+ "const-oid",
+ "crypto-common",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "encode_unicode"
 version = "1.0.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "34aa73646ffb006b8f5147f3dc182bd4bcb190227ce861fc4a4844bf8e3cb2c0"

+[[package]]
+name = "equivalent"
+version = "1.0.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "877a4ace8713b0bcf2a4e7eec82529c029f1d0619886d18145fea96c3ffe5c0f"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "errno"
 version = "0.3.14"
@@ -61,22 +153,33 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "da7c62ceae207dd37ea5b845da6a0696c799f85e97da1ab5b7910be3c1c80223"

 [[package]]
-name = "futures-core"
-version = "0.3.33"
+name = "flate2"
+version = "1.1.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2cd50c473c80f6d7c3670a752354b8e569b1a7cbfdc0419ec88e5edad85e0dc7"
+checksum = "6e634e2e0ebac1ee034020da1ca582e17ffe4e0f5e985823721e168928136dcb"
+dependencies = [
+ "crc32fast",
+ "miniz_oxide",
+ "zlib-rs",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-core"
+version = "0.3.34"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "92d699e522242e69e3003b94ecc1f960f3a5e015aa7c5d7486e65ad01dd94f5e"

 [[package]]
 name = "futures-task"
-version = "0.3.33"
+version = "0.3.34"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b231ed28831efb4a61a08580c4bc233ec56bc009f4cd8f52da2c3cb97df0c109"
+checksum = "cd417de3d1d015fc3bfd2b1ea46dfc7bab72ef86f1cc7cc9c78e728b34a6d1fd"

 [[package]]
 name = "futures-util"
-version = "0.3.33"
+version = "0.3.34"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a77a90a256fce34da66415271e30f94ee91c57b04b8a2c042d9cf3220179deaa"
+checksum = "0d50a92467f8ba5dd6e3ee5d4bd04d73ab2e4e1c44474a0674821dfce14b79bc"
 dependencies = [
 "futures-core",
 "futures-task",
@@ -95,6 +198,42 @@ dependencies = [
 "r-efi",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "goblin"
+version = "0.10.7"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "17582616a7718cca54cec18e534a76c7c4aec11a8b9a85695712f262fd15a4c8"
+dependencies = [
+ "log",
+ "plain",
+ "scroll",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "hashbrown"
+version = "0.17.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "hybrid-array"
+version = "0.4.14"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "707114b52a152fa7bdb290cd7cd5912d9467273b6d74e21b8d81aca1f8533f6b"
+dependencies = [
+ "typenum",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "indexmap"
+version = "2.14.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "07aa2048142242915a31d35844fb311e0e53fcca590c3a0a40dcf1b841fa09eb"
+dependencies = [
+ "equivalent",
+ "hashbrown",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "indicatif"
 version = "0.18.6"
@@ -109,10 +248,25 @@ dependencies = [
 ]

 [[package]]
-name = "js-sys"
-version = "0.3.103"
+name = "inout"
+version = "0.2.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "53b44bfcdb3f8d5837a46dae1ca9660a837176eee74a28b229bc626816589102"
+checksum = "4250ce6452e92010fdf7268ccc5d14faa80bb12fc741938534c58f16804e03c7"
+dependencies = [
+ "hybrid-array",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "itoa"
+version = "1.0.18"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8f42a60cbdf9a97f5d2305f08a87dc4e09308d1276d28c869c684d7777685682"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "js-sys"
+version = "0.3.104"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "0e0c1080212aad755ea003d18543e8768dd432c48819efd73a7bf1e39b7a5a3a"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 "futures-util",
@@ -131,6 +285,37 @@ version = "0.12.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "32a66949e030da00e8c7d4434b251670a91556f4144941d37452769c25d58a53"

+[[package]]
+name = "log"
+version = "0.4.34"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f9f8bd3e56ce4dfc153cf470fffbfa98c7620958b312ca5c3a4b8d5181fd13c6"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "memchr"
+version = "2.8.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "cf8baf1c55e62ffcace7a9f06f4bd9cd3f0c4beb022d3b367256b91b87513d98"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "memmap2"
+version = "0.9.11"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d1219ed1b7f229ee7104d281dd01d6802fe28bb6e95d292942c4daacdeb798c0"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "miniz_oxide"
+version = "0.9.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b63fbc4a50860e98e7b2aa7804ded1db5cbc3aff9193adaff57a6931bf7c4b4c"
+dependencies = [
+ "adler2",
+ "simd-adler32",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "once_cell"
 version = "1.21.4"
@@ -139,9 +324,9 @@ checksum = "9f7c3e4beb33f85d45ae3e3a1792185706c8e16d043238c593331cc7cd313b50"

 [[package]]
 name = "owo-colors"
-version = "4.3.0"
+version = "4.4.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d211803b9b6b570f68772237e415a029d5a50c65d382910b879fb19d3271f94d"
+checksum = "13c45bb4a6ae1280ec0803b1ef9d3455eb50f01efbbe1447ab020f1d54fba9d8"

 [[package]]
 name = "pin-project-lite"
@@ -150,10 +335,16 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a89322df9ebe1c1578d689c92318e070967d1042b512afbe49518723f4e6d5cd"

 [[package]]
-name = "portable-atomic"
-version = "1.14.0"
+name = "plain"
+version = "0.2.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3d20d5497ef88037a52ff98267d066e7f11fcc5e99bbfbd58a42336193aacec3"
+checksum = "b4596b6d070b27117e987119b4dac604f3c58cfb0b191112e24771b2faeac1a6"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "portable-atomic"
+version = "1.15.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "05c8b63e8d9609db387f0324918f81d68fe27748f084ef092fb35954d0539a85"

 [[package]]
 name = "proc-macro2"
@@ -208,19 +399,178 @@ dependencies = [
 ]

 [[package]]
-name = "senbei"
-version = "1.0.1"
+name = "scroll"
+version = "0.13.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c1257cd4248b4132760d6524d6dda4e053bc648c9070b960929bf50cfb1e7add"
+dependencies = [
+ "scroll_derive",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "scroll_derive"
+version = "0.13.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e1a36a382ed65dbcc0ab47fd5e9a94112417ccd34560a392ef3b7b0f0ec39148"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 3.0.4",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-android-crypto"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "aes",
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-android-elf"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "memmap2",
+ "senbei-android-crypto",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+ "sha2",
+ "tempfile",
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-android-engine"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "goblin",
+ "memmap2",
+ "senbei-android-crypto",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+ "sha2",
+ "tempfile",
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-android-metadata"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-cli"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "senbei-io",
+ "senbei-metadata",
+ "sha2",
+ "tempfile",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-crypto"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-io"
+version = "1.2.0"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
+ "flate2",
 "indicatif",
 "libc",
 "owo-colors",
+ "senbei-android-elf",
+ "senbei-android-engine",
+ "senbei-android-metadata",
+ "senbei-metadata",
+ "senbei-pe",
+ "sha2",
 "tempfile",
- "thiserror",
 "walkdir",
 "windows",
+ "zip",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-metadata"
+version = "1.2.0"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "senbei-pe"
+version = "1.2.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "senbei-crypto",
+ "thiserror",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde"
+version = "1.0.229"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4148590afebada386688f18773da617792bf2ef03ffc1e4cbd2b1d45b023e0ba"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde_core",
+ "serde_derive",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_core"
+version = "1.0.229"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "67dca2c9c51e58a4791a4b1ed58308b39c64224d349a935ab5039aa360942a48"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde_derive",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_derive"
+version = "1.0.229"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e7a5d71263a5a7d47b41f6b3f06ba276f10cc18b0931f1799f710578e2309348"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 3.0.4",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_json"
+version = "1.0.151"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c841b55ecdae098c80dcae9cf767f6f8a0c2cdb3416bbef72181df4d0fe73f14"
+dependencies = [
+ "itoa",
+ "memchr",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_core",
+ "zmij",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "sha2"
+version = "0.11.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "446ba717509524cb3f22f17ecc096f10f4822d76ab5c0b9822c5f9c284e825f4"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "cpufeatures",
+ "digest",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "simd-adler32"
+version = "0.3.10"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3a219298ac11a56ea9a6d2120044824d6f01aeb034955e7af7bc16858527deea"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "slab"
 version = "0.4.12"
@@ -240,9 +590,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "syn"
-version = "3.0.3"
+version = "3.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "53e9bae58849f64dfa4f5d5ae372c8341f7305f82a3868709269343628b659a3"
+checksum = "e6275cddf4610d1775e6d1fe9469b2e77d0f39fd98fb7450901b821e0c53649f"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
@@ -264,24 +614,36 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror"
-version = "2.0.19"
+version = "2.0.20"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "09a43598840e33d5b0331f38c5e30d13bb11c11210a4b58f0d9b18a5a5eefcd9"
+checksum = "ec86235f5fcc2a73650310756d2ac5b138a5780bbbdfae3eeccec992c435ba4f"
 dependencies = [
 "thiserror-impl",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror-impl"
-version = "2.0.19"
+version = "2.0.20"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "43cbfe0cf76104d42a574802844187e84a305e531ed54455f11fbde0f10541cd"
+checksum = "bc04cd3e1236dd4a98afca4569f2deb3f120e5422a4023be2cb683f8486292af"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.3",
+ "syn 3.0.4",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "typed-path"
+version = "0.12.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8e28f89b80c87b8fb0cf04ab448d5dd0dd0ade2f8891bae878de66a75a28600e"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "typenum"
+version = "1.20.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b6f5e870be6c3b371b77fe0ee0bafb859fa4964b4404c27de1d380043c4dda20"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-ident"
 version = "1.0.24"
@@ -312,9 +674,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "wasm-bindgen"
-version = "0.2.126"
+version = "0.2.127"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4b067c0c11094aef6b7a801c1e34a26affafdf3d051dba08456b868789aaf9a4"
+checksum = "1b70935747edd64d89de3efa29d73789b806c15798f8e7dca4d8ac356b50ce70"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 "once_cell",
@@ -325,9 +687,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "wasm-bindgen-macro"
-version = "0.2.126"
+version = "0.2.127"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "167ce5e579f6bcf889c4f7175a8a5a585de84e8ff93976ce393efa5f2837aab1"
+checksum = "77775f8f3f7217702089053b94958f8f54061a3f663417df76e19cbdcca29bc1"
 dependencies = [
 "quote",
 "wasm-bindgen-macro-support",
@@ -335,9 +697,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "wasm-bindgen-macro-support"
-version = "0.2.126"
+version = "0.2.127"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f3997c7839262f4ef12cf90b818d6340c18e80f263f1a94bf157d0ec4420380e"
+checksum = "e11d33f857dc2fb11b8bc75aee111aa9cbeb12cd9f25efd3d4c2a3dd4e235284"
 dependencies = [
 "bumpalo",
 "proc-macro2",
@@ -348,9 +710,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "wasm-bindgen-shared"
-version = "0.2.126"
+version = "0.2.127"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "dc1b4cb0cc549fcf58d7dfc081778139b3d283a081644e833e84682ad71cea24"
+checksum = "7ef64dbcc55df09c7e5a46182d181c2cfa3e925f3da937ea764728b4bbb9dcbf"
 dependencies = [
 "unicode-ident",
 ]
@@ -492,3 +854,41 @@ checksum = "3949bd5b99cafdf1c7ca86b43ca564028dfe27d66958f2470940f73d86d75b37"
 dependencies = [
 "windows-link",
 ]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zip"
+version = "8.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2d04a6b5381502aa6087c94c669499eb1602eb9c5e8198e534de571f7154809b"
+dependencies = [
+ "crc32fast",
+ "flate2",
+ "indexmap",
+ "memchr",
+ "typed-path",
+ "zopfli",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zlib-rs"
+version = "0.6.7"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "34b31d188d9d685a4f9c7b46d6e36631b07058d2cfe190267adce54dc230bf12"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zmij"
+version = "1.0.23"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "29666d0abbfad1e3dc4dcf6144730dd3a3ab225bbbdac83319345b1b44ccfc1b"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zopfli"
+version = "0.8.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f05cd8797d63865425ff89b5c4a48804f35ba0ce8d125800027ad6017d2b5249"
+dependencies = [
+ "bumpalo",
+ "crc32fast",
+ "log",
+ "simd-adler32",
+]
@@ -1,39 +1,65 @@
-[package]
-name = "senbei"
-version = "1.0.1"
+[workspace]
+members = [
+    "senbei-android-crypto",
+    "senbei-android-elf",
+    "senbei-android-engine",
+    "senbei-android-metadata",
+    "senbei-cli",
+    "senbei-crypto",
+    "senbei-io",
+    "senbei-metadata",
+    "senbei-pe",
+]
+default-members = ["senbei-cli"]
+# The wasm bindings crate is its own crate (own Cargo.lock, cdylib) and stays
+# outside the workspace.
+exclude = ["senbei-wasm"]
+resolver = "2"
+
+[workspace.package]
+version = "1.2.0"
 edition = "2024"
-description = "Static unpacker for Crackproof-protected PE files"
+rust-version = "1.85"
 license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
-keywords = ["unpacker", "reverse-engineering", "pe", "security-research"]
-categories = ["command-line-utilities"]

-[lib]
-name = "senbei"
-path = "src/lib.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "senbei"
-path = "src/main.rs"
-
-[dependencies]
+[workspace.dependencies]
+aes = "0.9"
 anyhow = "1"
+flate2 = "1"
+goblin = "0.10"
+indicatif = "0.18"
+libc = "0.2"
+memmap2 = "0.9"
+owo-colors = "4"
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_json = "1"
+sha2 = "0.11"
+tempfile = "3"
 thiserror = "2"
 walkdir = "2"
-indicatif = "0.18"
-owo-colors = "4"
-
-[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
 windows = { version = "0.62", features = [
    "Win32_Foundation",
    "Win32_System_Console",
    "Win32_System_SystemInformation",
 ] }
+zip = { version = "8", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
+senbei-android-crypto = { path = "senbei-android-crypto" }
+senbei-android-elf = { path = "senbei-android-elf" }
+senbei-android-engine = { path = "senbei-android-engine" }
+senbei-android-metadata = { path = "senbei-android-metadata" }
+senbei-crypto = { path = "senbei-crypto" }
+senbei-io = { path = "senbei-io" }
+senbei-metadata = { path = "senbei-metadata" }
+senbei-pe = { path = "senbei-pe" }

-[target.'cfg(all(not(windows), not(target_arch = "wasm32")))'.dependencies]
-libc = "0.2"
+[workspace.lints.rust]
+unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"

-[dev-dependencies]
-tempfile = "3"
+[workspace.lints.clippy]
+correctness = { level = "deny", priority = -1 }
+suspicious = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
+complexity = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
+perf = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }

 [profile.release]
 opt-level = 3
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # Senbei

-A static unpacker for Crackproof-protected 64-bit and 32-bit PE files. Point it
-at a file or a folder and it writes decrypted copies — no launch of the
+A static unpacker for Crackproof-protected 64-bit and 32-bit PE files and
+protected Android (AArch64) shared libraries. Point it at a file, an app
+package, or a folder and it writes decrypted copies — no launch of the
 protected program, no kernel driver, no code runs out of the protected binary.

 > _"Crackproof"? It's senbei (煎餅 — rice cracker). Cracks itself._
@@ -27,8 +28,12 @@ lives in [`web/`](web/).
  is lawful.
 - Senbei does not bypass any access control for you: it performs a purely
  static transformation of a file already on your disk. It derives everything
-  it needs from the input file itself, contains no vendor code or secrets, and
-  distributes no keys, cracks, or copyrighted content.
+  it needs from the input file itself, contains no vendor code, and
+  distributes no cracks or copyrighted content. (One Android packaging
+  variant's embedded metadata layer is unwrapped with an XOR keystream
+  recovered from a ciphertext/plaintext pair during analysis of a single
+  build; that keystream is research output shipped with the unpacker, not a
+  vendor-distributed key, and builds it doesn't match are left alone.)
 - Senbei does not enable online play, license fraud, or cheating, and must not
  be used to redistribute decrypted binaries. Do not upload outputs anywhere.
 - The authors provide this software "as is", without warranty of any kind, and
@@ -47,9 +52,13 @@ lives in [`web/`](web/).
 | `ManagedDll` | Protected .NET assembly (has a CLR data directory). |
 | `._` companion | Stub + external encrypted payload layout, spliced automatically. |
 | `global-metadata.dat` | il2cpp metadata with obfuscated method tokens, de-obfuscated in place. |
+| Android `.so` | Protected AArch64 shared library, statically restored (hollowed sections + stripped dynamic tables rebuilt). |
+| `.apk` / `.apks` / `.xapk` | App packages; protected entries inside are restored, preserving the package's internal layout. |

 Detection is content-based (header key-table at offset 4096, magic `KONN`),
-not extension-based. Anything unrecognized is left untouched.
+not extension-based — app packages are the one exception, recognised by
+extension plus the zip magic because they are containers. Anything
+unrecognized is left untouched.

 ## Quick start

@@ -59,6 +68,9 @@ cargo build --release
 senbei protected.exe
 :: -> unpack\protected.unpack.exe

+senbei game.apk
+:: -> unpack\game.apk\lib\arm64-v8a\libil2cpp.unpack.so
+
 senbei "C:\Games\MyGame"
 :: -> C:\Games\MyGame\unpack\...  (recursive, skips non-targets)
 ```
@@ -7,41 +7,91 @@ no driver or proxy DLL is involved.

 ## Crate layout

-The crate is split into a pure core and a thin CLI shell:
+Senbei is a Cargo workspace split into a pure core and thin shells around it:

- **`src/unpacker/`** — the core. Pure functions over byte slices: no file
-  I/O, no environment access (beyond a few debugging overrides, see
+- **`senbei-pe/`** — the core. Pure functions over byte slices: no file I/O,
+  no environment access (beyond a few debugging overrides, see
  [development.md](development.md)), panic-free at the public boundary (all
  internal panics are trapped and converted to `UnpackError::Corrupt`). This
  is what the WebAssembly build embeds.
- **`src/` (top level)** — the CLI shell: argument parsing, recursive folder
-  scanning, per-run log file, progress bar, Explorer-friendly exit pause, and
-  the single-file/folder orchestration in `job.rs`.
- **`src/metadata.rs`** — il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` method-token
+- **`senbei-crypto/`** — cryptographic, checksum, compression, and bytecode
+  primitives the core is built from. Same purity rules as `senbei-pe`.
+- **`senbei-metadata/`** — il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` method-token
  de-obfuscation (format version 31; other versions are left untouched).
+- **`senbei-android-crypto/`** — container primitives of the Android
+  (AArch64) protection scheme: the word/record ciphers, the GF(2³²)
+  transform, the AES-augmented segment transform, and the Huffman/LZ decoder.
+- **`senbei-android-engine/`** — stage-1/stage-2 extraction: finds the
+  appended payload section, decrypts the stage-1 header and stage-2 payload,
+  and walks the recursive record streams to decode every module. Native-only
+  (memory-maps the input, writes the module set to a workspace directory).
+- **`senbei-android-elf/`** — the restore: replays the decoded target-image
+  and fixup containers onto a hollowed ELF and rebuilds the dynamic-linker
+  tables (hash tables, symbols, relocations) the protector stripped.
+  Native-only.
+- **`senbei-android-metadata/`** — the Android metadata variants: the seeded
+  five-round MethodDef-RID permutation restore (v31), seed discovery, and the
+  embedded-metadata XOR unwrap (`keystream.rs`).
+- **`senbei-io/`** — filesystem and orchestration: recursive folder scanning,
+  per-run log file, progress bar, Explorer-friendly exit pause, the
+  single-file/folder orchestration in `job.rs` (incl. the wasm-safe in-memory
+  byte API used by the web frontend), and `android.rs` — the Android
+  single-library / folder / app-package orchestration.
+- **`senbei-cli/`** — the `senbei` binary: argument parsing + dispatch. The
+  integration test suite (incl. the golden corpus test) lives in
+  `senbei-cli/tests/`.

 ```
-src/
-├── main.rs                argument parsing + dispatch
-├── lib.rs                 module roots
+senbei-cli/
+└── src/main.rs            argument parsing + dispatch
+senbei-io/src/
 ├── job.rs                 single-file + folder orchestration, out-naming,
 │                          companion splice, stub overlay/TLS restore,
 │                          pipeline routing (incl. the wasm-safe byte API)
-├── scan.rs                recursive Crackproof + metadata discovery
-├── metadata.rs            il2cpp global-metadata.dat de-obfuscation
+├── android.rs             Android single-library / folder / package
+│                          orchestration, cross-source dedup
+├── scan.rs                recursive target discovery (PE + metadata + Android)
 ├── logfile.rs             per-run timestamped log
 ├── ui.rs                  progress bar + status lines
-├── pause.rs               Explorer-friendly exit pause
-└── unpacker/              pure, panic-free, no-I/O core
-    ├── mod.rs             detection + unpack_auto dispatch
-    ├── exe.rs             EXE pipeline (PE32+ and PE32)
-    ├── dll.rs             native + managed DLL pipeline
-    ├── integrity.rs       static post-unpack sanity check
-    ├── primitives.rs      decrypt_data* steps, key/shift selection
-    ├── bytecode.rs        bytecode VM
-    ├── parallel.rs        deterministic block-parallel fan-out
-    ├── tables.rs          constant tables
-    └── crc32.rs           checksum
+└── pause.rs               Explorer-friendly exit pause
+senbei-metadata/src/
+└── metadata.rs            il2cpp global-metadata.dat de-obfuscation
+senbei-crypto/src/
+├── primitives.rs          decrypt_data* steps, key derivation
+├── bytecode.rs            bytecode VM
+├── tables.rs              constant tables
+└── crc32.rs               checksum
+senbei-pe/src/engine/      pure, panic-free, no-I/O core
+├── mod.rs                 detection + unpack_auto dispatch
+├── error.rs               structured error taxonomy
+├── integrity.rs           static post-unpack sanity check
+├── parallel.rs            deterministic block-parallel fan-out
+├── layout/                layout discovery + validation
+│   ├── dd8.rs             .text dd8 key-formula + shift selection
+│   ├── discovery.rs       layout candidate discovery (trial-and-validate)
+│   └── image.rs           PE image reconstruction helpers
+├── exe/
+│   ├── pipeline.rs        EXE pipeline (PE32+ and PE32 orchestration)
+│   └── pipeline/pe32.rs   PE32-specific EXE restore
+└── dll/
+    └── pipeline.rs        native + managed DLL pipeline
+senbei-android-crypto/src/
+└── protector.rs           container ciphers, GF(2^32), Huffman/LZ decoder
+senbei-android-engine/src/
+├── stage1.rs              payload-section discovery + stage-1 header/payload
+├── stream.rs              record-stream parsing
+├── extract.rs             recursive module extraction (writes the workspace)
+├── probe.rs               protected-library content probe
+└── report.rs              machine-readable extraction report
+senbei-android-elf/src/
+├── restore.rs             image restore + dynamic-table rebuild
+├── layout.rs              ELF layout parsing
+├── artifact.rs            module-workspace index loading
+└── hash.rs                SysV/GNU hash table rebuild
+senbei-android-metadata/src/
+├── method_tokens.rs       seeded RID permutation restore + seed discovery
+├── embedded.rs            embedded-metadata blob locate + XOR unwrap
+└── keystream.rs           recovered keystream table (one observed build)
 ```

 ## Detection and routing
@@ -50,7 +100,11 @@ Detection is content-based (`unpacker::detect`), never extension-based: the
 key table is derived from the file header and checked against the format
 magic, then the PE characteristics classify the input as EXE or DLL and the
 CLR data directory splits each into native vs managed (`NativeExe` /
-`ManagedExe` / `NativeDll` / `ManagedDll`).
+`ManagedExe` / `NativeDll` / `ManagedDll`). The folder scan additionally
+classifies Android targets: an ELF64/AArch64 prefix promotes the file to a
+full protection probe (`senbei_android_engine::is_protected_libil2cpp`), and a
+package extension plus zip magic marks an app package for container
+extraction.

 `unpack_auto` then dispatches:

@@ -99,6 +153,47 @@ Several protected stages are themselves little bytecode programs. The core
 includes a small VM (`bytecode.rs`) that generates and interprets those
 programs rather than hardcoding each variant's constants.

+## The Android pipeline
+
+The Android scheme hollows an ELF64/AArch64 shared object: section bodies are
+zeroed in the file and the original bytes move into an encrypted payload
+appended as a `SHT_LOUSER` section (invisible to the dynamic loader). Restore
+is two-phase:
+
+1. **Extract** (`senbei-android-engine`): decrypt the stage-1 parameter block
+   and stage-2 payload from the payload section, then walk the recursive
+   record streams — each decoded module may interpret a further nested stream
+   — into a temporary module workspace with a JSON index.
+2. **Restore** (`senbei-android-elf`): decode the target-image container onto
+   a copy of the hollowed file, apply the compact fixup database (the
+   relocations stripped from `.rela.dyn`), and rebuild the dynamic-linker
+   tables the loader needs (SysV/GNU hash, symbol and string tables,
+   `.rela.dyn`/`.rela.plt`). Validation is structural and total: mismatched
+   container sizes, descriptor bounds, or a rebuilt table overhanging its
+   section fail the restore rather than emit a broken image.
+
+il2cpp metadata comes in three shapes, all routed through
+`job::deobfuscate_metadata_to` / `android::restore_metadata_bytes`:
+
+- **structural (Windows `-GMD`)**: sparse method tokens remapped to the
+  contiguous per-module range, keyless, idempotent (`senbei-metadata`).
+- **seeded permutation (Android v31)**: MethodDef RIDs permuted by a keyed
+  five-round transform; the seed is recovered by intersecting per-image key
+  residues, and the restore validates every RID — a wrong seed errors and the
+  structural remap takes over (`senbei-android-metadata`).
+- **embedded blob**: no metadata file in the app at all; a slim blob sits in
+  the library's data section under a per-word XOR layer. After a restore the
+  blob is located by content (two known plaintext header words against the
+  embedded keystream) and unwrapped to a standalone `global-metadata.dat`.
+  Key derivation is untraced — the shipped keystream covers the one observed
+  build, and other builds simply never match the probe.
+
+Packages (`.apk`/`.apks`/`.xapk`) are containers, not targets: entries are
+extracted to a temporary workspace and content-probed like loose files.
+Cross-source duplicates (a library loose in the tree *and* inside its
+package) are restored once, preferring the loose file, then the `.apk`, then
+bundle splits.
+
 ## Integrity check

 Every produced image passes through `integrity::check` — a static, execution-
@@ -57,12 +57,16 @@ since binaries are not committed).
 - `SENBEI_THREADS` — cap the block-parallel fan-out (`1` forces the fully
  sequential path).
 - `SENBEI_SCAN_ALL` — same as `--scan-all` (probe every file in a folder).
+- `SENBEI_ANDROID_SAMPLES` — override the Android corpus location (default
+  `samples/android/`; see `samples/README.md`). The Android corpus test pins
+  restored outputs with SHA-256 sidecar files next to each protected input
+  and documents known restore gaps with empty `<base>.restore-fails` markers.

 ## Conventions

- The `src/unpacker/` core is pure: no file I/O, no panics across the public
-  boundary, no `unsafe`. Keep it that way — it is what the WebAssembly build
-  embeds.
+- The `senbei-pe/` core (and its `senbei-crypto/` base) is pure: no file I/O,
+  no panics across the public boundary, no `unsafe`. Keep it that way — it is
+  what the WebAssembly build embeds.
 - Layout heuristics must **trial-and-validate**: never pick a candidate offset
  on shape alone and trust it; validate by decryption/checksum and fall
  through to the next candidate on failure. A silent wrong offset produces a
@@ -81,12 +85,18 @@ since binaries are not committed).

 ```
 senbei/
-├── Cargo.toml                 senbei lib + bin package
+├── Cargo.toml                 workspace root (members: the senbei-* crates)
 ├── rust-toolchain.toml        pinned toolchain + targets
-├── src/                       CLI shell + pure unpacker core (see docs/design.md)
-├── tests/                     CLI, detection, golden, and folder tests
+├── senbei-cli/                senbei binary (default member)
+│   └── tests/                 CLI, detection, golden, and folder tests
+├── senbei-pe/                 pure unpacker core (see docs/design.md)
+├── senbei-crypto/             crypto/compression primitives
+├── senbei-metadata/           il2cpp metadata de-obfuscation
+├── senbei-io/                 filesystem, scanning, CLI orchestration
+├── senbei-wasm/               WebAssembly bindings crate (own Cargo.lock,
+│                              outside the workspace; builds into web/pkg/)
 ├── samples/                   local-only test corpus (git-ignored)
-├── web/                       WebAssembly browser build
+├── web/                       static browser frontend assets (+ built pkg/)
 ├── docs/                      usage, design, and development documentation
 └── .github/                   CI workflows and issue templates
 ```
@@ -96,8 +106,8 @@ senbei/
 See [web/README.md](../web/README.md). In short:

 ```cmd
-cd web
-wasm-pack build --target web --release
+cd senbei-wasm
+wasm-pack build --target web --release --out-dir ../web/pkg
 ```

 then serve `web/` statically and open `index.html`. Everything runs
@@ -30,13 +30,44 @@ expects; the output is `global-metadata.unpack.dat`, written only when tokens
 actually changed. Only metadata format version 31 is rewritten; other versions
 are reported and left untouched.

+## Android targets
+
+Senbei also restores Android (AArch64) protected shared libraries and app
+packages:
+
+- **`.so`** — a protected library is hollowed out on disk: its original
+  sections live in an encrypted payload appended to the file, and senbei
+  rebuilds the static image from it. Output: `libil2cpp.unpack.so`.
+- **`.apk`** — entries are extracted to a temporary workspace and
+  content-probed like loose files; protected libraries and metadata blobs
+  inside are restored to `<out>/<apk name>/<entry path>`.
+- **`.apks` / `.xapk`** — split-package bundles; each nested `.apk` is opened
+  and searched the same way, under `<out>/<bundle name>/<split name>/...`.
+
+When a restored il2cpp library carries its metadata embedded in its data
+section (no standalone `global-metadata.dat` in the app at all), senbei
+unwraps the blob and writes it next to the library as
+`global-metadata.unpack.dat`. One observed packaging variant wraps the blob in
+a per-word XOR layer whose keys are generated at runtime and stored nowhere;
+senbei ships the keystream recovered from the one build known to use it and
+content-probes for it — builds with a different keystream are silently
+skipped (the library itself is still fully restored).
+
+The same content may appear loose in a folder, in its `.apk`, and in a bundle
+side by side: identical content is restored once, at the loose file's
+destination. A restored library is validated structurally by the restore
+itself (the rebuild refuses inconsistent layouts); a protected library that
+fails validation counts as an error, not a suspect.
+
 ## Folder mode

 Senbei walks the directory recursively, skips any subdirectory literally named
-`unpack`, and unpacks every file it recognises as Crackproof-protected (by
-content, not extension — renamed files and `.bak` backups are still found).
-Results land under `<root>/unpack/` (or `--out DIR`), mirroring the input
-tree's relative paths. The run log is written **in that same out directory**:
+`unpack`, and unpacks every file it recognises as protected (by content, not
+extension — renamed files and `.bak` backups are still found; packages are the
+one exception, recognised by extension plus the zip magic because they are
+containers). Results land under `<root>/unpack/` (or `--out DIR`), mirroring
+the input tree's relative paths. The run log is written **in that same out
+directory**:

 ```cmd
 senbei "C:\Games\MyGame"
@@ -58,8 +89,14 @@ line, then duration:
 done in 1234 ms
 ```

+The `packages` count appears (as `· N packages`) only when Android app
+packages were processed.
+
 ## Integrity check

+(PE outputs only — Android restores carry their own structural validation; see
+[Android targets](#android-targets).)
+
 A successful unpack is not always a runnable one: a layout heuristic can pick
 the wrong offset and leave the entry-point stub or import strings encrypted, so
 the pipeline reports success but the OS loader faults at runtime (typically
@@ -98,7 +135,7 @@ line, adds a `SUSPECT` entry to the run log, and counts it in the summary's
 | Flag | Behavior |
 | --- | --- |
 | `--out DIR` | Write outputs (and the log, unless `--no-log`) under `DIR`. |
-| `-v`, `--verbose` | Print detailed `[N/9]` per-stage unpack progress (and the destination path) for each file. In folder mode this replaces the progress bar. |
+| `-v`, `--verbose` | Print detailed per-stage progress (and the destination path) for each file — `[N/9]` stages for PE targets, container/segment lines for Android libraries. In folder mode this replaces the progress bar. |
 | `-q`, `--quiet` | Once: hide progress bar and per-file lines; keep banner, summary, and duration. Twice (`-q -q`): suppress all stdio (exit code only). |
 | `--no-log` | Do not write `senbei-*.log`. Console output is unchanged by this flag alone. |
 | `--scan-all` | Probe every file in a folder, including ones the scan pre-filter skips (under 4128 bytes, or a bulk-asset extension like `.ab`/`.xml`/`.acb`). Much slower on large game trees; finds the same targets in practice. |
@@ -115,7 +152,7 @@ process.

 | Code | Meaning |
 | --- | --- |
-| `0` | Success (single file unpacked, or folder run with no errors). |
+| `0` | Success (single file restored, or folder run with no errors). |
 | `1` | At least one file failed, a scan probe was unreadable, or a single-file unpack errored. |
 | `2` | Usage error: no path given, unknown option, missing `--out` value, or multiple input paths (help printed). |

@@ -82,3 +82,24 @@ cargo test --release --test samples -- --nocapture
 - A **companion** is `<input file name>._` (e.g. `stub.dll._` for `stub.dll`).
  Its extension is `_`, so it is never picked up as an input of its own; it is
  read only when its base module is processed.
+
+## Android corpus (`samples/android/`)
+
+The `android/` subfolder holds Android samples, one **extracted app tree** per
+subdirectory (the layout an APK unpacks to: `lib/<abi>/*.so`,
+`assets/.../global-metadata.dat`, ...). The test
+(`tests/android_samples.rs`) finds protected AArch64 libraries by content and
+restores them through the real pipeline. `SENBEI_ANDROID_SAMPLES` overrides
+the corpus location.
+
+Sidecar conventions (all next to the protected `.so` input):
+
+| File | Meaning |
+| ---- | ------- |
+| `<base>.golden.so.sha256` | Expected SHA-256 of the restored library |
+| `<base>.golden.metadata.sha256` | Expected SHA-256 of the unwrapped embedded metadata blob (when the library carries one) |
+| `<base>.restore-fails` | Empty marker: this input's restore is a known gap and *must* fail (a future fix fails the test, prompting marker removal) |
+
+A missing sidecar is a warning (with the computed digest printed, ready to
+promote), never a failure. App packages (`.apk`/`.apks`/`.xapk`) dropped into
+a tree are exercised by folder mode as containers.
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-android-crypto"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Protector container primitives for Senbei Android"
+
+[dependencies]
+aes.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+//! Cryptographic and container primitives used by Senbei Android.
+
+mod protector;
+
+pub use protector::{
+    ContainerHeader, EncodedSegment, Error, HuffmanLzDecoder, Module9bConfig, ProtectedDescriptor,
+    decode_container, gf32_mul_fixed, transform_segment,
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,718 @@
+//! Cryptographic and compression primitives used by the Android protector.
+
+use aes::Aes256;
+use aes::cipher::{BlockCipherDecrypt, KeyInit};
+
+const RECORD_SIZE: usize = 0x5c;
+
+/// Errors raised while parsing or decoding protector containers.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Invalid(String),
+}
+
+type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+fn invalid<T>(message: impl Into<String>) -> Result<T> {
+    Err(Error::Invalid(message.into()))
+}
+
+fn range(data: &[u8], offset: usize, size: usize) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("byte range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    data.get(offset..end).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "byte range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} is out of bounds"
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+fn read_u16(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u16> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 2] = range(data, offset, 2)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid u16 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u16::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 4] = range(data, offset, 4)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid u32 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+fn align_up(value: usize, alignment: usize) -> Result<usize> {
+    let mask = alignment
+        .checked_sub(1)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("zero alignment".to_owned()))?;
+    value
+        .checked_add(mask)
+        .map(|v| v & !mask)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("alignment overflow".to_owned()))
+}
+
+/// Multiply by the fixed element used by the native GF(2^32) transform.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn gf32_mul_fixed(mut value: u32) -> u32 {
+    let mut multiplier = 0x9451_1dd2_u32;
+    let mut result = 0_u32;
+    while multiplier != 0 {
+        if multiplier & 1 != 0 {
+            result ^= value;
+        }
+        let carry = value >> 31;
+        value = value.wrapping_shl(1);
+        if carry != 0 {
+            value ^= 0x5793_57eb;
+        }
+        multiplier >>= 1;
+    }
+    result
+}
+
+fn mix_columns(block: [u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
+    const fn xtime(value: u8) -> u8 {
+        (value << 1) ^ if value & 0x80 != 0 { 0x1b } else { 0 }
+    }
+
+    let mut output = [0_u8; 16];
+    for offset in (0..16).step_by(4) {
+        let [a, b, c, d] = block[offset..offset + 4] else {
+            unreachable!("fixed four-byte AES column")
+        };
+        output[offset] = xtime(a) ^ (xtime(b) ^ b) ^ c ^ d;
+        output[offset + 1] = a ^ xtime(b) ^ (xtime(c) ^ c) ^ d;
+        output[offset + 2] = a ^ b ^ xtime(c) ^ (xtime(d) ^ d);
+        output[offset + 3] = (xtime(a) ^ a) ^ b ^ c ^ xtime(d);
+    }
+    output
+}
+
+/// Static configuration recovered from module `0x9B`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Module9bConfig {
+    pub header_seed: u32,
+    pub container_seed: u32,
+    pub aes_key: [u8; 32],
+    pub skip_aes: bool,
+    pub schedule_offset: usize,
+}
+
+impl Module9bConfig {
+    /// Parse the unique AES-256 decryption schedule and adjacent configuration.
+    pub fn parse(image: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        Self::parse_inner(image, true)
+    }
+
+    /// Parse the decoder configuration embedded in the raw Stage 2 image.
+    ///
+    /// The embedded decoder ends before the interpreter-only `skip_aes`
+    /// field, so that flag is definitionally false for this layout.
+    pub fn parse_embedded(image: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        Self::parse_inner(image, false)
+    }
+
+    fn parse_inner(image: &[u8], has_skip_aes: bool) -> Result<Self> {
+        const MARKER: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x00];
+        let mut matches = image
+            .windows(MARKER.len())
+            .enumerate()
+            .filter_map(|(offset, bytes)| (bytes == MARKER).then_some(offset));
+        let schedule_offset = matches
+            .next()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("cannot locate the 0x9B AES-256 schedule".to_owned()))?;
+        if schedule_offset < 8 || matches.next().is_some() {
+            return invalid("cannot uniquely locate the 0x9B AES-256 schedule");
+        }
+
+        let header_seed = read_u32(image, schedule_offset - 8)?;
+        let schedule_size = read_u32(image, schedule_offset - 4)?;
+        if !matches!(schedule_size, 0 | 0xf4) {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "unexpected 0x9B AES schedule size 0x{schedule_size:x}"
+            ));
+        }
+        let bits = read_u16(image, schedule_offset)?;
+        let rounds = read_u16(image, schedule_offset + 2)?;
+        if (bits, rounds) != (0x100, 14) {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "unexpected AES schedule header 0x{bits:x}/{rounds}"
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let schedule = range(image, schedule_offset + 4, 15 * 16)?;
+        let mut round_keys = [[0_u8; 16]; 15];
+        for (round, output) in round_keys.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            let source = &schedule[round * 16..round * 16 + 16];
+            for word in 0..4 {
+                let start = word * 4;
+                for byte in 0..4 {
+                    output[start + byte] = source[start + 3 - byte];
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        let mut aes_key = [0_u8; 32];
+        aes_key[..16].copy_from_slice(&round_keys[14]);
+        aes_key[16..].copy_from_slice(&mix_columns(round_keys[13]));
+
+        let container_seed_offset = schedule_offset
+            .checked_add(0x100)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("container seed offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let skip_aes = if has_skip_aes {
+            let skip_aes_offset = schedule_offset
+                .checked_add(0x240)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("skip-AES offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            *image.get(skip_aes_offset).ok_or_else(|| {
+                Error::Invalid("module static configuration exceeds its image".to_owned())
+            })? != 0
+        } else {
+            false
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            header_seed,
+            container_seed: if has_skip_aes {
+                read_u32(image, container_seed_offset)?
+            } else {
+                header_seed
+            },
+            aes_key,
+            skip_aes,
+            schedule_offset,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decrypted header at the start of direct-data object `0x9D`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ProtectedDescriptor {
+    pub command_id: u32,
+    pub flags: u32,
+    pub outer_offset: u32,
+    pub outer_expected_size: u32,
+    pub auxiliary_offset: u32,
+    pub auxiliary_expected_size: u32,
+}
+
+impl ProtectedDescriptor {
+    /// Decrypt the `0x5c`-byte descriptor with the module header seed.
+    pub fn decrypt(data: &[u8], seed: u32) -> Result<Self> {
+        if data.len() < RECORD_SIZE {
+            return invalid("0x9D descriptor is truncated");
+        }
+        let base0 = seed.wrapping_add(0xd3e8_7144).wrapping_mul(seed);
+        let base1 = base0.wrapping_add(seed.wrapping_mul(0x0bd9_418d));
+        let mut words = [0_u32; RECORD_SIZE / 4];
+        for (index, word) in words.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            let cipher = read_u32(data, index * 4)?;
+            let subtractor = base0.wrapping_shl(if index & 1 != 0 { 4 } else { 0 });
+            *word = cipher.wrapping_sub(subtractor)
+                ^ base1.wrapping_shr((seed.wrapping_add((index as u32).wrapping_mul(4))) & 7);
+        }
+        if words[6..].iter().any(|&word| word != 0) {
+            return invalid("unexpected nonzero reserved words in the 0x9D descriptor");
+        }
+        let descriptor = Self {
+            command_id: words[0],
+            flags: words[1],
+            outer_offset: words[2],
+            outer_expected_size: words[3],
+            auxiliary_offset: words[4],
+            auxiliary_expected_size: words[5],
+        };
+        if descriptor.command_id != 0x9d || descriptor.outer_offset as usize != RECORD_SIZE {
+            return invalid("unexpected decrypted 0x9D descriptor");
+        }
+        Ok(descriptor)
+    }
+}
+
+/// One encrypted segment in a decoded `0x9D` container header.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct EncodedSegment {
+    pub offset: u32,
+    pub size: u32,
+}
+
+/// Parsed primary or auxiliary `0x9D` container.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ContainerHeader {
+    pub start: usize,
+    pub output_size: u32,
+    pub skip_aes: bool,
+    pub tree: Vec<u8>,
+    pub segments: Vec<EncodedSegment>,
+}
+
+impl ContainerHeader {
+    /// Parse and decrypt a container header, Huffman tree, and segment table.
+    pub fn parse(data: &[u8], start: usize, seed: u32) -> Result<Self> {
+        range(data, start, 12)?;
+        let seed_square = seed.wrapping_mul(seed);
+        let state = seed_square.wrapping_shr(17) ^ seed_square.wrapping_shl(11);
+        let raw0 = read_u32(data, start)?;
+        let raw1 = read_u32(data, start + 4)?;
+        let raw2 = read_u32(data, start + 8)?;
+        let output_size = 0xa21d_fb3a_u32
+            .wrapping_shl(state & 7)
+            .wrapping_add(state.wrapping_mul(0xf87b_337c))
+            .wrapping_add(gf32_mul_fixed(raw0));
+        let flag_word = gf32_mul_fixed(raw1)
+            ^ state
+                .wrapping_add(0xbd19_c63c)
+                .wrapping_add(0x416e_2af2_u32.wrapping_shr(state & 0x0d));
+        let segment_count = (flag_word & 0xff) as usize;
+        let skip_aes = (flag_word >> 8) & 0xff == 1;
+        let tree_size = 0x643a_3a3b_u32
+            .wrapping_shl(state & 0x0b)
+            .wrapping_sub(state ^ 0x3b2b_f538)
+            .wrapping_add(gf32_mul_fixed(raw2)) as usize;
+        if segment_count == 0 || tree_size > 0x1b00 {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "invalid container fields: segments={segment_count}, tree=0x{tree_size:x}"
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let tree_start = start
+            .checked_add(12)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("tree offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let mut tree = range(data, tree_start, tree_size)?.to_vec();
+        for offset in (0..tree_size & !3).step_by(4) {
+            let value = read_u32(&tree, offset)?;
+            tree[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&gf32_mul_fixed(value).to_le_bytes());
+        }
+        let tree_state = state.wrapping_add(0xf1cb_5b81).wrapping_mul(state);
+        let tree_delta = tree_state.wrapping_sub(0x23b3_2203_u32.wrapping_mul(state));
+        for (index, byte) in tree.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            let shift = u32::try_from(index & 0x1b)
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("tree shift conversion failed".to_owned()))?;
+            let left = gf32_mul_fixed(tree_state.wrapping_shl(shift));
+            let right = tree_delta.wrapping_shr((index & 0x17) as u32);
+            let adjustment = left.wrapping_sub(right).wrapping_shr((index & 0x1f) as u32);
+            *byte = byte.wrapping_add(adjustment as u8);
+        }
+
+        let table_start = start
+            .checked_add(align_up(12 + tree_size, 4)?)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("segment table offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let table_size = segment_count
+            .checked_mul(8)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("segment table size overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let mut table = range(data, table_start, table_size)?.to_vec();
+        let table_state = state.wrapping_add(0xb31f_451c).wrapping_mul(state);
+        let table_xor = table_state.wrapping_shl(3);
+        let table_add = table_state.wrapping_sub(0x822f_e82d_u32.wrapping_mul(state));
+        for offset in (0..table_size).step_by(4) {
+            let value = read_u32(&table, offset)?;
+            let decoded = gf32_mul_fixed(value ^ table_xor)
+                .wrapping_add(table_add.wrapping_shr(((offset & 7) + 5) as u32));
+            table[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&decoded.to_le_bytes());
+        }
+        let mut segments = Vec::with_capacity(segment_count);
+        for index in 0..segment_count {
+            let offset = read_u32(&table, index * 8)?;
+            let size = read_u32(&table, index * 8 + 4)?;
+            let absolute = start
+                .checked_add(offset as usize)
+                .and_then(|value| value.checked_add(size as usize));
+            if size == 0 || absolute.is_none_or(|end| end > data.len()) {
+                return invalid(format!("container segment {index} lies outside 0x9D"));
+            }
+            segments.push(EncodedSegment { offset, size });
+        }
+        Ok(Self {
+            start,
+            output_size,
+            skip_aes,
+            tree,
+            segments,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// End offset of the furthest encrypted segment.
+    pub fn encoded_end(&self) -> Result<usize> {
+        self.segments
+            .iter()
+            .map(|segment| {
+                self.start
+                    .checked_add(segment.offset as usize)
+                    .and_then(|value| value.checked_add(segment.size as usize))
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("encoded segment end overflow".to_owned()))
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?
+            .into_iter()
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("container has no encoded segments".to_owned()))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decoder for the protector's Huffman/LZ writer streams.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct HuffmanLzDecoder {
+    tree: Vec<u8>,
+    lookup_symbols: Vec<u16>,
+    lookup_bits: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl HuffmanLzDecoder {
+    /// Build the full 16-bit prefix lookup used by the static decoder.
+    pub fn new(tree: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        if tree.len() < 256 * 3 || tree.len() % 3 != 0 {
+            return invalid(format!("invalid Huffman tree size 0x{:x}", tree.len()));
+        }
+        let mut result = Self {
+            tree: tree.to_vec(),
+            lookup_symbols: vec![0; 0x1_0000],
+            lookup_bits: vec![0; 0x1_0000],
+        };
+        for word in 0..0x1_0000_u32 {
+            let (symbol, bits) = result.decode_symbol(word)?;
+            if bits <= 16 {
+                result.lookup_symbols[word as usize] = symbol;
+                result.lookup_bits[word as usize] = bits;
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    fn entry(&self, index: usize) -> Result<(u16, bool, u8)> {
+        let offset = index
+            .checked_mul(3)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Huffman node offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let bytes = range(&self.tree, offset, 3)?;
+        let raw = u16::from(bytes[0]) | (u16::from(bytes[1]) << 8);
+        Ok((raw & 0x7fff, raw & 0x8000 != 0, bytes[2]))
+    }
+
+    fn decode_symbol(&self, word: u32) -> Result<(u16, u8)> {
+        let (mut value, leaf, extra) = self.entry((word & 0xff) as usize)?;
+        if leaf {
+            if extra == 0 {
+                return invalid("zero-width Huffman leaf");
+            }
+            return Ok((value, extra));
+        }
+        let mut bits = extra
+            .checked_add(1)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Huffman bit count overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let mut mask = 1_u32.wrapping_shl(u32::from(extra));
+        loop {
+            let branch = usize::from(word & mask != 0);
+            let (next, is_leaf, _) = self.entry(usize::from(value) + branch)?;
+            value = next;
+            if is_leaf {
+                return Ok((value, bits));
+            }
+            mask = mask.wrapping_shl(1);
+            bits = bits
+                .checked_add(1)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Huffman bit count overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            if bits > 31 {
+                return invalid("Huffman code exceeds the native 32-bit window");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Decode one compressed writer payload to its exact expected size.
+    pub fn decode(&self, source: &[u8], output_size: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut output = vec![0_u8; output_size];
+        let mut source_pos = 0_usize;
+        let mut bit_buffer = 0_u64;
+        let mut available = 0_u8;
+        let mut consumed_bits = 0_usize;
+        let mut output_pos = 0_usize;
+        let mut prefix = 0_usize;
+
+        while output_pos < output_size {
+            while available < 24 && source_pos < source.len() {
+                bit_buffer |= u64::from(source[source_pos]) << available;
+                source_pos += 1;
+                available += 8;
+            }
+            let key = (bit_buffer & 0xffff) as usize;
+            let mut bits = self.lookup_bits[key];
+            let symbol = if bits != 0 {
+                self.lookup_symbols[key]
+            } else {
+                let mut value_offset = ((bit_buffer & 0xff) as usize) * 3;
+                let mut node = range(&self.tree, value_offset, 3)?;
+                let mut raw = u16::from(node[0]) | (u16::from(node[1]) << 8);
+                if raw & 0x8000 != 0 {
+                    bits = node[2];
+                    raw & 0x7fff
+                } else {
+                    let extra = node[2];
+                    bits = extra + 1;
+                    let mut mask = 1_u64 << extra;
+                    loop {
+                        let branch = usize::from(bit_buffer & mask != 0);
+                        let index = usize::from(raw & 0x7fff) + branch;
+                        value_offset = index
+                            .checked_mul(3)
+                            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Huffman node overflow".to_owned()))?;
+                        node = range(&self.tree, value_offset, 3)?;
+                        raw = u16::from(node[0]) | (u16::from(node[1]) << 8);
+                        if raw & 0x8000 != 0 {
+                            break raw & 0x7fff;
+                        }
+                        mask <<= 1;
+                        bits += 1;
+                    }
+                }
+            };
+            if bits == 0 || bits > available {
+                return invalid("compressed stream ends inside a Huffman code");
+            }
+            bit_buffer >>= bits;
+            available -= bits;
+            consumed_bits = consumed_bits
+                .checked_add(usize::from(bits))
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("consumed bit count overflow".to_owned()))?;
+
+            let kind = symbol & 0x300;
+            let value = usize::from(symbol & 0xff);
+            match kind {
+                0 => {
+                    output[output_pos] = value as u8;
+                    output_pos += 1;
+                }
+                0x100 => {
+                    if prefix > 0xff {
+                        return invalid("compressed prefix exceeds 16 bits");
+                    }
+                    prefix = if prefix == 0 {
+                        value
+                    } else {
+                        value | (prefix << 8)
+                    };
+                }
+                0x200 => {
+                    if prefix == 0 {
+                        prefix = 1;
+                    }
+                    let count = value
+                        .checked_mul(prefix)
+                        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("repeat count overflow".to_owned()))?;
+                    if !matches!(value, 1 | 2 | 4)
+                        || value > output_pos
+                        || output_pos
+                            .checked_add(count)
+                            .is_none_or(|end| end > output_size)
+                    {
+                        return invalid("invalid compressed repeated-pattern command");
+                    }
+                    let pattern = output[output_pos - value..output_pos].to_vec();
+                    for chunk in output[output_pos..output_pos + count].chunks_exact_mut(value) {
+                        chunk.copy_from_slice(&pattern);
+                    }
+                    output_pos += count;
+                    prefix = 0;
+                }
+                0x300 => {
+                    let length = value;
+                    let distance = prefix.checked_add(length).ok_or_else(|| {
+                        Error::Invalid("back-reference distance overflow".to_owned())
+                    })?;
+                    if distance > output_pos
+                        || output_pos
+                            .checked_add(length)
+                            .is_none_or(|end| end > output_size)
+                    {
+                        return invalid("invalid compressed back-reference");
+                    }
+                    let source_start = output_pos - distance;
+                    output.copy_within(source_start..source_start + length, output_pos);
+                    output_pos += length;
+                    prefix = 0;
+                }
+                _ => unreachable!("masked Huffman symbol kind"),
+            }
+        }
+        if consumed_bits.div_ceil(8) != source.len() {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "compressed input consumption mismatch: used=0x{:x}, size=0x{:x}",
+                consumed_bits.div_ceil(8),
+                source.len()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(output)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Apply the native word transform and optional AES-256-CBC decryption.
+pub fn transform_segment(
+    data: &[u8],
+    seed: u32,
+    aes_key: &[u8; 32],
+    decrypt_aes: bool,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut transformed = data.to_vec();
+    let mut state = seed;
+    let mut left = 0xe34e_ac63_u32;
+    let mut right = 0x07b4_8238_u32;
+    for (index, chunk) in transformed.chunks_exact_mut(4).enumerate() {
+        let index32 = u32::try_from(index)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("segment word index exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+        left = state
+            .wrapping_add(0x72f6_fcbe)
+            .wrapping_add(left.wrapping_add(0x4f8b_1bca).wrapping_mul(left))
+            .wrapping_shr(index32.wrapping_mul(index32) & 0x0f);
+        right = state
+            .wrapping_sub(0x71b6_a98d)
+            .wrapping_add(right.wrapping_sub(0x1605_a81c).wrapping_mul(right))
+            .wrapping_shl(index32 & 7);
+        state = left ^ right;
+        let bytes: [u8; 4] = chunk
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid transformed word".to_owned()))?;
+        let mut value = u32::from_le_bytes(bytes);
+        value = value.wrapping_add(0xb43b_9baf_u32.wrapping_mul(index32 & 0x0d));
+        value ^= 0xaf57_f7fb_u32.wrapping_mul(index32 & 3);
+        value = value.wrapping_sub(state) ^ state;
+        chunk.copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+
+    if decrypt_aes {
+        let cipher = Aes256::new_from_slice(aes_key)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid AES-256 key length".to_owned()))?;
+        let aligned_size = transformed.len() & !0x0f;
+        let mut previous = [0_u8; 16];
+        for chunk in transformed[..aligned_size].chunks_exact_mut(16) {
+            let mut ciphertext = [0_u8; 16];
+            ciphertext.copy_from_slice(chunk);
+            // chunk is exactly one block (chunks_exact_mut(16)).
+            cipher.decrypt_block(chunk.try_into().expect("chunk is one block"));
+            for (byte, prior) in chunk.iter_mut().zip(previous) {
+                *byte ^= prior;
+            }
+            previous = ciphertext;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(transformed)
+}
+
+/// Decode one complete protector container into its flat output buffer.
+///
+/// This is the static equivalent of the decoder entrypoint embedded in Stage
+/// 2 and in each nested interpreter module.
+pub fn decode_container(
+    data: &[u8],
+    config: &Module9bConfig,
+    expected_size: usize,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let header = ContainerHeader::parse(data, 0, config.container_seed)?;
+    let header_size = usize::try_from(header.output_size)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("container output size exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    if header_size != expected_size {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "container output size 0x{header_size:x} != expected 0x{expected_size:x}"
+        ));
+    }
+    let decoder = HuffmanLzDecoder::new(&header.tree)?;
+    let decrypt_aes = !(config.skip_aes || header.skip_aes);
+    let mut output = vec![0_u8; expected_size];
+
+    for (segment_index, encoded) in header.segments.iter().enumerate() {
+        let start = header
+            .start
+            .checked_add(encoded.offset as usize)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("encoded segment start overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let encoded_data = range(data, start, encoded.size as usize)?;
+        let transformed = transform_segment(
+            encoded_data,
+            config.container_seed,
+            &config.aes_key,
+            decrypt_aes,
+        )?;
+        if transformed.len() < 16 {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "decoded segment {segment_index} is shorter than its header"
+            ));
+        }
+        let base_offset = read_u32(&transformed, 0)? as usize;
+        let writer_count = read_u32(&transformed, 4)? as usize;
+        let table_offset = read_u32(&transformed, 8)? as usize;
+        let data_offset = read_u32(&transformed, 12)? as usize;
+        let table_size = writer_count
+            .checked_mul(16)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer table size overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let table_end = table_offset
+            .checked_add(table_size)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer table end overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        if table_end > transformed.len() || data_offset > transformed.len() {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "decoded segment {segment_index} has invalid writer offsets"
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let mut data_cursor = data_offset;
+        for writer_index in 0..writer_count {
+            let record =
+                table_offset
+                    .checked_add(writer_index.checked_mul(16).ok_or_else(|| {
+                        Error::Invalid("writer record offset overflow".to_owned())
+                    })?)
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer record offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            let output_offset = read_u32(&transformed, record)? as usize;
+            let output_size = read_u32(&transformed, record + 4)? as usize;
+            let encoded_size = read_u32(&transformed, record + 8)? as usize;
+            let reserved = read_u32(&transformed, record + 12)?;
+            let encoded_end = data_cursor
+                .checked_add(encoded_size)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer data end overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            if reserved != 0 || encoded_end > transformed.len() {
+                return invalid(format!(
+                    "segment {segment_index} writer {writer_index} has invalid bounds"
+                ));
+            }
+            let source = &transformed[data_cursor..encoded_end];
+            let decoded = if encoded_size == output_size {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(decoder.decode(source, output_size)?)
+            };
+            let decoded = decoded.as_deref().unwrap_or(source);
+            let target = base_offset
+                .checked_add(output_offset)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer target offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            let target_end = target
+                .checked_add(decoded.len())
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("writer target end overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            let destination = output.get_mut(target..target_end).ok_or_else(|| {
+                Error::Invalid(format!(
+                    "segment {segment_index} writer {writer_index} target is out of range"
+                ))
+            })?;
+            destination.copy_from_slice(decoded);
+            data_cursor = encoded_end;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(output)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn aes_mix_columns_matches_fips_example() {
+        let input = [
+            0xdb, 0x13, 0x53, 0x45, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0x22, 0x5c, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0xc6, 0xc6,
+            0xc6, 0xc6,
+        ];
+        assert_eq!(
+            mix_columns(input),
+            [
+                0x8e, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0xbc, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0x58, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0xc6, 0xc6,
+                0xc6, 0xc6,
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn descriptor_rejects_truncated_input() {
+        assert!(ProtectedDescriptor::decrypt(&[0_u8; 16], 1).is_err());
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-android-elf"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "AArch64 ELF restoration for Senbei Android"
+
+[dependencies]
+memmap2.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tempfile.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+senbei-android-crypto.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+
+const REQUIRED_IDS: [u32; 3] = [0x9b, 0x9d, 0x9e];
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(crate) struct Artifact {
+    pub path: PathBuf,
+    pub size: u64,
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn load_artifacts(index_path: &Path) -> Result<BTreeMap<u32, Artifact>> {
+    let text = std::fs::read_to_string(index_path)
+        .map_err(|error| Error::io("read module index", index_path, error))?;
+    let document: Value = serde_json::from_str(&text)?;
+    let root = index_path.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("."));
+    let mut result = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    if let Some(items) = document.get("module_registry").and_then(Value::as_array) {
+        for item in items {
+            let Some(command_id) = item.get("command_id").and_then(Value::as_u64) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let command_id = u32::try_from(command_id)
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("module command ID exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+            if !REQUIRED_IDS.contains(&command_id) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Some(path) = item.get("image_path").and_then(Value::as_str) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let size = item
+                .get("size")
+                .and_then(Value::as_u64)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("module 0x{command_id:02X} lacks size")))?;
+            result.insert(
+                command_id,
+                Artifact {
+                    path: root.join(path),
+                    size,
+                },
+            );
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(streams) = document.get("streams").and_then(Value::as_array) {
+        for stream in streams {
+            let Some(records) = stream.get("records").and_then(Value::as_array) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            for record in records {
+                let Some(command_id) = record.get("command_id").and_then(Value::as_u64) else {
+                    continue;
+                };
+                let command_id = u32::try_from(command_id)
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("record command ID exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+                if !REQUIRED_IDS.contains(&command_id) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let Some(image) = record.get("image") else {
+                    continue;
+                };
+                let Some(path) = image.get("path").and_then(Value::as_str) else {
+                    continue;
+                };
+                let size = image.get("size").and_then(Value::as_u64).ok_or_else(|| {
+                    Error::Invalid(format!("record 0x{command_id:02X} lacks image size"))
+                })?;
+                result.insert(
+                    command_id,
+                    Artifact {
+                        path: root.join(path),
+                        size,
+                    },
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let missing = REQUIRED_IDS
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|id| !result.contains_key(id))
+        .map(|id| format!("0x{id:02X}"))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    if !missing.is_empty() {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "module index lacks required IDs: {}",
+            missing.join(", ")
+        ));
+    }
+    for (&command_id, artifact) in &result {
+        let metadata = std::fs::metadata(&artifact.path)
+            .map_err(|error| Error::io("inspect artifact", &artifact.path, error))?;
+        if !metadata.is_file() || metadata.len() != artifact.size {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "invalid artifact for module 0x{command_id:02X}: {}",
+                artifact.path.display()
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(result)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+/// ELF restoration failure.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("{action} `{path}`: {source}")]
+    Io {
+        action: &'static str,
+        path: PathBuf,
+        #[source]
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+    #[error("cannot parse module index: {0}")]
+    Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Crypto(#[from] senbei_android_crypto::Error),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Invalid(String),
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    pub(crate) fn io(action: &'static str, path: &Path, source: std::io::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::Io {
+            action,
+            path: path.to_path_buf(),
+            source,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+pub(crate) fn invalid<T>(message: impl Into<String>) -> Result<T> {
+    Err(Error::Invalid(message.into()))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+
+#[must_use]
+pub(crate) fn elf_hash(name: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+    let mut value = 0_u32;
+    for &byte in name {
+        value = value.wrapping_shl(4).wrapping_add(u32::from(byte));
+        let high = value & 0xf000_0000;
+        if high != 0 {
+            value ^= high >> 24;
+            value &= !high;
+        }
+    }
+    value
+}
+
+#[must_use]
+pub(crate) fn gnu_hash(name: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+    name.iter().fold(5381_u32, |value, &byte| {
+        value.wrapping_mul(33).wrapping_add(u32::from(byte))
+    })
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn build_sysv_hash(names: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if names.len() < 2 {
+        return invalid("dynamic symbol table is unexpectedly empty");
+    }
+    let bucket_count = names.len();
+    let symbol_count = names.len();
+    let mut buckets = vec![0_u32; bucket_count];
+    let mut chains = vec![0_u32; symbol_count];
+    for (symbol_index, name) in names.iter().enumerate().skip(1) {
+        let bucket_index = elf_hash(name) as usize % bucket_count;
+        let symbol_index32 = u32::try_from(symbol_index)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("dynamic symbol index exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+        if buckets[bucket_index] == 0 {
+            buckets[bucket_index] = symbol_index32;
+            continue;
+        }
+        let mut chain_index = buckets[bucket_index] as usize;
+        while chains[chain_index] != 0 {
+            chain_index = chains[chain_index] as usize;
+        }
+        chains[chain_index] = symbol_index32;
+    }
+    let mut output = Vec::with_capacity((2 + bucket_count + symbol_count) * 4);
+    output.extend_from_slice(
+        &u32::try_from(bucket_count)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("SysV bucket count exceeds u32".to_owned()))?
+            .to_le_bytes(),
+    );
+    output.extend_from_slice(
+        &u32::try_from(symbol_count)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("SysV symbol count exceeds u32".to_owned()))?
+            .to_le_bytes(),
+    );
+    for value in buckets.into_iter().chain(chains) {
+        output.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    Ok(output)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn build_gnu_hash(names: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let hashes = names
+        .iter()
+        .skip(1)
+        .map(|name| gnu_hash(name))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    if hashes.is_empty() {
+        return invalid("GNU hash requires at least one dynamic symbol");
+    }
+    let bloom_shift = 5_u32;
+    let mut bloom_word = 0_u64;
+    for &value in &hashes {
+        bloom_word |= 1_u64 << (value & 63);
+        bloom_word |= 1_u64 << ((value >> bloom_shift) & 63);
+    }
+    let mut chains = hashes
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|value| value & !1)
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let last = chains
+        .last_mut()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("GNU hash chain is empty".to_owned()))?;
+    *last |= 1;
+    let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(28 + chains.len() * 4);
+    for value in [1_u32, 1, 1, bloom_shift] {
+        output.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    output.extend_from_slice(&bloom_word.to_le_bytes());
+    output.extend_from_slice(&1_u32.to_le_bytes());
+    for value in chains {
+        output.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    Ok(output)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn standard_elf_hash_is_stable() {
+        assert_eq!(elf_hash(b"printf"), 0x0779_05a6);
+        assert_eq!(gnu_hash(b"printf"), 0x156b_2bb8);
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+
+pub(crate) const SHT_NOBITS: u32 = 8;
+pub(crate) const SHT_LOUSER: u32 = 0x8000_0000;
+pub(crate) const SHF_ALLOC: u64 = 2;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(crate) struct LoadSegment {
+    pub offset: u64,
+    pub virtual_address: u64,
+    pub file_size: u64,
+    pub memory_size: u64,
+    pub flags: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(crate) struct SectionHeader {
+    pub name: u32,
+    pub section_type: u32,
+    pub flags: u64,
+    pub address: u64,
+    pub offset: u64,
+    pub size: u64,
+    pub link: u32,
+    pub info: u32,
+    pub alignment: u64,
+    pub entry_size: u64,
+}
+
+impl SectionHeader {
+    pub const SIZE: usize = 0x40;
+
+    fn parse(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            name: read_u32(data, offset)?,
+            section_type: read_u32(data, offset + 4)?,
+            flags: read_u64(data, offset + 8)?,
+            address: read_u64(data, offset + 0x10)?,
+            offset: read_u64(data, offset + 0x18)?,
+            size: read_u64(data, offset + 0x20)?,
+            link: read_u32(data, offset + 0x28)?,
+            info: read_u32(data, offset + 0x2c)?,
+            alignment: read_u64(data, offset + 0x30)?,
+            entry_size: read_u64(data, offset + 0x38)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn encode(self) -> [u8; Self::SIZE] {
+        let mut output = [0_u8; Self::SIZE];
+        output[0..4].copy_from_slice(&self.name.to_le_bytes());
+        output[4..8].copy_from_slice(&self.section_type.to_le_bytes());
+        output[8..0x10].copy_from_slice(&self.flags.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x10..0x18].copy_from_slice(&self.address.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x18..0x20].copy_from_slice(&self.offset.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x20..0x28].copy_from_slice(&self.size.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x28..0x2c].copy_from_slice(&self.link.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x2c..0x30].copy_from_slice(&self.info.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x30..0x38].copy_from_slice(&self.alignment.to_le_bytes());
+        output[0x38..0x40].copy_from_slice(&self.entry_size.to_le_bytes());
+        output
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(crate) struct ElfLayout {
+    pub entrypoint: u64,
+    pub program_headers: Vec<LoadSegment>,
+    pub section_headers: Vec<SectionHeader>,
+    pub section_name_index: usize,
+    pub private_section_index: usize,
+}
+
+impl ElfLayout {
+    pub fn parse(data: &[u8], require_private: bool) -> Result<Self> {
+        let ident = slice(data, 0, 6)?;
+        if ident[..4] != *b"\x7fELF" || ident[4] != 2 || ident[5] != 1 {
+            return invalid("input is not a little-endian ELF64 file");
+        }
+        if read_u16(data, 0x12)? != 0xb7 {
+            return invalid("input is not an AArch64 ELF");
+        }
+        let entrypoint = read_u64(data, 0x18)?;
+        let program_header_offset = usize_from_u64(read_u64(data, 0x20)?, "program header offset")?;
+        let section_header_offset = usize_from_u64(read_u64(data, 0x28)?, "section header offset")?;
+        let program_header_size = usize::from(read_u16(data, 0x36)?);
+        let program_header_count = usize::from(read_u16(data, 0x38)?);
+        let section_header_size = usize::from(read_u16(data, 0x3a)?);
+        let section_header_count = usize::from(read_u16(data, 0x3c)?);
+        let section_name_index = usize::from(read_u16(data, 0x3e)?);
+        if program_header_size != 0x38 || section_header_size != SectionHeader::SIZE {
+            return invalid("unexpected ELF program/section header size");
+        }
+
+        let mut program_headers = Vec::new();
+        for index in 0..program_header_count {
+            let offset = checked_index(program_header_offset, index, program_header_size)?;
+            if read_u32(data, offset)? != 1 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let segment = LoadSegment {
+                flags: read_u32(data, offset + 4)?,
+                offset: read_u64(data, offset + 8)?,
+                virtual_address: read_u64(data, offset + 0x10)?,
+                file_size: read_u64(data, offset + 0x20)?,
+                memory_size: read_u64(data, offset + 0x28)?,
+            };
+            let file_end = segment
+                .offset
+                .checked_add(segment.file_size)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(format!("PT_LOAD {index} file range overflow")))?;
+            if file_end > data.len() as u64 {
+                return invalid(format!("PT_LOAD {index} exceeds input file"));
+            }
+            program_headers.push(segment);
+        }
+        if program_headers.is_empty() {
+            return invalid("input ELF contains no PT_LOAD segments");
+        }
+
+        let mut section_headers = Vec::with_capacity(section_header_count);
+        for index in 0..section_header_count {
+            let offset = checked_index(section_header_offset, index, section_header_size)?;
+            section_headers.push(SectionHeader::parse(data, offset)?);
+        }
+        if section_name_index >= section_headers.len() {
+            return invalid("ELF section-name index is out of range");
+        }
+        let private = section_headers
+            .iter()
+            .enumerate()
+            .filter_map(|(index, section)| (section.section_type == SHT_LOUSER).then_some(index))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        let private_section_index = match private.as_slice() {
+            [index] => *index,
+            [] if !require_private => usize::MAX,
+            _ => {
+                return invalid(format!(
+                    "expected {} SHT_LOUSER section, found {}",
+                    if require_private {
+                        "one"
+                    } else {
+                        "at most one"
+                    },
+                    private.len()
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+        Ok(Self {
+            entrypoint,
+            program_headers,
+            section_headers,
+            section_name_index,
+            private_section_index,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn private_section(&self) -> Result<SectionHeader> {
+        self.section_headers
+            .get(self.private_section_index)
+            .copied()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("ELF has no private section".to_owned()))
+    }
+
+    pub fn load_end(&self) -> Result<u64> {
+        self.program_headers
+            .iter()
+            .map(|segment| {
+                segment
+                    .virtual_address
+                    .checked_add(segment.memory_size)
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("PT_LOAD memory end overflow".to_owned()))
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?
+            .into_iter()
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("ELF has no PT_LOAD memory range".to_owned()))
+    }
+
+    pub fn file_load_end(&self) -> Result<u64> {
+        self.program_headers
+            .iter()
+            .map(|segment| {
+                segment
+                    .offset
+                    .checked_add(segment.file_size)
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("PT_LOAD file end overflow".to_owned()))
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?
+            .into_iter()
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("ELF has no PT_LOAD file range".to_owned()))
+    }
+
+    pub fn section_names(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        let table = self.section_headers[self.section_name_index];
+        let strings = slice_u64(data, table.offset, table.size)?;
+        self.section_headers
+            .iter()
+            .map(|section| {
+                let offset = section.name as usize;
+                if offset >= strings.len() {
+                    return Ok(String::new());
+                }
+                let end = strings[offset..]
+                    .iter()
+                    .position(|&byte| byte == 0)
+                    .map_or(strings.len(), |length| offset + length);
+                Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&strings[offset..end]).into_owned())
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    pub fn file_offset_to_virtual_address(&self, offset: u64, size: u64) -> Result<u64> {
+        let end = offset
+            .checked_add(size)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("file range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        for segment in &self.program_headers {
+            let segment_end = segment
+                .offset
+                .checked_add(segment.file_size)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("PT_LOAD file range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            if segment.offset <= offset && end <= segment_end {
+                return segment
+                    .virtual_address
+                    .checked_add(offset - segment.offset)
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("virtual address overflow".to_owned()));
+            }
+        }
+        invalid(format!(
+            "file range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} is not in PT_LOAD"
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn slice(data: &[u8], offset: usize, size: usize) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("byte range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    data.get(offset..end).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "byte range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} is out of bounds"
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn slice_u64(data: &[u8], offset: u64, size: u64) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    slice(
+        data,
+        usize_from_u64(offset, "file offset")?,
+        usize_from_u64(size, "file size")?,
+    )
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn read_u16(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u16> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 2] = slice(data, offset, 2)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid u16 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u16::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 4] = slice(data, offset, 4)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid u32 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn read_u64(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u64> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 8] = slice(data, offset, 8)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid u64 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u64::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn read_i64(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<i64> {
+    let bytes: [u8; 8] = slice(data, offset, 8)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("invalid i64 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(i64::from_le_bytes(bytes))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn usize_from_u64(value: u64, field: &str) -> Result<usize> {
+    usize::try_from(value).map_err(|_| Error::Invalid(format!("{field} 0x{value:x} exceeds usize")))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn checked_index(base: usize, index: usize, stride: usize) -> Result<usize> {
+    index
+        .checked_mul(stride)
+        .and_then(|value| base.checked_add(value))
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("table index overflow".to_owned()))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn align_up(value: u64, alignment: u64) -> Result<u64> {
+    if alignment == 0 || !alignment.is_power_of_two() {
+        return invalid(format!("invalid alignment {alignment}"));
+    }
+    value
+        .checked_add(alignment - 1)
+        .map(|aligned| aligned & !(alignment - 1))
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("alignment overflow".to_owned()))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+//! Static restoration of the current protected AArch64 `libil2cpp.so`.
+
+mod artifact;
+mod error;
+mod hash;
+mod layout;
+mod restore;
+
+pub use error::Error;
+pub use restore::{RestoreOptions, RestoreReport, restore_libil2cpp};
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-android-engine"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Static Stage 1 and Stage 2 extraction for Senbei Android"
+
+[dependencies]
+goblin.workspace = true
+memmap2.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tempfile.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+senbei-android-crypto.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+/// Stage 1 or Stage 2 extraction failure.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("{action} `{path}`: {source}")]
+    Io {
+        action: &'static str,
+        path: PathBuf,
+        #[source]
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+    #[error("parse ELF `{path}`: {source}")]
+    Elf {
+        path: PathBuf,
+        #[source]
+        source: goblin::error::Error,
+    },
+    #[error("serialize extraction index: {0}")]
+    Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
+    #[error("embedded Stage 2 decoder configuration: {0}")]
+    EmbeddedConfig(#[source] senbei_android_crypto::Error),
+    #[error(
+        "depth {depth} stream 0x{stream_id:02X} interpreter 0x{interpreter_id:02X} configuration: {source}"
+    )]
+    InterpreterConfig {
+        depth: usize,
+        stream_id: u32,
+        interpreter_id: u32,
+        #[source]
+        source: senbei_android_crypto::Error,
+    },
+    #[error(
+        "depth {depth} stream 0x{stream_id:02X} record {record_index} command 0x{command_id:02X} {part}: {source}"
+    )]
+    RecordDecode {
+        depth: usize,
+        stream_id: u32,
+        record_index: usize,
+        command_id: u32,
+        part: &'static str,
+        #[source]
+        source: senbei_android_crypto::Error,
+    },
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Invalid(String),
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    pub(crate) fn io(action: &'static str, path: &Path, source: std::io::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::Io {
+            action,
+            path: path.to_path_buf(),
+            source,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+pub(crate) fn invalid<T>(message: impl Into<String>) -> Result<T> {
+    Err(Error::Invalid(message.into()))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet, HashSet};
+use std::fs::{File, create_dir_all};
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use memmap2::MmapOptions;
+use senbei_android_crypto::{Module9bConfig, decode_container};
+use serde_json::to_vec_pretty;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+use crate::report::{
+    ArtifactReport, DecoderReport, ExtractionReport, ModuleRegistryEntry, RecordReport,
+    Stage1Report, StreamParent, StreamReport,
+};
+use crate::stage1::{
+    DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT, DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE, SHT_LOUSER, Stage1Result, inspect,
+};
+use crate::stream::{DIRECT_FLAG, Record, parse_record_stream};
+
+/// Inputs and output locations for one complete static Stage 2 extraction.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ExtractOptions {
+    pub input: PathBuf,
+    pub output_dir: PathBuf,
+    pub stage2_output: Option<PathBuf>,
+    pub outer_size: usize,
+    pub cipher_constant: u32,
+}
+
+impl ExtractOptions {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_defaults(input: PathBuf, output_dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            input,
+            output_dir,
+            stage2_output: None,
+            outer_size: DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE,
+            cipher_constant: DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct LoadedModule {
+    image: Vec<u8>,
+    metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    image_path: String,
+    metadata_path: Option<String>,
+    sha256: String,
+    depth: usize,
+    record_index: usize,
+    command_id: u32,
+    init_offset: u32,
+    entry_offset: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+struct ArtifactSpec<'a> {
+    suffix: &'a str,
+    kind: &'a str,
+    classification: &'a str,
+}
+
+struct Extractor {
+    output_dir: PathBuf,
+    streams: Vec<StreamReport>,
+    artifacts: Vec<ArtifactReport>,
+    registry: BTreeMap<u32, LoadedModule>,
+    seen_streams: HashSet<(u32, String)>,
+}
+
+pub fn extract_stage2(options: &ExtractOptions) -> Result<ExtractionReport> {
+    let input_path = absolute(&options.input)?;
+    let output_dir = absolute(&options.output_dir)?;
+    if !input_path.is_file() {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "protected ELF does not exist: {}",
+            input_path.display()
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(stage2_output) = &options.stage2_output {
+        let stage2_output = absolute(stage2_output)?;
+        if stage2_output == input_path {
+            return invalid("refusing to overwrite the protected ELF with Stage 2 output");
+        }
+    }
+    create_dir_all(&output_dir)
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("create Stage 2 output directory", &output_dir, source))?;
+
+    let file = File::open(&input_path)
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("open protected ELF", &input_path, source))?;
+    // SAFETY: the mapping is read-only, the file remains open for the mapping
+    // lifetime, and extraction never mutates or truncates the source.
+    let source = unsafe { MmapOptions::new().map(&file) }
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("map protected ELF", &input_path, source))?;
+    let stage1 = inspect(
+        &source,
+        &input_path,
+        options.outer_size,
+        options.cipher_constant,
+    )?;
+    if let Some(stage2_output) = &options.stage2_output {
+        write_atomic(&absolute(stage2_output)?, &stage1.plaintext)?;
+    }
+
+    let core_config =
+        Module9bConfig::parse_embedded(&stage1.plaintext).map_err(Error::EmbeddedConfig)?;
+    let bootstrap_end = stage1
+        .remaining_file_offset
+        .checked_add(stage1.remaining_size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 2 bootstrap range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    let bootstrap = source
+        .get(stage1.remaining_file_offset..bootstrap_end)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 2 bootstrap range is outside the ELF".to_owned()))?;
+    let mut extractor = Extractor {
+        output_dir: output_dir.clone(),
+        streams: Vec::new(),
+        artifacts: Vec::new(),
+        registry: BTreeMap::new(),
+        seen_streams: HashSet::new(),
+    };
+    extractor.extract_stream(
+        bootstrap,
+        0xe2,
+        0,
+        None,
+        Some(stage1.remaining_file_offset),
+        core_config,
+    )?;
+
+    let module_registry = extractor
+        .registry
+        .values()
+        .map(|module| ModuleRegistryEntry {
+            command_id: module.command_id,
+            size: module.image.len(),
+            sha256: module.sha256.clone(),
+            depth: module.depth,
+            record_index: module.record_index,
+            image_path: module.image_path.clone(),
+            metadata_path: module.metadata_path.clone(),
+            init_offset: module.init_offset,
+            entry_offset: module.entry_offset,
+            classification: if module.metadata.is_some() {
+                "module_image".to_owned()
+            } else {
+                "decoded_data".to_owned()
+            },
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let report = ExtractionReport {
+        format_version: 4,
+        protected_elf: input_path.display().to_string(),
+        output_dir: output_dir.display().to_string(),
+        stage1: stage1_report(&stage1, options.outer_size),
+        streams: extractor.streams,
+        artifacts: extractor.artifacts,
+        errors: Vec::new(),
+        module_registry,
+    };
+    write_json_atomic(&output_dir.join("index.json"), &report)?;
+    Ok(report)
+}
+
+impl Extractor {
+    fn extract_stream(
+        &mut self,
+        stream: &[u8],
+        stream_id: u32,
+        depth: usize,
+        parent: Option<StreamParent>,
+        source_file_offset: Option<usize>,
+        config: Module9bConfig,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let digest = sha256(stream);
+        if !self.seen_streams.insert((stream_id, digest.clone())) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let (header, records, table_size) =
+            parse_record_stream(stream, stream_id).map_err(|source| {
+                Error::Invalid(format!(
+                    "depth {depth} stream 0x{stream_id:02X} record table: {source}"
+                ))
+            })?;
+        let mut stream_report = StreamReport {
+            depth,
+            stream_id,
+            parent,
+            source_file_offset,
+            available_size: stream.len(),
+            descriptor_table_size: table_size,
+            encrypted_header_words: header.encrypted_words,
+            decrypted_header_words: header.decrypted_words,
+            record_state: header.record_state,
+            sha256: digest,
+            decoder: decoder_report(
+                if depth == 0 {
+                    "embedded_stage2"
+                } else {
+                    "decoded_interpreter"
+                },
+                (depth != 0).then_some(stream_id),
+                &config,
+            ),
+            records: Vec::with_capacity(records.len()),
+        };
+        let mut direct_records = Vec::new();
+        let mut modules_at_level = BTreeSet::new();
+
+        for record in records {
+            let mut result = record_report(record);
+            let mut image_data = None;
+            let mut metadata_data = None;
+
+            if !record.direct() && record.image_size != 0 {
+                let image_source = record_tail(stream, record.image_offset)?;
+                let image = decode_container(image_source, &config, record.image_size as usize)
+                    .map_err(|source| Error::RecordDecode {
+                        depth,
+                        stream_id,
+                        record_index: record.index,
+                        command_id: record.command_id,
+                        part: "image decode",
+                        source,
+                    })?;
+                let classification = if record.metadata_size != 0 {
+                    "module_image"
+                } else {
+                    "decoded_data"
+                };
+                let artifact = self.write_artifact(
+                    &record,
+                    depth,
+                    stream_id,
+                    ArtifactSpec {
+                        suffix: "module.bin",
+                        kind: "decoded_container",
+                        classification,
+                    },
+                    &image,
+                )?;
+                result.image = Some(artifact.clone());
+                image_data = Some((image, artifact));
+            }
+            if record.metadata_size != 0 {
+                let metadata_source = record_tail(stream, record.metadata_offset)?;
+                let metadata =
+                    decode_container(metadata_source, &config, record.metadata_size as usize)
+                        .map_err(|source| Error::RecordDecode {
+                            depth,
+                            stream_id,
+                            record_index: record.index,
+                            command_id: record.command_id,
+                            part: "metadata decode",
+                            source,
+                        })?;
+                let artifact = self.write_artifact(
+                    &record,
+                    depth,
+                    stream_id,
+                    ArtifactSpec {
+                        suffix: "metadata.bin",
+                        kind: "decoded_metadata",
+                        classification: "decoded_metadata",
+                    },
+                    &metadata,
+                )?;
+                result.metadata = Some(artifact.clone());
+                metadata_data = Some((metadata, artifact));
+            }
+            if let Some((image, image_artifact)) = image_data {
+                let (metadata, metadata_path) = if let Some((data, artifact)) = metadata_data {
+                    (Some(data), Some(artifact.path))
+                } else {
+                    (None, None)
+                };
+                self.register_module(LoadedModule {
+                    sha256: image_artifact.sha256.clone(),
+                    image_path: image_artifact.path.clone(),
+                    metadata_path,
+                    image,
+                    metadata,
+                    depth,
+                    record_index: record.index,
+                    command_id: record.command_id,
+                    init_offset: record.init_offset,
+                    entry_offset: record.entry_offset,
+                })?;
+                modules_at_level.insert(record.command_id);
+            }
+            if record.direct() && record.image_size != 0 {
+                direct_records.push((record, stream_report.records.len()));
+            }
+            stream_report.records.push(result);
+        }
+
+        let mut children = Vec::new();
+        for (record, report_index) in direct_records {
+            let next_stream_id = record.command_id.wrapping_sub(0x10);
+            if modules_at_level.contains(&next_stream_id) {
+                stream_report.records[report_index].nested_stream_id = Some(next_stream_id);
+                children.push((record, next_stream_id));
+                continue;
+            }
+            let direct_data = record_slice(stream, record.image_offset, record.image_size)?;
+            let artifact = self.write_artifact(
+                &record,
+                depth,
+                stream_id,
+                ArtifactSpec {
+                    suffix: "direct.bin",
+                    kind: "direct",
+                    classification: "direct_data",
+                },
+                direct_data,
+            )?;
+            stream_report.records[report_index].image = Some(artifact);
+        }
+
+        self.streams.push(stream_report);
+        for (record, next_stream_id) in children {
+            let child_data = record_slice(stream, record.image_offset, record.image_size)?;
+            let parent = StreamParent {
+                stream_id,
+                record_index: record.index,
+                command_id: record.command_id,
+            };
+            let interpreter = self.registry.get(&next_stream_id).ok_or_else(|| {
+                Error::Invalid(format!(
+                    "depth {depth} stream 0x{stream_id:02X} child 0x{next_stream_id:02X} has no interpreter module"
+                ))
+            })?;
+            let interpreter_config =
+                Module9bConfig::parse(&interpreter.image).map_err(|source| {
+                    Error::InterpreterConfig {
+                        depth: depth + 1,
+                        stream_id: next_stream_id,
+                        interpreter_id: next_stream_id,
+                        source,
+                    }
+                })?;
+            self.extract_stream(
+                child_data,
+                next_stream_id,
+                depth + 1,
+                Some(parent),
+                None,
+                interpreter_config,
+            )?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn register_module(&mut self, module: LoadedModule) -> Result<()> {
+        if let Some(previous) = self.registry.get(&module.command_id) {
+            if previous.sha256 != module.sha256 {
+                return invalid(format!(
+                    "module 0x{:02X} produced conflicting images: {} and {}",
+                    module.command_id, previous.sha256, module.sha256
+                ));
+            }
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        self.registry.insert(module.command_id, module);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn write_artifact(
+        &mut self,
+        record: &Record,
+        depth: usize,
+        stream_id: u32,
+        spec: ArtifactSpec<'_>,
+        data: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<ArtifactReport> {
+        let digest = sha256(data);
+        let filename = format!(
+            "d{depth:02}_s{stream_id:02X}_r{:03}_id{:08X}_{}.{}",
+            record.index,
+            record.command_id,
+            &digest[..12],
+            spec.suffix
+        );
+        let path = self.output_dir.join(filename);
+        write_atomic(&path, data)?;
+        let artifact = ArtifactReport {
+            kind: spec.kind.to_owned(),
+            path: path
+                .file_name()
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("artifact path has no file name".to_owned()))?
+                .to_string_lossy()
+                .into_owned(),
+            size: data.len(),
+            sha256: digest,
+            depth,
+            stream_id,
+            record_index: Some(record.index),
+            command_id: Some(record.command_id),
+            classification: spec.classification.to_owned(),
+        };
+        self.artifacts.push(artifact.clone());
+        Ok(artifact)
+    }
+}
+
+fn record_report(record: Record) -> RecordReport {
+    RecordReport {
+        index: record.index,
+        command_id: record.command_id,
+        flags: record.flags,
+        image_offset: record.image_offset,
+        image_size: record.image_size,
+        metadata_offset: record.metadata_offset,
+        metadata_size: record.metadata_size,
+        id_copy: record.id_copy,
+        entry_offset: record.entry_offset,
+        init_offset: record.init_offset,
+        direct: record.flags & DIRECT_FLAG != 0,
+        extraction_status: "complete".to_owned(),
+        image: None,
+        metadata: None,
+        nested_stream_id: None,
+    }
+}
+
+fn decoder_report(
+    kind: &str,
+    interpreter_id: Option<u32>,
+    config: &Module9bConfig,
+) -> DecoderReport {
+    DecoderReport {
+        kind: kind.to_owned(),
+        interpreter_id,
+        header_seed: config.header_seed,
+        container_seed: config.container_seed,
+        schedule_offset: config.schedule_offset,
+        aes_key_sha256: sha256(&config.aes_key),
+        skip_aes: config.skip_aes,
+    }
+}
+
+fn record_slice(stream: &[u8], offset: u32, size: u32) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let offset = usize::try_from(offset)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("record payload offset exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let size = usize::try_from(size)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("record payload size exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("record payload range overflows usize".to_owned()))?;
+    stream.get(offset..end).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "record payload range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} exceeds stream 0x{:x}",
+            stream.len()
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+fn record_tail(stream: &[u8], offset: u32) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let offset = usize::try_from(offset)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("record container offset exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    stream.get(offset..).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "record container offset 0x{offset:x} exceeds stream 0x{:x}",
+            stream.len()
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+fn stage1_report(stage1: &Stage1Result, outer_size: usize) -> Stage1Report {
+    Stage1Report {
+        section_index: stage1.section_index,
+        section_type: SHT_LOUSER,
+        section_offset: stage1.section_offset,
+        section_size: stage1.section_size,
+        outer_size,
+        header_offset: stage1.header_offset,
+        header_key: stage1.header.key,
+        payload_offset: stage1.header.payload_offset,
+        payload_size: stage1.header.payload_size,
+        payload_key: stage1.header.payload_key,
+        entry_offset: stage1.header.entry_offset,
+        protect_size: stage1.header.protect_size,
+        stage2_file_offset: stage1.payload_file_offset,
+        stage2_size: stage1.plaintext.len(),
+        stage2_sha256: sha256(&stage1.plaintext),
+        remaining_file_offset: stage1.remaining_file_offset,
+        remaining_size: stage1.remaining_size,
+    }
+}
+
+fn write_json_atomic(path: &Path, value: &impl serde::Serialize) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut bytes = to_vec_pretty(value)?;
+    bytes.push(b'\n');
+    write_atomic(path, &bytes)
+}
+
+fn write_atomic(path: &Path, data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    let parent = path.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("."));
+    create_dir_all(parent)
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("create output directory", parent, source))?;
+    let mut temporary = NamedTempFile::new_in(parent)
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("create temporary output", parent, source))?;
+    temporary
+        .write_all(data)
+        .and_then(|()| temporary.as_file().sync_all())
+        .map_err(|source| Error::io("write temporary output", temporary.path(), source))?;
+    temporary
+        .persist(path)
+        .map_err(|error| Error::io("replace output", path, error.error))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn absolute(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    if path.is_absolute() {
+        Ok(path.to_path_buf())
+    } else {
+        std::env::current_dir()
+            .map(|current| current.join(path))
+            .map_err(|source| Error::io("query current directory", path, source))
+    }
+}
+
+fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let mut digest = Sha256::new();
+    digest.update(data);
+    hex_digest(&digest.finalize())
+}
+/// Lowercase hex of a digest output (sha2 0.11's `Array` no longer formats as
+/// hex directly).
+fn hex_digest(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(data.len() * 2);
+    for byte in data {
+        out.push_str(&format!("{byte:02x}"));
+    }
+    out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+//! Pure-static Stage 1 decryption and recursive Stage 2 module extraction.
+
+mod error;
+mod extract;
+mod probe;
+mod report;
+mod stage1;
+mod stream;
+
+pub use error::Error;
+pub use extract::{ExtractOptions, extract_stage2};
+pub use probe::is_protected_libil2cpp;
+pub use report::ExtractionReport;
+pub use stage1::{DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT, DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE};
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+use std::path::Path;
+
+use senbei_android_crypto::Module9bConfig;
+
+use crate::stage1::{self, DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT, DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE};
+
+/// Return whether `data` has a supported protected AArch64 IL2CPP layout.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn is_protected_libil2cpp(data: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    if !stage1::looks_protected(data) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let Ok(stage1) = stage1::inspect(
+        data,
+        Path::new("<probe>"),
+        DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE,
+        DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT,
+    ) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    Module9bConfig::parse_embedded(&stage1.plaintext).is_ok()
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+use serde::Serialize;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct Stage1Report {
+    pub section_index: usize,
+    pub section_type: u32,
+    pub section_offset: usize,
+    pub section_size: usize,
+    pub outer_size: usize,
+    pub header_offset: usize,
+    pub header_key: u32,
+    pub payload_offset: u32,
+    pub payload_size: u32,
+    pub payload_key: u32,
+    pub entry_offset: u32,
+    pub protect_size: u32,
+    pub stage2_file_offset: usize,
+    pub stage2_size: usize,
+    pub stage2_sha256: String,
+    pub remaining_file_offset: usize,
+    pub remaining_size: usize,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct DecoderReport {
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub interpreter_id: Option<u32>,
+    pub header_seed: u32,
+    pub container_seed: u32,
+    pub schedule_offset: usize,
+    pub aes_key_sha256: String,
+    pub skip_aes: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct ArtifactReport {
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub path: String,
+    pub size: usize,
+    pub sha256: String,
+    pub depth: usize,
+    pub stream_id: u32,
+    pub record_index: Option<usize>,
+    pub command_id: Option<u32>,
+    pub classification: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct RecordReport {
+    pub index: usize,
+    pub command_id: u32,
+    pub flags: u32,
+    pub image_offset: u32,
+    pub image_size: u32,
+    pub metadata_offset: u32,
+    pub metadata_size: u32,
+    pub id_copy: u32,
+    pub entry_offset: u32,
+    pub init_offset: u32,
+    pub direct: bool,
+    pub extraction_status: String,
+    pub image: Option<ArtifactReport>,
+    pub metadata: Option<ArtifactReport>,
+    pub nested_stream_id: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct StreamParent {
+    pub stream_id: u32,
+    pub record_index: usize,
+    pub command_id: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct StreamReport {
+    pub depth: usize,
+    pub stream_id: u32,
+    pub parent: Option<StreamParent>,
+    pub source_file_offset: Option<usize>,
+    pub available_size: usize,
+    pub descriptor_table_size: usize,
+    pub encrypted_header_words: [u32; 2],
+    pub decrypted_header_words: [u32; 2],
+    pub record_state: u32,
+    pub sha256: String,
+    pub decoder: DecoderReport,
+    pub records: Vec<RecordReport>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct ModuleRegistryEntry {
+    pub command_id: u32,
+    pub size: usize,
+    pub sha256: String,
+    pub depth: usize,
+    pub record_index: usize,
+    pub image_path: String,
+    pub metadata_path: Option<String>,
+    pub init_offset: u32,
+    pub entry_offset: u32,
+    pub classification: String,
+}
+
+/// Machine-readable output of one complete static Stage 2 extraction.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct ExtractionReport {
+    pub format_version: u32,
+    pub protected_elf: String,
+    pub output_dir: String,
+    pub stage1: Stage1Report,
+    pub streams: Vec<StreamReport>,
+    pub artifacts: Vec<ArtifactReport>,
+    pub errors: Vec<String>,
+    pub module_registry: Vec<ModuleRegistryEntry>,
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+use std::path::Path;
+
+use goblin::elf::{Elf, header::EM_AARCH64};
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+
+pub(crate) const SHT_LOUSER: u32 = 0x8000_0000;
+pub const DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT: u32 = 0xbf20_165d;
+pub const DEFAULT_OUTER_SIZE: usize = 0x23c;
+
+pub(crate) fn looks_protected(data: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    let Ok(elf) = Elf::parse(data) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if elf.header.e_machine != EM_AARCH64
+        || elf
+            .section_headers
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|section| section.sh_type == SHT_LOUSER)
+            .count()
+            != 1
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+    [
+        ".dynsym",
+        ".dynstr",
+        ".gnu.hash",
+        ".gnu.version",
+        ".gnu.version_r",
+    ]
+    .into_iter()
+    .all(|wanted| {
+        elf.section_headers.iter().any(|section| {
+            elf.shdr_strtab
+                .get_at(section.sh_name)
+                .is_some_and(|name| name == wanted)
+        })
+    })
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub(crate) struct Stage1Header {
+    pub key: u32,
+    pub reserved: u32,
+    pub payload_offset: u32,
+    pub payload_size: u32,
+    pub payload_key: u32,
+    pub entry_offset: u32,
+    pub protect_size: u32,
+    pub size_copy: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct Stage1Result {
+    pub section_index: usize,
+    pub section_offset: usize,
+    pub section_size: usize,
+    pub header_offset: usize,
+    pub payload_file_offset: usize,
+    pub remaining_file_offset: usize,
+    pub remaining_size: usize,
+    pub header: Stage1Header,
+    pub plaintext: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn inspect(
+    data: &[u8],
+    path: &Path,
+    outer_size: usize,
+    cipher_constant: u32,
+) -> Result<Stage1Result> {
+    let elf = Elf::parse(data).map_err(|source| Error::Elf {
+        path: path.to_path_buf(),
+        source,
+    })?;
+    if elf.header.e_machine != EM_AARCH64 {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "expected AArch64 ELF (machine 0x{EM_AARCH64:X}), got 0x{:X}",
+            elf.header.e_machine
+        ));
+    }
+    let matches = elf
+        .section_headers
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .filter(|(_, section)| section.sh_type == SHT_LOUSER)
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    if matches.len() != 1 {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "expected exactly one SHT_LOUSER section, found {}",
+            matches.len()
+        ));
+    }
+    let (section_index, section) = matches[0];
+    let section_offset = usize::try_from(section.sh_offset)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("SHT_LOUSER offset exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let section_size = usize::try_from(section.sh_size)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("SHT_LOUSER size exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let section_end = section_offset
+        .checked_add(section_size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("SHT_LOUSER range overflows usize".to_owned()))?;
+    if section_end > data.len() {
+        return invalid("SHT_LOUSER range extends beyond the input file");
+    }
+    let header_relative = outer_size;
+    if outer_size
+        .checked_add(0x1000)
+        .is_none_or(|end| end > section_size)
+    {
+        return invalid("Stage 1 outer header leaves no complete parameter area");
+    }
+    let header_offset = section_offset
+        .checked_add(header_relative)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 header offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    let header_raw = bytes(data, header_offset, 0x1000)?;
+    let header = decrypt_header(header_raw, cipher_constant)?;
+    if header.reserved != 0 {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "Stage 1 header reserved word is nonzero: 0x{:x}",
+            header.reserved
+        ));
+    }
+    if header.size_copy != header.payload_size {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "Stage 1 payload size copy 0x{:x} != size 0x{:x}",
+            header.size_copy, header.payload_size
+        ));
+    }
+    let private_size = section_size - outer_size;
+    let payload_offset = usize::try_from(header.payload_offset)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 payload offset exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let payload_size = usize::try_from(header.payload_size)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 payload size exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    let payload_end = payload_offset
+        .checked_add(payload_size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 payload range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    if payload_offset < 0x20 || payload_end > private_size {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "Stage 1 payload range 0x{payload_offset:x}..0x{payload_end:x} exceeds private size 0x{private_size:x}"
+        ));
+    }
+    if payload_size == 0 || payload_size % 4 != 0 {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "Stage 1 payload size must be nonzero and word aligned: 0x{payload_size:x}"
+        ));
+    }
+    let entry_offset = usize::try_from(header.entry_offset)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 entry offset exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    if entry_offset >= payload_size {
+        return invalid("Stage 1 entry offset is outside the payload");
+    }
+    let protect_size = usize::try_from(header.protect_size)
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 protect size exceeds usize".to_owned()))?;
+    if protect_size > payload_size {
+        return invalid("Stage 1 mprotect length exceeds the payload");
+    }
+    let payload_file_offset = header_offset
+        .checked_add(payload_offset)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 payload file offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    let encrypted = bytes(data, payload_file_offset, payload_size)?;
+    let plaintext = decrypt_words(encrypted, header.payload_key, cipher_constant)?;
+    let aligned_payload_end = (payload_end + 3) & !3;
+    let remaining_relative = aligned_payload_end;
+    if remaining_relative > private_size {
+        return invalid("aligned Stage 2 cursor exceeds SHT_LOUSER");
+    }
+    let remaining_file_offset = section_offset
+        .checked_add(outer_size)
+        .and_then(|value| value.checked_add(remaining_relative))
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("Stage 2 stream offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(Stage1Result {
+        section_index,
+        section_offset,
+        section_size,
+        header_offset,
+        payload_file_offset,
+        remaining_file_offset,
+        remaining_size: private_size - remaining_relative,
+        header,
+        plaintext,
+    })
+}
+
+fn decrypt_header(raw: &[u8], constant: u32) -> Result<Stage1Header> {
+    let key = read_u32(raw, 0)?;
+    let mut decoded = decrypt_words(&raw[..0x20], key, constant)?;
+    decoded[..4].copy_from_slice(&key.to_le_bytes());
+    Ok(Stage1Header {
+        key,
+        reserved: read_u32(&decoded, 4)?,
+        payload_offset: read_u32(&decoded, 8)?,
+        payload_size: read_u32(&decoded, 12)?,
+        payload_key: read_u32(&decoded, 16)?,
+        entry_offset: read_u32(&decoded, 20)?,
+        protect_size: read_u32(&decoded, 24)?,
+        size_copy: read_u32(&decoded, 28)?,
+    })
+}
+
+fn decrypt_words(ciphertext: &[u8], key: u32, constant: u32) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if ciphertext.len() % 4 != 0 {
+        return invalid("Stage 1 word cipher input is not 4-byte aligned");
+    }
+    let mut plaintext = ciphertext.to_vec();
+    for (index, chunk) in plaintext.chunks_exact_mut(4).enumerate() {
+        let index = u32::try_from(index)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 word index exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+        let mut word = u32::from_le_bytes(
+            chunk
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("Stage 1 word has an invalid size".to_owned()))?,
+        );
+        word = word.wrapping_add(index.wrapping_add(3).wrapping_mul(key));
+        word ^= constant.wrapping_mul(index.wrapping_add(1));
+        chunk.copy_from_slice(&word.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    Ok(plaintext)
+}
+
+fn bytes(data: &[u8], offset: usize, size: usize) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("byte range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    data.get(offset..end).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!(
+            "byte range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} is outside the input"
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    let bytes = bytes(data, offset, 4)?;
+    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
+        Error::Invalid("invalid u32 byte range".to_owned())
+    })?))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stage1_word_transform_round_trips() {
+        let key = 0x1234_5678;
+        let constant = DEFAULT_CIPHER_CONSTANT;
+        let plain = [0x1122_3344_u32, 0xaabb_ccdd, 0x0102_0304];
+        let mut cipher = Vec::new();
+        for (index, value) in plain.into_iter().enumerate() {
+            let index = index as u32;
+            let word = (value ^ constant.wrapping_mul(index + 1))
+                .wrapping_sub((index + 3).wrapping_mul(key));
+            cipher.extend_from_slice(&word.to_le_bytes());
+        }
+        let decoded = decrypt_words(&cipher, key, constant).unwrap();
+        let expected = plain
+            .into_iter()
+            .flat_map(u32::to_le_bytes)
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        assert_eq!(decoded, expected);
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+use senbei_android_crypto::gf32_mul_fixed;
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result, invalid};
+
+pub(crate) const RECORD_SIZE: usize = 0x5c;
+pub(crate) const DIRECT_FLAG: u32 = 2;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub(crate) struct Record {
+    pub index: usize,
+    pub command_id: u32,
+    pub flags: u32,
+    pub image_offset: u32,
+    pub image_size: u32,
+    pub metadata_offset: u32,
+    pub metadata_size: u32,
+    pub id_copy: u32,
+    pub entry_offset: u32,
+    pub init_offset: u32,
+}
+
+impl Record {
+    pub(crate) fn direct(self) -> bool {
+        self.flags & DIRECT_FLAG != 0
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub(crate) struct StreamHeader {
+    pub encrypted_words: [u32; 2],
+    pub decrypted_words: [u32; 2],
+    pub record_state: u32,
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn parse_record_stream(
+    stream: &[u8],
+    stream_id: u32,
+) -> Result<(StreamHeader, Vec<Record>, usize)> {
+    if stream.len() < 8 {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} is shorter than its 8-byte header"
+        ));
+    }
+    let cipher0 = read_u32(stream, 0)?;
+    let cipher1 = read_u32(stream, 4)?;
+    let key = stream_id.wrapping_mul(0x9d32_3cd7);
+    let shift = stream_id & 7;
+    let base = (key >> shift)
+        .wrapping_add(0x5e72_7d74)
+        .wrapping_add(key.wrapping_shl(stream_id & 0xb))
+        .wrapping_add(0xf71e_3005);
+    let plain0 =
+        gf32_mul_fixed(cipher0.wrapping_add(0xcbf0_c1d8)) ^ 0xeb_e81dba_u32.wrapping_add(base);
+    let plain1 = gf32_mul_fixed(cipher1.wrapping_add(cipher0))
+        ^ 0xeb_e81dba_u32.wrapping_mul(5).wrapping_add(base);
+    let header = StreamHeader {
+        encrypted_words: [cipher0, cipher1],
+        decrypted_words: [plain0, plain1],
+        record_state: plain1.wrapping_add(base),
+    };
+
+    let mut records = Vec::new();
+    let mut first_payload = stream.len();
+    for index in 0..256_usize {
+        let start =
+            8_usize
+                .checked_add(index.checked_mul(RECORD_SIZE).ok_or_else(|| {
+                    Error::Invalid("record descriptor offset overflow".to_owned())
+                })?)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("record descriptor offset overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        let end = start
+            .checked_add(RECORD_SIZE)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("record descriptor end overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        if end > stream.len() {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} descriptor table is truncated at record {index}"
+            ));
+        }
+        let record = decrypt_record(&stream[start..end], index, header.record_state)?;
+        if record.id_copy != 0 && record.command_id != record.id_copy {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} record {index} command/id mismatch: 0x{:X} != 0x{:X}",
+                record.command_id, record.id_copy
+            ));
+        }
+        for (offset, size) in [
+            (record.image_offset, record.image_size),
+            (record.metadata_offset, record.metadata_size),
+        ] {
+            if offset != 0 && size != 0 {
+                let offset = usize::try_from(offset).map_err(|_| {
+                    Error::Invalid(format!(
+                        "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} record {index} payload offset exceeds usize"
+                    ))
+                })?;
+                if offset >= stream.len() {
+                    return invalid(format!(
+                        "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} record {index} payload offset 0x{offset:x} exceeds stream 0x{:x}",
+                        stream.len()
+                    ));
+                }
+                first_payload = first_payload.min(offset);
+            }
+        }
+        records.push(record);
+        if end == first_payload {
+            return Ok((header, records, first_payload));
+        }
+        if end > first_payload {
+            return invalid(format!(
+                "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} descriptor table crosses first payload at 0x{first_payload:x}"
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    invalid(format!(
+        "stream 0x{stream_id:02X} has no descriptor boundary in 256 records"
+    ))
+}
+
+fn decrypt_record(raw: &[u8], index: usize, state: u32) -> Result<Record> {
+    if raw.len() != RECORD_SIZE {
+        return invalid(format!(
+            "record {index} has size 0x{:x}, expected 0x{RECORD_SIZE:x}",
+            raw.len()
+        ));
+    }
+    let product = state.wrapping_add(0x96f6_0b71).wrapping_mul(state);
+    let index_mask = product.wrapping_shl(((index + 1) & 3) as u32);
+    let mix = state.wrapping_mul(0x06a5_5bcc).wrapping_add(product);
+    let mut accumulator = 0x7993_4cf6_u32;
+    let mut feedback = 0xf02f_7685_u32;
+    let mut words = [0_u32; RECORD_SIZE / 4];
+    for (word_index, chunk) in raw.chunks_exact(4).enumerate() {
+        feedback = feedback.wrapping_mul(feedback);
+        let cipher = u32::from_le_bytes(
+            chunk
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("record word has an invalid size".to_owned()))?,
+        );
+        let mut value = gf32_mul_fixed(cipher ^ (feedback >> 3)) ^ index_mask;
+        value = value.wrapping_add(accumulator).wrapping_add(state);
+        value = value.wrapping_sub(mix >> ((word_index * 4 + 3) & 5));
+        words[word_index] = value;
+        accumulator = accumulator.wrapping_add(0xe64d_33d8);
+        feedback = cipher;
+    }
+    Ok(Record {
+        index,
+        command_id: words[0],
+        flags: words[1],
+        image_offset: words[2],
+        image_size: words[3],
+        metadata_offset: words[4],
+        metadata_size: words[5],
+        id_copy: words[6],
+        entry_offset: words[7],
+        init_offset: words[8],
+    })
+}
+
+fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    let bytes = data.get(offset..offset + 4).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Invalid(format!("record header range 0x{offset:x} is out of bounds"))
+    })?;
+    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
+        Error::Invalid("invalid record u32 range".to_owned())
+    })?))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-android-metadata"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "IL2CPP metadata restoration for Senbei Android"
+
+[dependencies]
+serde.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+//! Extraction of the embedded-metadata packaging variant.
+//!
+//! Some protected il2cpp builds ship no `global-metadata.dat` in the app's
+//! assets at all. Instead a slim metadata blob (an older header format with
+//! custom record layouts) is embedded in the protected library's data section
+//! and wrapped in a per-word XOR layer: a 0x100-byte header whose 64 words each
+//! carry their own key, followed by exactly 256 segments with one u32 key each
+//! at irregular boundaries. At runtime the protector's il2cpp-side modules
+//! regenerate the keys and unwrap the blob in place; the keys are stored
+//! nowhere in the image.
+//!
+//! For the one observed build using this variant the full keystream was
+//! recovered from a ciphertext/plaintext pair and is embedded in
+//! [`crate::keystream`]. Extraction is therefore content-gated: the wrapped
+//! header's first plaintext words are known constants, so a restored image that
+//! does not contain them (every other build) is skipped cheaply and nothing is
+//! written.
+//!
+//! The unwrapped blob stores its patched sanity/version fields byte-swapped;
+//! they are rewritten to the standard il2cpp metadata magic and version so the
+//! output is a well-formed `global-metadata.dat`.
+
+use crate::keystream::{HEADER_KEYS, SEGMENTS};
+
+/// Standard il2cpp metadata sanity magic written over the patched header.
+const STANDARD_MAGIC: u32 = 0xfab1_1baf;
+/// Standard header version matching the blob's record layout.
+const STANDARD_VERSION: u32 = 24;
+
+/// Plaintext of the first two wrapped header words (the byte-swapped patched
+/// sanity/version pair). Also the probe pattern: a restored image contains the
+/// embedded blob iff `word[0] ^ HEADER_KEYS[0]` and `word[1] ^ HEADER_KEYS[1]`
+/// equal these constants at some 4-aligned offset.
+const PROBE_WORDS: [u32; 2] = [0x9732_ca38, 0xbac4_374f];
+
+/// Size of the wrapped blob: the last segment's end offset.
+pub fn embedded_metadata_size() -> usize {
+    SEGMENTS[SEGMENTS.len() - 1].0 as usize
+}
+
+/// Locate and unwrap the embedded metadata blob in a restored library image.
+///
+/// Returns a standalone, well-formed `global-metadata.dat`, or `None` when the
+/// image carries no blob wrapped with the known keystream.
+pub fn extract_embedded_metadata(image: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let total = embedded_metadata_size();
+    let offset = find_wrapped_header(image)?;
+    let blob = image.get(offset..offset.checked_add(total)?)?;
+
+    let mut out = blob.to_vec();
+    for (i, &key) in HEADER_KEYS.iter().enumerate() {
+        xor_word(&mut out, 4 * i, key);
+    }
+    let mut pos = 0x100_usize;
+    for &(end, key) in &SEGMENTS {
+        let end = end as usize;
+        let mut o = pos;
+        while o + 4 <= end {
+            xor_word(&mut out, o, key);
+            o += 4;
+        }
+        pos = end;
+    }
+    out[0..4].copy_from_slice(&STANDARD_MAGIC.to_le_bytes());
+    out[4..8].copy_from_slice(&STANDARD_VERSION.to_le_bytes());
+    Some(out)
+}
+
+/// Scan `image` for the wrapped header probe pattern (4-aligned).
+fn find_wrapped_header(image: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
+    let mut off = 0;
+    while off + 8 <= image.len() {
+        let word = u32::from_le_bytes(image[off..off + 4].try_into().ok()?);
+        if word ^ HEADER_KEYS[0] == PROBE_WORDS[0] {
+            let next = u32::from_le_bytes(image[off + 4..off + 8].try_into().ok()?);
+            if next ^ HEADER_KEYS[1] == PROBE_WORDS[1] {
+                return Some(off);
+            }
+        }
+        off += 4;
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn xor_word(data: &mut [u8], offset: usize, key: u32) {
+    let word = u32::from_le_bytes(data[offset..offset + 4].try_into().expect("word in bounds"));
+    data[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&(word ^ key).to_le_bytes());
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Wrap a synthetic blob with the keystream, then unwrap it back.
+    #[test]
+    fn roundtrip_wrapped_blob() {
+        let total = embedded_metadata_size();
+        let mut image = vec![0_u8; total + 0x40];
+        // Plaintext blob: standard probe words, then a ramp.
+        image[0..4].copy_from_slice(&PROBE_WORDS[0].to_le_bytes());
+        image[4..8].copy_from_slice(&PROBE_WORDS[1].to_le_bytes());
+        for o in (8..total).step_by(4) {
+            let v = (o as u32).wrapping_mul(0x9e37_79b1);
+            image[o..o + 4].copy_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes());
+        }
+        // Wrap with the keystream.
+        for (i, &key) in HEADER_KEYS.iter().enumerate() {
+            xor_word(&mut image, 4 * i, key);
+        }
+        let mut pos = 0x100_usize;
+        for &(end, key) in &SEGMENTS {
+            let mut o = pos;
+            while o + 4 <= end as usize {
+                xor_word(&mut image, o, key);
+                o += 4;
+            }
+            pos = end as usize;
+        }
+
+        let out = extract_embedded_metadata(&image).expect("blob found");
+        assert_eq!(out.len(), total);
+        // Header rewritten to the standard magic/version…
+        assert_eq!(&out[0..4], &STANDARD_MAGIC.to_le_bytes());
+        assert_eq!(&out[4..8], &STANDARD_VERSION.to_le_bytes());
+        // …and the body round-trips.
+        for o in (8..total).step_by(4) {
+            let v = (o as u32).wrapping_mul(0x9e37_79b1);
+            assert_eq!(&out[o..o + 4], &v.to_le_bytes(), "word at {o:#x}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_blob_in_plain_data() {
+        let image = vec![0xAB_u8; 0x1000];
+        assert!(extract_embedded_metadata(&image).is_none());
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/// Per-word XOR keystream for the embedded-metadata packaging variant,
+/// recovered from a ciphertext/plaintext pair of one observed build.
+/// Key derivation for future builds is untraced; other builds simply do
+/// not match the header probe and are left untouched.
+pub(crate) const HEADER_KEYS: [u32; 64] = [
+    0x39184c70, 0xd901afd4, 0x19b98815, 0x132906ed, 0x663e8ace, 0x299b1952, 0xe5404ab8, 0xd93b331c,
+    0xb67d3761, 0x42da9259, 0xc29c7a59, 0x17cb841c, 0xd0bcb9c6, 0x21db779b, 0x43874deb, 0x89bf697b,
+    0x0b7f97b4, 0xbe1c59f7, 0xc653ad92, 0x8cdf4336, 0x5e0b6b68, 0x1bd4d668, 0x7250ed61, 0x31a36491,
+    0xaf144dcd, 0xc1e387d0, 0x9d6df5b7, 0x78514f32, 0xc2648cbf, 0x3b8272a5, 0xd2053679, 0x4b18af77,
+    0x71b9ebdd, 0x0094daaa, 0xf3adfed8, 0xc0d082bc, 0xae5e523c, 0xa8dec0be, 0x090a7784, 0x2c0483d6,
+    0x95f0e8f7, 0x234de6d4, 0xa7464527, 0x3b1c531d, 0xc2b31d82, 0xe1c60be0, 0x3d65a0c2, 0x2ea7d77a,
+    0x4ababadb, 0xce484b16, 0x59ab3f99, 0x10a9a463, 0x70e2f78a, 0x0ed71c9c, 0xf8996b2e, 0xff637928,
+    0xf413313d, 0x77c57bf9, 0xdab41dba, 0x0cd2ccbc, 0x3b2fbde3, 0x0b19b14d, 0xd2645dbc, 0x318113d4,
+];
+
+/// (segment end offset, segment key) pairs; offsets relative to blob start.
+pub(crate) const SEGMENTS: [(u32, u32); 256] = [
+    (0x3915c, 0xbb5dda1a),
+    (0x736b4, 0x906dbe0f),
+    (0xaedc4, 0x1e4ca8bd),
+    (0xc506c, 0xe603cb21),
+    (0xdfe34, 0x93bec702),
+    (0xe8f10, 0x9a9f429f),
+    (0x139088, 0x125a8b3f),
+    (0x20bd30, 0x69a6395f),
+    (0x20c548, 0xca807b9a),
+    (0x20c774, 0x8b8880c4),
+    (0x300518, 0x48087852),
+    (0x36c07c, 0x32aa7b5b),
+    (0x448b7c, 0x2e668589),
+    (0x4592b0, 0x292e07d9),
+    (0x45d374, 0x83b0a0ef),
+    (0x474520, 0x8983245d),
+    (0x47a1d4, 0xefb941b7),
+    (0x4bdc74, 0x7c3b3458),
+    (0x4c34c8, 0xee0a87b3),
+    (0x4f1068, 0xf6a2069f),
+    (0x51601c, 0x2e83612b),
+    (0x549d40, 0xb413a58f),
+    (0x56a714, 0x95596da3),
+    (0x573c98, 0x68513e8d),
+    (0x59d058, 0xc4ff5f9a),
+    (0x5c4b34, 0x249ed022),
+    (0x5f19bc, 0xc27272d3),
+    (0x5f47c8, 0xd73aa37b),
+    (0x627df4, 0x002334ba),
+    (0x648f54, 0x868bb6c9),
+    (0x6718a4, 0x17ff0ef4),
+    (0x6a88b8, 0x22cfbc5f),
+    (0x742dbc, 0x152072dd),
+    (0x75603c, 0xbd31be45),
+    (0x783238, 0x45911d6a),
+    (0x7b94d8, 0x6f281add),
+    (0x800060, 0xcf58c8d0),
+    (0x819b50, 0xb40f0276),
+    (0x82dea4, 0x1a1a8402),
+    (0x880210, 0xf2c0824a),
+    (0x8e4f08, 0x86c9ba90),
+    (0x8ea544, 0x0e928544),
+    (0x931454, 0xc3fa017b),
+    (0x94eb70, 0x1dbe612a),
+    (0x95993c, 0x902498fe),
+    (0x98d2b0, 0xb7760451),
+    (0x992034, 0x711cddfc),
+    (0x9e14a0, 0x8bd95e64),
+    (0xa1d2d0, 0xbfdce920),
+    (0xa21ed8, 0x90cf0372),
+    (0xa4d2b8, 0x91e88c9c),
+    (0xa76f8c, 0x9c721e61),
+    (0xac5ba4, 0xbda16e3e),
+    (0xaf070c, 0xe02b6799),
+    (0xaf3a78, 0x32953b4e),
+    (0xb32510, 0x47ea48db),
+    (0xb46550, 0x1443e512),
+    (0xb54998, 0x9e123a75),
+    (0xb5e24c, 0xe11a8efd),
+    (0xb625cc, 0x3facfbf4),
+    (0xb66ec8, 0x76c0c452),
+    (0xb67ad0, 0x4de4ed6c),
+    (0xb7ba5c, 0xe622d97a),
+    (0xb85a90, 0x6f564f8b),
+    (0xbff8b8, 0x3e25d671),
+    (0xc03e50, 0x3563fc2b),
+    (0xc6e958, 0xda8bc3b0),
+    (0xc87f7c, 0x5a9d2269),
+    (0xcb36a4, 0x0ab420cc),
+    (0xcbe4d0, 0x9bbb091e),
+    (0xccd7dc, 0x9e4fd577),
+    (0xd078c0, 0x4b655ae1),
+    (0xd275dc, 0x5ca2a2f4),
+    (0xd2c840, 0xdb437f0d),
+    (0xd3296c, 0x66487f75),
+    (0xd7cbe8, 0xf5427945),
+    (0xd8e0a0, 0x9a65bdb6),
+    (0xda2ed4, 0x46dea4b3),
+    (0xda6f1c, 0xb9916a02),
+    (0xdee9ac, 0x18800a5c),
+    (0xe3673c, 0x4afab3cd),
+    (0xe65420, 0x52e80204),
+    (0xe861f8, 0x639a02d7),
+    (0xeb61c0, 0x21077eba),
+    (0xed51dc, 0x17be91d8),
+    (0xf048a4, 0xd30cc8cb),
+    (0xf3b274, 0xdfb43f3f),
+    (0xf76ac8, 0x63a8b363),
+    (0xf84b64, 0x16508a16),
+    (0xf8bb2c, 0x22ce110d),
+    (0xfb3390, 0xf09a4eb2),
+    (0xff07bc, 0xd2bb0e2c),
+    (0x102d32c, 0xb424012c),
+    (0x10795b0, 0x07338bb9),
+    (0x108d65c, 0x5d68f86e),
+    (0x10ce528, 0x1826c952),
+    (0x10d3528, 0xa7473860),
+    (0x10dca58, 0x92435967),
+    (0x1115c78, 0x061200f4),
+    (0x1171098, 0x94f538a1),
+    (0x117ebf0, 0xd8731d88),
+    (0x1186638, 0x4381b3f9),
+    (0x118afdc, 0xf25ff376),
+    (0x11ee3b4, 0x29605488),
+    (0x11f182c, 0x04367932),
+    (0x11f41dc, 0xaeaccadd),
+    (0x11ff0f4, 0x7c4d358e),
+    (0x120caac, 0xacbc8412),
+    (0x12437cc, 0x3e0ac7e9),
+    (0x124edf8, 0x06f523fd),
+    (0x1263ba0, 0x0a1b9763),
+    (0x12943f0, 0x24a86ba4),
+    (0x12d9230, 0x0cd82e2e),
+    (0x12fd9b4, 0xf3903fb9),
+    (0x135a198, 0x2887f4a3),
+    (0x1366180, 0x9f0d7ca5),
+    (0x13680a4, 0x61e9a459),
+    (0x13a1b44, 0xe61623a4),
+    (0x13a860c, 0xdc44c798),
+    (0x13c024c, 0xc90f7be6),
+    (0x1475c00, 0xc2f338b3),
+    (0x1480aa8, 0xb7b0609e),
+    (0x14fb82c, 0x748e3939),
+    (0x1511184, 0x98426fcf),
+    (0x153c144, 0x1a452d5d),
+    (0x1547838, 0x7dd360e9),
+    (0x15565d4, 0x1d8f093b),
+    (0x156e298, 0x102a1524),
+    (0x159df70, 0xe42613f7),
+    (0x15a13d0, 0xafc5fdc6),
+    (0x15e7f24, 0x84fcd342),
+    (0x15f0878, 0x55038958),
+    (0x1614210, 0xe0602ae4),
+    (0x1631b3c, 0xce2765f6),
+    (0x164eb70, 0xf772dac5),
+    (0x1688b68, 0x5f1a72c9),
+    (0x16d5f8c, 0x7c77747d),
+    (0x16e76dc, 0xac0e16fb),
+    (0x1726374, 0x4a1e7fd7),
+    (0x173455c, 0x870856b4),
+    (0x17697d8, 0xbb2f0a5c),
+    (0x176ed60, 0xc937b386),
+    (0x1784fa8, 0x5e676ab2),
+    (0x17ae3a0, 0xdbf662a1),
+    (0x1866c7c, 0x4e3f1a7d),
+    (0x186b844, 0xe30fce60),
+    (0x18b507c, 0xdfc73c88),
+    (0x18c2f64, 0xb7ee08e0),
+    (0x18c8010, 0xd1471a25),
+    (0x18de290, 0x292e6310),
+    (0x19140d0, 0x9f346f05),
+    (0x192c590, 0xf1eb61bf),
+    (0x194fca0, 0x8888b1df),
+    (0x1959d34, 0x92b89d15),
+    (0x196c0c4, 0x5e152de5),
+    (0x19a5710, 0x866e7bfa),
+    (0x19abfd4, 0x3084ae26),
+    (0x19b1550, 0x0581836f),
+    (0x19b7214, 0xeefc34eb),
+    (0x19c523c, 0xc980335d),
+    (0x19dc4c0, 0x019084e6),
+    (0x19dfb8c, 0xdb1a21a7),
+    (0x19fbf3c, 0xec84cc17),
+    (0x1a29b18, 0xcb31da7d),
+    (0x1a4c670, 0xc5fe570e),
+    (0x1a97024, 0xbbd80964),
+    (0x1ac33bc, 0xe186586d),
+    (0x1acd124, 0x1e413252),
+    (0x1ad9bac, 0x48fc4c75),
+    (0x1b1b728, 0x8071d7a5),
+    (0x1b31d78, 0x9d958013),
+    (0x1badb24, 0x2f236951),
+    (0x1bccc00, 0x7023c620),
+    (0x1bdab2c, 0x88b1e4b8),
+    (0x1c000dc, 0x9e43291a),
+    (0x1c9f0cc, 0x27a7d592),
+    (0x1cd1328, 0x9c0bcc88),
+    (0x1cd79a0, 0x63e0ed75),
+    (0x1d0e484, 0xf51a0d3d),
+    (0x1d17b10, 0xbfd2a7ac),
+    (0x1d930c4, 0xf6b9e877),
+    (0x1db115c, 0xf3eb7e37),
+    (0x1df16b4, 0x682326ff),
+    (0x1e389c0, 0xea11f566),
+    (0x1eb7e48, 0x3dc5fa76),
+    (0x1ec38fc, 0x296ffc1d),
+    (0x1ee87a0, 0x1b9f7fd4),
+    (0x1f19f88, 0x78972e8f),
+    (0x1f33a0c, 0x390c2deb),
+    (0x1f4e0fc, 0xe05e8c6b),
+    (0x1f5a718, 0x367432ae),
+    (0x1f61dcc, 0x7063e58a),
+    (0x1f85878, 0x21c00cea),
+    (0x1fc043c, 0x2676aaaa),
+    (0x1ffdb94, 0xc270eb02),
+    (0x202a618, 0x3a98aed2),
+    (0x2037b34, 0x115d5afc),
+    (0x203d92c, 0x11bced76),
+    (0x203da14, 0xf2628105),
+    (0x2066014, 0x97f32700),
+    (0x208a908, 0xa68e2f71),
+    (0x20ab8ac, 0x1daa2a78),
+    (0x20ba504, 0x73919ef6),
+    (0x20e71e0, 0x0b3fd1d3),
+    (0x2102278, 0x6c123def),
+    (0x21166dc, 0xee354161),
+    (0x2126478, 0x299493f4),
+    (0x2137090, 0x05ae2007),
+    (0x2148270, 0x34b52663),
+    (0x21482ac, 0xe381b5b6),
+    (0x21813b8, 0x94244de1),
+    (0x21a41e8, 0x02c38df5),
+    (0x21a8c4c, 0xf72700dd),
+    (0x21abbac, 0x34c2e7b5),
+    (0x21bcb24, 0x442739ad),
+    (0x21cbe84, 0x6e40d22c),
+    (0x21e2798, 0xdbf774d0),
+    (0x21f892c, 0xe90f1e0c),
+    (0x222beec, 0xa27f27f3),
+    (0x22394f4, 0x7f999a4f),
+    (0x22437ec, 0xf12d28f8),
+    (0x22480b0, 0xf58f3a7d),
+    (0x2261a0c, 0x89b28301),
+    (0x22a76c8, 0x1fe501e2),
+    (0x22b2018, 0xf079db5f),
+    (0x22cc610, 0xaf7d17b7),
+    (0x22cd4f8, 0x71c010cb),
+    (0x22d016c, 0x4a8daed0),
+    (0x22e1c04, 0xe1201aca),
+    (0x22f9994, 0xf3f0e4ee),
+    (0x2384f5c, 0x6b8a5eb1),
+    (0x23d5ecc, 0x5298a9c4),
+    (0x23e15b0, 0xc7bf0afb),
+    (0x23e248c, 0x2d67fecf),
+    (0x2407898, 0x4eef422a),
+    (0x241695c, 0x33ba9ce8),
+    (0x243e8b0, 0x833c1d2c),
+    (0x2460b64, 0x819c96ee),
+    (0x247caec, 0x0ebccbd6),
+    (0x24832b4, 0xf789d4b6),
+    (0x24938b8, 0x9f63baeb),
+    (0x24a7c64, 0x3384e552),
+    (0x24bce94, 0x7bfec208),
+    (0x24bd8f4, 0x9b5260cc),
+    (0x24ce8ec, 0xaf854888),
+    (0x24e741c, 0xda82f062),
+    (0x254401c, 0xbb1a5d5a),
+    (0x25a6a64, 0x24d202d3),
+    (0x2617878, 0x6ac71e5f),
+    (0x2617df0, 0x0e76bd90),
+    (0x268e9b8, 0x874d931c),
+    (0x26a8848, 0xefefd680),
+    (0x26e4f10, 0xfc2799f7),
+    (0x26e93d8, 0x1930ad55),
+    (0x26eea84, 0xfa2f742f),
+    (0x2701f30, 0xed9b92c4),
+];
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+//! Static IL2CPP metadata restoration interfaces.
+
+mod embedded;
+mod keystream;
+mod method_tokens;
+
+pub use embedded::{embedded_metadata_size, extract_embedded_metadata};
+pub use method_tokens::{
+    DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED, Error, ImageKeyDiscovery, Report, SeedDiscoveryReport,
+    discover_method_token_seeds, restore_method_tokens,
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+//! Static restoration of protected IL2CPP v31 method tokens.
+
+use serde::Serialize;
+
+/// Seed embedded in the current `libil2cpp` module `0x0C`.
+pub const DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED: u32 = 0xa6fa_e968;
+
+const MAGIC: u32 = 0xfab1_1baf;
+const SUPPORTED_VERSION: u32 = 31;
+const HDR_METHODS: usize = 0x30;
+const HDR_TYPES: usize = 0xa0;
+const HDR_IMAGES: usize = 0xa8;
+const METHOD_STRIDE: usize = 0x24;
+const METHOD_TOKEN_OFFSET: usize = 0x18;
+const TYPE_STRIDE: usize = 0x58;
+const TYPE_METHOD_START_OFFSET: usize = 0x24;
+const TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFFSET: usize = 0x40;
+const IMAGE_STRIDE: usize = 0x28;
+const IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFFSET: usize = 0x08;
+const IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFFSET: usize = 0x0c;
+const METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE: u32 = 0x0600_0000;
+
+/// Summary of one metadata restoration pass.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
+pub struct Report {
+    pub version: u32,
+    pub seed: String,
+    pub encryption_status: String,
+    pub images: usize,
+    pub images_with_methods: usize,
+    pub types: usize,
+    pub methods: usize,
+    pub visited_methods: usize,
+    pub already_correct_before: usize,
+    pub correct_after: usize,
+    pub changed_tokens: usize,
+    pub transformed_images: usize,
+}
+
+/// Per-image constraints recovered from the encrypted MethodDef RID
+/// permutation.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
+pub struct ImageKeyDiscovery {
+    pub image: usize,
+    pub method_count: u32,
+    pub modulus: u32,
+    pub clean: bool,
+    pub seed_residues: Vec<u32>,
+}
+
+/// Result of statically testing the known five-round permutation against a
+/// metadata file without assuming a seed.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
+pub struct SeedDiscoveryReport {
+    pub version: u32,
+    pub images: Vec<ImageKeyDiscovery>,
+    pub seed_candidates: Vec<u32>,
+}
+
+/// Metadata parsing or validation failure.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("not an IL2CPP global-metadata.dat")]
+    NotMetadata,
+    #[error("unsupported metadata version {0}")]
+    UnsupportedVersion(u32),
+    #[error("malformed metadata: {0}")]
+    Malformed(String),
+    #[error("method-token restoration failed: {0}")]
+    Validation(String),
+}
+
+type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+fn malformed<T>(message: impl Into<String>) -> Result<T> {
+    Err(Error::Malformed(message.into()))
+}
+
+fn validation<T>(message: impl Into<String>) -> Result<T> {
+    Err(Error::Validation(message.into()))
+}
+
+fn bytes(data: &[u8], offset: usize, size: usize) -> Result<&[u8]> {
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(size)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("byte range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+    data.get(offset..end).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Malformed(format!(
+            "byte range 0x{offset:x}..0x{end:x} is out of bounds"
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+fn read_u16(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u16> {
+    let value: [u8; 2] = bytes(data, offset, 2)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed("invalid u16 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u16::from_le_bytes(value))
+}
+
+fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    let value: [u8; 4] = bytes(data, offset, 4)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed("invalid u32 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(value))
+}
+
+fn read_i32(data: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<i32> {
+    let value: [u8; 4] = bytes(data, offset, 4)?
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed("invalid i32 range".to_owned()))?;
+    Ok(i32::from_le_bytes(value))
+}
+
+fn table(data: &[u8], header_offset: usize) -> Result<(usize, usize)> {
+    let offset = read_u32(data, header_offset)? as usize;
+    let size = read_u32(data, header_offset + 4)? as usize;
+    bytes(data, offset, size)?;
+    Ok((offset, size))
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn inverse_round(mut value: u32, count: u32, key: u32) -> u32 {
+    let mirror = count.wrapping_mul(2).wrapping_sub(1);
+    if value & 1 != 0 {
+        value = mirror.wrapping_sub(value);
+    }
+    value >>= 1;
+    if value >= count {
+        value = mirror.wrapping_sub(value);
+    }
+    let value = value.wrapping_sub(key);
+    if value > count {
+        value.wrapping_add(count)
+    } else {
+        value
+    }
+}
+
+fn decrypt_rid(rid: u32, low: u32, high: u32, seed: u32) -> Result<u32> {
+    let count = high
+        .checked_add(1)
+        .and_then(|value| value.checked_sub(low))
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("invalid image RID interval".to_owned()))?;
+    if count < 2 {
+        return validation("RID inverse permutation requires at least two entries");
+    }
+    let half = count / 2;
+    if half == 0 {
+        return validation("RID inverse permutation has a zero divisor");
+    }
+    let key = seed % half + count / 4;
+    let mut value = rid
+        .checked_sub(low)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("encrypted RID lies below image minimum".to_owned()))?;
+    for _ in 0..5 {
+        value = inverse_round(value, count, key);
+    }
+    value
+        .checked_add(low)
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("restored RID overflow".to_owned()))
+}
+
+/// Restore MethodDef RID values exactly as module `0x0C` does.
+///
+/// The operation is idempotent for tooling purposes: an image whose tokens are
+/// already canonical is detected and left untouched instead of applying the
+/// native inverse permutation a second time.
+pub fn restore_method_tokens(data: &[u8], seed: u32) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Report)> {
+    if read_u32(data, 0).ok() != Some(MAGIC) {
+        return Err(Error::NotMetadata);
+    }
+    let version = read_u32(data, 4)?;
+    if version != SUPPORTED_VERSION {
+        return Err(Error::UnsupportedVersion(version));
+    }
+
+    let (method_offset, method_size) = table(data, HDR_METHODS)?;
+    let (type_offset, type_size) = table(data, HDR_TYPES)?;
+    let (image_offset, image_size) = table(data, HDR_IMAGES)?;
+    if method_size % METHOD_STRIDE != 0
+        || type_size % TYPE_STRIDE != 0
+        || image_size % IMAGE_STRIDE != 0
+    {
+        return malformed("v31 table size is not divisible by its entry stride");
+    }
+    let method_count = method_size / METHOD_STRIDE;
+    let type_count = type_size / TYPE_STRIDE;
+    let image_count = image_size / IMAGE_STRIDE;
+    let mut owners = vec![u32::MAX; method_count];
+    let mut output = data.to_vec();
+    let mut images_with_methods = 0_usize;
+    let mut visited_methods = 0_usize;
+    let mut already_correct_before = 0_usize;
+    let mut correct_after = 0_usize;
+    let mut changed_tokens = 0_usize;
+    let mut transformed_images = 0_usize;
+
+    for image_index in 0..image_count {
+        let image_base = image_offset + image_index * IMAGE_STRIDE;
+        let type_start = read_i32(data, image_base + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFFSET)?;
+        let type_start = usize::try_from(type_start)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed(format!("image {image_index} has negative typeStart")))?;
+        let type_entries = read_u32(data, image_base + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFFSET)? as usize;
+        let type_end = type_start
+            .checked_add(type_entries)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("image type range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        if type_end > type_count {
+            return malformed(format!("image {image_index} type range exceeds the table"));
+        }
+
+        let mut methods = Vec::new();
+        for type_index in type_start..type_end {
+            let type_base = type_offset + type_index * TYPE_STRIDE;
+            let method_entries = read_u16(data, type_base + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFFSET)? as usize;
+            if method_entries == 0 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let method_start = read_i32(data, type_base + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFFSET)?;
+            let method_start = usize::try_from(method_start).map_err(|_| {
+                Error::Malformed(format!(
+                    "type {type_index} has methods but negative methodStart"
+                ))
+            })?;
+            let method_end = method_start
+                .checked_add(method_entries)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("type method range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            if method_end > method_count {
+                return malformed(format!("type {type_index} method range exceeds the table"));
+            }
+            for (method_index, owner) in owners
+                .iter_mut()
+                .enumerate()
+                .take(method_end)
+                .skip(method_start)
+            {
+                if *owner != u32::MAX {
+                    return malformed(format!("method {method_index} belongs to multiple images"));
+                }
+                *owner = u32::try_from(image_index)
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed("image index exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+                methods.push(method_index);
+            }
+        }
+        if methods.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        images_with_methods += 1;
+        visited_methods += methods.len();
+        let method_base = *methods
+            .iter()
+            .min()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("nonempty image lost its method minimum".to_owned()))?;
+        let method_last = *methods
+            .iter()
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("nonempty image lost its method maximum".to_owned()))?;
+        if method_last - method_base + 1 != methods.len() {
+            return malformed(format!(
+                "image {image_index} method block is not contiguous"
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let mut tokens = Vec::with_capacity(methods.len());
+        let mut image_already_clean = true;
+        for &method_index in &methods {
+            let token_offset = method_offset + method_index * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFFSET;
+            let token = read_u32(data, token_offset)?;
+            if token & 0xff00_0000 != METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE {
+                return malformed(format!(
+                    "method {method_index} has non-MethodDef token 0x{token:08x}"
+                ));
+            }
+            let expected = u32::try_from(method_index - method_base + 1)
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Validation("local method RID exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+            let rid = token & 0x00ff_ffff;
+            if rid == expected {
+                already_correct_before += 1;
+            } else {
+                image_already_clean = false;
+            }
+            tokens.push((method_index, token_offset, token, expected));
+        }
+
+        if image_already_clean {
+            correct_after += tokens.len();
+            continue;
+        }
+        transformed_images += 1;
+        let low = tokens
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(_, _, token, _)| token & 0x00ff_ffff)
+            .min()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("image has no MethodDef RID".to_owned()))?;
+        let high = tokens
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(_, _, token, _)| token & 0x00ff_ffff)
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("image has no MethodDef RID".to_owned()))?;
+        if high <= 1 {
+            return validation(format!(
+                "image {image_index} is noncanonical but native R > 1 gate would skip it"
+            ));
+        }
+        let interval = high - low + 1;
+        if interval as usize != tokens.len() {
+            return validation(format!(
+                "image {image_index} RID interval {low}..={high} is not a permutation"
+            ));
+        }
+        for (method_index, token_offset, token, expected) in tokens {
+            let restored_rid = decrypt_rid(token & 0x00ff_ffff, low, high, seed)?;
+            if restored_rid != expected {
+                return validation(format!(
+                    "method {method_index} restored RID {restored_rid} != expected {expected}"
+                ));
+            }
+            let restored_token = METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | restored_rid;
+            if restored_token != token {
+                output[token_offset..token_offset + 4]
+                    .copy_from_slice(&restored_token.to_le_bytes());
+                changed_tokens += 1;
+            }
+            correct_after += 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if owners.contains(&u32::MAX) {
+        return malformed("one or more method definitions are not owned by an image");
+    }
+    if visited_methods != method_count || correct_after != method_count {
+        return validation(format!(
+            "method coverage mismatch: visited={visited_methods}, correct={correct_after}, total={method_count}"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    Ok((
+        output,
+        Report {
+            version,
+            seed: format!("0x{seed:08X}"),
+            encryption_status: if changed_tokens == 0 {
+                "clean".to_owned()
+            } else {
+                "encrypted".to_owned()
+            },
+            images: image_count,
+            images_with_methods,
+            types: type_count,
+            methods: method_count,
+            visited_methods,
+            already_correct_before,
+            correct_after,
+            changed_tokens,
+            transformed_images,
+        },
+    ))
+}
+
+/// Discover seeds compatible with the known v31 five-round RID permutation.
+///
+/// This is diagnostic and does not modify metadata. It enumerates the only
+/// possible per-image key residues and intersects them over the 32-bit seed
+/// domain. An empty candidate list means that the sample changed the
+/// permutation itself rather than merely embedding a different seed.
+pub fn discover_method_token_seeds(data: &[u8]) -> Result<SeedDiscoveryReport> {
+    if read_u32(data, 0).ok() != Some(MAGIC) {
+        return Err(Error::NotMetadata);
+    }
+    let version = read_u32(data, 4)?;
+    if version != SUPPORTED_VERSION {
+        return Ok(SeedDiscoveryReport {
+            version,
+            images: Vec::new(),
+            seed_candidates: Vec::new(),
+        });
+    }
+    let (method_offset, method_size) = table(data, HDR_METHODS)?;
+    let (type_offset, type_size) = table(data, HDR_TYPES)?;
+    let (image_offset, image_size) = table(data, HDR_IMAGES)?;
+    if method_size % METHOD_STRIDE != 0
+        || type_size % TYPE_STRIDE != 0
+        || image_size % IMAGE_STRIDE != 0
+    {
+        return malformed("v31 table size is not divisible by its entry stride");
+    }
+    let method_count = method_size / METHOD_STRIDE;
+    let type_count = type_size / TYPE_STRIDE;
+    let image_count = image_size / IMAGE_STRIDE;
+    let mut reports = Vec::with_capacity(image_count);
+    for image_index in 0..image_count {
+        let image_base = image_offset + image_index * IMAGE_STRIDE;
+        let type_start = usize::try_from(read_i32(data, image_base + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFFSET)?)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed(format!("image {image_index} has negative typeStart")))?;
+        let type_entries = read_u32(data, image_base + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFFSET)? as usize;
+        let type_end = type_start
+            .checked_add(type_entries)
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("image type range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+        if type_end > type_count {
+            return malformed(format!("image {image_index} type range exceeds the table"));
+        }
+        let mut methods = Vec::new();
+        for type_index in type_start..type_end {
+            let type_base = type_offset + type_index * TYPE_STRIDE;
+            let method_entries = read_u16(data, type_base + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFFSET)? as usize;
+            if method_entries == 0 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let method_start =
+                usize::try_from(read_i32(data, type_base + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFFSET)?).map_err(
+                    |_| Error::Malformed(format!("type {type_index} has negative methodStart")),
+                )?;
+            let method_end = method_start
+                .checked_add(method_entries)
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("type method range overflow".to_owned()))?;
+            if method_end > method_count {
+                return malformed(format!("type {type_index} method range exceeds the table"));
+            }
+            methods.extend(method_start..method_end);
+        }
+        if methods.is_empty() {
+            reports.push(ImageKeyDiscovery {
+                image: image_index,
+                method_count: 0,
+                modulus: 0,
+                clean: true,
+                seed_residues: Vec::new(),
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+        let method_base = *methods
+            .iter()
+            .min()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("image method minimum is missing".to_owned()))?;
+        let method_last = *methods
+            .iter()
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Malformed("image method maximum is missing".to_owned()))?;
+        if method_last - method_base + 1 != methods.len() {
+            return validation(format!(
+                "image {image_index} method block is not contiguous"
+            ));
+        }
+        let mut values = Vec::with_capacity(methods.len());
+        let mut clean = true;
+        for method_index in methods {
+            let token = read_u32(
+                data,
+                method_offset + method_index * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFFSET,
+            )?;
+            if token & 0xff00_0000 != METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE {
+                return validation(format!(
+                    "method {method_index} has non-MethodDef token 0x{token:08x}"
+                ));
+            }
+            let expected = u32::try_from(method_index - method_base + 1)
+                .map_err(|_| Error::Validation("local method RID exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+            let rid = token & 0x00ff_ffff;
+            clean &= rid == expected;
+            values.push((rid, expected));
+        }
+        let count = u32::try_from(values.len())
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Validation("image method count exceeds u32".to_owned()))?;
+        if clean {
+            reports.push(ImageKeyDiscovery {
+                image: image_index,
+                method_count: count,
+                modulus: count / 2,
+                clean,
+                seed_residues: Vec::new(),
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+        let low = values
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(rid, _)| *rid)
+            .min()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("image has no encrypted RID".to_owned()))?;
+        let high = values
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(rid, _)| *rid)
+            .max()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Validation("image has no encrypted RID".to_owned()))?;
+        if high - low + 1 != count || count < 2 {
+            return validation(format!(
+                "image {image_index} RID interval is not a permutation"
+            ));
+        }
+        let half = count / 2;
+        let quarter = count / 4;
+        let mut residues = Vec::new();
+        for key_delta in 0..half {
+            let key = quarter + key_delta;
+            let valid = values
+                .iter()
+                .all(|(rid, expected)| decrypt_rid_with_key(*rid, low, high, key) == *expected);
+            if valid {
+                residues.push(key_delta);
+            }
+        }
+        reports.push(ImageKeyDiscovery {
+            image: image_index,
+            method_count: count,
+            modulus: half,
+            clean,
+            seed_residues: residues,
+        });
+    }
+
+    let constraints = reports
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|report| !report.clean)
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let mut seeds = Vec::new();
+    if let Some(anchor) = constraints.iter().max_by_key(|report| report.modulus) {
+        for &residue in &anchor.seed_residues {
+            let mut candidate = u64::from(residue);
+            let modulus = u64::from(anchor.modulus);
+            while candidate <= u64::from(u32::MAX) {
+                let valid = constraints.iter().all(|report| {
+                    report.modulus != 0
+                        && !report.seed_residues.is_empty()
+                        && report
+                            .seed_residues
+                            .iter()
+                            .any(|&value| candidate % u64::from(report.modulus) == u64::from(value))
+                });
+                if valid {
+                    seeds.push(candidate as u32);
+                }
+                candidate = candidate.saturating_add(modulus);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    seeds.sort_unstable();
+    seeds.dedup();
+    Ok(SeedDiscoveryReport {
+        version,
+        images: reports,
+        seed_candidates: seeds,
+    })
+}
+
+fn decrypt_rid_with_key(rid: u32, low: u32, high: u32, key: u32) -> u32 {
+    let count = high - low + 1;
+    let mut value = rid - low;
+    for _ in 0..5 {
+        value = inverse_round(value, count, key);
+    }
+    value + low
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn put_u16(data: &mut [u8], offset: usize, value: u16) {
+        data[offset..offset + 2].copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+
+    fn put_u32(data: &mut [u8], offset: usize, value: u32) {
+        data[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+
+    fn encrypted_rid(expected: u32, count: u32, seed: u32) -> u32 {
+        (1..=count)
+            .find(|&candidate| decrypt_rid(candidate, 1, count, seed) == Ok(expected))
+            .expect("inverse permutation must be bijective")
+    }
+
+    fn build(tokens: &[u32]) -> (Vec<u8>, usize) {
+        let header_size = 0x100;
+        let images = header_size;
+        let types = images + IMAGE_STRIDE;
+        let methods = types + 2 * TYPE_STRIDE;
+        let mut data = vec![0_u8; methods + tokens.len() * METHOD_STRIDE];
+        put_u32(&mut data, 0, MAGIC);
+        put_u32(&mut data, 4, SUPPORTED_VERSION);
+        put_u32(&mut data, HDR_METHODS, methods as u32);
+        put_u32(
+            &mut data,
+            HDR_METHODS + 4,
+            (tokens.len() * METHOD_STRIDE) as u32,
+        );
+        put_u32(&mut data, HDR_TYPES, types as u32);
+        put_u32(&mut data, HDR_TYPES + 4, (2 * TYPE_STRIDE) as u32);
+        put_u32(&mut data, HDR_IMAGES, images as u32);
+        put_u32(&mut data, HDR_IMAGES + 4, IMAGE_STRIDE as u32);
+        put_u32(&mut data, images + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFFSET, 0);
+        put_u32(&mut data, images + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFFSET, 2);
+        // Deliberately traverse the high method indices first.
+        put_u32(&mut data, types + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFFSET, 4);
+        put_u16(&mut data, types + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFFSET, 3);
+        put_u32(&mut data, types + TYPE_STRIDE + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFFSET, 0);
+        put_u16(&mut data, types + TYPE_STRIDE + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFFSET, 4);
+        for (index, &token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
+            put_u32(
+                &mut data,
+                methods + index * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFFSET,
+                token,
+            );
+        }
+        (data, methods)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn restores_five_round_permutation_by_physical_method_index() {
+        let tokens = (1..=7)
+            .map(|expected| {
+                METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | encrypted_rid(expected, 7, DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED)
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        let (data, methods) = build(&tokens);
+        let (restored, report) =
+            restore_method_tokens(&data, DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED).expect("restore");
+        assert_eq!(report.encryption_status, "encrypted");
+        assert!(report.changed_tokens > 0);
+        assert_eq!(report.correct_after, 7);
+        for index in 0..7 {
+            assert_eq!(
+                read_u32(
+                    &restored,
+                    methods + index * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFFSET
+                )
+                .expect("token"),
+                METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | (index as u32 + 1)
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clean_metadata_is_idempotent() {
+        let tokens = (1..=7)
+            .map(|rid| METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | rid)
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        let (data, _) = build(&tokens);
+        let (restored, report) =
+            restore_method_tokens(&data, DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED).expect("restore");
+        assert_eq!(report.encryption_status, "clean");
+        assert_eq!(report.changed_tokens, 0);
+        assert_eq!(restored, data);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encrypted_metadata_rejects_the_wrong_seed() {
+        let tokens = (1..=7)
+            .map(|expected| {
+                METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | encrypted_rid(expected, 7, DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED)
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        let (data, _) = build(&tokens);
+        let wrong_seed = DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED.wrapping_add(1);
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            restore_method_tokens(&data, wrong_seed),
+            Err(Error::Validation(_))
+        ));
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-cli"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+description = "Command-line entry point for Senbei"
+license.workspace = true
+keywords = ["unpacker", "reverse-engineering", "pe", "security-research"]
+categories = ["command-line-utilities"]
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "senbei"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+senbei-io.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+senbei-io.workspace = true
+senbei-metadata.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tempfile.workspace = true
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use senbei::{job, pause};
+use senbei_io::{job, pause, scan};
 use std::path::Path;

 fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode {
@@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode {
            "--no-log" => no_log = true,
            "--scan-all" => scan_all = true,
            "--out" => match args.next() {
-                // Reject a missing value (and a following flag swallowed as the
-                // value): previously `--out` at end of argv silently fell back
-                // to the default output directory.
                Some(v) if !v.starts_with('-') => out = Some(v),
                _ => {
                    eprintln!("error: --out requires a directory argument");
@@ -42,7 +39,6 @@ fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode {
                return std::process::ExitCode::from(2);
            }
            other => {
-                // Previously the last positional silently won.
                if let Some(prev) = &path {
                    eprintln!("error: multiple input paths given ('{prev}' and '{other}')");
                    return std::process::ExitCode::from(2);
@@ -63,33 +59,29 @@ fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode {
            }
            let p = Path::new(&p);
            let out_path = out.as_deref().map(Path::new);
-            let r = if p.is_dir() {
+            let result = if p.is_dir() {
                job::run_folder_opts(
                    p,
                    out_path,
                    quiet,
                    verbose,
                    no_log,
-                    scan_all || senbei::scan::scan_all_env(),
+                    scan_all || scan::scan_all_env(),
                )
            } else {
                job::run_file_v(p, out_path, quiet, verbose, no_log)
            };
-            match r {
-                Ok(s) => {
+            match result {
+                Ok(summary) => {
                    if quiet < 2 {
-                        println!(
-                            "{} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata",
-                            s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata
-                        );
-                        println!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms);
+                        println!("{}", summary.line());
+                        println!("done in {} ms", summary.duration_ms);
                    }
-                    if s.errors > 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+                    if summary.errors > 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
                }
-                Err(e) => {
-                    // Fatal: out-dir/log create, etc.
+                Err(error) => {
                    if quiet < 2 {
-                        eprintln!("error: {e:#}");
+                        eprintln!("error: {error:#}");
                    }
                    1
                }
@@ -105,9 +97,15 @@ fn print_help() {
    println!(
        "senbei <file|folder> [--out DIR] [-v|--verbose] [-q|--quiet]... [--scan-all] [--no-log] [--no-pause] [-V|--version] [-h|--help]"
    );
+    println!(
+        "  input        a Crackproof PE (.exe/.dll), an il2cpp global-metadata.dat,\n\
+         \x20              a protected Android AArch64 library (.so), an Android app\n\
+         \x20              package (.apk/.apks/.xapk), or a folder containing any of\n\
+         \x20              these"
+    );
    println!(
        "  --scan-all   probe every file in a folder, including ones the scan\n\
-         \x20              pre-filter skips (under 4128 bytes, or a bulk-asset\n\
-         \x20              extension like .ab/.xml/.acb). Much slower on game trees."
+         \x20              pre-filter skips (under 4128 bytes, extensionless,\n\
+         \x20              or a bulk-asset extension). Much slower on large trees."
    );
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+//! Corpus test over the user-managed Android samples.
+//!
+//! Each immediate subdirectory of `samples/android/` that contains a `lib/`
+//! tree is one app-package sample (an extracted APK layout). For every
+//! protected AArch64 `.so` found by content probe, the test runs the real
+//! restore pipeline and checks the result:
+//!
+//! - `<name>.golden.so.sha256` next to the input pins the restored bytes
+//!   (byte-identity through the digest; absent sidecar -> WARNING).
+//! - `<name>.restore-fails` (empty marker) documents an input whose restore
+//!   is known to fail; the test then *requires* failure, so a future fix
+//!   surfaces as a test failure too. Without the marker a failed restore is
+//!   a test failure.
+//! - A restored library carrying an unwrappable embedded metadata blob must
+//!   produce one, pinned by `<name>.golden.metadata.sha256`.
+//!
+//! The folder-mode driver is then run over each app dir to exercise the
+//! scan/restore/write path end to end; its error count must equal the number
+//! of marked known-failures.
+//!
+//! The corpus is git-ignored and absent on CI (no binaries in the repo);
+//! `SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES=1` turns an absent corpus into a failure, and
+//! `SENBEI_ANDROID_SAMPLES` overrides the corpus location.
+
+mod common;
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use senbei_io::{android, job};
+
+fn corpus_dir() -> PathBuf {
+    if let Some(dir) = std::env::var_os("SENBEI_ANDROID_SAMPLES") {
+        return PathBuf::from(dir);
+    }
+    common::samples_dir().join("android")
+}
+
+/// Immediate subdirectories of `root` that hold an app tree (a `lib/`
+/// folder) — research notes, dumps, and other non-app material in the corpus
+/// never match.
+fn app_dirs(root: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    let mut dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = std::fs::read_dir(root)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("read {}: {e}", root.display()))
+        .filter_map(|entry| entry.ok().map(|entry| entry.path()))
+        .filter(|path| path.is_dir() && path.join("lib").is_dir())
+        .collect();
+    dirs.sort();
+    dirs
+}
+
+/// Every regular `.so` below `dir`, skipping previous output trees.
+fn collect_so_files(dir: &Path, out: &mut Vec<PathBuf>) {
+    let mut entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("read {}: {e}", dir.display()))
+        .filter_map(|entry| entry.ok().map(|entry| entry.path()))
+        .collect();
+    entries.sort();
+    for path in entries {
+        if path.is_dir() {
+            if path
+                .file_name()
+                .is_some_and(|name| !name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("unpack"))
+            {
+                collect_so_files(&path, out);
+            }
+        } else if path
+            .extension()
+            .and_then(|ext| ext.to_str())
+            .is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("so"))
+        {
+            out.push(path);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn sha256_hex(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+    use sha2::Digest;
+    let mut digest = sha2::Sha256::new();
+    digest.update(data);
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(64);
+    for byte in digest.finalize() {
+        out.push_str(&format!("{byte:02x}"));
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// `<stem>.golden.so.sha256` next to `input`.
+fn golden_sidecar(input: &Path, artifact: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    let file = input.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy();
+    let stem = file.strip_suffix(".so").unwrap_or(&file);
+    input.with_file_name(format!("{stem}.golden.{artifact}.sha256"))
+}
+
+fn read_sidecar(path: &Path) -> Option<String> {
+    std::fs::read_to_string(path)
+        .ok()
+        .map(|text| text.trim().to_ascii_lowercase())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn android_samples_restore_against_goldens() {
+    let root = corpus_dir();
+    // Same opt-in gate as the PE corpus test: an absent corpus is a no-op
+    // pass unless CI explicitly requires it.
+    let require = std::env::var_os("SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES").is_some();
+    if !root.is_dir() {
+        assert!(
+            !require,
+            "android samples: {} does not exist — corpus required (CI)",
+            root.display()
+        );
+        eprintln!(
+            "android samples: {} does not exist, nothing to test",
+            root.display()
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+    let apps = app_dirs(&root);
+    if apps.is_empty() {
+        assert!(
+            !require,
+            "android samples: no app trees under {} — corpus required (CI)",
+            root.display()
+        );
+        eprintln!("android samples: no app trees under {}", root.display());
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let mut passed = 0usize;
+    let mut warnings: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    let mut failures: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+
+    for app in &apps {
+        let mut so_files = Vec::new();
+        collect_so_files(app, &mut so_files);
+        let protected: Vec<PathBuf> = so_files
+            .into_iter()
+            .filter(|path| android::is_protected_so_file(path))
+            .collect();
+        let mut known_failures = 0usize;
+
+        for input in &protected {
+            let name = input.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy().to_string();
+            let known_fails = input.with_file_name(format!(
+                "{}.restore-fails",
+                name.strip_suffix(".so").unwrap_or(&name)
+            ));
+            let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+            let dest = temp.path().join("restored.so");
+            match android::restore_so_file(input, &dest, false) {
+                Ok(embedded) => {
+                    if known_fails.is_file() {
+                        failures.push(format!(
+                            "{name}: restore succeeded but a restore-fails marker exists \
+                             (delete the marker — the gap is fixed)"
+                        ));
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    let bytes = std::fs::read(&dest).expect("read restored output");
+                    match read_sidecar(&golden_sidecar(input, "so")) {
+                        Some(expected) if expected == sha256_hex(&bytes) => passed += 1,
+                        Some(expected) => failures.push(format!(
+                            "{name}: restored bytes differ from golden\n  expected sha256 {expected}\n  actual   sha256 {}",
+                            sha256_hex(&bytes)
+                        )),
+                        None => warnings.push(format!(
+                            "{name}: no golden sidecar — restored sha256 {}",
+                            sha256_hex(&bytes)
+                        )),
+                    }
+                    if let Some(blob) = embedded {
+                        match read_sidecar(&golden_sidecar(input, "metadata")) {
+                            Some(expected) if expected == sha256_hex(&blob) => {}
+                            Some(expected) => failures.push(format!(
+                                "{name}: embedded metadata differs from golden\n  expected sha256 {expected}\n  actual   sha256 {}",
+                                sha256_hex(&blob)
+                            )),
+                            None => warnings.push(format!(
+                                "{name}: no embedded-metadata sidecar — sha256 {}",
+                                sha256_hex(&blob)
+                            )),
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(error) => {
+                    if known_fails.is_file() {
+                        known_failures += 1;
+                    } else {
+                        failures.push(format!("{name}: restore failed: {error:#}"));
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Folder-mode smoke run: the scan must route every protected library,
+        // and only the marked known-failures may error.
+        let out_temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+        match job::run_folder_opts(app, Some(out_temp.path()), 2, false, true, false) {
+            Ok(summary) => {
+                if summary.errors != known_failures {
+                    failures.push(format!(
+                        "{}: folder run errors {} != known-failure markers {known_failures}",
+                        app.display(),
+                        summary.errors
+                    ));
+                }
+                if summary.unpacked < protected.len().saturating_sub(known_failures) {
+                    failures.push(format!(
+                        "{}: folder run restored {} libraries, per-file pass found {} ({} known-failing)",
+                        app.display(),
+                        summary.unpacked,
+                        protected.len(),
+                        known_failures
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            Err(error) => failures.push(format!("{}: folder run failed: {error:#}", app.display())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    for warning in &warnings {
+        eprintln!("WARNING: {warning}");
+    }
+    eprintln!(
+        "android samples: {} app tree(s) — {passed} pass, {} warning(s), {} failure(s)",
+        apps.len(),
+        warnings.len(),
+        failures.len()
+    );
+    assert!(failures.is_empty(), "{}", failures.join("\n"));
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+//! Shared test fixtures.
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+/// Path to the workspace-root `samples/` — the user-managed corpus dropped in
+/// by hand. Git-ignored except its README; tests here run against whatever is
+/// present. `CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR` is `senbei-cli/`, so go one level up.
+pub fn samples_dir() -> PathBuf {
+    PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../samples")
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use senbei::job::{default_out_root_for_file, out_name};
+use senbei_io::job::{default_out_root_for_file, out_name};
 use std::path::Path;

 #[test]
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use senbei::logfile::{Log, local_stamp_compact, local_stamp_display};
+use senbei_io::logfile::{Log, local_stamp_compact, local_stamp_display};

 #[test]
 fn local_stamp_compact_matches_shape() {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use senbei::job;
+use senbei_io::job;
 use std::path::Path;

 fn list_logs(dir: &Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 //! - golden present, bytes differ     -> FAIL (the test fails)
 //! - no golden                        -> WARNING (printed; needs a manual check)
 //!
-//! Inputs go through [`senbei::job::unpack_bytes`], the same routing the CLI
+//! Inputs go through [`senbei_io::job::unpack_bytes`], the same routing the CLI
 //! uses, **not** `unpack_auto` directly. That matters: `unpack_auto` alone
 //! cannot reach the external-companion layout, whose stub is meaningless
 //! without its `<name>._` payload — a corpus wired to `unpack_auto` silently
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 //! samples folder is picked up automatically, exactly as it is on disk.
 //!
 //! An input whose bytes carry the il2cpp metadata magic is routed through
-//! [`senbei::metadata::deobfuscate`] instead, giving the method-token remap
+//! [`senbei_metadata::deobfuscate`] instead, giving the method-token remap
 //! real-world coverage (its unit tests only build synthetic layouts).
 //!
 //! The folder is git-ignored (see `senbei/samples/README.md`), so the set of
@@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ fn samples_unpack_against_goldens() {
            }
        };

-        let got = if senbei::metadata::is_metadata(&bytes) {
+        let got = if senbei_metadata::is_metadata(&bytes) {
            // il2cpp metadata: method-token de-obfuscation, no PE pipeline and
            // no integrity check (the output is not a PE image).
-            match senbei::metadata::deobfuscate(&bytes) {
+            match senbei_metadata::deobfuscate(&bytes) {
                Ok((out, _report)) => out,
                Err(e) => {
                    failures.push(format!("{name}: de-obfuscation failed: {e}"));
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ fn samples_unpack_against_goldens() {
                },
                None => None,
            };
-            let image = match senbei::job::unpack_bytes(&bytes, companion.as_deref()) {
+            let image = match senbei_io::job::unpack_bytes(&bytes, companion.as_deref()) {
                Ok(img) => img,
                Err(e) => {
                    failures.push(format!("{name}: unpack failed: {e:?}"));
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-crypto"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Cryptographic and compression primitives for Senbei"
+
+[dependencies]
+thiserror.workspace = true
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ impl OpsLut {
 pub fn generate(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> Option<Vec<Op>> {
    // Bounds-checked cursor: a corrupt `data_offset` (bad decrypt_data6 / the
    // alignment fallback) must yield `None`, not an out-of-bounds panic — the
-    // panic path would surface as a misleading `UnpackError::Corrupt` instead
-    // of the precise `BytecodeGenFailed`, and any future caller without a
+    // panic path would surface as a misleading `UnpackError::InternalPanic` instead
+    // of the precise `BytecodeGenerationFailed`, and any future caller without a
    // `catch_unwind` wrapper would abort outright.
    let mut pos = offset as usize;
    let mut next = move || {
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+//! Cryptographic, checksum, compression, and bytecode primitives.
+
+pub mod bytecode;
+pub mod crc32;
+pub mod primitives;
+mod tables;
+
+/// Maximum buffer size accepted by allocation-sensitive transforms.
+pub const MAX_IMAGE_SIZE: u64 = 1 << 30;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BufferOperation {
+    Read,
+    CopySource,
+    CopyDestination,
+    ZeroFill,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for BufferOperation {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(match self {
+            Self::Read => "read",
+            Self::CopySource => "copy source",
+            Self::CopyDestination => "copy destination",
+            Self::ZeroFill => "zero-fill",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error(
+        "{operation} range out of bounds (offset {offset}, size {size}, buffer length {buffer_len})"
+    )]
+    BufferRangeOutOfBounds {
+        operation: BufferOperation,
+        offset: usize,
+        size: usize,
+        buffer_len: usize,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum DecompressionFailure {
+    #[error("compressed source size {size} exceeds limit {max}")]
+    SourceTooLarge { size: u32, max: u64 },
+    #[error("Huffman code length {bits} is invalid")]
+    InvalidCodeLength { bits: u8 },
+    #[error("Huffman tree traversal exceeded 64 levels")]
+    HuffmanTraversalLimit,
+    #[error("pending length accumulator overflowed at {pending}")]
+    PendingLengthOverflow { pending: u32 },
+    #[error("output step {step} at byte {written} exceeds expected size {expected}")]
+    OutputOverflow {
+        written: u32,
+        step: u32,
+        expected: u32,
+    },
+    #[error("run-fill width {width} reads before output offset 0x{destination:08X}")]
+    RunFillBeforeOutput { width: u32, destination: u32 },
+    #[error("run-fill width {width} is unsupported")]
+    InvalidRunFillWidth { width: u32 },
+    #[error("back-reference distance {distance} exceeds {written} written bytes")]
+    InvalidBackReference { distance: u32, written: u32 },
+    #[error("Huffman symbol consumed no input and produced no output")]
+    NoProgress,
+    #[error(
+        "output size mismatch (wrote {written}/{expected} bytes after consuming {consumed}/{source_size})"
+    )]
+    OutputSizeMismatch {
+        written: u32,
+        expected: u32,
+        consumed: u32,
+        source_size: u32,
+    },
+}
@@ -146,11 +146,11 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn generated_tables_match_committed_bytes() {
        assert_eq!(COLUMMIX1.len(), 1024);
-        assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX1), 0x7e8d_5d5f);
-        assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX2), 0xfcc4_acfc);
-        assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX3), 0x637a_f0cd);
-        assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX4), 0x1e7b_c381);
-        assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&SBOX), 0x10fd_6dc1);
+        assert_eq!(crate::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX1), 0x7e8d_5d5f);
+        assert_eq!(crate::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX2), 0xfcc4_acfc);
+        assert_eq!(crate::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX3), 0x637a_f0cd);
+        assert_eq!(crate::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX4), 0x1e7b_c381);
+        assert_eq!(crate::crc32::compute(&SBOX), 0x10fd_6dc1);
        // Spot-check the first dword of each (matches the original first row).
        assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX1[..4], &[0x50, 0xa7, 0xf4, 0x51]);
        assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX2[..4], &[0xa7, 0xf4, 0x51, 0x50]);
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-io"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Filesystem, scanning, logging, and CLI orchestration for Senbei"
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+flate2.workspace = true
+indicatif.workspace = true
+owo-colors.workspace = true
+senbei-android-elf.workspace = true
+senbei-android-engine.workspace = true
+senbei-android-metadata.workspace = true
+senbei-metadata.workspace = true
+senbei-pe.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tempfile.workspace = true
+walkdir.workspace = true
+zip.workspace = true
+
+[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
+windows.workspace = true
+
+[target.'cfg(all(not(windows), not(target_arch = "wasm32")))'.dependencies]
+libc.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tempfile.workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+//! Android target orchestration: protected AArch64 shared libraries (`.so`),
+//! app packages (`.apk` / `.apks` / `.xapk`), and the Android variant of the
+//! il2cpp method-token obfuscation.
+//!
+//! The protection scheme hollows out an ELF64/AArch64 shared object and moves
+//! the original bytes into an encrypted payload appended as a `SHT_LOUSER`
+//! section; restoration extracts the stage-2 module set
+//! ([`senbei_android_engine`]) and rebuilds the static image
+//! ([`senbei_android_elf`]). Some il2cpp builds additionally embed their
+//! metadata blob — XOR-wrapped, with no standalone `global-metadata.dat` in
+//! the assets — inside the library's data section; after a successful restore
+//! the blob is located by content and unwrapped
+//! ([`senbei_android_metadata::extract_embedded_metadata`]).
+//!
+//! All functions in this module are native filesystem orchestration; the web
+//! app (wasm) never touches them.
+
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
+use flate2::read::DeflateDecoder;
+use senbei_android_elf::{RestoreOptions, restore_libil2cpp};
+use senbei_android_engine::{ExtractOptions, extract_stage2, is_protected_libil2cpp};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use zip::ZipArchive;
+
+/// File name of an il2cpp metadata blob (a platform-standard technology name).
+pub const METADATA_FILE_NAME: &str = "global-metadata.dat";
+
+/// Package extensions recognised as Android app packages. Packages are
+/// *containers*: membership is decided by extension plus the zip magic, while
+/// every file pulled out of one is still content-probed like a loose file.
+const PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS: [&str; 3] = ["apk", "apks", "xapk"];
+
+/// Whether `prefix` (the first bytes of a file) is an ELF64/AArch64 image.
+/// Only those can be protected Android libraries, so the folder scan uses this
+/// cheap check to decide when the full-file protection probe is worth its
+/// read.
+pub fn is_elf64_aarch64(prefix: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    prefix.len() >= 20
+        && prefix[0..4] == [0x7f, b'E', b'L', b'F']
+        && prefix[4] == 2 // ELFCLASS64
+        && prefix[5] == 1 // ELFDATA2LSB
+        && u16::from_le_bytes([prefix[18], prefix[19]]) == 0xB7 // EM_AARCH64
+}
+
+/// Whether `path` is an Android app package: a recognised package extension
+/// and the local-file-header zip magic in `prefix`.
+pub fn is_app_package(path: &Path, prefix: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    let is_package_ext = path
+        .extension()
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str())
+        .is_some_and(|value| {
+            PACKAGE_EXTENSIONS
+                .iter()
+                .any(|ext| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case(ext))
+        });
+    is_package_ext && prefix.starts_with(b"PK\x03\x04")
+}
+
+/// Probe a file on disk: true when it is a protected AArch64 library.
+/// Reads the whole file (the payload section is found through the
+/// section-header table at the end); call only after [`is_elf64_aarch64`]
+/// has matched a prefix.
+pub fn is_protected_so_file(path: &Path) -> bool {
+    let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(path) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    is_elf64_aarch64(&bytes) && is_protected_libil2cpp(&bytes)
+}
+
+/// Restore one protected `.so` to `dest`.
+///
+/// The stage-2 module set is extracted into a temporary workspace (it is an
+/// implementation detail of the two-phase restore, not user-facing output).
+/// Returns the unwrapped embedded metadata blob when the restored image
+/// carries one (see the module docs); the caller decides where to write it.
+pub fn restore_so_file(input: &Path, dest: &Path, verbose: bool) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    let temporary = tempfile::tempdir().context("create stage-2 workspace")?;
+    let stage2_dir = temporary.path().join("stage2");
+    extract_stage2(&ExtractOptions::with_defaults(
+        input.to_path_buf(),
+        stage2_dir.clone(),
+    ))
+    .context("extract stage-1/stage-2 payload")?;
+    restore_libil2cpp(&RestoreOptions {
+        input: input.to_path_buf(),
+        output: dest.to_path_buf(),
+        index: stage2_dir.join("index.json"),
+        dump_auxiliary: None,
+        outer_only: false,
+        preserve_entrypoint: false,
+        verbose,
+    })
+    .context("restore protected library")?;
+    let restored =
+        std::fs::read(dest).with_context(|| format!("read restored `{}`", dest.display()))?;
+    Ok(senbei_android_metadata::extract_embedded_metadata(
+        &restored,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// Content identity for cross-source deduplication: the same library may
+/// appear loose in a tree, in its `.apk`, and again in an `.apks`/`.xapk`
+/// bundle — restore it once, at the highest-priority source's destination.
+pub fn content_identity(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let mut digest = Sha256::new();
+    digest.update(data);
+    hex_digest(&digest.finalize())
+}
+
+/// Restore an il2cpp metadata blob (Android seeded permutation first, then the
+/// structural remap used by the Windows builds).
+///
+/// The Android variant obfuscates MethodDef RIDs with a keyed five-round
+/// permutation; the correct seed is recovered by intersecting per-image key
+/// residues, and the restore *validates* every restored RID against its
+/// canonical per-module index — so an unusable seed fails loudly and the
+/// caller falls through to the structural remap, which targets the same
+/// canonical form. Both paths are no-ops (`remapped == 0`) on an
+/// already-clean blob.
+pub fn restore_metadata_bytes(data: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<(Vec<u8>, senbei_metadata::Report)> {
+    if let Ok(discovery) = senbei_android_metadata::discover_method_token_seeds(data)
+        && discovery.version == 31
+        && discovery.images.iter().any(|image| !image.clean)
+    {
+        let mut seeds = discovery.seed_candidates.clone();
+        if seeds.is_empty() {
+            seeds.push(senbei_android_metadata::DEFAULT_METHOD_TOKEN_SEED);
+        }
+        // Trial-and-validate: a wrong seed fails the restore's full-coverage
+        // RID check, so ambiguous candidates cost one extra pass each and a
+        // build with an unseeded permutation falls through to the structural
+        // remap rather than producing a silently wrong file.
+        for seed in seeds {
+            if let Ok((out, report)) = senbei_android_metadata::restore_method_tokens(data, seed) {
+                return Ok((
+                    out,
+                    senbei_metadata::Report {
+                        version: report.version,
+                        methods: report.methods,
+                        remapped: report.changed_tokens,
+                        modules: report.images_with_methods,
+                    },
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let (out, report) = senbei_metadata::deobfuscate(data).map_err(anyhow::Error::new)?;
+    Ok((out, report))
+}
+
+/// What happened to one archive entry (or one loose Android target).
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct EntryOutcome {
+    /// Human-readable source label, e.g. `base.apk::lib/arm64-v8a/libil2cpp.so`.
+    pub label: String,
+    /// Where the restored bytes were written (meaningless unless `status` is
+    /// `Restored`).
+    pub dest: PathBuf,
+    pub kind: EntryKind,
+    pub status: EntryStatus,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum EntryKind {
+    /// A protected shared library, restored.
+    So,
+    /// An il2cpp metadata blob, de-obfuscated (`remapped` tokens changed).
+    Metadata { remapped: usize },
+    /// A metadata blob unwrapped from a restored library's data section.
+    EmbeddedMetadata,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum EntryStatus {
+    Restored,
+    /// Byte-identical content was already restored from a higher-priority
+    /// source; no output written.
+    Duplicate,
+    /// Content-probed but not a target (unprotected library).
+    NotTarget,
+    /// A metadata blob whose tokens were already canonical; no copy written.
+    Unchanged,
+    /// Recognised as a target but the restore failed.
+    Failed(anyhow::Error),
+}
+
+/// Restore every protected library and metadata blob inside one app package.
+///
+/// `rel` is the package's path relative to the scanned root (or its bare file
+/// name in single-file mode); outputs mirror the package's internal layout
+/// under `out_root/rel/`, with [`crate::job::out_name`] renaming. `seen`
+/// carries content identities already restored from higher-priority sources
+/// (loose files first, then `.apk`, then bundles) across the whole run.
+pub fn restore_package(
+    package: &Path,
+    rel: &Path,
+    out_root: &Path,
+    seen: &mut HashSet<String>,
+    verbose: bool,
+) -> Result<Vec<EntryOutcome>> {
+    let bundle = package
+        .extension()
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str())
+        .is_some_and(|value| {
+            value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("apks") || value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("xapk")
+        });
+    let mut archive = open_package(package)?;
+    let temporary = tempfile::tempdir().context("create package workspace")?;
+    let mut outcomes = Vec::new();
+
+    let mut direct = Vec::new();
+    let mut nested = Vec::new();
+    for index in 0..archive.len() {
+        let (name, is_dir) = {
+            let entry = archive.by_index(index)?;
+            (entry.enclosed_name(), entry.is_dir())
+        };
+        if is_dir {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let Some(name) = name else {
+            bail!("unsafe entry path in package `{}`", package.display());
+        };
+        if bundle {
+            if name
+                .extension()
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str())
+                .is_some_and(|value| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("apk"))
+            {
+                nested.push((index, name));
+            }
+        } else {
+            direct.push((index, name));
+        }
+    }
+    drop(archive);
+
+    for (index, name) in direct {
+        let label = format!("{}::{}", rel.display(), name.display());
+        let dest = out_root.join(rel).join(crate::job::out_name(&name));
+        let mut entry_outcomes =
+            restore_package_entry(package, index, &label, &dest, &temporary, seen, verbose)
+                .with_context(|| format!("extract `{label}`"))?;
+        outcomes.append(&mut entry_outcomes);
+    }
+    for (index, name) in nested {
+        let nested_label = rel.join(&name);
+        let nested_path = extract_entry(package, index, &temporary, &nested_label)
+            .with_context(|| format!("extract `{}`", nested_label.display()))?;
+        let mut nested_archive = open_package(&nested_path)?;
+        let mut entries = Vec::new();
+        for nested_index in 0..nested_archive.len() {
+            let (entry_name, is_dir) = {
+                let entry = nested_archive.by_index(nested_index)?;
+                (entry.enclosed_name(), entry.is_dir())
+            };
+            if !is_dir {
+                let Some(entry_name) = entry_name else {
+                    bail!("unsafe entry path in `{}`", nested_label.display());
+                };
+                entries.push((nested_index, entry_name));
+            }
+        }
+        drop(nested_archive);
+        // Keep the nested package's stem in the output layout so two splits
+        // carrying same-named entries cannot collide.
+        let base = rel.join(name.with_extension(""));
+        for (nested_index, entry_name) in entries {
+            let label = format!("{}::{}", nested_label.display(), entry_name.display());
+            let dest = out_root.join(&base).join(crate::job::out_name(&entry_name));
+            let mut entry_outcomes = restore_package_entry(
+                &nested_path,
+                nested_index,
+                &label,
+                &dest,
+                &temporary,
+                seen,
+                verbose,
+            )
+            .with_context(|| format!("extract `{label}`"))?;
+            outcomes.append(&mut entry_outcomes);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(outcomes)
+}
+
+/// Probe one extracted package entry and restore it when it is a target.
+/// Returns one outcome per produced/consumed artifact: the entry itself, plus
+/// an `EmbeddedMetadata` outcome when the restored library carried a blob.
+fn restore_package_entry(
+    package: &Path,
+    index: usize,
+    label: &str,
+    dest: &Path,
+    temporary: &tempfile::TempDir,
+    seen: &mut HashSet<String>,
+    verbose: bool,
+) -> Result<Vec<EntryOutcome>> {
+    let entry_path = extract_entry(package, index, temporary, Path::new(label))?;
+    let data = std::fs::read(&entry_path).with_context(|| format!("read extracted `{label}`"))?;
+
+    let is_so = is_elf64_aarch64(&data) && is_protected_libil2cpp(&data);
+    let is_meta = !is_so && senbei_metadata::is_metadata(&data);
+    let outcome = |kind, status| EntryOutcome {
+        label: label.to_owned(),
+        dest: dest.to_path_buf(),
+        kind,
+        status,
+    };
+    if !is_so && !is_meta {
+        return Ok(vec![outcome(EntryKind::So, EntryStatus::NotTarget)]);
+    }
+    if !seen.insert(content_identity(&data)) {
+        let kind = if is_so {
+            EntryKind::So
+        } else {
+            EntryKind::Metadata { remapped: 0 }
+        };
+        return Ok(vec![outcome(kind, EntryStatus::Duplicate)]);
+    }
+
+    if is_so {
+        return Ok(match restore_so_file(&entry_path, dest, verbose) {
+            Ok(embedded) => {
+                let mut outcomes = vec![outcome(EntryKind::So, EntryStatus::Restored)];
+                if let Some(blob) = embedded {
+                    let meta_dest = embedded_metadata_dest(dest);
+                    let status = match write_metadata_blob(&meta_dest, &blob) {
+                        Ok(()) => EntryStatus::Restored,
+                        Err(error) => EntryStatus::Failed(error),
+                    };
+                    outcomes.push(EntryOutcome {
+                        label: format!("{label} (embedded metadata)"),
+                        dest: meta_dest,
+                        kind: EntryKind::EmbeddedMetadata,
+                        status,
+                    });
+                }
+                outcomes
+            }
+            Err(error) => vec![outcome(EntryKind::So, EntryStatus::Failed(error))],
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Metadata entry: write only when the restore actually changed tokens —
+    // a clean blob needs no copy (same contract as loose metadata files).
+    let kind_and_status = match restore_metadata_bytes(&data) {
+        Ok((out, report)) if report.remapped > 0 => {
+            let kind = EntryKind::Metadata {
+                remapped: report.remapped,
+            };
+            match write_metadata_blob(dest, &out) {
+                Ok(()) => (kind, EntryStatus::Restored),
+                Err(error) => (kind, EntryStatus::Failed(error)),
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(_) => (EntryKind::Metadata { remapped: 0 }, EntryStatus::Unchanged),
+        Err(error) => (
+            EntryKind::Metadata { remapped: 0 },
+            EntryStatus::Failed(error),
+        ),
+    };
+    Ok(vec![outcome(kind_and_status.0, kind_and_status.1)])
+}
+
+/// Output path for a metadata blob unwrapped from a restored library: next to
+/// the library, under the standard file name (with the usual `.unpack` infix).
+pub fn embedded_metadata_dest(restored_so: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    let dir = restored_so.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("."));
+    dir.join(crate::job::out_name(Path::new(METADATA_FILE_NAME)))
+}
+
+/// Write a metadata blob, creating the parent directory. The restore writes
+/// its own output atomically; metadata blobs go through the job layer's
+/// atomic write to share the mid-write failure semantics.
+fn write_metadata_blob(dest: &Path, data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
+            .with_context(|| format!("create `{}`", parent.display()))?;
+    }
+    crate::job::write_atomic(dest, data)
+        .map_err(anyhow::Error::from)
+        .context("write metadata output")
+}
+
+fn open_package(path: &Path) -> Result<ZipArchive<std::fs::File>> {
+    let file = std::fs::File::open(path).with_context(|| format!("open `{}`", path.display()))?;
+    ZipArchive::new(file).with_context(|| format!("read package `{}`", path.display()))
+}
+
+/// Extract one package entry to the temporary workspace, streaming stored
+/// entries and inflating deflated ones by hand so compression-method
+/// surprises fail loudly instead of producing a truncated file.
+fn extract_entry(
+    package: &Path,
+    index: usize,
+    temporary: &tempfile::TempDir,
+    label: &Path,
+) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let mut archive = open_package(package)?;
+    let mut entry = archive.by_index_raw(index)?;
+    let key = format!("{}-{index:08x}", label.display());
+    // `:` appears in `package::entry` labels and is invalid in Windows file
+    // names; sanitize every path-ish separator.
+    let destination = temporary.path().join(key.replace(['\\', '/', ':'], "_"));
+    let compressed_size = usize::try_from(entry.compressed_size())
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("entry compressed size exceeds usize"))?;
+    let output_size =
+        usize::try_from(entry.size()).map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("entry size exceeds usize"))?;
+    let mut compressed = vec![0_u8; compressed_size];
+    entry.read_exact(&mut compressed)?;
+    let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(output_size);
+    match entry.compression() {
+        zip::CompressionMethod::Stored => output.extend_from_slice(&compressed),
+        zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated => {
+            DeflateDecoder::new(compressed.as_slice()).read_to_end(&mut output)?;
+        }
+        method => bail!("unsupported compression method {method:?} in entry `{key}`"),
+    }
+    if output.len() != output_size {
+        bail!(
+            "entry `{key}` decompressed to 0x{:x}, expected 0x{output_size:x}",
+            output.len()
+        );
+    }
+    std::fs::write(&destination, &output)?;
+    Ok(destination)
+}
+/// Lowercase hex of a digest output (sha2 0.11's `Array` no longer formats as
+/// hex directly).
+fn hex_digest(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(data.len() * 2);
+    for byte in data {
+        out.push_str(&format!("{byte:02x}"));
+    }
+    out
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use crate::unpacker;
+use senbei_pe as unpacker;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

 /// Crackproof header key table lives at this fixed file offset. For the
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ fn splice_companion(stub: &[u8], comp: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
 }

 /// Summary of a folder-mode run.
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct Summary {
    pub unpacked: usize,
    pub skipped: usize,
@@ -331,12 +332,29 @@ pub struct Summary {
    /// — likely to crash at runtime (e.g. 0xC0000005). Counted in addition to
    /// `unpacked` (a suspect file is still written).
    pub suspect: usize,
-    /// il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` files de-obfuscated (method tokens remapped).
+    /// il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` files de-obfuscated (method tokens remapped),
+    /// including blobs unwrapped from restored Android libraries.
    pub metadata: usize,
+    /// Android app packages (`.apk`/`.apks`/`.xapk`) opened and searched.
+    pub packages: usize,
    /// Wall-clock duration of the folder run in milliseconds.
    pub duration_ms: u128,
 }

+impl Summary {
+    /// The summary line shared by CLI output and the log file.
+    pub fn line(&self) -> String {
+        let mut line = format!(
+            "{} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata",
+            self.unpacked, self.skipped, self.errors, self.suspect, self.metadata
+        );
+        if self.packages > 0 {
+            line.push_str(&format!(" · {} packages", self.packages));
+        }
+        line
+    }
+}
+
 /// Default output root for a folder unpack: `<root>/unpack`.
 pub fn default_out_root_for_folder(root: &Path) -> PathBuf {
    root.join("unpack")
@@ -387,9 +405,9 @@ pub fn run_folder_v(
 ///
 /// When `scan_all` is true every regular file under `root` is opened and
 /// content-probed, instead of skipping ones the free directory metadata already
-/// rules out (too small to hold a Crackproof key table, or a bulk-asset
-/// extension). See [`crate::scan::find_targets_opts`] — exhaustive scanning is
-/// dramatically slower on asset-heavy game trees and finds the same targets.
+/// rules out (extensionless, too small to hold a Crackproof key table, or a
+/// bulk-asset extension). See [`crate::scan::find_targets_opts`] — exhaustive
+/// scanning is dramatically slower on asset-heavy trees.
 pub fn run_folder_opts(
    root: &Path,
    out_dir: Option<&Path>,
@@ -416,12 +434,15 @@ pub fn run_folder_opts(
        log.step(&format!("out {}", out_root.display()));
        Some(log)
    };
-    // Single merged directory walk: returns Crackproof unpack candidates and
-    // il2cpp metadata blobs from one traversal (see
+    // Single merged directory walk: returns Crackproof unpack candidates, il2cpp
+    // metadata blobs, and Android targets from one traversal (see
    // [`crate::scan::find_targets_opts`]). Files the free directory metadata
    // already rules out are never opened — on asset-heavy trees the per-file
    // open+read latency, not the traversal, is the whole cost.
-    let (candidates, metas, scan_stats) = crate::scan::find_targets_opts(root, scan_all);
+    let scan = crate::scan::find_targets_opts(root, scan_all);
+    let candidates = scan.crackproof.as_slice();
+    let metas = scan.metadata.as_slice();
+    let scan_stats = &scan.stats;
    // Files the scan could not classify are potential missed targets, not
    // clean skips: an unreadable directory or a locked il2cpp game assembly must
    // fail the run (exit 1) rather than report "0 errors" over a partial scan.
@@ -453,21 +474,22 @@ pub fn run_folder_opts(
    // Verbose mode prints multi-line `[N/9]` step output per file straight to
    // stdout; an active progress bar would be clobbered by it, so hide the bar
    // (its per-file ok/err lines still print) when verbose is on.
-    let bar = crate::ui::progress(candidates.len() as u64, quiet >= 1 || verbose);
+    let android_targets = scan.android_so.len() + scan.android_packages.len();
+    let bar = crate::ui::progress(
+        (candidates.len() + android_targets) as u64,
+        quiet >= 1 || verbose,
+    );
    let mut s = Summary {
-        unpacked: 0,
        skipped: scan_stats.skipped,
        errors: scan_failed,
-        suspect: 0,
-        metadata: 0,
-        duration_ms: 0,
+        ..Summary::default()
    };

    // Silence the default panic hook's stderr spew during per-file processing.
    let default_hook = std::panic::take_hook();
    std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|_| {})); // suppress "thread panicked" messages

-    for input in &candidates {
+    for input in candidates {
        let rel = rel_in_tree(root, input);
        let dest = out_root.join(out_name(&rel));

@@ -515,14 +537,146 @@ pub fn run_folder_opts(
        bar.inc(1);
    }

+    // Android pass: protected AArch64 libraries and app packages. Loose `.so`
+    // files restore first so the cross-source dedup keeps them over a copy
+    // inside a package (loose beats `.apk` beats `.apks`/`.xapk` bundle).
+    let mut android_seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+    // Hashing a protected library costs a full read, so only pay it when a
+    // duplicate source can actually exist in this run.
+    let android_dedup = scan.android_so.len() > 1 || !scan.android_packages.is_empty();
+    for input in &scan.android_so {
+        let rel = rel_in_tree(root, input);
+        let dest = out_root.join(out_name(&rel));
+        // Unreadable here is fine: the restore reports the same error.
+        if android_dedup
+            && let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(input)
+            && !android_seen.insert(crate::android::content_identity(&bytes))
+        {
+            s.skipped += 1;
+            if let Some(log) = &log {
+                log.step(&format!("SKIP {rel:?}: duplicate of an earlier target"));
+            }
+            bar.inc(1);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let input_owned = input.clone();
+        let dest_owned = dest.clone();
+        let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+            crate::android::restore_so_file(&input_owned, &dest_owned, verbose_steps)
+        }));
+        match result {
+            Ok(Ok(embedded)) => {
+                s.unpacked += 1;
+                crate::ui::ok_label(
+                    &bar,
+                    suppress_file_lines,
+                    &rel.display().to_string(),
+                    "So",
+                    &dest,
+                );
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("OK {rel:?} -> {dest:?} (Android SO)"));
+                }
+                match write_embedded_metadata(embedded, &dest) {
+                    Ok(Some(meta_dest)) => {
+                        s.metadata += 1;
+                        crate::ui::ok_label(
+                            &bar,
+                            suppress_file_lines,
+                            &format!("{} (embedded metadata)", rel.display()),
+                            "metadata",
+                            &meta_dest,
+                        );
+                        if let Some(log) = &log {
+                            log.step(&format!("META {rel:?} (embedded) -> {meta_dest:?}"));
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(None) => {}
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        s.errors += 1;
+                        crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e);
+                        if let Some(log) = &log {
+                            log.step(&format!("ERR {rel:?}: embedded metadata: {e:#}"));
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(Err(e)) => {
+                s.errors += 1;
+                crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e);
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("ERR {rel:?}: {e:#}"));
+                }
+            }
+            Err(panic) => {
+                s.errors += 1;
+                let e = anyhow::anyhow!("unexpected panic: {}", panic_payload(&panic));
+                crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e);
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!(
+                        "ERR {rel:?}: panic during restore: {}",
+                        panic_payload(&panic)
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        bar.inc(1);
+    }
+    for package in &scan.android_packages {
+        let rel = rel_in_tree(root, package);
+        s.packages += 1;
+        let package_owned = package.clone();
+        let rel_owned = rel.clone().into_owned();
+        let out_root_owned = out_root.clone();
+        let mut seen_taken = std::mem::take(&mut android_seen);
+        let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+            let outcomes = crate::android::restore_package(
+                &package_owned,
+                &rel_owned,
+                &out_root_owned,
+                &mut seen_taken,
+                verbose_steps,
+            );
+            (outcomes, seen_taken)
+        }));
+        match result {
+            Ok((Ok(outcomes), seen_back)) => {
+                android_seen = seen_back;
+                apply_package_outcomes(outcomes, &mut s, &bar, suppress_file_lines, &log);
+            }
+            Ok((Err(e), seen_back)) => {
+                android_seen = seen_back;
+                s.errors += 1;
+                crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e);
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("ERR {rel:?}: {e:#}"));
+                }
+            }
+            Err(panic) => {
+                // The dedup set may be in an unknown state after a panic; a
+                // re-scan costs a duplicate restore at worst, never corruption.
+                let e = anyhow::anyhow!("unexpected panic: {}", panic_payload(&panic));
+                s.errors += 1;
+                crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e);
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!(
+                        "ERR {rel:?}: panic during package restore: {}",
+                        panic_payload(&panic)
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        bar.inc(1);
+    }
+
    // il2cpp metadata pass. Crackproof's `-GMD` option obfuscates the method
    // tokens in `global-metadata.dat`; de-obfuscate any we find so the unpacked
    // il2cpp game assembly resolves methods instead of indexing its per-module
-    // tables out of bounds (see [`crate::metadata`]). This is additive to the
+    // tables out of bounds (see [`senbei_metadata`]). This is additive to the
    // Crackproof module unpack above — the metadata blob is not itself a
    // Crackproof file.
-    for meta in metas {
-        let rel = rel_in_tree(root, &meta);
+    for meta in metas.iter() {
+        let rel = rel_in_tree(root, meta);
        let dest = out_root.join(out_name(&rel));
        let meta_owned = meta.clone();
        let dest_owned = dest.clone();
@@ -604,10 +758,7 @@ pub fn run_folder_opts(
    s.duration_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis();
    if let Some(log) = &log {
        log.step(&format!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms));
-        log.step(&format!(
-            "summary: {} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata",
-            s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata
-        ));
+        log.step(&format!("summary: {}", s.line()));
    }
    Ok(s)
 }
@@ -646,23 +797,30 @@ pub fn run_file_v(

    let name = out_name(Path::new(input.file_name().unwrap_or_default()));
    let dest = out_root.join(name);
-    let mut s = Summary {
-        unpacked: 0,
-        skipped: 0,
-        errors: 0,
-        suspect: 0,
-        metadata: 0,
-        duration_ms: 0,
-    };
+    let mut s = Summary::default();

-    let is_meta = {
+    let prefix = {
        use std::io::Read;
-        let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
-        std::fs::File::open(input)
-            .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut buf))
-            .map(|_| crate::metadata::is_metadata(&buf))
-            .unwrap_or(false)
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 8 * 1024];
+        match std::fs::File::open(input).and_then(|mut f| f.read(&mut buf).map(|n| (buf, n))) {
+            Ok((buf, n)) => {
+                let mut b = buf;
+                b.truncate(n);
+                b
+            }
+            Err(_) => Vec::new(),
+        }
    };
+    let is_meta = senbei_metadata::is_metadata(&prefix);
+    // Android single-file targets are routed by content: a protected AArch64
+    // library probe needs the whole file (its payload section is found through
+    // the section-header table at the end), while a package is a container
+    // handled entry-by-entry. Anything else falls through to the PE pipeline.
+    let is_android_so = crate::android::is_elf64_aarch64(&prefix)
+        && std::fs::read(input)
+            .map(|bytes| senbei_android_engine::is_protected_libil2cpp(&bytes))
+            .unwrap_or(false);
+    let is_android_package = !is_android_so && crate::android::is_app_package(input, &prefix);

    if is_meta {
        match deobfuscate_metadata_to(input, &dest, verbose && quiet == 0) {
@@ -706,6 +864,77 @@ pub fn run_file_v(
                }
            }
        }
+    } else if is_android_so {
+        match crate::android::restore_so_file(input, &dest, verbose && quiet == 0) {
+            Ok(embedded) => {
+                s.unpacked = 1;
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("OK {:?} -> {:?} (Android SO)", input, dest));
+                }
+                if quiet == 0 {
+                    println!("✓ So  {}  ->  {}", input.display(), dest.display());
+                }
+                match write_embedded_metadata(embedded, &dest) {
+                    Ok(Some(meta_dest)) => {
+                        s.metadata += 1;
+                        if let Some(log) = &log {
+                            log.step(&format!("META {:?} (embedded) -> {:?}", input, meta_dest));
+                        }
+                        if quiet == 0 {
+                            println!(
+                                "✓ metadata  {} (embedded)  ->  {}",
+                                input.display(),
+                                meta_dest.display()
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Ok(None) => {}
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        s.errors += 1;
+                        if let Some(log) = &log {
+                            log.step(&format!("ERR {:?}: embedded metadata: {e:#}", input));
+                        }
+                        if quiet == 0 {
+                            eprintln!("error: embedded metadata: {e:#}");
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                s.errors = 1;
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("ERR {:?}: {e:#}", input));
+                }
+                if quiet == 0 {
+                    eprintln!("error: {e:#}");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else if is_android_package {
+        s.packages = 1;
+        let rel = PathBuf::from(input.file_name().unwrap_or_default());
+        let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        match crate::android::restore_package(
+            input,
+            &rel,
+            &out_root,
+            &mut seen,
+            verbose && quiet == 0,
+        ) {
+            Ok(outcomes) => {
+                let bar = crate::ui::progress(0, true);
+                apply_package_outcomes(outcomes, &mut s, &bar, quiet >= 1, &log);
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                s.errors = 1;
+                if let Some(log) = &log {
+                    log.step(&format!("ERR {:?}: {e:#}", input));
+                }
+                if quiet == 0 {
+                    eprintln!("error: {e:#}");
+                }
+            }
+        }
    } else {
        match unpack_one_v(input, &dest, verbose && quiet == 0) {
            Ok((kind, report)) => {
@@ -748,10 +977,7 @@ pub fn run_file_v(
    s.duration_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis();
    if let Some(log) = &log {
        log.step(&format!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms));
-        log.step(&format!(
-            "summary: {} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata",
-            s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata
-        ));
+        log.step(&format!("summary: {}", s.line()));
    }
    Ok(s)
 }
@@ -801,13 +1027,13 @@ fn panic_payload(panic: &(dyn std::any::Any + Send)) -> String {
    }
 }

-/// If `e`'s chain contains [`crate::metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion`],
+/// If `e`'s chain contains [`senbei_metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion`],
 /// return the version. Used to apply the folder-mode "leave untouched, don't
 /// fail the run" policy to metadata versions this build can't de-obfuscate.
 fn unsupported_version(e: &anyhow::Error) -> Option<u32> {
    for cause in e.chain() {
-        if let Some(crate::metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion(v)) =
-            cause.downcast_ref::<crate::metadata::Error>()
+        if let Some(senbei_metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion(v)) =
+            cause.downcast_ref::<senbei_metadata::Error>()
        {
            return Some(*v);
        }
@@ -820,7 +1046,7 @@ fn unsupported_version(e: &anyhow::Error) -> Option<u32> {
 /// failure (disk full, AV lock, quota) destroys a previously good unpack at
 /// the same path; the temp+rename keeps the old file until the new one is
 /// complete. Best-effort temp cleanup on failure.
-fn write_atomic(dest: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+pub(crate) fn write_atomic(dest: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    let mut tmp_name = dest.as_os_str().to_os_string();
    tmp_name.push(".senbei-tmp");
    let tmp = PathBuf::from(tmp_name);
@@ -831,19 +1057,14 @@ fn write_atomic(dest: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    r
 }

-/// Detect `bytes` and run the right pipeline. The EXE pipeline is invoked
-/// directly (no DLL-pipeline probe) when the input was spliced from an
-/// external companion (`spliced`) or when the caller forces it (`force_exe`
-/// — the web app's recovery path after a DLL-probe trap; see
-/// [`unpack_bytes_force_exe`]).
+/// Detect `bytes` and run the right pipeline. Spliced external companions use
+/// the EXE pipeline directly because that layout is definitionally EXE-style.
 ///
 /// Routing spliced inputs straight to the EXE pipeline is safe: the
 /// companion layout is definitionally the EXE-style shell (the runtime
 /// loader maps the companion and runs the standard shell unpack), so the DLL
-/// pipeline probe can never be right for it — and probing is not a no-op on
-/// targets without unwinding (wasm), where the probe's caught panic becomes
-/// a fatal trap. Output bytes are identical to the dll-first + exe-fallback
-/// route for every input that route handles.
+/// pipeline probe can never be right for it. Output bytes are identical to the
+/// DLL-first + EXE-fallback route for every input that route handles.
 fn unpack_spliced_or_auto(
    bytes: &[u8],
    spliced: bool,
@@ -880,10 +1101,9 @@ pub struct UnpackedImage {
 /// Unpack in-memory `input` bytes, optionally paired with an external
 /// companion payload `companion` (the `<input>._` file's contents).
 ///
-/// This is the I/O-free counterpart of [`unpack_one_v`], used by the
-/// WebAssembly build: splice (when the companion's first 32 bytes match the
-/// stub header), unpack, overlay the export table and TLS directory from the
-/// stub, then run the static integrity check.
+/// This is the in-memory counterpart of [`unpack_one_v`]: splice a matching
+/// companion, unpack, overlay the export table and TLS directory from the stub,
+/// then run the static integrity check.
 pub fn unpack_bytes(
    input: &[u8],
    companion: Option<&[u8]>,
@@ -960,7 +1180,7 @@ pub fn unpack_one_v(
 /// into a sparse, original-metadata-style value; il2cpp expects the contiguous
 /// per-module index it indexes its codegen tables with, so a statically-unpacked
 /// il2cpp game assembly reads garbage and crashes during init. This rewrites
-/// the tokens back to their canonical form (see [`crate::metadata::deobfuscate`]).
+/// the tokens back to their canonical form (see [`senbei_metadata::deobfuscate`]).
 ///
 /// The output is written only when something actually changed
 /// (`report.remapped > 0`); an already-clean metadata is left untouched and no
@@ -970,12 +1190,15 @@ pub fn deobfuscate_metadata_to(
    input: &Path,
    dest: &Path,
    verbose: bool,
-) -> anyhow::Result<crate::metadata::Report> {
+) -> anyhow::Result<senbei_metadata::Report> {
    let data = std::fs::read(input)?;
-    // Preserve the metadata::Error in the chain (rather than stringifying it)
-    // so the folder driver can apply its unsupported-version policy.
-    let (out, report) = crate::metadata::deobfuscate(&data)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::Error::new(e).context(format!("{input:?}")))?;
+    // The Android seeded-permutation variant is tried first (it validates
+    // every restored RID); the structural remap is the fallback and the
+    // Windows path. The [`senbei_metadata::Error`] is preserved in the chain
+    // (rather than stringified) so the folder driver can apply its
+    // unsupported-version policy.
+    let (out, report) = crate::android::restore_metadata_bytes(&data)
+        .map_err(|e| e.context(format!("{input:?}")))?;
    if report.remapped > 0 {
        if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
@@ -988,6 +1211,77 @@ pub fn deobfuscate_metadata_to(
    Ok(report)
 }

+/// Write an embedded metadata blob (unwrapped from a restored Android
+/// library) next to the restored library. Returns the destination when a
+/// blob was written.
+fn write_embedded_metadata(
+    embedded: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    so_dest: &Path,
+) -> anyhow::Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
+    let Some(blob) = embedded else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let dest = crate::android::embedded_metadata_dest(so_dest);
+    if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+    }
+    write_atomic(&dest, &blob)?;
+    Ok(Some(dest))
+}
+
+/// Fold one package's per-entry outcomes into the run summary, UI, and log.
+fn apply_package_outcomes(
+    outcomes: Vec<crate::android::EntryOutcome>,
+    s: &mut Summary,
+    bar: &indicatif::ProgressBar,
+    quiet: bool,
+    log: &Option<crate::logfile::Log>,
+) {
+    use crate::android::{EntryKind, EntryStatus};
+    for outcome in outcomes {
+        match outcome.status {
+            EntryStatus::Restored => {
+                match outcome.kind {
+                    EntryKind::So => {
+                        s.unpacked += 1;
+                        crate::ui::ok_label(bar, quiet, &outcome.label, "So", &outcome.dest);
+                    }
+                    EntryKind::Metadata { remapped } => {
+                        s.metadata += 1;
+                        crate::ui::metadata(
+                            bar,
+                            quiet,
+                            Path::new(&outcome.label),
+                            remapped,
+                            &outcome.dest,
+                        );
+                    }
+                    EntryKind::EmbeddedMetadata => {
+                        s.metadata += 1;
+                        crate::ui::ok_label(bar, quiet, &outcome.label, "metadata", &outcome.dest);
+                    }
+                }
+                if let Some(log) = log {
+                    log.step(&format!("OK {} -> {:?}", outcome.label, outcome.dest));
+                }
+            }
+            EntryStatus::Duplicate | EntryStatus::NotTarget | EntryStatus::Unchanged => {
+                s.skipped += 1;
+                if let Some(log) = log {
+                    log.step(&format!("SKIP {} ({:?})", outcome.label, outcome.kind));
+                }
+            }
+            EntryStatus::Failed(e) => {
+                s.errors += 1;
+                crate::ui::err(bar, quiet, Path::new(&outcome.label), &e);
+                if let Some(log) = log {
+                    log.step(&format!("ERR {}: {e:#}", outcome.label));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+//! Filesystem and command-line orchestration.
+
+pub mod android;
 pub mod job;
 pub mod logfile;
-pub mod metadata;
 pub mod pause;
 pub mod scan;
 pub mod ui;
-pub mod unpacker;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use crate::unpacker::detect;
+use senbei_pe::detect;
 use std::io::Read;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use walkdir::WalkDir;
@@ -16,24 +16,23 @@ const DETECT_PREFIX: u64 = 8 * 1024;
 /// Smallest file that can possibly be a target, so anything shorter is skipped
 /// without ever being opened.
 ///
-/// A Crackproof module needs ≥ 4128 bytes for [`crate::unpacker::detect`]'s key
+/// A Crackproof module needs ≥ 4128 bytes for [`senbei_pe::detect`]'s key
 /// table (it reads the dword at 4124), so the bound is exact for the unpack
 /// path. An il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` only needs 4 bytes to match its magic,
 /// but its header alone runs to offset 0xB0 and the images/types/methods tables
 /// it indexes make every real one megabytes long — a sub-4 KiB "metadata" could
-/// only ever fail [`crate::metadata::deobfuscate`] with `Malformed`, so nothing
+/// only ever fail [`senbei_metadata::deobfuscate`] with `Malformed`, so nothing
 /// processable is lost.
 const MIN_SIZE: u64 = 4128;

 /// File extensions that are bulk data by construction and can never be a PE
 /// image or an il2cpp metadata blob.
 ///
-/// This is deliberately a **deny**-list, not an allow-list: the default is to
-/// probe, so anything unrecognised is still opened. Targets are recognised by
-/// content, not extension, and can carry arbitrary names — there is no closed
-/// set of target extensions an allow-list of `exe`/`dll` could enumerate.
-/// Only extensions that are bulk asset or text formats by construction appear
-/// here.
+/// This is deliberately a **deny**-list, not an executable allow-list: unknown
+/// extensions are still probed. Extensionless files are handled separately by
+/// [`denied_name`] because asset stores commonly contain tens of thousands of
+/// extensionless chunks; exhaustive probing remains available through
+/// `--scan-all`.
 ///
 /// Set `SENBEI_SCAN_ALL=1` (or pass `--scan-all`) to probe every file regardless.
 const DENY_EXT: &[&str] = &[
@@ -90,11 +89,12 @@ const DENY_EXT: &[&str] = &[
    "sr",
 ];

-/// Whether `path`'s extension is on [`DENY_EXT`]. Extensionless files are never
-/// denied (they could be anything).
-fn denied_ext(path: &Path) -> bool {
+/// Whether `path` can be skipped from its name alone. Extensionless files and
+/// files whose extension is on [`DENY_EXT`] are not opened during a default
+/// scan. `--scan-all` remains available when exhaustive probing is required.
+fn denied_name(path: &Path) -> bool {
    let Some(ext) = path.extension() else {
-        return false;
+        return true;
    };
    let Some(ext) = ext.to_str() else {
        return false;
@@ -115,6 +115,25 @@ enum Class {
    Crackproof,
    /// An il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` (de-obfuscation target).
    Metadata,
+    /// A protected AArch64 shared library (Android restore target).
+    AndroidSo,
+    /// An Android app package (`.apk`/`.apks`/`.xapk`) — a container whose
+    /// entries are content-probed individually during the Android pass.
+    AndroidPackage,
+}
+
+/// Everything one [`find_targets_opts`] walk found, plus non-target tallies.
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct ScanResult {
+    /// Crackproof-protected PE files.
+    pub crackproof: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` blobs.
+    pub metadata: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Protected AArch64 shared libraries.
+    pub android_so: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Android app packages (containers restored entry-by-entry).
+    pub android_packages: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    pub stats: ScanStats,
 }

 /// Walk `root` recursively (skipping any directory literally named `"unpack"`)
@@ -146,7 +165,7 @@ enum Class {
 /// thread count: each worker owns a disjoint contiguous slice of the path list
 /// and writes the matching disjoint slice of the class list, so results are
 /// deterministic.
-pub fn find_targets(root: &Path) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<PathBuf>, ScanStats) {
+pub fn find_targets(root: &Path) -> ScanResult {
    find_targets_opts(root, scan_all_env())
 }

@@ -169,7 +188,7 @@ pub struct ScanStats {
 /// [`find_targets`], but with the pre-filter explicitly controlled. When
 /// `scan_all` is true every regular file is probed, restoring the exhaustive
 /// (and on asset-heavy trees, far slower) behavior.
-pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<PathBuf>, ScanStats) {
+pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> ScanResult {
    // Phase 1: serial traversal collecting regular-file paths only. No file is
    // opened here; `readdir` is fast relative to the content probe that follows,
    // and `entry.metadata()` is served from the directory entry on Windows, so
@@ -206,12 +225,17 @@ pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<Path
            continue;
        }
        if !scan_all {
+            // Name checks come first so extensionless asset chunks never
+            // trigger even an explicit metadata query.
+            if denied_name(entry.path()) {
+                continue;
+            }
            // Skip on directory metadata alone — never open these.
            let too_small = entry
                .metadata()
                .map(|m| m.len() < MIN_SIZE)
                .unwrap_or(false);
-            if too_small || denied_ext(entry.path()) {
+            if too_small {
                continue;
            }
        }
@@ -223,7 +247,7 @@ pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<Path
    // `Some(Class::None)` means "probed, matched neither detector".
    let n = paths.len();
    let mut class: Vec<Option<Class>> = vec![Some(Class::None); n];
-    let workers = crate::unpacker::parallel::thread_cap().clamp(1, n.max(1));
+    let workers = senbei_pe::thread_cap().clamp(1, n.max(1));
    if workers <= 1 {
        for (p, c) in paths.iter().zip(class.iter_mut()) {
            *c = classify(p);
@@ -241,19 +265,23 @@ pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<Path
        });
    }

-    let mut candidates = Vec::new();
-    let mut metadata = Vec::new();
+    let mut result = ScanResult {
+        stats,
+        ..ScanResult::default()
+    };
    for (p, c) in paths.into_iter().zip(class) {
        match c {
-            Some(Class::Crackproof) => candidates.push(p),
-            Some(Class::Metadata) => metadata.push(p),
-            Some(Class::None) => stats.skipped += 1,
+            Some(Class::Crackproof) => result.crackproof.push(p),
+            Some(Class::Metadata) => result.metadata.push(p),
+            Some(Class::AndroidSo) => result.android_so.push(p),
+            Some(Class::AndroidPackage) => result.android_packages.push(p),
+            Some(Class::None) => result.stats.skipped += 1,
            // Unreadable / panicking probe: NOT skipped — the scan could not
            // classify it, so it may be a target we failed to unpack.
-            None => stats.probe_errors += 1,
+            None => result.stats.probe_errors += 1,
        }
    }
-    (candidates, metadata, stats)
+    result
 }

 /// True if a walked directory entry is a reparse point (junction or symlink).
@@ -287,10 +315,11 @@ pub fn scan_all_env() -> bool {
 }

 /// Classify one file by content. Reads a short prefix once and tests the
-/// Crackproof detector first, then the il2cpp metadata magic. Returns `None`
-/// when the file could not be classified at all — an I/O error opening it
-/// (locked, permissions) or a panic inside a detector — so the caller counts
-/// it as a probe error rather than a clean "not a target" skip.
+/// Crackproof detector first, then the il2cpp metadata magic, then the
+/// Android probes. Returns `None` when the file could not be classified at
+/// all — an I/O error opening it (locked, permissions) or a panic inside a
+/// detector — so the caller counts it as a probe error rather than a clean
+/// "not a target" skip.
 ///
 /// The detector is wrapped in `catch_unwind` because a panic in a scan worker
 /// thread would otherwise abort the whole folder run (a scoped-thread panic
@@ -299,16 +328,32 @@ pub fn scan_all_env() -> bool {
 ///
 /// A Crackproof PE never matches the metadata magic (it is a PE, not a
 /// metadata blob) and vice versa, so the order is immaterial.
+///
+/// The Android library probe needs more than the prefix: the protection
+/// payload lives in a section found via the section-header table at the *end*
+/// of the file, so an ELF64/AArch64 prefix triggers a full-file read. Only
+/// aarch64 images pay for it — a handful of `.so` files per app tree, against
+/// tens of thousands of assets the free name/size checks already rejected.
 fn classify(path: &Path) -> Option<Class> {
    let head = read_prefix(path, DETECT_PREFIX)?;
    let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
        if detect(&head).is_some() {
-            Class::Crackproof
-        } else if crate::metadata::is_metadata(&head) {
-            Class::Metadata
-        } else {
-            Class::None
+            return Class::Crackproof;
        }
+        if senbei_metadata::is_metadata(&head) {
+            return Class::Metadata;
+        }
+        if crate::android::is_elf64_aarch64(&head)
+            && std::fs::read(path)
+                .map(|bytes| senbei_android_engine::is_protected_libil2cpp(&bytes))
+                .unwrap_or(false)
+        {
+            return Class::AndroidSo;
+        }
+        if crate::android::is_app_package(path, &head) {
+            return Class::AndroidPackage;
+        }
+        Class::None
    }));
    r.ok()
 }
@@ -329,29 +374,49 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn denies_bulk_asset_extensions_case_insensitively() {
        for p in ["a.ab", "a.XML", "a.Acb", "a.ma2", "a.manifest", "a.PNG"] {
-            assert!(denied_ext(Path::new(p)), "{p} should be denied");
+            assert!(denied_name(Path::new(p)), "{p} should be denied");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn denies_extensionless_files() {
+        for p in ["asset", "level0", "0123456789abcdef"] {
+            assert!(denied_name(Path::new(p)), "{p} should be denied");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn never_denies_what_a_target_can_be_named() {
-        // Targets are recognised by content, not name — a protected module
-        // can carry any extension, or none — so names like these must always
-        // be probed. An allow-list would have skipped them.
+        // Unknown extensions must still be probed. This keeps the filter a
+        // narrow deny-list rather than an executable-extension allow-list.
        for p in [
            "app.exe.bak",
            "managed.dll.bak",
            "daemon.exe",
            "GameLib.dll",
            "global-metadata.dat",
-            "noextension",
            "a.so",
            "a.bin",
        ] {
-            assert!(!denied_ext(Path::new(p)), "{p} must still be probed");
+            assert!(!denied_name(Path::new(p)), "{p} must still be probed");
        }
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn extensionless_targets_require_exhaustive_scan() {
+        let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let root = td.path();
+        let mut blob = vec![0u8; MIN_SIZE as usize + 1];
+        blob[..4].copy_from_slice(&0xFAB1_1BAFu32.to_le_bytes());
+        std::fs::write(root.join("metadata"), &blob).unwrap();
+
+        let filtered = find_targets_opts(root, false);
+        assert!(filtered.metadata.is_empty());
+
+        let exhaustive = find_targets_opts(root, true);
+        assert_eq!(exhaustive.metadata.len(), 1);
+    }
+
    /// A file below the Crackproof key-table bound is skipped without being
    /// opened, but a large non-asset file is still probed.
    #[test]
@@ -364,10 +429,10 @@ mod tests {

        // None of them are Crackproof, so both modes find nothing; the point is
        // that the filtered walk does not panic and honors `scan_all`.
-        let (c, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, false);
-        assert!(c.is_empty() && m.is_empty());
-        let (c, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, true);
-        assert!(c.is_empty() && m.is_empty());
+        let scan = find_targets_opts(root, false);
+        assert!(scan.crackproof.is_empty() && scan.metadata.is_empty());
+        let scan = find_targets_opts(root, true);
+        assert!(scan.crackproof.is_empty() && scan.metadata.is_empty());
    }

    /// An il2cpp metadata blob is found by the filtered scan: `.dat` is not on
@@ -382,9 +447,9 @@ mod tests {
        // Same magic but too small to be processable — skipped by the size floor.
        std::fs::write(root.join("stub.dat"), &blob[..64]).unwrap();

-        let (_, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, false);
-        assert_eq!(m.len(), 1);
-        assert!(m[0].ends_with("global-metadata.dat"));
+        let scan = find_targets_opts(root, false);
+        assert_eq!(scan.metadata.len(), 1);
+        assert!(scan.metadata[0].ends_with("global-metadata.dat"));
    }

    /// Review regression: a previous output tree is pruned case-insensitively
@@ -403,12 +468,15 @@ mod tests {
        // A big non-target file at the root: probed, then skipped.
        std::fs::write(root.join("plain.dll"), vec![0u8; 100_000]).unwrap();

-        let (c, m, stats) = find_targets_opts(root, false);
+        let scan = find_targets_opts(root, false);
        assert!(
-            c.is_empty() && m.is_empty(),
+            scan.crackproof.is_empty() && scan.metadata.is_empty(),
            "old output tree must be pruned"
        );
-        assert_eq!(stats.skipped, 1, "the probed non-target counts as skipped");
-        assert_eq!(stats.walk_errors, 0);
+        assert_eq!(
+            scan.stats.skipped, 1,
+            "the probed non-target counts as skipped"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(scan.stats.walk_errors, 0);
    }
 }
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-use crate::unpacker::{IntegrityReport, Kind};
 use indicatif::{ProgressBar, ProgressStyle};
 use owo_colors::OwoColorize;
+use senbei_pe::{IntegrityReport, Kind};
 use std::path::Path;

 /// Create a progress bar for `n` items. Hidden when `quiet` is true.
@@ -19,16 +19,22 @@ pub fn progress(n: u64, quiet: bool) -> ProgressBar {

 /// Print a green success line, suspending the progress bar.
 pub fn ok(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &Path, kind: Kind, dest: &Path) {
+    ok_label(
+        bar,
+        quiet,
+        &rel.display().to_string(),
+        &format!("{kind:?}"),
+        dest,
+    );
+}
+
+/// Print a green success line with a free-form kind label (Android targets),
+/// suspending the progress bar.
+pub fn ok_label(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &str, label: &str, dest: &Path) {
    if quiet {
        return;
    }
-    let msg = format!(
-        "{} {:?}  {}  ->  {}",
-        "✓".green(),
-        kind,
-        rel.display(),
-        dest.display()
-    );
+    let msg = format!("{} {}  {}  ->  {}", "✓".green(), label, rel, dest.display());
    bar.suspend(|| println!("{msg}"));
 }

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-metadata"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Unity il2cpp metadata de-obfuscation for Senbei"
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//! Unity il2cpp metadata de-obfuscation.
+
+mod metadata;
+
+pub use metadata::*;
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[package]
+name = "senbei-pe"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "PE detection, unpacking, and validation for Senbei"
+
+[dependencies]
+senbei-crypto.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+mod pipeline;
+
+pub use pipeline::*;
@@ -13,9 +13,12 @@
 //!   CalculateChecksumWithSizeXor        -> primitives::calculate_checksum
 //!   CalculateCrc32                      -> crc32::compute (via above)

-use super::UnpackError;
-use super::bytecode::{Op, OpsLut, generate};
-use super::primitives::{self, *};
+use super::super::{
+    BufferOperation, BytecodeStage, DecompressionStage, DescriptorTable, SectionPipeline,
+    UnpackError,
+};
+use senbei_crypto::bytecode::{Op, OpsLut, generate};
+use senbei_crypto::primitives::{self, *};

 /// Read a signed 32-bit little-endian value.
 fn get_i32(d: &[u8], offset: i32) -> i32 {
@@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ fn decrypt_data4(
    key: i32,
    decomp_params: &[i32; 4],
    transform: Option<&[Op]>,
+    stage: DecompressionStage,
 ) -> Result<(), UnpackError> {
    let addr = get_i32(d, offset);
    let size = get_i32(d, offset + 4);
@@ -84,19 +88,17 @@ fn decrypt_data4(
        OpsLut::new(ops).map_region(d, addr as usize, size as usize);
    }

-    if size != decompressed_size {
-        // decompress reports corruption (after partial writes) via its bool;
-        // surface it instead of shipping a garbage block.
-        if !decompress(
+    if size != decompressed_size
+        && let Err(reason) = primitives::decompress_detailed(
            d,
            addr as u32,
            compressed_addr as u32,
            decomp_params[1] as u32,
            size as u32,
            decompressed_size as u32,
-        ) {
-            return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed);
-        }
+        )
+    {
+        return Err(UnpackError::StageDecompressionFailed { stage, reason });
    }
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -218,7 +220,11 @@ fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(
        // Guard: need 16 bytes at section_data_offset in `d`
        let off = section_data_offset as usize;
        if off.saturating_add(16) > d.len() {
-            return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(off));
+            return Err(UnpackError::DescriptorOutOfBounds {
+                table: DescriptorTable::DllSectionBlocks,
+                offset: off,
+                image_len: d.len(),
+            });
        }
        decrypt_data6_shift6(d, section_data_offset, 16);
        let dest_offset = get_i32(d, section_data_offset);
@@ -246,10 +252,10 @@ fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(
        let lut = OpsLut::new(decrypt_func);
        let ko0 = decomp_params[0];
        let ko2 = decomp_params[2];
-        let ks_snap =
-            primitives::aes_schedule_snapshot(d, ko2 as u32).ok_or(UnpackError::Corrupt)?;
+        let ks_snap = primitives::aes_schedule_snapshot(d, ko2 as u32)
+            .ok_or(UnpackError::InvalidAesKeySchedule { offset: ko2 as u32 })?;
        let tab_snap = primitives::huffman_table_snapshot(d, ko0 as u32)
-            .ok_or(UnpackError::DecompressFailed)?;
+            .ok_or(UnpackError::InvalidHuffmanTable { offset: ko0 as u32 })?;
        let spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = blocks
            .iter()
            .map(|b| {
@@ -277,12 +283,15 @@ fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(
                    b.size as u32,
                    b.expected_crc as u32,
                ) {
-                    return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed);
+                    return Err(UnpackError::SectionDecompressionFailed {
+                        pipeline: SectionPipeline::Dll,
+                        block: i,
+                    });
                }
            }
            Ok(())
        };
-        super::parallel::parallel_for(d, &spans, 1, do_block)?;
+        super::super::parallel::parallel_for(d, &spans, 1, do_block)?;
    }

    // Zero-fill loop.
@@ -292,7 +301,11 @@ fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(
        // decrypts 16 too, so guard 16 (an 8-byte guard would let
        // decrypt_data6_shift6 index past the end of a truncated descriptor).
        if off.saturating_add(16) > d.len() {
-            return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(off));
+            return Err(UnpackError::DescriptorOutOfBounds {
+                table: DescriptorTable::DllZeroFill,
+                offset: off,
+                image_len: d.len(),
+            });
        }
        decrypt_data6_shift6(d, section_data_offset, 16);
        let zero_offset = get_i32(d, section_data_offset);
@@ -305,7 +318,12 @@ fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(
        for i in 0..zero_size {
            let idx = (zero_offset + i) as usize;
            if idx >= d.len() {
-                return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(idx));
+                return Err(UnpackError::BufferRangeOutOfBounds {
+                    operation: BufferOperation::ZeroFill,
+                    offset: idx,
+                    size: 1,
+                    buffer_len: d.len(),
+                });
            }
            d[idx] = 0;
        }
@@ -324,12 +342,16 @@ pub fn unpack_dll(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError> {
 pub fn unpack_dll_v(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError> {
    // Trap any out-of-bounds panic from a truncated/garbled file and report it
    // as a clean error so the public API stays panic-free.
-    super::catch_unpack(move || unpack_dll_inner(input, verbose))
+    super::super::catch_unpack(move || unpack_dll_inner(input, verbose))
 }

 fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError> {
-    if input.len() < 4096 {
-        return Err(UnpackError::InputTooShort(input.len()));
+    const HEADER_LEN: usize = 4128;
+    if input.len() < HEADER_LEN {
+        return Err(UnpackError::InputTooShort {
+            actual: input.len(),
+            required: HEADER_LEN,
+        });
    }

    // `file_data` and `original_file_data` both borrow the same protected input.
@@ -347,15 +369,18 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        println!("  keys[6] anchor    = 0x{:08X}", keys[6] as u32);
    }

-    if !super::is_supported_magic(keys[1] as u32) {
-        return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack(
-            "Not a Crackproof protected file (KONN magic mismatch)".into(),
-        ));
+    if !super::super::is_supported_magic(keys[1] as u32) {
+        return Err(UnpackError::HeaderMagicMismatch {
+            found: keys[1] as u32,
+        });
    }

    let pe_offset = get_i32(file_data, 60);
    if pe_offset < 0 || (pe_offset as usize).saturating_add(84) > file_data.len() {
-        return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack("implausible PE offset".into()));
+        return Err(UnpackError::InvalidPeOffset {
+            offset: i64::from(pe_offset),
+            input_len: file_data.len(),
+        });
    }
    // This pipeline is PE32+-only: its header fixups write the data
    // directories at PE32+ offsets (pe+144..180, pe+136 for the DD blob). On a
@@ -363,14 +388,18 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
    // structurally plausible but unloadable file. Reject early with a clear
    // error so `unpack_auto`'s EXE-pipeline fallback handles PE32 DLLs (that
    // path is PE32-aware — see run_pe32), instead of us mangling them here.
-    if get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 24) & 0xFFFF != 0x20B {
-        return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack(
-            "not a PE32+ image (the DLL pipeline handles 64-bit only)".into(),
-        ));
+    let optional_magic = get_u16(file_data, (pe_offset + 24) as u32);
+    if optional_magic != 0x20B {
+        return Err(UnpackError::UnsupportedDllPeMagic {
+            found: optional_magic,
+        });
    }
    let size_of_image = get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 80);
-    if size_of_image <= 0 || size_of_image as u64 > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE {
-        return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack("implausible SizeOfImage".into()));
+    if size_of_image <= 0 || size_of_image as u64 > super::super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE {
+        return Err(UnpackError::InvalidImageSize {
+            size: i64::from(size_of_image),
+            max: super::super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE,
+        });
    }
    let mut out = vec![0u8; size_of_image as usize];
    let base_offset = keys[6] - keys[3] + 0x2000;
@@ -438,6 +467,16 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        println!("  checksum1       = 0x{:08X}", checksum1 as u32);
        println!("  decrypted_addr1 = 0x{:08X}", decrypted_addr1 as u32);
    }
+    let primary_end = decrypted_addr1.checked_add(3856);
+    if decrypted_addr1 < keys[3]
+        || primary_end.is_none_or(|end| end < 0 || end as usize > out.len())
+    {
+        return Err(UnpackError::InvalidDllPrimaryDescriptor {
+            address: decrypted_addr1 as u32,
+            minimum: keys[3] as u32,
+            image_len: out.len(),
+        });
+    }
    let import_offset = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3444);
    let decrypted_addr2_size = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3632);
    decrypt_data3(
@@ -512,6 +551,7 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        table_val ^ checksum2 ^ (xor_accumulator as i32),
        &decomp_params,
        None,
+        DecompressionStage::DllCodeBlock1,
    )?;

    let addr3b = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3728);
@@ -527,7 +567,7 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
    let crc_val = {
        let a = crc_data_addr as usize;
        let n = crc_data_size as usize;
-        super::crc32::compute(&out[a..a + n]) as i32
+        senbei_crypto::crc32::compute(&out[a..a + n]) as i32
    };
    let crc_xored = crc_data_size ^ crc_val;
    let trailing_val = get_i32(&out, crc_data_addr + crc_data_size - 4);
@@ -537,6 +577,7 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        crc_xored ^ (xor_accumulator as i32) ^ trailing_val,
        &decomp_params,
        None,
+        DecompressionStage::DllCodeBlock2,
    )?;

    let checksum3 = calculate_checksum(&out, (decrypted_addr1 + 3480) as u32) as i32;
@@ -549,6 +590,7 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        (not_val ^ (xor_key as u32)) as i32,
        &decomp_params,
        None,
+        DecompressionStage::DllCodeBlock3,
    )?;

    let addr4 = get_i32(&out, addr4_offset);
@@ -574,8 +616,9 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        lfsr_seed_val = lfsr_seed_val.wrapping_add(k);
    }

-    let decrypt_func = generate(&out, lfsr as u32)
-        .ok_or_else(|| UnpackError::DllUnpack("Failed to build decryption expression".into()))?;
+    let decrypt_func = generate(&out, lfsr as u32).ok_or(UnpackError::BytecodeGenerationFailed(
+        BytecodeStage::DllPrimaryDecryptor,
+    ))?;

    let addr5_offset = decrypted_addr1 + 3840;
    let addr5 = get_i32(&out, addr5_offset);
@@ -585,6 +628,7 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
        lfsr_seed_val ^ xor_key ^ checksum4,
        &decomp_params,
        Some(&decrypt_func),
+        DecompressionStage::DllCodeBlock4,
    )?;
    if verbose {
        println!("[7/9] Decrypting code block 4 (addr5)...");
@@ -603,9 +647,9 @@ fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
    let lfsr2 = metadata_offset + 88;
    decrypt_data6(&mut out, lfsr2 as u32);

-    let decrypt_func2 = generate(&out, lfsr2 as u32).ok_or_else(|| {
-        UnpackError::DllUnpack("Failed to build second decryption expression".into())
-    })?;
+    let decrypt_func2 = generate(&out, lfsr2 as u32).ok_or(
+        UnpackError::BytecodeGenerationFailed(BytecodeStage::DllSectionDecryptor),
+    )?;

    let section_image_base = 4095 - get_i32(original_file_data, 4224);
    let section_data_offset = get_i32(&out, addr5 + 11976);
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+pub use senbei_crypto::{BufferOperation, DecompressionFailure};
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum DecompressionStage {
+    ExeStage3,
+    ExeStage3Secondary,
+    ExeStage4,
+    ExeStage5,
+    Pe32FourthStage,
+    Pe32FifthStage,
+    Pe32SeventhStage,
+    DllCodeBlock1,
+    DllCodeBlock2,
+    DllCodeBlock3,
+    DllCodeBlock4,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for DecompressionStage {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(match self {
+            Self::ExeStage3 => "EXE stage3",
+            Self::ExeStage3Secondary => "EXE secondary stage3",
+            Self::ExeStage4 => "EXE stage4",
+            Self::ExeStage5 => "EXE stage5",
+            Self::Pe32FourthStage => "PE32 fourth stage",
+            Self::Pe32FifthStage => "PE32 fifth stage",
+            Self::Pe32SeventhStage => "PE32 seventh stage",
+            Self::DllCodeBlock1 => "DLL code block 1",
+            Self::DllCodeBlock2 => "DLL code block 2",
+            Self::DllCodeBlock3 => "DLL code block 3",
+            Self::DllCodeBlock4 => "DLL code block 4",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BytecodeStage {
+    ExeStage4,
+    ExeStage5,
+    Pe32CustomDecryptor,
+    Pe32FileDecryptor,
+    DllPrimaryDecryptor,
+    DllSectionDecryptor,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for BytecodeStage {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(match self {
+            Self::ExeStage4 => "EXE stage4",
+            Self::ExeStage5 => "EXE stage5",
+            Self::Pe32CustomDecryptor => "PE32 custom decryptor",
+            Self::Pe32FileDecryptor => "PE32 file decryptor",
+            Self::DllPrimaryDecryptor => "DLL primary decryptor",
+            Self::DllSectionDecryptor => "DLL section decryptor",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SectionPipeline {
+    ExePe32Plus,
+    ExePe32,
+    Dll,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for SectionPipeline {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(match self {
+            Self::ExePe32Plus => "PE32+ EXE",
+            Self::ExePe32 => "PE32 EXE",
+            Self::Dll => "DLL",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum DescriptorTable {
+    DllSectionBlocks,
+    DllZeroFill,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for DescriptorTable {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(match self {
+            Self::DllSectionBlocks => "DLL section-block",
+            Self::DllZeroFill => "DLL zero-fill",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum UnpackError {
+    #[error("input too short (need at least {required} bytes, got {actual})")]
+    InputTooShort { actual: usize, required: usize },
+
+    #[error("decrypted header magic mismatch (got 0x{found:08X})")]
+    HeaderMagicMismatch { found: u32 },
+
+    #[error("anchor field not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    AnchorNotFound,
+
+    #[error("stage1 descriptor not found near anchor 0x{anchor:08X}")]
+    Stage1DescriptorNotFound { anchor: u32 },
+
+    #[error("stage2 field not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    Stage2NotFound,
+
+    #[error("chk_src_start not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    ChkSrcStartNotFound,
+
+    #[error("table_start not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    TableStartNotFound,
+
+    #[error("{0} bytecode generation failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    BytecodeGenerationFailed(BytecodeStage),
+
+    #[error("stage5 marker not found — this build's layout is not supported by this unpacker")]
+    Stage5MarkerNotFound,
+
+    #[error("not a Crackproof-protected file")]
+    NotCrackproof,
+
+    #[error("invalid PE header offset {offset} for {input_len}-byte input")]
+    InvalidPeOffset { offset: i64, input_len: usize },
+
+    #[error("DLL pipeline requires PE32+ optional-header magic, got 0x{found:04X}")]
+    UnsupportedDllPeMagic { found: u16 },
+
+    #[error(
+        "DLL primary descriptor address 0x{address:08X} is below layout base 0x{minimum:08X} or outside {image_len}-byte image"
+    )]
+    InvalidDllPrimaryDescriptor {
+        address: u32,
+        minimum: u32,
+        image_len: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error("invalid SizeOfImage {size}; expected 1..={max}")]
+    InvalidImageSize { size: i64, max: u64 },
+
+    #[error(
+        "{operation} range out of bounds (offset {offset}, size {size}, buffer length {buffer_len})"
+    )]
+    BufferRangeOutOfBounds {
+        operation: BufferOperation,
+        offset: usize,
+        size: usize,
+        buffer_len: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error(
+        "EXE checksum descriptor at 0x{descriptor:08X} points outside input (offset {offset}, size {size}, input length {image_len})"
+    )]
+    ExeChecksumRangeOutOfBounds {
+        descriptor: u32,
+        offset: usize,
+        size: usize,
+        image_len: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error(
+        "{table} descriptor out of bounds (offset {offset}, size 16, image length {image_len})"
+    )]
+    DescriptorOutOfBounds {
+        table: DescriptorTable,
+        offset: usize,
+        image_len: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error("PE32 tbl not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    Pe32TblNotFound,
+
+    #[error("PE32 thirdStage decrypt failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")]
+    Pe32ThirdStageFailed,
+
+    #[error("PE32 customDecryptor not found in sevenStage")]
+    Pe32CustomDecryptorNotFound,
+
+    #[error("PE32 eighthStageKey not found")]
+    Pe32EighthKeyNotFound,
+
+    #[error("PE32 file LFSR not found in eighthStage")]
+    Pe32FileLfsrNotFound,
+
+    #[error("{stage} decompression failed: {reason}")]
+    StageDecompressionFailed {
+        stage: DecompressionStage,
+        reason: DecompressionFailure,
+    },
+
+    #[error("{pipeline} section block {block} decompression failed")]
+    SectionDecompressionFailed {
+        pipeline: SectionPipeline,
+        block: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error("AES key schedule is outside the image at offset {offset}")]
+    InvalidAesKeySchedule { offset: u32 },
+
+    #[error("Huffman table is outside the image at offset {offset}")]
+    InvalidHuffmanTable { offset: u32 },
+
+    #[error("DLL pipeline failed: {dll}; EXE fallback failed: {exe}")]
+    PipelineFallbackFailed {
+        dll: Box<UnpackError>,
+        exe: Box<UnpackError>,
+    },
+
+    #[error(
+        "PE32 second-stage range is invalid (offset {offset}, size {size}, image length {image_len})"
+    )]
+    Pe32SecondStageRangeInvalid {
+        offset: u32,
+        size: u32,
+        image_len: usize,
+    },
+
+    #[error("PE32 relocation-data descriptor not found")]
+    Pe32RelocationDataNotFound,
+
+    #[error("file decryptor candidate failed structural validation")]
+    FileDecryptorValidationFailed,
+
+    #[error("PE32 memory image could not be rebuilt as a file-layout PE")]
+    Pe32OutputLayoutInvalid,
+
+    #[error("internal panic at {file}:{line}:{column}: {message}")]
+    InternalPanic {
+        message: String,
+        file: String,
+        line: u32,
+        column: u32,
+    },
+}
+
+impl From<senbei_crypto::Error> for UnpackError {
+    fn from(error: senbei_crypto::Error) -> Self {
+        match error {
+            senbei_crypto::Error::BufferRangeOutOfBounds {
+                operation,
+                offset,
+                size,
+                buffer_len,
+            } => Self::BufferRangeOutOfBounds {
+                operation,
+                offset,
+                size,
+                buffer_len,
+            },
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+mod pipeline;
+
+pub use pipeline::*;
@@ -77,6 +77,49 @@ fn rva_to_off(secs: &[Section], file_len: usize, rva: u32, need: u32) -> Option<
    None
 }

+fn is_executable_rva(secs: &[Section], rva: u32) -> bool {
+    secs.iter().any(|section| {
+        let span = section.vsize.max(section.raw_size);
+        rva >= section.va
+            && rva < section.va.wrapping_add(span)
+            && (section.chars & 0x2000_0000) != 0
+    })
+}
+
+fn check_common_entry_branches(
+    stub: &[u8],
+    ep: u32,
+    secs: &[Section],
+    report: &mut IntegrityReport,
+) {
+    if stub.len() < 18
+        || stub[0..3] != [0x48, 0x83, 0xEC]
+        || stub[4] != 0xE8
+        || stub[9..12] != [0x48, 0x83, 0xC4]
+        || stub[12] != stub[3]
+        || stub[13] != 0xE9
+    {
+        return;
+    }
+    for (name, rel_off, instruction_len) in [("call", 5usize, 9i64), ("jump", 14usize, 18i64)] {
+        let rel = i32::from_le_bytes([
+            stub[rel_off],
+            stub[rel_off + 1],
+            stub[rel_off + 2],
+            stub[rel_off + 3],
+        ]) as i64;
+        let target = i64::from(ep) + instruction_len + rel;
+        let valid = u32::try_from(target)
+            .ok()
+            .is_some_and(|rva| is_executable_rva(secs, rva));
+        if !valid {
+            report.issues.push(format!(
+                "entry point {name} target 0x{target:X} is outside executable sections (DD8 selection is likely wrong)"
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Inspect an unpacked PE image and report any defect that would make the OS
 /// loader fault at runtime. `out` is the bytes the unpacker produced.
 pub fn check(out: &[u8]) -> IntegrityReport {
@@ -253,6 +296,9 @@ pub fn check(out: &[u8]) -> IntegrityReport {
                        "entry point RVA 0x{ep:X} is not in an executable section"
                    ));
                }
+                if let Some(entry_stub) = out.get(off as usize..off as usize + 18) {
+                    check_common_entry_branches(entry_stub, ep, &secs, &mut r);
+                }
            }
        }
    }
@@ -363,3 +409,40 @@ fn looks_like_dll_name(d: &[u8], off: u32) -> bool {
    }
    d[start..end].iter().all(|&b| (0x20..0x7F).contains(&b))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn executable_text() -> Vec<Section> {
+        vec![Section {
+            va: 0x1000,
+            vsize: 0x4000,
+            raw_ptr: 0x1000,
+            raw_size: 0x4000,
+            chars: 0x6000_0020,
+        }]
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn common_entry_stub_rejects_out_of_image_branches() {
+        let stub = [
+            0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xE8, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x28, 0xE9,
+            0x7A, 0xFE, 0x54, 0xFF,
+        ];
+        let mut report = IntegrityReport::default();
+        check_common_entry_branches(&stub, 0x1264, &executable_text(), &mut report);
+        assert_eq!(report.issues.len(), 2);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn common_entry_stub_accepts_executable_branches() {
+        let stub = [
+            0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xE8, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x28, 0xE9,
+            0x7A, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        ];
+        let mut report = IntegrityReport::default();
+        check_common_entry_branches(&stub, 0x1264, &executable_text(), &mut report);
+        assert!(report.ok());
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+//! Internal PE layout discovery and image reconstruction.
+
+mod dd8;
+mod discovery;
+mod image;
+
+pub(super) use dd8::{select_dd8_formula_pe32, select_dd8_shift};
+pub(super) use discovery::{
+    discover_eighth_slots, find_bytecode_offset, find_lfsr_block, find_str_pos, find_tbl_pe32,
+    find_v_after_pad, find_v4_offset, get_string_to_null, section_name, trial_decrypt5_u32,
+};
+pub(super) use image::{
+    compact_memory_image_to_pe, move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat, pe32_imports_already_match_idata_layout,
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
+//! Validation-driven selection for per-page text transforms.
+
+use super::discovery::trial_decrypt5_u32;
+
+/// PE32 `.text` dd8 key-formula selection with a skip decision. The packer keys
+/// the per-page XOR either with `page+1` or `0x8000*(page+1)`; the formula is
+/// not recorded. Replays the dd8 page pass on a scratch copy of sample pages
+/// (25/50/75% of `.text`) under each formula and counts how many positions
+/// decode to `0xCC` (int3 padding).
+///
+/// Returns `Some(true)` for the `0x8000*(page+1)` formula, `Some(false)` for
+/// `page+1`, or `None` when `.text` must NOT be dd8-decrypted at all. The packer
+/// dd8-encrypts `.text` on EXEs (so unpacking must replay it) but leaves a native
+/// DLL's `.text` plaintext; replaying dd8 there scrambles ~1 byte per 16-byte
+/// block. The decision: dd8 only *restores* int3 padding when `.text` was
+/// genuinely encrypted, so apply it only when the chosen formula's whole-page
+/// 0xCC count rises *clearly* above the no-dd8 baseline; otherwise skip.
+///
+/// "Clearly" matters: dd8 XORs 255 positions per page with pseudo-random bytes,
+/// so on an already-plaintext `.text` it manufactures ~1 spurious `0xCC` per
+/// sampled page for free (255/256 expected). A bare `best > baseline` test is
+/// therefore biased towards *applying* dd8 on exactly the inputs that must skip
+/// it — and a wrongly-applied dd8 is silent: it scrambles ~1 byte per 16 with no
+/// error and nothing downstream (not even `integrity::check`, which only reads
+/// 16 bytes at the entry point) notices. The [`MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN`] floor below is
+/// the PE32 counterpart of the margin+floor `select_dd8_shift` already applies
+/// on PE32+ for the same failure mode.
+pub fn select_dd8_formula_pe32(data: &[u8], text_off: u32, text_size: u32) -> Option<bool> {
+    let num_pages_total = text_size / 0x1000;
+    let mut sample_pages: Vec<u32> = Vec::new();
+    for frac in [0.25f64, 0.5, 0.75] {
+        let pg = (num_pages_total as f64 * frac) as u32;
+        if pg > 0 && pg < num_pages_total {
+            sample_pages.push(pg);
+        }
+    }
+    if sample_pages.is_empty() && num_pages_total > 1 {
+        sample_pages.push(num_pages_total / 2);
+    }
+    let score = |big: bool| -> i64 {
+        let mut total = 0i64;
+        for &sp in &sample_pages {
+            let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize;
+            if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let mut buf = [0u8; 0x1000];
+            buf.copy_from_slice(&data[pg_off..pg_off + 0x1000]);
+            let pk = if big {
+                0x8000u32.wrapping_mul(sp.wrapping_add(1))
+            } else {
+                sp.wrapping_add(1)
+            };
+            let mut k = pk;
+            let rk = k.rotate_right(15);
+            k = rk;
+            for bi in 1..256u32 {
+                let rk = k.rotate_right(15);
+                let ri = rk.wrapping_add(bi);
+                k = ri.wrapping_add(bi);
+                let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(ri & 0xF)) as usize;
+                if tidx < buf.len() {
+                    buf[tidx] ^= k as u8;
+                }
+            }
+            total += buf.iter().filter(|&&b| b == 0xCC).count() as i64;
+        }
+        total
+    };
+    let s_small = score(false);
+    let s_big = score(true);
+    // Baseline: whole-page 0xCC over the same sample pages with NO dd8. dd8 only
+    // rewrites 255 bytes per page, so comparing the chosen formula's whole-page
+    // 0xCC against this baseline reveals whether dd8 *restores* int3 padding
+    // (count rises -> .text was packer-encrypted, apply) or merely scrambles
+    // already-plaintext code (count falls -> native-DLL .text left intact, skip).
+    let mut baseline: i64 = 0;
+    for &sp in &sample_pages {
+        let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize;
+        if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        baseline += data[pg_off..pg_off + 0x1000]
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|&&b| b == 0xCC)
+            .count() as i64;
+    }
+    let big = s_big > s_small;
+    let best = s_small.max(s_big);
+    // Minimum net 0xCC gain over the baseline before dd8 is applied. Noise on an
+    // already-plaintext `.text` is ~1 manufactured 0xCC per sampled page (3 pages
+    // -> ~3); every corpus build that genuinely needs dd8 gains +154 or more
+    // (observed +154 and +312), and the one native DLL that must skip scores -18.
+    // A floor of 32 sits ~10x above the noise and ~5x below the smallest true
+    // positive, so it changes no existing decision.
+    const MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN: i64 = 32;
+    let apply = best.saturating_sub(baseline) >= MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN;
+    if std::env::var("SEL_DIAG").is_ok() {
+        eprintln!(
+            "SEL pe32 dd8 s_small={} s_big={} baseline={} gain={} big={} apply={}",
+            s_small,
+            s_big,
+            baseline,
+            best - baseline,
+            big,
+            apply
+        );
+    }
+    // When no interior pages could be sampled (tiny .text) we cannot measure the
+    // effect; preserve the historical behavior of applying dd8.
+    if sample_pages.is_empty() || apply {
+        Some(big)
+    } else {
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// dd8 page-XOR shift selection.
+//
+// The packer scrambles ~1 byte per 16-byte block of .text via decrypt_data8,
+// keyed by `page_idx << shift` (absolute page index = text_va >> 12). Observed
+// shifts are 0 and 15. The shift is NOT stored in any header/config field, so
+// the decision must be validated against the resulting .text content.
+//
+// A recognised CRT entry stub is the strongest oracle: decode skip/0/15 and
+// require both of its direct rel32 branches to land in executable .text. This
+// includes the call/jump displacement bytes themselves; an older entry oracle
+// wildcarded those bytes and could accept a stub whose opcodes looked right but
+// whose branch targets were outside the image.
+//
+// Other entry shapes fall back to padding statistics over a few sample pages
+// (head/tail margin skipped: entry/exit regions have atypical padding density).
+// The primary signal is a *structural* fingerprint: the MSVC function-end
+// padding pattern, a 0xC3 RET opcode followed by a run of >= 4 0xCC int3 bytes.
+// dd8 XORs one pseudo-random byte per 16-byte block, so an already-plaintext
+// page keeps its padding runs only under "no dd8", while a packer-encrypted
+// page restores them only under the correct shift — a wrong candidate destroys
+// every run it touches and essentially never manufactures a RET followed by a
+// long int3 run by chance. This separates the states far more cleanly than a
+// bare 0xCC count, which a wrong candidate inflates for free (~255 coincidences
+// per page at p=1/256).
+//
+// When no candidate produces any RET-anchored padding (sampled pages with
+// dense code and no padded epilogues), the fingerprint is silent, so the
+// decision falls back to the older mutated-position 0xCC count. Both signals
+// use the same decision rule: a candidate must beat the no-dd8 baseline by a
+// clear margin AND an absolute floor, otherwise dd8 is skipped — a wrongly
+// applied dd8 scrambles ~1 byte per 16 with no error surfaced downstream.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+pub fn select_dd8_shift(data: &[u8], text_va: u32, text_size: u32, info3: u32) -> u32 {
+    if let Some((shift, scores)) = select_dd8_by_entry_stub(data, text_va, text_size, info3) {
+        if std::env::var("SEL_DIAG").is_ok() {
+            eprintln!(
+                "SEL dd8 entry best_shift={} none={} s0={} s15={}",
+                shift, scores[0], scores[1], scores[2]
+            );
+        }
+        return shift;
+    }
+    let num_pages_total = text_size >> 12;
+    // Fewer than two pages: nothing meaningful to sample; preserve the
+    // historical behavior (shift 0 — the dd8 loop is empty or single-page).
+    if num_pages_total < 2 {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    let text_off = text_va as usize;
+
+    // Sample up to 4 pages, skipping a head/tail margin (entry/exit regions
+    // have atypical padding density). Small .text: sample every page.
+    let mut sample_pages: Vec<u32> = Vec::new();
+    if num_pages_total <= 4 {
+        sample_pages.extend(0..num_pages_total);
+    } else {
+        let margin = (num_pages_total / 8).max(1);
+        let lo = margin;
+        let hi = num_pages_total - margin;
+        if hi <= lo {
+            sample_pages.extend(0..num_pages_total);
+        } else {
+            let step = ((hi - lo) / 4).max(1);
+            let mut i = 0;
+            while i < 4 {
+                let p = lo + i * step;
+                if p < num_pages_total {
+                    sample_pages.push(p);
+                }
+                i += 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if sample_pages.is_empty() {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    let abs_base = text_va >> 12;
+    // Require a clear 2x margin over the already-plaintext baseline AND an
+    // absolute floor. The 2x test alone trips on noise when the counts are
+    // tiny: an external-companion DLL whose .text is already plaintext scores
+    // s15=4 vs none=1 — a spurious 4x — and gets dd8 wrongly applied,
+    // corrupting ~1 byte per 16. The floor rejects that noise while sitting
+    // far below every genuinely-encrypted build's score.
+    const MIN_DD8_HITS: u32 = 8;
+    let margin_pick = |none: u32, s0: u32, s15: u32| -> u32 {
+        let mut best_score = none;
+        let mut best_shift = 99u32; // 99 == skip dd8
+        for (shift, hits) in [(0u32, s0), (15u32, s15)] {
+            if hits > best_score {
+                best_score = hits;
+                best_shift = shift;
+            }
+        }
+        if best_shift != 99 && (best_score < none * 2 || best_score < MIN_DD8_HITS) {
+            best_shift = 99;
+        }
+        best_shift
+    };
+
+    // Primary: RET+int3 padding fingerprint. The fingerprint is diluted across
+    // the whole page (dd8 touches only 255 of 4096 bytes, so even an encrypted
+    // page keeps most of its padding runs), so instead of the fallback's 2x
+    // margin the gate is a *positive delta* over the no-dd8 baseline: on an
+    // already-plaintext .text each wrong shift destroys runs (scores below the
+    // baseline), while the correct shift on an encrypted page restores them
+    // (scores above it). The floor on the delta rejects noise-level gains.
+    let r_none = fingerprint_score(data, text_off, abs_base, &sample_pages, None);
+    let r0 = fingerprint_score(data, text_off, abs_base, &sample_pages, Some(0));
+    let r15 = fingerprint_score(data, text_off, abs_base, &sample_pages, Some(15));
+    // Fallback: mutated-position 0xCC count, for pages whose code has no
+    // RET-anchored padding at all (the fingerprint is silent there).
+    let (none_hits, s0, s15);
+    let best_shift = if r_none != 0 || r0 != 0 || r15 != 0 {
+        none_hits = 0;
+        s0 = 0;
+        s15 = 0;
+        let mut best_score = r_none;
+        let mut shift = 99u32;
+        for (s, score) in [(0u32, r0), (15u32, r15)] {
+            if score > best_score {
+                best_score = score;
+                shift = s;
+            }
+        }
+        if shift != 99 && best_score.saturating_sub(r_none) < MIN_DD8_HITS {
+            shift = 99;
+        }
+        shift
+    } else {
+        none_hits = score_dd8_baseline(data, text_off, &sample_pages);
+        s0 = score_dd8_shift(data, text_off, text_va, &sample_pages, 0);
+        s15 = score_dd8_shift(data, text_off, text_va, &sample_pages, 15);
+        margin_pick(none_hits, s0, s15)
+    };
+    if std::env::var("SEL_DIAG").is_ok() {
+        eprintln!(
+            "SEL dd8 best_shift={} fp=({},{},{}) cc=({},{},{}) samples={:?}",
+            best_shift, r_none, r0, r15, none_hits, s0, s15, sample_pages
+        );
+    }
+    best_shift
+}
+
+/// Minimum 0xCC run length after a RET for the run to count as MSVC
+/// function-end padding.
+const MIN_CC_RUN: u32 = 4;
+
+/// Total length of MSVC function-end padding runs in a page: each 0xC3 byte
+/// followed by >= [`MIN_CC_RUN`] 0xCC bytes contributes the run length.
+fn ret_int3_score(page: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+    let mut total = 0u32;
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < page.len() {
+        if page[i] == 0xC3 {
+            let mut j = i + 1;
+            while j < page.len() && page[j] == 0xCC {
+                j += 1;
+            }
+            let run = (j - i - 1) as u32;
+            if run >= MIN_CC_RUN {
+                total += run;
+            }
+            i = j;
+        } else {
+            i += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    total
+}
+
+/// Replay the dd8 page-XOR in place on one sample page.
+fn dd8_apply(buf: &mut [u8; 0x1000], abs_page: u32, shift: u32) {
+    let mut key = abs_page << shift;
+    for bi in 0..256u32 {
+        let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(bi);
+        key = mixed.wrapping_add(bi);
+        // The packer's dd8 loop does not XOR block i=0 (see decrypt_data8).
+        if bi == 0 {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF)) as usize;
+        buf[tidx] ^= key as u8;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Sum the RET+int3 fingerprint over the sample pages for one candidate
+/// (`None` = the no-dd8 baseline, page as-is).
+fn fingerprint_score(
+    data: &[u8],
+    text_off: usize,
+    abs_base: u32,
+    sample_pages: &[u32],
+    shift: Option<u32>,
+) -> u32 {
+    let mut total = 0u32;
+    for &sp in sample_pages {
+        let pg_off = text_off + (sp as usize) * 0x1000;
+        if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let mut page = [0u8; 0x1000];
+        page.copy_from_slice(&data[pg_off..pg_off + 0x1000]);
+        if let Some(sh) = shift {
+            dd8_apply(&mut page, abs_base.wrapping_add(sp), sh);
+        }
+        total += ret_int3_score(&page);
+    }
+    total
+}
+
+/// Select DD8 from the common CRT entry stub when its direct call and jump
+/// provide a stronger oracle than sparse padding statistics. The candidate is
+/// accepted only when it is the sole one whose two branch targets stay inside
+/// `.text`; unrecognised entry code falls through to the padding selector.
+fn select_dd8_by_entry_stub(
+    data: &[u8],
+    text_va: u32,
+    text_size: u32,
+    info3: u32,
+) -> Option<(u32, [u8; 3])> {
+    for entry in entry_candidates(data, text_va, text_size, info3) {
+        let [Some(none), Some(s0), Some(s15)] = [None, Some(0), Some(15)]
+            .map(|shift| entry_stub_branch_score(data, text_va, text_size, entry, shift))
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        let scores = [none, s0, s15];
+        let best = scores.iter().copied().max()?;
+        if best == 2 && scores.iter().filter(|&&score| score == best).count() == 1 {
+            let index = scores.iter().position(|&score| score == best)?;
+            return Some(([99, 0, 15][index], scores));
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn entry_candidates(data: &[u8], text_va: u32, text_size: u32, info3: u32) -> Vec<u32> {
+    let text_end = text_va.saturating_add(text_size);
+    let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(3);
+    if let Some(pe) = read_u32(data, 0x3C)
+        && let Some(entry) = pe.checked_add(40).and_then(|offset| read_u32(data, offset))
+        && (text_va..text_end).contains(&entry)
+    {
+        entries.push(entry);
+    }
+    for metadata_off in [32u32, 64] {
+        let Some(end) = info3
+            .checked_add(metadata_off)
+            .and_then(|offset| offset.checked_add(8))
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        if end as usize > data.len() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let entry = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, info3 + metadata_off);
+        let image_base = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, info3 + metadata_off + 4);
+        if image_base == info3 && (text_va..text_end).contains(&entry) && !entries.contains(&entry)
+        {
+            entries.push(entry);
+        }
+    }
+    entries
+}
+
+fn entry_stub_branch_score(
+    data: &[u8],
+    text_va: u32,
+    text_size: u32,
+    entry: u32,
+    shift: Option<u32>,
+) -> Option<u8> {
+    let text_end = text_va.checked_add(text_size)?;
+    if entry < text_va || entry.checked_add(18)? > text_end {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let mut stub = [0u8; 18];
+    for (offset, byte) in stub.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+        *byte = dd8_candidate_byte(data, entry + offset as u32, shift)?;
+    }
+    if stub[0..3] != [0x48, 0x83, 0xEC]
+        || stub[4] != 0xE8
+        || stub[9..12] != [0x48, 0x83, 0xC4]
+        || stub[12] != stub[3]
+        || stub[13] != 0xE9
+    {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let call_rel = i32::from_le_bytes(stub[5..9].try_into().ok()?) as i64;
+    let jump_rel = i32::from_le_bytes(stub[14..18].try_into().ok()?) as i64;
+    let call_target = i64::from(entry) + 9 + call_rel;
+    let jump_target = i64::from(entry) + 18 + jump_rel;
+    let in_text = |target: i64| target >= i64::from(text_va) && target < i64::from(text_end);
+    Some(u8::from(in_text(call_target)) + u8::from(in_text(jump_target)))
+}
+
+fn dd8_candidate_byte(data: &[u8], rva: u32, shift: Option<u32>) -> Option<u8> {
+    let mut byte = *data.get(rva as usize)?;
+    let Some(shift) = shift else {
+        return Some(byte);
+    };
+    let page = rva >> 12;
+    let block = (rva & 0xFFF) >> 4;
+    let mut key = page << shift;
+    for index in 0..=block {
+        let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(index);
+        key = mixed.wrapping_add(index);
+        if index != 0 {
+            let target = (page << 12)
+                .wrapping_add(index << 4)
+                .wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF);
+            if target == rva {
+                byte ^= key as u8;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Some(byte)
+}
+
+fn read_u32(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> Option<u32> {
+    let start = offset as usize;
+    let bytes = data.get(start..start.checked_add(4)?)?;
+    Some(u32::from_le_bytes(bytes.try_into().ok()?))
+}
+
+// Baseline: count int3 pads already present at the first byte of each 16-byte
+// block, i.e. the positions dd8 would target if its in-block offset were 0.
+fn score_dd8_baseline(data: &[u8], text_off: usize, sample_pages: &[u32]) -> u32 {
+    let mut hits = 0u32;
+    for &sp in sample_pages {
+        let pg_off = text_off + (sp as usize) * 0x1000;
+        if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        for bi in 1..256usize {
+            if data[pg_off + bi * 16] == 0xCC {
+                hits += 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    hits
+}
+
+// Replay decrypt_data8 on each sample page under `shift` and count how many of
+// the 255 mutated positions decode to 0xCC.
+fn score_dd8_shift(
+    data: &[u8],
+    text_off: usize,
+    text_va: u32,
+    sample_pages: &[u32],
+    shift: u32,
+) -> u32 {
+    let abs_base = text_va >> 12;
+    let mut hits = 0u32;
+    for &sp in sample_pages {
+        let pg_off = text_off + (sp as usize) * 0x1000;
+        if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let abs_page = abs_base.wrapping_add(sp);
+        let mut key = abs_page << shift;
+        for bi in 0..256u32 {
+            let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(bi);
+            key = mixed.wrapping_add(bi);
+            if bi == 0 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF)) as usize;
+            if tidx < 0x1000 {
+                let mutated = data[pg_off + tidx] ^ (key as u8);
+                if mutated == 0xCC {
+                    hits += 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    hits
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn entry_stub_fixture() -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut data = vec![0u8; 0x5000];
+        data[0x3C..0x40].copy_from_slice(&0x100u32.to_le_bytes());
+        data[0x128..0x12C].copy_from_slice(&0x1264u32.to_le_bytes());
+        data[0x1264..0x1276].copy_from_slice(&[
+            0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xE8, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x28, 0xE9,
+            0x7A, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+        ]);
+        data
+    }
+
+    fn apply_dd8_page(data: &mut [u8], page_rva: u32, shift: u32) {
+        let mut key = (page_rva >> 12) << shift;
+        for index in 0..256u32 {
+            let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(index);
+            key = mixed.wrapping_add(index);
+            if index == 0 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let target = page_rva.wrapping_add(index << 4).wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF) as usize;
+            data[target] ^= key as u8;
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn entry_stub_selects_plaintext_and_both_dd8_shifts() {
+        let plain = entry_stub_fixture();
+        assert_eq!(select_dd8_shift(&plain, 0x1000, 0x4000, 0), 99);
+
+        for expected in [0u32, 15] {
+            let mut encrypted = plain.clone();
+            apply_dd8_page(&mut encrypted, 0x1000, expected);
+            assert_eq!(select_dd8_shift(&encrypted, 0x1000, 0x4000, 0), expected);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Seed the first `count` dd8-targeted positions of each sampled page with
+    /// the byte that decodes to `0xCC` under the `page+1` formula — i.e. an
+    /// encrypted `.text` whose plaintext is int3 padding. Positions whose key
+    /// byte would make the *ciphertext* itself `0xCC` are skipped so the
+    /// fixture contains no `0xCC` at all and every post-dd8 `0xCC` is a genuine
+    /// gain over a zero baseline.
+    fn seed_dd8_int3(data: &mut [u8], text_off: u32, pages: &[u32], count: u32) {
+        for &sp in pages {
+            let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize;
+            let mut k = sp.wrapping_add(1);
+            k = k.rotate_right(15);
+            let mut planted = 0u32;
+            for bi in 1..256u32 {
+                let ri = k.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(bi);
+                k = ri.wrapping_add(bi);
+                if planted >= count {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let ct = 0xCCu8 ^ (k as u8);
+                if ct == 0xCC {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(ri & 0xF)) as usize;
+                data[pg_off + tidx] = ct;
+                planted += 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Review regression: a near-plaintext `.text` must NOT be dd8-decrypted.
+    /// dd8 XORs 255 positions per page with pseudo-random bytes, so it
+    /// manufactures a few `0xCC` for free — under the old bare
+    /// `best > baseline` test any positive gain was enough to "apply" dd8 and
+    /// scramble ~1 byte per 16 of a native DLL's already-plaintext code,
+    /// silently (nothing downstream, including the integrity check, notices).
+    /// Here the gain is real but small; the floor must still reject it.
+    #[test]
+    fn pe32_dd8_skips_text_whose_gain_is_only_noise_sized() {
+        let text_off: u32 = 0x1000;
+        let text_size: u32 = 8 * 0x1000;
+        let mut data = vec![0u8; (text_off + text_size) as usize];
+        seed_dd8_int3(&mut data, text_off, &[2, 4, 6], 5);
+        assert!(
+            !data.contains(&0xCC),
+            "fixture must have a zero 0xCC baseline"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            select_dd8_formula_pe32(&data, text_off, text_size),
+            None,
+            "a gain this small is indistinguishable from dd8's own noise"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Control for the above: a `.text` whose dd8 pass restores a large amount
+    /// of int3 padding clears the floor and is decrypted. Same fixture shape,
+    /// only the amount of restored padding differs.
+    #[test]
+    fn pe32_dd8_applies_when_padding_is_restored() {
+        let text_off: u32 = 0x1000;
+        let text_size: u32 = 8 * 0x1000;
+        let mut data = vec![0u8; (text_off + text_size) as usize];
+        seed_dd8_int3(&mut data, text_off, &[2, 4, 6], 255);
+        assert_eq!(
+            select_dd8_formula_pe32(&data, text_off, text_size),
+            Some(false),
+            "encrypted .text must be decrypted with the page+1 formula"
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+//! Structural locators for protected PE stages.
+
+use senbei_crypto::primitives::{get_u32, lfsr_keystream};
+
+/// Find the 4-byte v_val that follows the LAST occurrence of `48 EB 01 B9`
+/// (REX.W jmp+1; mov ecx,imm32) plus any 0xCC padding. Used to locate
+/// stage4's accum2 seed. Works across builds even when API-name anchors are
+/// absent.
+pub fn find_v_after_pad(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option<u32> {
+    let start = base as usize;
+    let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize;
+    if end > data.len() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let sig = [0x48u8, 0xEB, 0x01, 0xB9];
+    let slice = &data[start..end];
+    // last occurrence
+    let mut last = None;
+    let mut i = 0usize;
+    while i + sig.len() <= slice.len() {
+        if slice[i..i + sig.len()] == sig {
+            last = Some(i);
+        }
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    let pos = last?;
+    // skip CCs after the `48 EB 01 B9`
+    let mut after = pos + sig.len();
+    while after < slice.len() && slice[after] == 0xCC {
+        after += 1;
+    }
+    if after + 4 > slice.len() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some((start + after) as u32)
+}
+
+/// Predict the 4 bytes that DecryptData5(va, size) would produce at va+0..va+4
+/// without mutating the buffer. The cipher's per-byte transform depends only
+/// on the byte itself and the low 8 bits of (va+i), with no cross-byte state,
+/// so each byte can be decrypted in isolation. Used to detect the EP/DD layout
+/// offset before committing to the actual call.
+pub fn trial_decrypt5_u32(data: &[u8], va: u32) -> u32 {
+    let mut out = [0u8; 4];
+    for i in 0..4u32 {
+        let b3 = data[(va + i) as usize];
+        let b = (va + i) as u8;
+        let b2 = b.wrapping_add(1);
+        let b4 = b3.rotate_left(2) ^ b2;
+        let b5 = b4.rotate_left(2) ^ b;
+        out[i as usize] = b5.rotate_left(2);
+    }
+    u32::from_le_bytes(out)
+}
+
+/// Scan stage4/stage5 for the encrypted custom-decryptor bytecode block. The
+/// raw byte at p+95 is used by decrypt_data6 as the iteration count. We trial-
+/// decrypt that many bytes with the LFSR keystream and accept the first
+/// position where the byte stream parses as a valid opcode sequence ending in
+/// 195 (ret).
+pub fn find_bytecode_offset(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option<u32> {
+    let start = base as usize;
+    let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize;
+    if end > data.len() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut ks = [0u8; 256];
+    lfsr_keystream(&mut ks);
+    // Scan forward from `start+16` on 16-byte boundaries relative to `start`.
+    // The bytecode block is positioned a fixed offset into stage4/stage5; the
+    // lowest parseable candidate is the real one (later ones are coincidental
+    // parses of trailing filler bytes that happen to map to valid opcodes).
+    // The enclosing buffer isn't necessarily 16-aligned to its absolute
+    // address in newer builds, so we anchor the stride to `start`.
+    let mut p = start + 16;
+    while p + 96 <= end {
+        let count = data[p + 95] as usize;
+        if count >= 8 && p + count <= end {
+            let mut buf = [0u8; 256];
+            let take = count.min(256);
+            for i in 0..take {
+                buf[i] = data[p + i] ^ ks[i];
+            }
+            if let Some(nops) = parse_bytecode_check(&buf[..take])
+                && nops >= 4
+            {
+                return Some(p as u32);
+            }
+        }
+        p += 16;
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Validate bytecode structure without allocating a `Vec` of ops. Returns
+/// `Some(non_nop_op_count)` if the byte stream parses successfully as a valid
+/// opcode sequence ending in 195 (ret), `None` otherwise. Allows non-trivial
+/// bytecode filtering by op count.
+pub fn parse_bytecode_check(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
+    let mut i = 0usize;
+    let mut nops: usize = 0;
+    while i < buf.len() {
+        let b = buf[i];
+        i += 1;
+        match b {
+            4 | 44 | 52 => {
+                if i >= buf.len() {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                i += 1;
+                nops += 1;
+            }
+            144 => {}
+            192 | 254 => {
+                if i >= buf.len() {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                let mb = buf[i];
+                i += 1;
+                let rm = mb & 7;
+                let mod_ = (mb >> 6) & 3;
+                let reg = (mb >> 3) & 7;
+                if mod_ != 3 || rm != 0 {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                if reg > 1 {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                if b == 192 {
+                    if i >= buf.len() {
+                        return None;
+                    }
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+                nops += 1;
+            }
+            195 => return Some(nops),
+            _ => return None,
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Locate stage3's v4_val: the last non-zero dword in the buffer, anchored
+/// by the `C3 CC CC CC` (ret + 3 int3) immediately before it.
+pub fn find_v4_offset(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option<u32> {
+    let start = base as usize;
+    let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize;
+    if end > data.len() || end < start + 4 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // walk backwards looking for the first non-zero byte
+    let mut i = end;
+    while i > start && data[i - 1] == 0 {
+        i -= 1;
+    }
+    if i < start + 4 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // v_val occupies the 4 bytes ending at i (rounded up to dword boundary)
+    let v_end = i;
+    let v_start = ((v_end + 3) & !3).saturating_sub(4);
+    // require that the 4 bytes preceding v_val match `C3 CC CC CC`
+    if v_start < start + 4 || data[v_start - 4..v_start] != [0xC3, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC] {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(v_start as u32)
+}
+
+/// Scan a sub-buffer for an ASCII needle; return its absolute position.
+pub fn find_str_pos(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32, needle: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
+    let start = base as usize;
+    let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize;
+    if end > data.len() || needle.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    data[start..end]
+        .windows(needle.len())
+        .position(|w| w == needle)
+        .map(|rel| (start + rel) as u32)
+}
+
+pub fn get_string_to_null(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> String {
+    let start = offset as usize;
+    if start >= data.len() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    // Bounded: an unterminated run must never walk off the end of the buffer
+    // (panic) or scan unboundedly into unrelated data.
+    let limit = start.saturating_add(4096).min(data.len());
+    let mut i = start;
+    while i < limit && data[i] != 0 {
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&data[start..i]).into_owned()
+}
+
+/// Read a PE section-name field: exactly 8 bytes, NOT necessarily
+/// NUL-terminated (a full-width name like `.textbss` has no NUL at all).
+/// Returns the name with trailing NULs stripped. Using `get_string_to_null`
+/// here would run past the field into the VirtualSize/VirtualAddress dwords.
+pub fn section_name(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> String {
+    let start = offset as usize;
+    let Some(field) = data.get(start..start + 8) else {
+        return String::new();
+    };
+    let end = field.iter().position(|&b| b == 0).unwrap_or(8);
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&field[..end]).into_owned()
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// PE32 (32-bit) helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// PE32 shell-table locator. Walks the shell region (`info[6]`) for a dword
+/// equal to `info[6]` followed by a plausible shell size, returning the table
+/// base (`candidate = off - 0x88`) when `candidate+0x58` holds a valid pointer.
+pub fn find_tbl_pe32(data: &[u8], info: &[u32; 8]) -> Option<u32> {
+    let shell = info[6];
+    if (data.len() as u64) < 0x100 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let hi = (shell as u64)
+        .saturating_add(0x3000)
+        .min(data.len() as u64 - 0x100) as u32;
+    let mut off = shell;
+    while off < hi {
+        if off as usize + 8 <= data.len() {
+            let candidate = off.wrapping_sub(0x88);
+            if candidate >= shell && get_u32(data, off) == info[6] {
+                let shell_size_val = get_u32(data, off.wrapping_add(4));
+                if shell_size_val > 0x1000 && shell_size_val < 0x100000 {
+                    let v58_off = candidate.wrapping_add(0x58);
+                    if (v58_off as usize + 4) <= data.len() {
+                        let v58 = get_u32(data, v58_off);
+                        if v58 > 0 && (v58 as usize) < data.len() {
+                            return Some(candidate);
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        off = off.wrapping_add(4);
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Locate an LFSR-encrypted bytecode block (decrypt_data6 form) in a region.
+/// `start_off` is the byte offset to begin scanning at, `scan_backward`
+/// controls direction. Returns the relative offset of the block. Includes full
+/// opcode-walk validation of candidate blocks.
+pub fn find_lfsr_block(
+    data: &[u8],
+    base: u32,
+    size: u32,
+    start_off: u32,
+    scan_backward: bool,
+) -> Option<u32> {
+    if size < 96 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut ks = [0u8; 128];
+    lfsr_keystream(&mut ks);
+    let check = |scan_off: u32| -> bool {
+        let abs_off = base.wrapping_add(scan_off) as usize;
+        if abs_off + 96 > data.len() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let sz = data[abs_off + 95] as usize;
+        if !(10..=95).contains(&sz) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let mut decoded = [0u8; 95];
+        for bi in 0..sz {
+            decoded[bi] = data[abs_off + bi] ^ ks[bi];
+        }
+        // Full bytecode validation (shared with the stage4/5 locator): every
+        // opcode must decode with a valid ModR/M and the stream must REACH a
+        // RET (0xC3) as an opcode. The previous check only required a 0xC3
+        // byte *anywhere* in the window and accepted a walk that ran off the
+        // end without hitting RET — a `0x04 0xC3` (ADD 0xC3) tail passed, so
+        // coincidental LFSR-shaped garbage was accepted as a decryptor block.
+        parse_bytecode_check(&decoded[..sz]).is_some()
+    };
+    if scan_backward {
+        let hi = size - 96;
+        if hi >= start_off {
+            let mut scan_off = hi;
+            loop {
+                if check(scan_off) {
+                    return Some(scan_off);
+                }
+                if scan_off == start_off {
+                    break;
+                }
+                scan_off -= 1;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        let hi = size - 95;
+        let mut scan_off = start_off;
+        while scan_off < hi {
+            if check(scan_off) {
+                return Some(scan_off);
+            }
+            scan_off += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Slots discovered in the eighthStage for the marker-less layout.
+pub struct EighthSlots {
+    /// Absolute address of the file-data decryptor LFSR bytecode block. The
+    /// fileCS chain pointer is derived downstream as `file_lfsr - 0x58`.
+    pub file_lfsr: u32,
+    /// Absolute address of the compressedInfo (ptr,size) table pointer slot.
+    pub compressed_info_ptr: u32,
+}
+
+/// Marker-independent eighthStage slot discovery (PE32+ branch).
+///
+/// Newer Crackproof builds (e.g. some native/managed DLLs) omit the
+/// `pm\0\0cm\0\0` and `00 00 00 40 01 00 00 00` markers that the older layout's
+/// walk3/walk4/walk5 slot derivation relies on. Instead this discovers the
+/// slots structurally:
+///   * Scan the eighthStage for every LFSR (decrypt_data6) bytecode block.
+///   * The file decryptor is the LFSR block whose `fileCS = lfsr - 0x58` holds
+///     a pointer sitting just past `info[3]` (smallest positive distance).
+///   * `compressedInfo` is the pointer slot whose 16-byte target, after a
+///     trial `decrypt_data5`, parses as a plausible (src,sSize,dst,dSize)
+///     descriptor.
+///
+/// Returns `None` if no plausible file LFSR is found. `eighth_start`/`eighth_dsz`
+/// bound the search region; `info3` is `info[3]`; `compress_data_offset` is
+/// `(!u32(file_data,0x1080)) + 0x1000`; `file_data_len` is the protected file
+/// length.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub fn discover_eighth_slots(
+    data: &[u8],
+    eighth_start: u32,
+    eighth_dsz: u32,
+    info3: u32,
+    compress_data_offset: u32,
+    file_data_len: u32,
+) -> Option<EighthSlots> {
+    // Collect all LFSR candidates (forward scan).
+    //
+    // Advance by 1 after each hit, NOT by 96. A false-positive LFSR match can sit
+    // just before the real file-decryptor block (observed on an il2cpp game
+    // assembly build, 2026-07-13: junk at rel=0x31C1, real block at 0x3210).
+    // Stepping by the LFSR body size then skips the real block and discovery
+    // fails. Byte-stepping is cheap: eighthStage is only a few KB.
+    let mut all_lfsrs: Vec<u32> = Vec::new();
+    let mut scan_off: u32 = 0;
+    while scan_off + 95 < eighth_dsz {
+        match find_lfsr_block(data, eighth_start, eighth_dsz, scan_off, false) {
+            Some(found) => {
+                all_lfsrs.push(found);
+                scan_off = found + 1;
+            }
+            None => break,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Pick the file LFSR: prefer the candidate whose fileCS pointer sits the
+    // smallest positive distance past info[3].
+    let mut off_file_lfsr: Option<u32> = None;
+    let mut best_dist: Option<u32> = None;
+    for &lfsr_off in &all_lfsrs {
+        if lfsr_off < 0x58 {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let cs_off = lfsr_off - 0x58;
+        let cs_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(cs_off));
+        if !(0x1000 < cs_val && (cs_val as usize) < data.len()) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if cs_val < info3 {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let dist = cs_val - info3;
+        if best_dist.is_none_or(|b| dist < b) {
+            best_dist = Some(dist);
+            off_file_lfsr = Some(lfsr_off);
+        }
+    }
+    // Fallback: last LFSR with any in-image fileCS pointer.
+    if off_file_lfsr.is_none() {
+        for &lfsr_off in all_lfsrs.iter().rev() {
+            if lfsr_off < 0x58 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let cs_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(lfsr_off - 0x58));
+            if 0x1000 < cs_val && (cs_val as usize) < data.len() {
+                off_file_lfsr = Some(lfsr_off);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let off_file_lfsr = off_file_lfsr?;
+    let off_file_cs = off_file_lfsr - 0x58;
+
+    // Trial-decrypt to find compressedInfo: the pointer slot in the data area
+    // (between fileCS region start and the LFSR) whose target parses as a valid
+    // (src,sSize,dst,dSize) descriptor after a transient decrypt_data5.
+    let scan_from = off_file_lfsr.saturating_sub(0x400);
+    let mut off_compressed_info: Option<u32> = None;
+    let mut doff = scan_from;
+    while doff < off_file_lfsr {
+        if doff == off_file_cs {
+            doff += 4;
+            continue;
+        }
+        let ptr_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(doff));
+        if !(0x1000 < ptr_val && (ptr_val as usize) < data.len().saturating_sub(16)) {
+            doff += 4;
+            continue;
+        }
+        // Predict decrypt_data5(ptr_val, 16) without mutating: each dword is
+        // position-keyed and independent, so trial_decrypt5_u32 per dword.
+        let src2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val);
+        let s_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 4);
+        let dst2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 8);
+        let d_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 12);
+        let src_file_off = src2.wrapping_add(compress_data_offset);
+        let valid = s_sz2 > 0
+            && s_sz2 < 0x200000
+            && (src_file_off as u64 + s_sz2 as u64) <= file_data_len as u64
+            && dst2 >= 0x1000
+            && (dst2 as u64 + d_sz2 as u64) <= data.len() as u64
+            && d_sz2 >= s_sz2
+            && d_sz2 < 0x200000;
+        if valid {
+            off_compressed_info = Some(doff);
+            break;
+        }
+        doff += 4;
+    }
+    let off_compressed_info = off_compressed_info?;
+
+    Some(EighthSlots {
+        file_lfsr: eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_file_lfsr),
+        compressed_info_ptr: eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_compressed_info),
+    })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Task 4.1 regression: build a synthetic buffer whose valid bytecode block
+    /// sits PAST `len` but within `len*2`. Assert that the smaller window misses
+    /// it and the doubled window finds it.
+    #[test]
+    fn bytecode_locate_double_window_retry() {
+        // We place the block at offset (base + len + 16) which is inside
+        // the len*2 window but outside the len window.
+        let base: u32 = 0;
+        let len: u32 = 256;
+        // Block sits at base + len + 16 = 272, aligned to 16.
+        let block_pos: usize = (base + len + 16) as usize; // 272
+
+        // The buffer must be large enough for the block (block_pos + 96 bytes).
+        let buf_len = block_pos + 256;
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; buf_len];
+
+        // Build a valid plaintext op stream:
+        //   [4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 195]  (4 ADD-AL ops then RET)
+        // Padded to 10 bytes total; count >= 8.
+        let count: usize = 10;
+        let mut plain = [0u8; 256];
+        plain[0] = 4;
+        plain[1] = 0;
+        plain[2] = 4;
+        plain[3] = 0;
+        plain[4] = 4;
+        plain[5] = 0;
+        plain[6] = 4;
+        plain[7] = 0;
+        plain[8] = 195; // ret
+
+        // Compute the LFSR keystream and XOR the first `count` bytes to get the
+        // encrypted representation that the scanner would decrypt back.
+        let mut ks = [0u8; 256];
+        lfsr_keystream(&mut ks);
+        for i in 0..count {
+            buf[block_pos + i] = plain[i] ^ ks[i];
+        }
+        // Raw count byte at block_pos+95 (outside the XOR range since count=10 < 95).
+        buf[block_pos + 95] = count as u8;
+
+        // Verify our construction: find_bytecode_offset with len should NOT find it.
+        assert_eq!(
+            find_bytecode_offset(&buf, base, len),
+            None,
+            "smaller window should not find the block"
+        );
+
+        // The doubled window should find it at block_pos.
+        assert_eq!(
+            find_bytecode_offset(&buf, base, len.saturating_mul(2)),
+            Some(block_pos as u32),
+            "doubled window should locate the block"
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+//! PE import reconstruction and memory-image compaction.
+
+use senbei_crypto::primitives::{get_u16, get_u32, write_u16, write_u32};
+
+use super::super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE;
+
+/// Read a NUL-terminated byte string starting at `off`, bounded to 512 bytes.
+/// Returns the raw bytes up to the terminator (excluding it).
+fn read_cstr_bounded(data: &[u8], off: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let start = off as usize;
+    if start >= data.len() {
+        return Vec::new();
+    }
+    let limit = (start + 512).min(data.len());
+    let mut end = start;
+    while end < limit && data[end] != 0 {
+        end += 1;
+    }
+    data[start..end].to_vec()
+}
+
+fn align_up_u32(value: u32, alignment: u32) -> u32 {
+    ((value.wrapping_add(alignment - 1)) / alignment).wrapping_mul(alignment)
+}
+
+fn align_up_u64(value: u64, alignment: u64) -> u64 {
+    value.div_ceil(alignment) * alignment
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+enum ImportFunc {
+    Ordinal(u32),
+    Name(u16, Vec<u8>),
+}
+
+struct ImportDesc {
+    time_date: u32,
+    fwd_chain: u32,
+    dll_name: Vec<u8>,
+    iat_rva: u32,
+    functions: Vec<ImportFunc>,
+}
+
+/// Return true when PE32 imports already sit in the original `.idata` layout
+/// (so no relocation to `.kmiat` is needed). May write the IAT data directory
+/// (pe+0xD8).
+pub fn pe32_imports_already_match_idata_layout(data: &mut [u8], pe_header: u32) -> bool {
+    let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32;
+    let sec_table = pe_header.wrapping_add(24).wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size);
+    let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32;
+    let import_rva = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80));
+    let import_size = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84));
+    let len = data.len() as u32;
+    if !(import_rva > 0 && import_size > 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    for idx in 0..num_sections {
+        let sec_off = sec_table.wrapping_add(idx * 40);
+        if (sec_off as usize + 40) > data.len() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if &data[sec_off as usize..sec_off as usize + 6] != b".idata" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let sec_va = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(12));
+        let sec_size =
+            get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(8)).max(get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(16)));
+        let sec_end = sec_va.wrapping_add(sec_size);
+        if !(sec_va <= import_rva
+            && import_rva < sec_end
+            && import_rva.wrapping_add(import_size) <= sec_end)
+        {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let first_oft = get_u32(data, import_rva);
+        let first_name = get_u32(data, import_rva.wrapping_add(12));
+        let first_iat = get_u32(data, import_rva.wrapping_add(16));
+        if !(sec_va <= first_oft
+            && first_oft < sec_end
+            && sec_va <= first_iat
+            && first_iat < sec_end)
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if !(0x1000 < first_name && first_name < len) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let dll_name = read_cstr_bounded(data, first_name);
+        let lower: Vec<u8> = dll_name.iter().map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect();
+        if !lower.ends_with(b".dll") {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let mut iat_min = first_iat;
+        let mut iat_max = first_iat;
+        let mut idt_pos = import_rva;
+        while idt_pos.wrapping_add(20) <= len {
+            let oft_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos);
+            let name_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(12));
+            let iat_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(16));
+            if oft_rva == 0 && name_rva == 0 && iat_rva == 0 {
+                break;
+            }
+            if !(sec_va <= oft_rva && oft_rva < sec_end && sec_va <= iat_rva && iat_rva < sec_end) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            let mut thunk = iat_rva;
+            while thunk.wrapping_add(4) <= sec_end {
+                let tv = get_u32(data, thunk);
+                thunk = thunk.wrapping_add(4);
+                if tv == 0 {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            iat_min = iat_min.min(iat_rva);
+            iat_max = iat_max.max(thunk);
+            idt_pos = idt_pos.wrapping_add(20);
+        }
+        if iat_max > iat_min {
+            write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0xD8), iat_min);
+            write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0xDC), iat_max - iat_min);
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+/// Rebuild PE32 import metadata (descriptors, lookup tables, names) into the
+/// last section as `.kmiat`, leaving the loader-written IAT in place. Mutates
+/// `data` (may grow it).
+pub fn move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat(data: &mut Vec<u8>, pe_header: u32) {
+    const SECTION_SIZE: u32 = 0x7000;
+    let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32;
+    let opt_hdr = pe_header.wrapping_add(24);
+    let sec_table = opt_hdr.wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size);
+    let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32;
+    if num_sections == 0 {
+        return;
+    }
+    let import_rva = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80));
+    let import_size = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84));
+    let len = data.len() as u32;
+    if !(0x1000 < import_rva && import_rva < len && import_size > 0 && import_size < SECTION_SIZE) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let mut descriptors: Vec<ImportDesc> = Vec::new();
+    let mut idt_pos = import_rva;
+    while idt_pos.wrapping_add(20) <= len {
+        let oft_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos);
+        let time_date = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(4));
+        let fwd_chain = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(8));
+        let name_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(12));
+        let iat_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(16));
+        if oft_rva == 0 && name_rva == 0 && iat_rva == 0 {
+            break;
+        }
+        if !(0x1000 < name_rva && name_rva < len) {
+            break;
+        }
+        let dll_name = read_cstr_bounded(data, name_rva);
+        let thunk_rva = if 0x1000 < oft_rva && oft_rva < len {
+            oft_rva
+        } else {
+            iat_rva
+        };
+        let mut functions: Vec<ImportFunc> = Vec::new();
+        let mut thunk_pos = thunk_rva;
+        while 0x1000 < thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4) && thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4) <= len {
+            let thunk_val = get_u32(data, thunk_pos);
+            if thunk_val == 0 {
+                break;
+            }
+            if thunk_val & 0x8000_0000 != 0 {
+                functions.push(ImportFunc::Ordinal(thunk_val & 0xFFFF));
+            } else {
+                let hint = if thunk_val.wrapping_add(2) <= len {
+                    get_u16(data, thunk_val)
+                } else {
+                    0
+                };
+                let func_name = if thunk_val.wrapping_add(2) < len {
+                    read_cstr_bounded(data, thunk_val.wrapping_add(2))
+                } else {
+                    Vec::new()
+                };
+                functions.push(ImportFunc::Name(hint, func_name));
+            }
+            thunk_pos = thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4);
+        }
+        descriptors.push(ImportDesc {
+            time_date,
+            fwd_chain,
+            dll_name,
+            iat_rva,
+            functions,
+        });
+        idt_pos = idt_pos.wrapping_add(20);
+    }
+    if descriptors.is_empty() {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    for desc in &mut descriptors {
+        let lower: Vec<u8> = desc
+            .dll_name
+            .iter()
+            .map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase())
+            .collect();
+        if lower.starts_with(b"api-ms-win-crt-") {
+            desc.dll_name = b"ucrtbase.dll".to_vec();
+        } else {
+            desc.dll_name = lower;
+        }
+    }
+    descriptors.sort_by_key(|d| d.iat_rva);
+
+    let last_sec = sec_table.wrapping_add((num_sections - 1) * 40);
+    let kmiat_rva = get_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(12));
+    // A zero last-section VA means a corrupt section table: building .kmiat at
+    // RVA 0 would zero the DOS/PE headers and emit a structurally broken image
+    // with no error. Bail and keep the original import table.
+    if kmiat_rva == 0 {
+        return;
+    }
+    // Grow the image when .kmiat overruns it, but cap the growth: a corrupt VA
+    // could otherwise request a multi-gigabyte allocation, which aborts the
+    // process (uncatchable). Use u64 math so a near-u32::MAX VA cannot wrap the
+    // end calculation the way the previous wrapping/plain-add mix could.
+    let kmiat_end = kmiat_rva as u64 + SECTION_SIZE as u64;
+    if kmiat_end > MAX_IMAGE_SIZE {
+        return;
+    }
+    if kmiat_end > data.len() as u64 {
+        data.resize(kmiat_end as usize, 0);
+    }
+    // Zero the .kmiat region.
+    for b in &mut data[kmiat_rva as usize..kmiat_end as usize] {
+        *b = 0;
+    }
+
+    let idt_size = (descriptors.len() as u32 + 1) * 20;
+    let oft_start = kmiat_rva;
+    let mut idt_rva = oft_start;
+    for desc in &descriptors {
+        idt_rva = idt_rva.wrapping_add((desc.functions.len() as u32 + 1) * 4);
+    }
+    idt_rva = align_up_u32(idt_rva.wrapping_add(0x2C), 4);
+
+    // Size check: compute the final name_pos and bail if it overruns .kmiat.
+    let mut name_pos_check = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idt_size);
+    for desc in &descriptors {
+        name_pos_check = name_pos_check.wrapping_add(desc.dll_name.len() as u32 + 1);
+        for func in &desc.functions {
+            if let ImportFunc::Name(_, fname) = func {
+                name_pos_check = name_pos_check.wrapping_add(2 + fname.len() as u32 + 1);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if name_pos_check > kmiat_rva.wrapping_add(SECTION_SIZE) {
+        // Section too small; keep existing import table untouched.
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let mut oft_pos = oft_start;
+    let mut name_pos = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idt_size);
+    for (idx, desc) in descriptors.iter().enumerate() {
+        let idt_entry = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idx as u32 * 20);
+        let current_oft = oft_pos;
+        write_u32(data, idt_entry, current_oft);
+        write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(4), desc.time_date);
+        write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(8), desc.fwd_chain);
+        let dll_name_pos = name_pos;
+        write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(12), dll_name_pos);
+        write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(16), desc.iat_rva);
+
+        let dnp = dll_name_pos as usize;
+        data[dnp..dnp + desc.dll_name.len()].copy_from_slice(&desc.dll_name);
+        data[dnp + desc.dll_name.len()] = 0;
+        name_pos = name_pos.wrapping_add(desc.dll_name.len() as u32 + 1);
+
+        for func in &desc.functions {
+            match func {
+                ImportFunc::Ordinal(ord) => {
+                    write_u32(data, oft_pos, 0x8000_0000 | ord);
+                }
+                ImportFunc::Name(hint, fname) => {
+                    let hint_name_rva = name_pos;
+                    write_u32(data, oft_pos, hint_name_rva);
+                    write_u16(data, hint_name_rva, *hint as u32);
+                    let fp = (hint_name_rva + 2) as usize;
+                    data[fp..fp + fname.len()].copy_from_slice(fname);
+                    data[fp + fname.len()] = 0;
+                    name_pos = name_pos.wrapping_add(2 + fname.len() as u32 + 1);
+                }
+            }
+            oft_pos = oft_pos.wrapping_add(4);
+        }
+        write_u32(data, oft_pos, 0);
+        oft_pos = oft_pos.wrapping_add(4);
+    }
+    // Null-terminator IDT entry (20 zero bytes) after the last descriptor.
+    let term = idt_rva.wrapping_add(descriptors.len() as u32 * 20) as usize;
+    for b in &mut data[term..term + 20] {
+        *b = 0;
+    }
+
+    let ls = last_sec as usize;
+    data[ls..ls + 8].copy_from_slice(b".kmiat\x00\x00");
+    write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(8), SECTION_SIZE);
+    write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(16), SECTION_SIZE);
+    write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(36), 0xE000_0060);
+    write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80), idt_rva);
+    write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84), idt_size);
+    write_u32(
+        data,
+        pe_header.wrapping_add(80),
+        kmiat_rva.wrapping_add(SECTION_SIZE),
+    );
+}
+
+/// Convert the unpacked RVA-addressed image back to a compact PE file layout
+/// (headers at 0x400, sections packed consecutively, FileAlignment 0x200).
+/// Returns `None` if the accumulated output size wraps or exceeds
+/// [`MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`]: the final allocation is sized from header-derived
+/// section data, and an uncapped `vec![0; n]` from a corrupt header would abort
+/// the process (which `catch_unpack` cannot trap).
+pub fn compact_memory_image_to_pe(data: &[u8], pe_header: u32) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    const FILE_ALIGNMENT: u32 = 0x200;
+    const HEADER_SIZE: u32 = 0x400;
+    let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32;
+    let opt_hdr = pe_header.wrapping_add(24);
+    let sec_table = opt_hdr.wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size);
+    let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32;
+
+    struct SecLayout {
+        sec_off: u32,
+        va: u32,
+        vsize: u32,
+        raw_ptr: u32,
+        raw_size: u32,
+    }
+
+    let mut raw_cursor: u64 = HEADER_SIZE as u64;
+    let mut raw_layout: Vec<SecLayout> = Vec::new();
+    for idx in 0..num_sections {
+        let sec_off = sec_table.wrapping_add(idx * 40);
+        let vsize = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(8));
+        let va = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(12));
+        let sd_start = va as usize;
+        let sd_end = if (va.wrapping_add(vsize) as usize) <= data.len() {
+            va.wrapping_add(vsize) as usize
+        } else {
+            data.len()
+        };
+        let section_data: &[u8] = if sd_start <= sd_end && sd_start <= data.len() {
+            &data[sd_start..sd_end]
+        } else {
+            &[]
+        };
+
+        let mut last_nonzero: i64 = -1;
+        for pos in (0..section_data.len()).rev() {
+            if section_data[pos] != 0 {
+                last_nonzero = pos as i64;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        let meaningful = if last_nonzero >= 0 {
+            (last_nonzero + 1) as u32
+        } else {
+            0
+        };
+        let mut raw_size = if meaningful != 0 {
+            align_up_u32(meaningful, FILE_ALIGNMENT)
+        } else {
+            0
+        };
+        if vsize != 0 && raw_size == 0 {
+            raw_size = FILE_ALIGNMENT;
+        }
+        raw_size = raw_size.min(align_up_u32(section_data.len() as u32, FILE_ALIGNMENT));
+
+        let raw_ptr = if raw_size != 0 { raw_cursor as u32 } else { 0 };
+        raw_layout.push(SecLayout {
+            sec_off,
+            va,
+            vsize,
+            raw_ptr,
+            raw_size,
+        });
+        if raw_size != 0 {
+            // Accumulate in u64 and cap: section sizes are header-derived, and
+            // a corrupt table could otherwise wrap raw_cursor (small alloc,
+            // huge recorded raw_ptrs → OOB panic) or request an abort-sized
+            // allocation.
+            raw_cursor = align_up_u64(raw_cursor + raw_size as u64, FILE_ALIGNMENT as u64);
+            if raw_cursor > MAX_IMAGE_SIZE {
+                return None;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut compact = vec![0u8; raw_cursor as usize];
+    let hdr_copy = (HEADER_SIZE as usize).min(data.len());
+    compact[..hdr_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[..hdr_copy]);
+    write_u32(&mut compact, opt_hdr.wrapping_add(36), FILE_ALIGNMENT);
+    write_u32(&mut compact, opt_hdr.wrapping_add(60), HEADER_SIZE);
+
+    for sl in &raw_layout {
+        write_u32(&mut compact, sl.sec_off.wrapping_add(16), sl.raw_size);
+        write_u32(&mut compact, sl.sec_off.wrapping_add(20), sl.raw_ptr);
+        if sl.raw_size != 0 {
+            let sd_start = sl.va as usize;
+            let sd_end = if (sl.va.wrapping_add(sl.vsize) as usize) <= data.len() {
+                sl.va.wrapping_add(sl.vsize) as usize
+            } else {
+                data.len()
+            };
+            let section_data: &[u8] = if sd_start <= sd_end {
+                &data[sd_start..sd_end]
+            } else {
+                &[]
+            };
+            let copy_size = (sl.raw_size as usize).min(section_data.len());
+            let rp = sl.raw_ptr as usize;
+            compact[rp..rp + copy_size].copy_from_slice(&section_data[..copy_size]);
+        }
+    }
+    Some(compact)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Review regression: a zero last-section VA (corrupt section table) must
+    /// bail instead of building .kmiat at RVA 0 — the old code zeroed
+    /// `[0, 0x7000)`, wiping the DOS/PE headers, and returned the broken image
+    /// as a success. A near-2 GiB VA must likewise refuse to grow the image
+    /// past [`MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`].
+    #[test]
+    fn kmiat_bogus_section_va_bails_without_wiping_headers() {
+        for last_sec_va in [0u32, 0x5000_0000] {
+            let pe: u32 = 0x80;
+            let mut data = vec![0xAAu8; 0x8000];
+            // COFF header: 1 section, optional header size 0xE0 (PE32).
+            write_u16(&mut data, pe + 6, 1);
+            write_u16(&mut data, pe + 20, 0xE0);
+            // Import directory at pe+0x80: one descriptor + null terminator.
+            write_u32(&mut data, pe + 0x80, 0x1100);
+            write_u32(&mut data, pe + 0x84, 0x28);
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100, 0x1200); // OFT rva
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100 + 12, 0x1300); // name rva
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100 + 16, 0x1400); // IAT rva
+            for b in &mut data[0x1100 + 20..0x1100 + 40] {
+                *b = 0; // null terminator descriptor
+            }
+            data[0x1300..0x1300 + 13].copy_from_slice(b"KERNEL32.dll\0");
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x1200, 0x1500); // thunk -> hint/name
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x1204, 0); // thunk terminator
+            data[0x1500..0x1502].copy_from_slice(&0u16.to_le_bytes());
+            data[0x1502..0x1502 + 12].copy_from_slice(b"ExitProcess\0");
+            // Section table at pe+24+0xE0 = 0x178; VA field at +12.
+            write_u32(&mut data, 0x178 + 12, last_sec_va);
+
+            let head_before: Vec<u8> = data[..0x400].to_vec();
+            let len_before = data.len();
+            move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat(&mut data, pe);
+            assert_eq!(
+                data.len(),
+                len_before,
+                "VA 0x{last_sec_va:08X}: image must not grow"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                &data[..0x400],
+                &head_before[..],
+                "VA 0x{last_sec_va:08X}: headers must be untouched"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -1,30 +1,157 @@
-//! Pure, panic-free Crackproof unpacker core. No file I/O lives here.
+//! PE detection, unpacking, and structural validation.

-mod bytecode;
-mod crc32;
 pub mod dll;
+mod error;
 pub mod exe;
 pub mod integrity;
+mod layout;
 pub(crate) mod parallel;
-pub(crate) mod primitives;
-mod tables;
+
+use senbei_crypto::primitives;
+use std::cell::RefCell;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};

 pub use dll::{unpack_dll, unpack_dll_v};
-pub use exe::{UnpackError, unpack as unpack_exe, unpack_v as unpack_exe_v};
+pub use error::*;
+pub use exe::{unpack as unpack_exe, unpack_v as unpack_exe_v};
 pub use integrity::{IntegrityReport, check as check_integrity};
+pub use parallel::thread_cap;

 /// Maximum plausible PE `SizeOfImage` we are willing to allocate a zero buffer
 /// for. Guards against a corrupt/crafted header requesting a multi-gigabyte
 /// (or, as a sign-extended negative `i32`, multi-exabyte) allocation, which
 /// would abort the process — an abort that `catch_unpack` below cannot trap.
 /// Real protected binaries are far below this.
-pub(crate) const MAX_IMAGE_SIZE: u64 = 1 << 30; // 1 GiB
+pub(crate) const MAX_IMAGE_SIZE: u64 = senbei_crypto::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct PanicCapture(Arc<Mutex<Option<PanicDetails>>>);
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct PanicDetails {
+    message: String,
+    file: String,
+    line: u32,
+    column: u32,
+}
+
+thread_local! {
+    static ACTIVE_PANIC_CAPTURE: RefCell<Option<PanicCapture>> = const { RefCell::new(None) };
+}
+
+struct PanicCaptureGuard(Option<PanicCapture>);
+
+impl Drop for PanicCaptureGuard {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        ACTIVE_PANIC_CAPTURE.with(|slot| {
+            slot.replace(self.0.take());
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+impl PanicCapture {
+    fn new() -> Self {
+        Self(Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)))
+    }
+
+    fn record(&self, info: &std::panic::PanicHookInfo<'_>) {
+        let location = info.location();
+        let details = PanicDetails {
+            message: panic_message(info.payload()),
+            file: location
+                .map(|value| value.file().to_owned())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| "<unknown>".to_owned()),
+            line: location.map_or(0, std::panic::Location::line),
+            column: location.map_or(0, std::panic::Location::column),
+        };
+        let mut captured = self
+            .0
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner);
+        if captured.is_none() {
+            *captured = Some(details);
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn into_error(self, payload: &(dyn std::any::Any + Send)) -> UnpackError {
+        let details = self
+            .0
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
+            .clone()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| PanicDetails {
+                message: panic_message(payload),
+                file: "<unknown>".to_owned(),
+                line: 0,
+                column: 0,
+            });
+        UnpackError::InternalPanic {
+            message: details.message,
+            file: details.file,
+            line: details.line,
+            column: details.column,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn merge_from(&self, other: &Self) {
+        let details = other
+            .0
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
+            .clone();
+        let Some(details) = details else { return };
+        let mut captured = self
+            .0
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner);
+        if captured.is_none() {
+            *captured = Some(details);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn panic_message(payload: &(dyn std::any::Any + Send)) -> String {
+    if let Some(message) = payload.downcast_ref::<&str>() {
+        (*message).to_owned()
+    } else if let Some(message) = payload.downcast_ref::<String>() {
+        message.clone()
+    } else {
+        "non-string panic payload".to_owned()
+    }
+}
+
+fn install_panic_capture_hook() {
+    static INSTALL: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
+    INSTALL.call_once(|| {
+        let previous = std::panic::take_hook();
+        std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(move |info| {
+            let capture = ACTIVE_PANIC_CAPTURE
+                .try_with(|slot| slot.borrow().clone())
+                .ok()
+                .flatten();
+            if let Some(capture) = capture {
+                capture.record(info);
+            } else {
+                previous(info);
+            }
+        }));
+    });
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn current_panic_capture() -> Option<PanicCapture> {
+    ACTIVE_PANIC_CAPTURE.with(|slot| slot.borrow().clone())
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn with_panic_capture<R>(capture: Option<PanicCapture>, f: impl FnOnce() -> R) -> R {
+    let previous = ACTIVE_PANIC_CAPTURE.with(|slot| slot.replace(capture));
+    let _guard = PanicCaptureGuard(previous);
+    f()
+}

 /// Run an unpack pipeline, converting any internal panic into a clean
-/// [`UnpackError::Corrupt`] so the public API stays panic-free on any input
-/// (truncated/garbled files chase offsets out of bounds). The default panic
-/// hook is suppressed transiently so a trapped panic does not spill a
-/// backtrace to stderr.
+/// [`UnpackError::InternalPanic`] so the public API stays panic-free on any input
+/// (truncated/garbled files chase offsets out of bounds). The panic location and
+/// payload are captured for diagnostics without printing a backtrace to stderr.
 ///
 /// Note: allocation *failures* abort the process and are NOT caught here; size
 /// requests are bounds-checked against [`MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`] before allocating.
@@ -32,17 +159,15 @@ pub(crate) fn catch_unpack<F>(f: F) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>
 where
    F: FnOnce() -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError>,
 {
-    // Hook suppression is skipped on wasm: the prebuilt std cannot unwind
-    // there, so a panic traps immediately — and the suppressed hook would
-    // hide the panic message, leaving a bare `unreachable` with no clue.
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    let prev = std::panic::take_hook();
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|_| {}));
-    let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(f));
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    std::panic::set_hook(prev);
-    r.unwrap_or(Err(UnpackError::Corrupt))
+    install_panic_capture_hook();
+    let capture = PanicCapture::new();
+    let r = with_panic_capture(Some(capture.clone()), || {
+        std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(f))
+    });
+    match r {
+        Ok(result) => result,
+        Err(payload) => Err(capture.into_error(payload.as_ref())),
+    }
 }

 /// Crackproof header magic stored in `keys[1]`/`info[1]`.
@@ -80,11 +205,8 @@ fn key_table(input: &[u8]) -> Option<[u32; 8]> {
    if input.len() < 4128 {
        return None;
    }
-    // Validate PE signature. `checked_add`, not `+`: `usize` is 32-bit on
-    // wasm32, where an `e_lfanew` of 0xFFFF_FFFC..=0xFFFF_FFFF wraps the bound
-    // check, and the slice below then panics with start > end. `detect` runs on
-    // the folder-scan threads and (in the web app) on the main thread outside
-    // the disposable-worker isolation, so it must not panic on any input.
+    // Validate the PE signature with checked arithmetic so a crafted offset
+    // cannot wrap the bounds check on a narrower target.
    let e_lfanew = primitives::get_u32(input, 0x3C);
    let pe_start = e_lfanew as usize;
    if pe_start.checked_add(4).is_none_or(|end| end > input.len()) {
@@ -194,13 +316,76 @@ pub fn unpack_auto_v(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<(Kind, Vec<u8>), Unp
                Ok(out) => out,
                Err(dll_err) => match exe::unpack_v(input, verbose) {
                    Ok(out) => out,
-                    // Surface the DLL-pipeline error, not the EXE one: for a
-                    // genuinely corrupt DLL the DLL error is the more relevant
-                    // diagnostic, and the EXE fallback is best-effort.
-                    Err(_) => return Err(dll_err),
+                    Err(exe_err) => {
+                        return Err(UnpackError::PipelineFallbackFailed {
+                            dll: Box::new(dll_err),
+                            exe: Box::new(exe_err),
+                        });
+                    }
                },
            }
        }
    };
    Ok((detected.kind, out))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caught_panic_reports_location_and_message() {
+        let error = catch_unpack(|| -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError> {
+            panic!("test panic");
+        })
+        .expect_err("panic must become an error");
+        let UnpackError::InternalPanic {
+            message,
+            file,
+            line,
+            column,
+        } = error
+        else {
+            panic!("unexpected error: {error}");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(message, "test panic");
+        assert!(
+            file.ends_with("senbei-pe/src/engine/mod.rs")
+                || file.ends_with("senbei-pe\\src\\engine\\mod.rs")
+        );
+        assert!(line > 0);
+        assert!(column > 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn worker_panic_keeps_the_worker_source_location() {
+        let error = catch_unpack(|| -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnpackError> {
+            let capture = current_panic_capture();
+            let result = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+                with_panic_capture(capture, || panic!("worker panic"));
+            })
+            .join();
+            if let Err(payload) = result {
+                std::panic::resume_unwind(payload);
+            }
+            Ok(Vec::new())
+        })
+        .expect_err("worker panic must become an error");
+        let UnpackError::InternalPanic {
+            message,
+            file,
+            line,
+            column,
+        } = error
+        else {
+            panic!("unexpected error: {error}");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(message, "worker panic");
+        assert!(
+            file.ends_with("senbei-pe/src/engine/mod.rs")
+                || file.ends_with("senbei-pe\\src\\engine\\mod.rs")
+        );
+        assert!(line > 0);
+        assert!(column > 0);
+    }
+}
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};

 /// Worker-thread cap. `SENBEI_THREADS` overrides it (`1` forces the sequential
 /// path); otherwise the host's available parallelism; otherwise 1.
-pub(crate) fn thread_cap() -> usize {
+pub fn thread_cap() -> usize {
    if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("SENBEI_THREADS")
        && let Ok(n) = v.trim().parse::<usize>()
        && n >= 1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub(crate) fn thread_cap() -> usize {
 ///
 /// Returns the first `Err` any block produces; re-raises the first block panic
 /// on the calling thread (so the pipeline's existing `catch_unpack` still
-/// converts it to `UnpackError::Corrupt`).
+/// converts it to `UnpackError::InternalPanic`).
 pub(crate) fn parallel_for<E, F>(
    buf: &mut [u8],
    spans: &[(usize, usize)],
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ where
    let stop = AtomicBool::new(false);
    let first_err: Mutex<Option<E>> = Mutex::new(None);
    let first_panic: Mutex<Option<Box<dyn std::any::Any + Send>>> = Mutex::new(None);
+    let panic_capture = super::current_panic_capture();

    std::thread::scope(|scope| {
        for _ in 0..workers {
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ where
            let first_err = &first_err;
            let first_panic = &first_panic;
            let f = &f;
+            let panic_capture = panic_capture.clone();
            scope.spawn(move || {
                loop {
                    if stop.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
@@ -141,9 +143,15 @@ where
                    let next = iter.lock().unwrap().next();
                    let Some((i, piece)) = next else { break };
                    let span = piece.unwrap();
-                    let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
-                        f(i, spans[i].0, span)
-                    }));
+                    // Keep details local until this panic wins `first_panic`;
+                    // otherwise simultaneous workers could pair one worker's
+                    // location with another worker's propagated payload.
+                    let block_capture = panic_capture.as_ref().map(|_| super::PanicCapture::new());
+                    let r = super::with_panic_capture(block_capture.clone(), || {
+                        std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+                            f(i, spans[i].0, span)
+                        }))
+                    });
                    match r {
                        Ok(Ok(())) => {}
                        Ok(Err(e)) => {
@@ -157,6 +165,11 @@ where
                        Err(panic) => {
                            let mut slot = first_panic.lock().unwrap();
                            if slot.is_none() {
+                                if let (Some(parent), Some(block)) =
+                                    (&panic_capture, &block_capture)
+                                {
+                                    parent.merge_from(block);
+                                }
                                *slot = Some(panic);
                            }
                            stop.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//! PE detection, unpacking, and structural validation.
+
+mod engine;
+
+pub use engine::*;
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+                    GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
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+<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
@@ -101,12 +101,12 @@ impl MetadataResult {
    }
 }

-fn kind_str(kind: senbei::unpacker::Kind) -> &'static str {
+fn kind_str(kind: senbei_pe::Kind) -> &'static str {
    match kind {
-        senbei::unpacker::Kind::NativeExe => "native-exe",
-        senbei::unpacker::Kind::ManagedExe => "managed-exe",
-        senbei::unpacker::Kind::NativeDll => "native-dll",
-        senbei::unpacker::Kind::ManagedDll => "managed-dll",
+        senbei_pe::Kind::NativeExe => "native-exe",
+        senbei_pe::Kind::ManagedExe => "managed-exe",
+        senbei_pe::Kind::NativeDll => "native-dll",
+        senbei_pe::Kind::ManagedDll => "managed-dll",
    }
 }

@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ fn kind_str(kind: senbei::unpacker::Kind) -> &'static str {
 /// anything unrecognized.
 #[wasm_bindgen]
 pub fn detect(input: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
-    if senbei::metadata::is_metadata(input) {
+    if senbei_metadata::is_metadata(input) {
        return Some("metadata".to_string());
    }
-    senbei::unpacker::detect(input).map(|d| kind_str(d.kind).to_string())
+    senbei_pe::detect(input).map(|d| kind_str(d.kind).to_string())
 }

 /// Unpack a protected module.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ pub fn unpack_file(
    input: &[u8],
    companion: Option<Vec<u8>>,
 ) -> Result<UnpackResult, JsError> {
-    let r = senbei::job::unpack_bytes(input, companion.as_deref())
+    let r = senbei_io::job::unpack_bytes(input, companion.as_deref())
        .map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?;
    Ok(UnpackResult {
        kind: kind_str(r.kind).to_string(),
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ pub fn unpack_file(
 #[wasm_bindgen]
 pub fn deobfuscate_metadata(data: &[u8]) -> Result<MetadataResult, JsError> {
    let (bytes, report) =
-        senbei::metadata::deobfuscate(data).map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?;
+        senbei_metadata::deobfuscate(data).map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?;
    Ok(MetadataResult {
        bytes,
        version: report.version,
@@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ pub fn deobfuscate_metadata(data: &[u8]) -> Result<MetadataResult, JsError> {
 }

 /// Unpack a protected module, forcing the EXE pipeline (no DLL-pipeline
-/// probe). See [`senbei::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe`] for why the web app
+/// probe). See [`senbei_io::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe`] for why the web app
 /// needs this recovery path.
 #[wasm_bindgen]
 pub fn unpack_file_force_exe(
    input: &[u8],
    companion: Option<Vec<u8>>,
 ) -> Result<UnpackResult, JsError> {
-    let r = senbei::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe(input, companion.as_deref())
+    let r = senbei_io::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe(input, companion.as_deref())
        .map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?;
    Ok(UnpackResult {
        kind: kind_str(r.kind).to_string(),
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-//! Shared test fixtures.
-#![allow(dead_code)]
-
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-
-/// Path to `senbei/samples` — the user-managed corpus dropped in by hand.
-/// Git-ignored except its README; tests here run against whatever is present.
-pub fn samples_dir() -> PathBuf {
-    PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("samples")
-}
@@ -1,441 +0,0 @@
-# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo.
-# It is not intended for manual editing.
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-
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-
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- "libc",
- "unicode-width",
- "windows-sys",
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-
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-version = "0.1.7"
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-checksum = "a06aeb73f470f66dcdbf7223caeebb85984942f22f1adb2a088cf9668146bbbc"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "wasm-bindgen",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "encode_unicode"
-version = "1.0.0"
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-
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "senbei-web"
-version = "1.0.1"
-edition = "2024"
-description = "WebAssembly browser frontend for senbei"
-license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
-
-[lib]
-crate-type = ["cdylib"]
-
-[dependencies]
-senbei = { path = ".." }
-wasm-bindgen = "0.2"
-console_error_panic_hook = "0.1"
-
-[profile.release]
-opt-level = "z"
-lto = true
-codegen-units = 1
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ including the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target) and
 [wasm-pack](https://rustwasm.github.io/wasm-pack/installer/).

 ```cmd
-cd web
-wasm-pack build --target web --release
+cd senbei-wasm
+wasm-pack build --target web --release --out-dir ../web/pkg
 ```

 This produces `web/pkg/` (git-ignored). Then serve the `web/` directory with
@@ -63,13 +63,14 @@ python -m http.server -d web 8000
 ## Layout

 ```
+senbei-wasm/   the senbei-wasm cdylib crate (own Cargo.lock, outside the
+               workspace; depends on the senbei-pe/-io/-metadata crates)
+└── src/lib.rs #[wasm_bindgen] bindings: detect / unpack_file /
+               unpack_file_force_exe / deobfuscate_metadata
 web/
-├── Cargo.toml     senbei-web cdylib crate (depends on the senbei lib)
-├── src/lib.rs     #[wasm_bindgen] bindings: detect / unpack_file /
-│                  unpack_file_force_exe / deobfuscate_metadata
-├── index.html     the page
-├── app.js         dropzone, file list, worker orchestration, downloads
-├── worker.js      one-shot unpack worker (fresh wasm instance per file)
+├── index.html the page
+├── app.js     dropzone, file list, worker orchestration, downloads
+├── worker.js  one-shot unpack worker (fresh wasm instance per file)
 ├── style.css
-└── pkg/           wasm-pack output (git-ignored)
+└── pkg/       wasm-pack output (git-ignored; build from senbei-wasm/)
 ```
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import init, { detect, deobfuscate_metadata } from './pkg/senbei_web.js';
+import init, { detect, deobfuscate_metadata } from './pkg/senbei_wasm.js';

 const dropzone = document.getElementById('dropzone');
 const picker = document.getElementById('picker');
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 //    instance is never reused). That reproduces the CLI's
 //    dll-first/exe-fallback routing without a catchable panic.

-import init, { unpack_file, unpack_file_force_exe } from './pkg/senbei_web.js';
+import init, { unpack_file, unpack_file_force_exe } from './pkg/senbei_wasm.js';

 let ready = null;
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Momoko-Ayase	cbfacbc31f	Upgrade dependencies to latest stable zip 0.6.6 -> 8.6.0 (the 0.6 line is unmaintained), aes 0.8 -> 0.9 (BlockCipherDecrypt trait replaces BlockDecrypt), sha2 0.10 -> 0.11 (Array no longer formats as hex; local hex_digest helpers). Outputs are byte-identical across the upgrade: full golden corpus and Android corpus sidecars all pass.	2026-09-02 03:19:06 +08:00
Momoko-Ayase	d3dd1a8ff8	Merge Android (AArch64) shared-library restoration, bump to 1.2.0 Adds the Android protection-scheme pipeline: hollowed ELF64/AArch64 libraries are restored statically (stage-1/stage-2 module extraction, container decode, dynamic-linker table rebuild), with app-package (.apk/.apks/.xapk) container handling, cross-source content dedup, and il2cpp metadata support for the Android variants (seeded RID permutation; embedded XOR-wrapped blob extraction). The single senbei CLI now routes single .so files, packages, and folders by content; outputs follow the existing .unpack-infix naming under <root>/unpack or --out. PE behavior is unchanged (35/35 goldens).	2026-09-02 03:09:21 +08:00
Momoko-Ayase	0c3f29f93a	Split web/ into senbei-wasm crate + static assets The Rust bindings move from web/src to a top-level senbei-wasm crate (still outside the workspace, own Cargo.lock), matching the other senbei-* crates. web/ keeps only the static frontend; wasm-pack emits the JS/wasm package into web/pkg/ via --out-dir. JS glue renamed senbei_web -> senbei_wasm with the crate.	2026-08-30 22:44:15 +08:00
Momoko-Ayase	f80749ffd6	Merge bfloat16-senbei workspace restructure, bump to 1.1.0 Adopts the fork's workspace split (senbei-cli / senbei-crypto / senbei-io / senbei-metadata / senbei-pe), its structured error taxonomy, entry-transform and layout validation, PE32 dd8 key-formula selection with a skip floor, the CRT entry-stub dd8 oracle, and the extensionless-file scan skip. Kept from senbei on top of the restructure: - ManagedExe detection/routing and the CLR (COR20 + BSJB) metadata restore in the EXE pipeline. - The RET+int3 padding fingerprint as the primary dd8 padding signal, ahead of the mutated-position 0xCC fallback. - docs/, .github/, samples/, tests/ (moved to senbei-cli/tests), and the web/ wasm frontend (rewired to the split crates), all of which the fork had dropped. - The fork's README compatibility matrix is not taken: it names real games, which the public-repo hygiene rules forbid. - The wasm32 localtime fallback in logfile and unpack_bytes_force_exe (the web app's trap-recovery entry point), both lost in the restructure. Golden corpus: 35/35 byte-identical. clippy -D warnings clean; wasm32 check clean for the full workspace.	2026-08-30 22:31:21 +08:00
bfloat16	35076848b6	chore: ignore local test corpus	2026-08-16 03:49:11 +08:00
bfloat16	18886272e5	docs: note embedded metadata compatibility	2026-08-16 03:43:12 +08:00
bfloat16	b534de872d	refactor: move library implementations into modules	2026-08-16 03:38:42 +08:00
bfloat16	a9aaf95e01	docs: add Android compatibility matrix	2026-08-16 03:31:25 +08:00
bfloat16	7f827d6400	feat: add folder-based Android unpack workflow	2026-08-16 02:38:07 +08:00
bfloat16	131ced6db5	feat: add static stage extraction and metadata detection	2026-08-16 01:47:25 +08:00
bfloat16	b1d3699df3	feat: add static Android il2cpp restoration	2026-08-16 00:34:08 +08:00
bfloat16	9433b4dcca	Initial commit	2026-08-15 22:20:03 +08:00
bfloat16	763bdbb21f	docs(readme): organize compatibility matrix by game	2026-08-13 10:49:44 +08:00
bfloat16	c5982a64b9	fix(unpacker): classify checksum range failures	2026-08-13 10:49:07 +08:00
bfloat16	55a31a2371	doc(none): add README.md	2026-08-12 23:57:00 +08:00
bfloat16	caadbd5325	fix(unpacker): validate executable entry transforms	2026-08-11 19:24:45 +08:00
bfloat16	ab1a14c9d1	perf(scan): skip extensionless files by default	2026-08-11 19:24:32 +08:00
bfloat16	e9ead4dc5f	refactor: init	2026-08-11 14:19:56 +08:00
bfloat16	a89900a812	fix(unpacker): refine layout validation and diagnostics	2026-08-11 11:42:12 +08:00
bfloat16	67178d34af	feat: Optimize error reporting	2026-08-11 10:51:37 +08:00