From 21cd151e15304cf5e3dd8dccc65d71b4ce2f4dd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=E7=B6=BE=E7=80=AC=E6=A1=83=E6=A1=83?= Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2026 00:08:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] First public commit --- .gitattributes | 52 + .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml | 48 + .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml | 1 + .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml | 25 + .github/workflows/ci.yml | 99 + .github/workflows/release.yml | 79 + .gitignore | 158 ++ AGENTS.md | 79 + CLAUDE.md | 1 + Cargo.lock | 494 ++++ Cargo.toml | 42 + LICENSE | 662 +++++ README.md | 77 + docs/design.md | 137 + docs/development.md | 116 + docs/usage.md | 126 + rust-toolchain.toml | 3 + samples/README.md | 84 + src/job.rs | 1051 ++++++++ src/lib.rs | 7 + src/logfile.rs | 148 ++ src/main.rs | 113 + src/metadata.rs | 348 +++ src/pause.rs | 24 + src/scan.rs | 414 +++ src/ui.rs | 73 + src/unpacker/bytecode.rs | 119 + src/unpacker/crc32.rs | 33 + src/unpacker/dll.rs | 745 ++++++ src/unpacker/exe.rs | 2812 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/unpacker/integrity.rs | 365 +++ src/unpacker/mod.rs | 210 ++ src/unpacker/parallel.rs | 227 ++ src/unpacker/primitives.rs | 2268 ++++++++++++++++ src/unpacker/tables.rs | 161 ++ tests/common/mod.rs | 10 + tests/job.rs | 31 + tests/logfile.rs | 47 + tests/run_log.rs | 80 + tests/samples.rs | 215 ++ web/Cargo.lock | 441 +++ web/Cargo.toml | 19 + web/LICENSE | 662 +++++ web/README.md | 75 + web/app.js | 392 +++ web/index.html | 78 + web/src/lib.rs | 180 ++ web/style.css | 369 +++ web/worker.js | 41 + 49 files changed, 14041 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .gitattributes create mode 100644 .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml create mode 100644 .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml create mode 100644 .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml create mode 100644 .github/workflows/ci.yml create mode 100644 .github/workflows/release.yml create mode 100644 .gitignore create mode 100644 AGENTS.md create mode 120000 CLAUDE.md create mode 100644 Cargo.lock create mode 100644 Cargo.toml create mode 100644 LICENSE create mode 100644 README.md create mode 100644 docs/design.md create mode 100644 docs/development.md create mode 100644 docs/usage.md create mode 100644 rust-toolchain.toml create mode 100644 samples/README.md create mode 100644 src/job.rs create mode 100644 src/lib.rs create mode 100644 src/logfile.rs create mode 100644 src/main.rs create mode 100644 src/metadata.rs create mode 100644 src/pause.rs create mode 100644 src/scan.rs create mode 100644 src/ui.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/bytecode.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/crc32.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/dll.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/exe.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/integrity.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/mod.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/parallel.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/primitives.rs create mode 100644 src/unpacker/tables.rs create mode 100644 tests/common/mod.rs create mode 100644 tests/job.rs create mode 100644 tests/logfile.rs create mode 100644 tests/run_log.rs create mode 100644 tests/samples.rs create mode 100644 web/Cargo.lock create mode 100644 web/Cargo.toml create mode 100644 web/LICENSE create mode 100644 web/README.md create mode 100644 web/app.js create mode 100644 web/index.html create mode 100644 web/src/lib.rs create mode 100644 web/style.css create mode 100644 web/worker.js diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10d65d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +# Default: detect text, store LF, check out LF. +* text=auto eol=lf + +# Explicit text types (defense in depth over the auto detector). +*.rs text eol=lf diff=rust +*.toml text eol=lf diff=toml +*.lock text eol=lf -diff +*.md text eol=lf diff=markdown linguist-detectable +*.yml text eol=lf +*.yaml text eol=lf +*.json text eol=lf +*.js text eol=lf +*.css text eol=lf diff=css +*.html text eol=lf diff=html +*.svg text eol=lf +*.txt text eol=lf +.gitignore text eol=lf +.gitattributes text eol=lf +LICENSE text eol=lf + +# Shell scripts must stay LF even on Windows checkouts. +*.sh text eol=lf + +# Windows-native scripts. +*.bat text eol=crlf +*.cmd text eol=crlf +*.ps1 text eol=crlf + +# Binaries — never subject to line-ending conversion. +*.exe binary +*.dll binary +*.sys binary +*.pdb binary +*.wasm binary +*.png binary +*.jpg binary +*.jpeg binary +*.gif binary +*.ico binary +*.woff binary +*.woff2 binary +*.ttf binary +*.otf binary +*.eot binary +*.zip binary +*.7z binary +*.gz binary +*.xz binary +*.dat binary + +# wasm-pack output is generated. +web/pkg/** linguist-generated=true diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bddcf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +name: Bug report +description: Report a file that fails to unpack, unpacks incorrectly, or crashes senbei +title: "[Bug]: " +labels: [bug] +body: + - type: markdown + attributes: + value: | + Thanks for the report. Attaching the protected input file helps us + better diagnose the issue. Please only attach files you are + authorized to share. + - type: textarea + id: symptom + attributes: + label: What happened? + description: The command you ran and the output/error you got. Use -v/--verbose and paste the stage log if unpacking failed midway. + placeholder: "senbei app.exe -> error: ..." + validations: + required: true + - type: textarea + id: expected + attributes: + label: What did you expect? + placeholder: "A runnable unpacked image at unpack\\app.unpack.exe" + validations: + required: true + - type: input + id: version + attributes: + label: Senbei version + description: Output of `senbei -V` + validations: + required: true + - type: textarea + id: fileinfo + attributes: + label: About the input file + description: | + Without attaching it: is it an EXE or DLL? 32-bit or 64-bit? Managed + (.NET) or native? Roughly how large? Does it have a `._` companion + file next to it? + - type: checkboxes + id: legal + attributes: + label: Confirmation + options: + - label: I am authorized to analyze and share the attached file(s), and I understand attachments are removed after investigation. + required: true diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ba13e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +blank_issues_enabled: false diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..613aacb --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +name: Feature request +description: Suggest an improvement or support for a new layout +title: "[Feature]: " +labels: [enhancement] +body: + - type: markdown + attributes: + value: | + For a new Crackproof layout, attaching a sample protected file helps + us better understand the request. Please only attach files you are + authorized to share. + - type: textarea + id: idea + attributes: + label: What would you like? + description: The problem it solves for you, and any layout details you can share. + validations: + required: true + - type: checkboxes + id: legal + attributes: + label: Confirmation + options: + - label: This request is for lawful research/interoperability use, and I am authorized to share any file I attach. + required: true diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65d0959 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +name: CI + +on: + push: + branches: [main] + pull_request: + +env: + CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always + +jobs: + fmt: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo fmt --all -- --check + + clippy: + runs-on: windows-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings + + test: + # The test suite exercises Windows path semantics, so it runs on Windows. + # The golden corpus (samples/) is user-managed and absent on CI; the + # samples test is a no-op pass there by design. + runs-on: windows-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo test --release + + check-portable: + # Build-only portability gate: non-Windows host and the wasm target the + # web build uses. Clippy runs here too, not just on Windows: the platform + # `cfg` branches (the POSIX `localtime_r` path, the non-Windows stubs) are + # invisible to the Windows clippy job, so without this they are never + # linted at all. + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings + - run: cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown + + cli: + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - os: windows-latest + target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc + bin: senbei.exe + - os: ubuntu-latest + target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu + bin: senbei + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo build --release --locked + - name: Package senbei-- + shell: bash + run: | + set -euo pipefail + version=$(grep -m1 '^version' Cargo.toml | cut -d'"' -f2) + name="senbei-$version-${{ matrix.target }}" + mkdir -p "stage/$name" + cp "target/release/${{ matrix.bin }}" "stage/$name/" + cp LICENSE "stage/$name/" + awk '/^## Legal notice and intended use/{f=1} f && /^## / && !/Legal notice/{exit} f' \ + README.md > "stage/$name/LEGAL-NOTICE.md" + echo "package=$name" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + # upload-artifact always wraps the upload in its own zip, so the staged + # directory is uploaded loose — pre-compressing here would nest archives. + # The download is already .zip with the folder inside. + - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: ${{ env.package }} + path: stage/ + retention-days: 14 + + web: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo install wasm-pack --locked + # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: web/Cargo.lock is committed on + # purpose, so the wasm build must be pinned by it rather than silently + # re-resolving (which is how it drifted out of sync with the manifest). + - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release -- --locked + working-directory: web + - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: senbei-web + path: | + web/index.html + web/app.js + web/worker.js + web/style.css + web/pkg/ + retention-days: 14 diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce1c71c --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +name: Release + +# Publishing a GitHub release: +# - cli-assets builds the Windows and Linux CLI binaries and attaches +# senbei--.zip (binary + LICENSE + the legal +# notice extracted from README.md) to the release. +# - deploy-web rebuilds the browser app and pushes it to Cloudflare Pages +# (https://senbei.pages.dev). Requires two repository secrets: +# CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (Pages:Edit) and CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID. The Pages +# project is `senbei`; direct-upload projects default to `main` as the +# production branch, which `--branch=main` targets. + +on: + release: + types: [published] + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + cli-assets: + permissions: + contents: write # attach assets to the release + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - os: windows-latest + target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc + bin: senbei.exe + - os: ubuntu-latest + target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu + bin: senbei + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo build --release --locked + - name: Package senbei-- + shell: bash + run: | + set -euo pipefail + version=$(grep -m1 '^version' Cargo.toml | cut -d'"' -f2) + name="senbei-$version-${{ matrix.target }}" + mkdir -p "stage/$name" + cp "target/release/${{ matrix.bin }}" "stage/$name/" + cp LICENSE "stage/$name/" + awk '/^## Legal notice and intended use/{f=1} f && /^## / && !/Legal notice/{exit} f' \ + README.md > "stage/$name/LEGAL-NOTICE.md" + # Release assets are served as-is (unlike CI artifacts, which the + # upload action always re-zips), so the archive is created here. + # Zip on every OS, matching the CI artifacts; 7z is preinstalled on + # both windows-latest and ubuntu-latest. + (cd stage && 7z a "$name.zip" "$name" > /dev/null) + echo "package=$name" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + - name: Attach to release + shell: bash + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} + run: gh release upload "${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" "stage/${{ env.package }}".* --clobber + + deploy-web: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - run: cargo install wasm-pack --locked + # `-- --locked` forwards to cargo: web/Cargo.lock is committed on + # purpose, so the wasm build must be pinned by it rather than silently + # re-resolving (which is how it drifted out of sync with the manifest). + - run: wasm-pack build --target web --release -- --locked + working-directory: web + - name: Stage static site + run: | + mkdir dist + cp web/index.html web/app.js web/worker.js web/style.css dist/ + cp -r web/pkg dist/pkg + - uses: cloudflare/wrangler-action@v3 + with: + apiToken: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN }} + accountId: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID }} + command: pages deploy dist --project-name=senbei --branch=main diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7285ac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +### Intellij ### +# Covers JetBrains IDEs: IntelliJ, RubyMine, PhpStorm, AppCode, PyCharm, CLion, Android Studio, WebStorm and Rider +# Reference: https://intellij-support.jetbrains.com/hc/en-us/articles/206544839 + +# User-specific stuff +.idea/**/workspace.xml +.idea/**/tasks.xml +.idea/**/usage.statistics.xml +.idea/**/dictionaries +.idea/**/shelf + +# AWS User-specific +.idea/**/aws.xml + +# Generated files +.idea/**/contentModel.xml + +# Sensitive or high-churn files +.idea/**/dataSources/ +.idea/**/dataSources.ids +.idea/**/dataSources.local.xml +.idea/**/sqlDataSources.xml +.idea/**/dynamic.xml +.idea/**/uiDesigner.xml +.idea/**/dbnavigator.xml + +# Gradle +.idea/**/gradle.xml +.idea/**/libraries + +# Gradle and Maven with auto-import +# When using Gradle or Maven with auto-import, you should exclude module files, +# since they will be recreated, and may cause churn. Uncomment if using +# auto-import. +# .idea/artifacts +# .idea/compiler.xml +# .idea/jarRepositories.xml +# .idea/modules.xml +# .idea/*.iml +# .idea/modules +# *.iml +# *.ipr + +# CMake +cmake-build-*/ + +# Mongo Explorer plugin +.idea/**/mongoSettings.xml + +# File-based project format +*.iws + +# IntelliJ +out/ + +# mpeltonen/sbt-idea plugin +.idea_modules/ + +# JIRA plugin +atlassian-ide-plugin.xml + +# Cursive Clojure plugin +.idea/replstate.xml + +# SonarLint plugin +.idea/sonarlint/ + +# Crashlytics plugin (for Android Studio and IntelliJ) +com_crashlytics_export_strings.xml +crashlytics.properties +crashlytics-build.properties +fabric.properties + +# Editor-based Rest Client +.idea/httpRequests + +# Android studio 3.1+ serialized cache file +.idea/caches/build_file_checksums.ser + +### Intellij Patch ### +# Comment Reason: https://github.com/joeblau/gitignore.io/issues/186#issuecomment-215987721 + +# *.iml +# modules.xml +# .idea/misc.xml +# *.ipr + +# Sonarlint plugin +# https://plugins.jetbrains.com/plugin/7973-sonarlint +.idea/**/sonarlint/ + +# SonarQube Plugin +# https://plugins.jetbrains.com/plugin/7238-sonarqube-community-plugin +.idea/**/sonarIssues.xml + +# Markdown Navigator plugin +# https://plugins.jetbrains.com/plugin/7896-markdown-navigator-enhanced +.idea/**/markdown-navigator.xml +.idea/**/markdown-navigator-enh.xml +.idea/**/markdown-navigator/ + +# Cache file creation bug +# See https://youtrack.jetbrains.com/issue/JBR-2257 +.idea/$CACHE_FILE$ + +# CodeStream plugin +# https://plugins.jetbrains.com/plugin/12206-codestream +.idea/codestream.xml + +# Azure Toolkit for IntelliJ plugin +# https://plugins.jetbrains.com/plugin/8053-azure-toolkit-for-intellij +.idea/**/azureSettings.xml + +### Rust ### +# Generated by Cargo +# will have compiled files and executables +debug/ +target/ + +# Cargo.lock is committed on purpose: senbei is a binary, and CI builds with +# --locked (web/Cargo.lock likewise, for the wasm build). + +# These are backup files generated by rustfmt +**/*.rs.bk + +# MSVC Windows builds of rustc generate these, which store debugging information +*.pdb + +### VisualStudioCode ### +.vscode/* +!.vscode/settings.json +!.vscode/tasks.json +!.vscode/launch.json +!.vscode/extensions.json +!.vscode/*.code-snippets + +# Local History for Visual Studio Code +.history/ + +# Built Visual Studio Code Extensions +*.vsix + +### VisualStudioCode Patch ### +# Ignore all local history of files +.history +.ionide + +### senbei test corpus ### +# The samples folder holds local-only Crackproof binaries; only its README is +# tracked. Ignore the folder's contents (not the folder itself, or git won't +# descend into it to find the re-included README). See senbei/samples/README.md. +/samples/* +!/samples/README.md + +### senbei web build ### +/web/pkg/ +/web/target/ +/web/.playwright-cli \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55d7781 --- /dev/null +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# AGENTS.md + +Guidance for AI coding agents (and human contributors) working in this repo. + +## Project + +Senbei is a static unpacker for Crackproof-protected PE files: a pure, +panic-free, no-I/O unpacker core (`src/unpacker/`) plus a thin CLI shell +(`src/`), an il2cpp metadata de-obfuscator (`src/metadata.rs`), and a +WebAssembly browser frontend (`web/`). Read `docs/design.md` first. + +## Commands + +```cmd +cargo build --release :: CLI +cargo test --release :: full suite (golden corpus: samples/, git-ignored) +cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings +cargo fmt --all +cd web && wasm-pack build --target web --release :: browser build +``` + +The `samples/` corpus is user-managed and absent on CI; without it the +samples test is a no-op pass. `SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES=1` makes an absent +corpus fail (use this on a private CI that *does* have the corpus). Do not +delete `samples/` with `rm -rf` — it may be a junction; use git +worktree-aware cleanup. + +## Hard rules + +- **The unpacker core stays pure**: no file I/O, no `unsafe`, no panics across + the public boundary, no platform-specific code. It must keep compiling to + `wasm32-unknown-unknown` (`cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown`). +- **`catch_unwind` does not work on wasm** (the prebuilt std can't unwind; a + caught panic becomes a fatal `unreachable` trap). Native code may rely on + `catch_unpack`, but any routing decision must also work without a catchable + panic: spliced companion inputs route straight to the EXE pipeline, and the + web app isolates every unpack in a disposable Web Worker, retrying trapped + DLLs with `job::unpack_bytes_force_exe`. Never make correctness on wasm + depend on catching a panic. +- **Byte-identical output is the contract.** Any pipeline change must re-run + the full golden corpus; a byte mismatch on any golden is a regression. +- **Trial-and-validate, never trust a heuristic.** A silently wrong offset + produces a silently broken binary — worse than an error. Every layout + candidate must be validated (checksum / structural oracle) with fall-through + to the next candidate. +- **Determinism under parallelism.** Block fan-out must stay byte-identical + regardless of thread count (`SENBEI_THREADS=1` is the sequential reference). +- **Folder scanning: deny-list, never allow-list.** Targets are recognised by + content, not extension, and can carry arbitrary names — there is no closed + set of target extensions an allow-list could enumerate. Only known + bulk-asset formats are excluded. +- **No binaries in the repo** — not as fixtures, not in commits. The only + corpus is the local git-ignored `samples/`. (Issue attachments of + protected inputs are fine when the user is authorized to share them, but + never commit them.) + +## Public-repo hygiene (important) + +This is a public research repository. In code comments, docs, tests, and +commit messages: + +- **Never name specific games, publishers, or product codenames.** Refer to + build families generically ("older EXE-64 builds", "the marker-less + layout", "external-companion builds"). Keep offsets/numbers — drop names. +- **Never name specific protected filenames** from real distributions. Test + fixtures use generic names (`app.exe`, `managed.dll`, `daemon.exe`). + Exceptions (platform-standard technology names, allowed): `il2cpp`, + `Unity`, `global-metadata.dat`, the Crackproof magic `KONN`. +- **Never reference other tools, projects, implementations, or paths outside + this repo.** Describe behavior and layout directly; do not mention prior + art, porting, or where any algorithm came from. + +## Conventions + +- Comments explain *why* (layout rationale, observed variants, failure modes), + not *what*. +- Rust 2024 edition; clippy-clean at `-D warnings`; rustfmt default style. +- CLI behavior (flags, exit codes, output naming) is documented in + `docs/usage.md` — update the doc when changing behavior. diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md new file mode 120000 index 0000000..47dc3e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/CLAUDE.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +AGENTS.md \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8fb6378 --- /dev/null +++ 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Point it +at a file or a folder and it writes decrypted copies — no launch of the +protected program, no kernel driver, no code runs out of the protected binary. + +> _"Crackproof"? It's senbei (煎餅 — rice cracker). Cracks itself._ + +Senbei reads a protected `.exe` or `.dll`, replays the unpacking algorithm +entirely in memory, and writes the recovered image to a new file. The core is a +pure, panic-free library with no file I/O; the CLI wraps it with scanning, a +progress bar, and a run log. A browser version (WebAssembly, fully client-side) +lives in [`web/`](web/). + +## Legal notice and intended use + +**Read this before using Senbei.** + +- Senbei is a research and interoperability tool. It exists to enable lawful + reverse engineering, security research, preservation, and interoperability + with software you already legitimately possess. +- **Only process binaries you own or are explicitly authorized to analyze.** + Depending on your jurisdiction and license agreements, circumventing + technological protection measures may be restricted (for example under + DMCA §1201 in the United States, which contains exemptions for security + research and interoperability). It is your responsibility to ensure your use + is lawful. +- Senbei does not bypass any access control for you: it performs a purely + static transformation of a file already on your disk. It derives everything + it needs from the input file itself, contains no vendor code or secrets, and + distributes no keys, cracks, or copyrighted content. +- Senbei does not enable online play, license fraud, or cheating, and must not + be used to redistribute decrypted binaries. Do not upload outputs anywhere. +- The authors provide this software "as is", without warranty of any kind, and + accept no liability for misuse. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) (AGPL-3.0). +- "Crackproof" is a trademark of its respective owner; this project is not + affiliated with or endorsed by the protection vendor or any software + publisher. Names are used for identification only. + +## What it handles + +| Kind | Description | +| --- | --- | +| `Exe` | Crackproof-protected executable (PE32+ and PE32). | +| `NativeDll` | Protected native (unmanaged) DLL. | +| `ManagedDll` | Protected .NET assembly (has a CLR data directory). | +| `._` companion | Stub + external encrypted payload layout, spliced automatically. | +| `global-metadata.dat` | il2cpp metadata with obfuscated method tokens, de-obfuscated in place. | + +Detection is content-based (header key-table at offset 4096, magic `KONN`), +not extension-based. Anything unrecognized is left untouched. + +## Quick start + +```cmd +cargo build --release + +senbei protected.exe +:: -> unpack\protected.unpack.exe + +senbei "C:\Games\MyGame" +:: -> C:\Games\MyGame\unpack\... (recursive, skips non-targets) +``` + +Every output is sanity-checked statically; structurally broken results are +flagged as suspect rather than silently trusted. + +## Documentation + +- [Usage reference](docs/usage.md) — CLI flags, exit codes, integrity check +- [Design](docs/design.md) — architecture, routing, and error model +- [Development](docs/development.md) — building, testing, environment variables +- [Web version](web/README.md) — run Senbei in a browser + +## License + +[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE) (AGPL-3.0-only). diff --git a/docs/design.md b/docs/design.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7dd6799 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +# Design + +Senbei is a fully static unpacker: it replays the unpacking algorithm on the +file bytes in memory and writes the recovered PE image. No code from the +protected binary is ever executed, no process is launched or attached to, and +no driver or proxy DLL is involved. + +## Crate layout + +The crate is split into a pure core and a thin CLI shell: + +- **`src/unpacker/`** — the core. Pure functions over byte slices: no file + I/O, no environment access (beyond a few debugging overrides, see + [development.md](development.md)), panic-free at the public boundary (all + internal panics are trapped and converted to `UnpackError::Corrupt`). This + is what the WebAssembly build embeds. +- **`src/` (top level)** — the CLI shell: argument parsing, recursive folder + scanning, per-run log file, progress bar, Explorer-friendly exit pause, and + the single-file/folder orchestration in `job.rs`. +- **`src/metadata.rs`** — il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` method-token + de-obfuscation (format version 31; other versions are left untouched). + +``` +src/ +├── main.rs argument parsing + dispatch +├── lib.rs module roots +├── job.rs single-file + folder orchestration, out-naming, +│ companion splice, stub overlay/TLS restore, +│ pipeline routing (incl. the wasm-safe byte API) +├── scan.rs recursive Crackproof + metadata discovery +├── metadata.rs il2cpp global-metadata.dat de-obfuscation +├── logfile.rs per-run timestamped log +├── ui.rs progress bar + status lines +├── pause.rs Explorer-friendly exit pause +└── unpacker/ pure, panic-free, no-I/O core + ├── mod.rs detection + unpack_auto dispatch + ├── exe.rs EXE pipeline (PE32+ and PE32) + ├── dll.rs native + managed DLL pipeline + ├── integrity.rs static post-unpack sanity check + ├── primitives.rs decrypt_data* steps, key/shift selection + ├── bytecode.rs bytecode VM + ├── parallel.rs deterministic block-parallel fan-out + ├── tables.rs constant tables + └── crc32.rs checksum +``` + +## Detection and routing + +Detection is content-based (`unpacker::detect`), never extension-based: the +key table is derived from the file header and checked against the format +magic, then the PE characteristics classify the input as EXE, native DLL, or +managed DLL. + +`unpack_auto` then dispatches: + +- `Exe` → the EXE pipeline (handles both PE32+ and PE32). +- `NativeDll` / `ManagedDll` → the DLL pipeline first; on failure, the EXE + pipeline as a fallback. Two DLL layouts exist in the wild: an older layout + the DLL pipeline parses, and a newer one that protects DLLs with the + EXE-style shell layout instead. The DLL-first order keeps old-layout outputs + byte-identical (the EXE pipeline also "succeeds" on old-layout DLLs but + produces different bytes); the fallback handles the new layout (including + the managed-DLL .NET metadata restore). + +One routing shortcut bypasses `unpack_auto`: inputs spliced from an external +companion (`job.rs`, both the CLI and the wasm byte API) go **straight to the +EXE pipeline**. The companion layout is definitionally the EXE-style shell, +so the DLL probe can never be right for it — and the probe's rejection of +EXE-shell DLLs relies on a caught panic, which is a fatal trap on targets +without unwinding (WebAssembly). Output bytes are identical to the +probe-then-fallback route. + +## External-companion inputs + +Some builds split a protected module into an on-disk loader stub plus an +encrypted `._` companion. When a `._` sibling matches the stub's header +region, `job.rs` splices the two before unpacking and afterwards overlays the +export table and TLS directory from the stub — pieces the encrypted companion +does not carry. All overlay steps are best-effort no-ops when their inputs +can't be mapped, so a malformed stub can never corrupt an otherwise-good +unpack. + +## Pipelines + +Both pipelines are **heuristic with trial-and-validate**: where a layout +leaves ambiguity (e.g. which block is the real file decryptor, or a page-XOR +shift), the pipeline tries candidates and validates the result structurally +(an entry-stub oracle, checksum stamps, cluster stamps) instead of trusting +the first match. A validation failure falls through to the next candidate +rather than producing silently wrong output. + +Several protected stages are themselves little bytecode programs. The core +includes a small VM (`bytecode.rs`) that generates and interprets those +programs rather than hardcoding each variant's constants. + +## Integrity check + +Every produced image passes through `integrity::check` — a static, execution- +free sanity check that only flags defects impossible in a correctly unpacked +image (malformed headers, unmapped/non-executable/all-zero/all-int3 entry +point, a native DLL with no base-relocation directory, any import descriptor +whose DLL name is still ciphertext, a managed image whose COR20 header or BSJB +metadata did not survive). See [usage.md](usage.md#integrity-check). +A clean report is not a proof of correctness; a non-clean report is a reliable +"broken" signal. + +## Parallelism + +Section decrypt/decompress blocks write disjoint output spans and read only +immutable input plus snapshotted key tables, so `parallel.rs` fans them out +across worker threads with **byte-identical** output regardless of thread +count. There is no `unsafe`: the buffer is carved with safe `split_at_mut` +chains so the borrow checker proves spans never alias. Overlapping spans (only +possible on corrupt input) degrade to the sequential whole-buffer pass, +preserving the deterministic last-writer-wins behavior of the serial +pipeline. `SENBEI_THREADS=1` forces the sequential path; on targets without +threads (WebAssembly) the sequential path is used automatically. + +## Error model + +The public API never panics: every pipeline runs under a `catch_unwind` +wrapper (`catch_unpack`) that converts a trapped panic to +`UnpackError::Corrupt`, with the default panic hook transiently suppressed. +Size requests are bounds-checked against a 1 GiB `MAX_IMAGE_SIZE` before +allocation so a crafted header cannot abort the process with a huge +allocation. In folder mode each file is isolated: one file's failure is logged +and counted, never fatal to the run. + +**WebAssembly caveat:** the prebuilt wasm std cannot unwind, so a caught +panic becomes a fatal `unreachable` trap there. The DLL-routing probe relies +on this mechanism to reject EXE-shell-layout DLLs, so the web build routes +around it instead of through it: spliced companion inputs skip the probe +entirely (see "Detection and routing"), and the web app isolates every unpack +in a disposable Web Worker — a trapped DLL is retried once in a fresh worker +with the forced-EXE pipeline (`job::unpack_bytes_force_exe`), reproducing the +probe-then-fallback outcome without a catchable panic. A trap on any other +input is reported as a clean error rather than freezing the page. diff --git a/docs/development.md b/docs/development.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0dbaad8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/development.md @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +# Development + +## Building + +Requires a Rust toolchain (MSVC backend is the default on Windows; +`rustup-init.exe` from installs it). The pinned toolchain +and targets are in `rust-toolchain.toml`. + +```cmd +cargo build --release +``` + +Output: `target\release\senbei.exe`. The binary is self-contained — no driver, +no proxy DLL, no external assets. + +The library and CLI also build for Linux/macOS (`cfg`-gated platform code +only) and for `wasm32-unknown-unknown` (see the [web version](../web/README.md)). + +## Testing + +```cmd +cargo test --release +``` + +The suite covers CLI behavior, detection, the folder driver, the run log, and +byte-exact golden tests over `samples/` — a user-managed corpus (git-ignored, +see `samples/README.md`) of real Crackproof inputs plus `.golden.` +reference outputs. Every input goes through `job::unpack_bytes` — the same +routing the CLI uses, so an `._` companion in the corpus is spliced and +the stub export/TLS overlays run — and is gated on **two** checks: the static +integrity check (catches runtime-broken outputs even when a stale golden would +still byte-match) and, when a golden exists, a bit-for-bit comparison. il2cpp +`*.dat` inputs are routed through `metadata::deobfuscate` instead. An empty or +absent corpus is a no-op pass; set `SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES` to make it fail +instead (useful on a private CI that has the corpus — public CI never does, +since binaries are not committed). + +> **Note:** goldens encode expected *bytes*, not runtime behavior. A golden +> produced before a pipeline fix may byte-match while still being wrong — the +> integrity check is the second gate for exactly this reason. Re-verify +> goldens against real runs when touching the affected pipeline stages. +> +> **The corpus only protects what it contains.** Wire the test to the routing +> the CLI actually takes (it is), and keep a sample for every layout family — +> marker-based, marker-less, external-companion, PE32, PE32+, native, managed, +> metadata. An unrepresented family has no regression gate at all, which is +> how a "re-run the golden corpus" rule can pass while silently covering +> nothing. + +## Debugging levers (environment variables) + +- `DD8_SHIFT` — override the `decrypt_data8` page-XOR shift (`99` skips dd8 + entirely). +- `SEL_DIAG` — print the dd8 selector's scores: the per-shift `0xCC` counts and + the plaintext baseline they are compared against (PE32+), and the per-formula + counts, baseline and net gain (PE32). +- `SENBEI_THREADS` — cap the block-parallel fan-out (`1` forces the fully + sequential path). +- `SENBEI_SCAN_ALL` — same as `--scan-all` (probe every file in a folder). + +## Conventions + +- The `src/unpacker/` core is pure: no file I/O, no panics across the public + boundary, no `unsafe`. Keep it that way — it is what the WebAssembly build + embeds. +- Layout heuristics must **trial-and-validate**: never pick a candidate offset + on shape alone and trust it; validate by decryption/checksum and fall + through to the next candidate on failure. A silent wrong offset produces a + silently broken output, which is worse than an error. +- Output must remain byte-identical against the golden corpus for every + supported layout. When fixing one build family, re-run the full golden + corpus to prove no other family regressed. +- Folder scanning uses a size floor plus an extension **deny**-list, never an + allow-list: targets are recognised by content, not extension, and can carry + arbitrary names, so only known bulk-asset extensions are excluded. The + pre-filter exists because folder-scan cost is per-file I/O latency, not the + walk — probe fewer files, don't parallelize the probe loop. +- `cargo fmt` and `cargo clippy` must stay clean (CI enforces both). + +## Repository layout + +``` +senbei/ +├── Cargo.toml senbei lib + bin package +├── rust-toolchain.toml pinned toolchain + targets +├── src/ CLI shell + pure unpacker core (see docs/design.md) +├── tests/ CLI, detection, golden, and folder tests +├── samples/ local-only test corpus (git-ignored) +├── web/ WebAssembly browser build +├── docs/ usage, design, and development documentation +└── .github/ CI workflows and issue templates +``` + +## Web build + +See [web/README.md](../web/README.md). In short: + +```cmd +cd web +wasm-pack build --target web --release +``` + +then serve `web/` statically and open `index.html`. Everything runs +client-side; no file leaves the browser. + +## Contributing + +Issues and pull requests are welcome. A few ground rules: + +- **Never commit binaries** (protected or decrypted) to the repository — + the only corpus is the local git-ignored `samples/`. Attaching a protected + input file to an issue is welcome if it helps diagnose the problem; only + attach files you are authorized to share. +- Run `cargo test --release`, `cargo clippy`, and `cargo fmt` before + submitting. +- Keep the unpacker core free of I/O, `unsafe`, and platform-specific code. diff --git a/docs/usage.md b/docs/usage.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9bfcc3f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/usage.md @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +# Usage + +``` +senbei [--out DIR] [-v|--verbose] [-q|--quiet]... [--scan-all] + [--no-log] [--no-pause] [-V|--version] [-h|--help] +``` + +Real runs print `Senbei ` once at start. Use `-V` / `--version` to +print the version and exit. + +## Single file + +The decrypted image is written under `/unpack/` with `.unpack` inserted +before the extension. A `senbei-.log` is written in the same +directory. With `--out DIR`, both the output and the log go into `DIR` instead: + +```cmd +senbei app.exe +:: -> unpack\app.unpack.exe +:: -> unpack\senbei-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.log + +senbei app.exe --out C:\out +:: -> C:\out\app.unpack.exe +:: -> C:\out\senbei-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.log +``` + +Pointing senbei directly at an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` rewrites its +obfuscated method tokens back to the contiguous per-module range il2cpp +expects; the output is `global-metadata.unpack.dat`, written only when tokens +actually changed. Only metadata format version 31 is rewritten; other versions +are reported and left untouched. + +## Folder mode + +Senbei walks the directory recursively, skips any subdirectory literally named +`unpack`, and unpacks every file it recognises as Crackproof-protected (by +content, not extension — renamed files and `.bak` backups are still found). +Results land under `/unpack/` (or `--out DIR`), mirroring the input +tree's relative paths. The run log is written **in that same out directory**: + +```cmd +senbei "C:\Games\MyGame" +:: -> C:\Games\MyGame\unpack\... +:: -> C:\Games\MyGame\unpack\senbei-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.log +``` + +Folder mode also picks up `global-metadata.dat` files and external-companion +`._` payloads: a module whose `._` sibling matches its header region is +spliced with the companion automatically (no flag needed) and unpacked as one +image, with the output named for the stub. + +Each file is processed in isolation: an error or panic on one file is caught, +counted, and logged, and the run continues. Folder mode finishes with a summary +line, then duration: + +``` +12 unpacked · 3 skipped · 0 errors · 1 suspect · 2 metadata +done in 1234 ms +``` + +## Integrity check + +A successful unpack is not always a runnable one: a layout heuristic can pick +the wrong offset and leave the entry-point stub or import strings encrypted, so +the pipeline reports success but the OS loader faults at runtime (typically +`0xC0000005`, STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION). To catch this, senbei runs a static +sanity check over every output it produces — inspecting the bytes alone, with +no reference image and no execution. + +It flags only defects that cannot occur in a correctly unpacked image: + +- malformed DOS/PE headers, bad optional-header magic, implausible section + count, zero `SizeOfImage`, or section raw-data ranges that run past EOF; +- an entry point that doesn't map into a section, isn't in an executable + section, or whose stub is all zeros or all `0xCC` int3 padding (the classic + left-encrypted symptom); +- a native (unmanaged) DLL with no base-relocation directory — it cannot + survive being mapped at a non-preferred base; +- **any** import descriptor whose DLL name doesn't resolve or isn't readable + ASCII (imports left encrypted) — the whole table is walked, not just the + first entry; +- for a managed assembly, a COR20 header whose `cb` isn't `0x48` or a + MetaData stream missing its `BSJB` signature (the CLR would reject the + image outright). + +The entry-point and import checks are skipped for managed assemblies, whose +native EP and import stub are legitimately not what the native loader expects. + +The check is deliberately conservative: a clean report is **not** a proof of +correctness, but a non-clean report is a reliable "this is broken" signal. A +suspect file is still written (the bytes are the best available) and flagged — +single-file mode prints a warning to stderr, folder mode prints a yellow `!` +line, adds a `SUSPECT` entry to the run log, and counts it in the summary's +`suspect` total (which is additive to `unpacked`). + +## Flags + +| Flag | Behavior | +| --- | --- | +| `--out DIR` | Write outputs (and the log, unless `--no-log`) under `DIR`. | +| `-v`, `--verbose` | Print detailed `[N/9]` per-stage unpack progress (and the destination path) for each file. In folder mode this replaces the progress bar. | +| `-q`, `--quiet` | Once: hide progress bar and per-file lines; keep banner, summary, and duration. Twice (`-q -q`): suppress all stdio (exit code only). | +| `--no-log` | Do not write `senbei-*.log`. Console output is unchanged by this flag alone. | +| `--scan-all` | Probe every file in a folder, including ones the scan pre-filter skips (under 4128 bytes, or a bulk-asset extension like `.ab`/`.xml`/`.acb`). Much slower on large game trees; finds the same targets in practice. | +| `--no-pause` | Skip the "Press Enter to exit" prompt (for scripted runs). | +| `-V`, `--version` | Print `Senbei ` and exit. | +| `-h`, `--help` | Show usage. | + +On Windows, when launched from Explorer (the process owns its console) senbei +pauses for Enter before exiting so the window doesn't vanish. `--no-pause` +disables this; it has no effect when stdout is piped or run from another +process. + +## Exit codes + +| Code | Meaning | +| --- | --- | +| `0` | Success (single file unpacked, or folder run with no errors). | +| `1` | At least one file failed, a scan probe was unreadable, or a single-file unpack errored. | +| `2` | Usage error: no path given, unknown option, missing `--out` value, or multiple input paths (help printed). | + +A folder run also fails with `1` when parts of the tree could not be scanned +(unreadable directory entries or files that failed the content probe) — those +are potential missed targets, not clean skips. An il2cpp metadata blob whose +format version senbei does not handle is *not* an error: it is reported, left +untouched, and counted as skipped. diff --git a/rust-toolchain.toml b/rust-toolchain.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f45a9a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust-toolchain.toml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +[toolchain] +channel = "stable" +targets = ["x86_64-pc-windows-msvc", "wasm32-unknown-unknown"] diff --git a/samples/README.md b/samples/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f6f0de3 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +# senbei/samples + +Drop-in corpus for the `samples` integration test (`tests/samples.rs`). + +This folder is **git-ignored** (only this `README.md` is tracked), so it holds +whatever Crackproof binaries happen to be on your machine. Nothing here is +committed. + +## What to put here + +Place protected inputs directly in this folder: + +- `*.exe` — Crackproof-protected executables (PE32 or PE32+) +- `*.dll` — Crackproof-protected DLLs (native or managed) +- `*.dat` — il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` blobs (method-token de-obfuscation) + +For an **external-companion** module, copy the `._` payload in as well, +keeping the exact `._` suffix on the full file name. The test splices it the +same way the CLI does; without it the loader stub alone is meaningless and the +splice / export-overlay / TLS-restore code is never exercised. + +Optionally, place a **golden** next to each input — the known-good unpacked +output, named `.golden.`: + +``` +samples/ + app.exe <- input + app.golden.exe <- golden (optional) + managed.dll <- input + managed.golden.dll <- golden (optional) + stub.dll <- input (external-companion layout) + stub.dll._ <- its encrypted payload (NOT an input itself) + stub.golden.dll <- golden + global-metadata.dat <- input + global-metadata.golden.dat<- golden + mystery.exe <- input, no golden +``` + +The type (EXE vs native/managed DLL vs metadata) is auto-detected from the file +contents, not the extension, so you don't need to classify anything by hand. + +Since the corpus is the only regression gate on byte-identical output, keep it +broad: each build family, each layout (marker-based and marker-less), and at +least one external-companion pair. A family with no sample here is a family no +test protects. + +## How the test treats each input + +Run with: + +``` +cargo test --release --test samples +``` + +For every input file, the test runs the same routing the CLI uses +(`job::unpack_bytes`, so companions splice and the stub overlays run) — or +`metadata::deobfuscate` for an il2cpp blob — and then: + +| Situation | Result | +| ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | +| Golden present, bytes **identical** | **pass** | +| Golden present, bytes **differ** | **fail** (test fails) | +| **No golden** found | **warning** (needs manual check)| +| Unpack errored / file unreadable | **fail** | + +Warnings are printed but do not fail the test — they flag outputs you should +eyeball or promote to a golden once verified. Failures fail the test. An empty +or absent folder is a no-op pass. + +To see the per-file warning/pass/fail summary, run with output shown: + +``` +cargo test --release --test samples -- --nocapture +``` + +## Naming rules + +- An **input** is any `*.exe` / `*.dll` / `*.dat` whose name does **not** + contain the `.golden.` segment. +- A **golden** is `.golden.` sitting next to its input. Files with + `.golden.` in the name are never treated as inputs. +- A **companion** is `._` (e.g. `stub.dll._` for `stub.dll`). + Its extension is `_`, so it is never picked up as an input of its own; it is + read only when its base module is processed. diff --git a/src/job.rs b/src/job.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d3d22d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/job.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1051 @@ +use crate::unpacker; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + +/// Crackproof header key table lives at this fixed file offset. For the +/// external-companion layout, the companion payload aligns to the stub here. +const HEADER_OFF: usize = 4096; + +/// Build the unpacker input for `input`, transparently handling the +/// **external-companion** layout used by some il2cpp games. +/// +/// In that layout a protected module is split into a thin on-disk loader stub +/// (`Foo.dll`, whose code sections are stripped to one page) plus an encrypted +/// `Foo.dll._` companion holding the real payload. The companion is byte-for-byte +/// the stub's payload region starting at the Crackproof header (offset 4096), so +/// `stub[..4096] ++ companion` reconstructs the ordinary embedded-payload file +/// the existing pipelines already unpack. The runtime loader does exactly this: +/// it maps `Foo.dll._` and feeds it through the standard Crackproof unpack. +/// +/// The splice fires only when a sibling `._` exists *and* its first 32 +/// bytes equal the stub's header at offset 4096 — a precise signal that the +/// companion is this stub's payload. Otherwise the file is returned untouched, +/// so normal (embedded-payload) inputs are unaffected. +fn read_unpacker_input(input: &Path) -> std::io::Result { + let stub = std::fs::read(input)?; + + // Companion path: append "._" to the full file name (Foo.dll -> Foo.dll._). + let companion = match input.file_name() { + Some(name) => { + let mut n = name.to_os_string(); + n.push("._"); + input.with_file_name(n) + } + None => { + return Ok(UnpackerInput { + bytes: stub, + stub: None, + }); + } + }; + if !companion.is_file() { + return Ok(UnpackerInput { + bytes: stub, + stub: None, + }); + } + let comp = std::fs::read(&companion)?; + match splice_companion(&stub, &comp) { + // A splice fired: keep the stub so its plaintext export table can be + // overlaid onto the unpacked image (the companion does not carry it). + Some(spliced) => Ok(UnpackerInput { + bytes: spliced, + stub: Some(stub), + }), + None => Ok(UnpackerInput { + bytes: stub, + stub: None, + }), + } +} + +/// The bytes fed to the unpacker, plus the original loader stub when the input +/// was reconstructed from an external companion. The stub is retained because +/// the crackproof loader rebuilds the PE export table at runtime from data kept +/// in the stub — that table is *not* present in the encrypted companion, so the +/// unpacked image needs it overlaid from the stub afterwards +/// (see [`overlay_exports_from_stub`]). +struct UnpackerInput { + bytes: Vec, + stub: Option>, +} + +/// Overlay the PE export table from the loader `stub` onto the unpacked image +/// `out`, for the external-companion layout. +/// +/// In that layout the encrypted companion carries the real `.text`/`il2cpp` +/// payload but **not** a usable export directory: the crackproof loader rebuilds +/// exports at runtime from the plaintext copy retained in the stub's `.rdata`. +/// Statically, the spliced input therefore decrypts to a garbage export +/// directory (`NumberOfFunctions` etc. are ciphertext), which makes downstream +/// tools (IL2CppDumper, IDA) choke when they parse it. The fix does what the +/// loader does: copy the export-directory region byte-for-byte from the stub to +/// the same RVA in the unpacked image. +/// +/// No-op (leaves `out` untouched) if there is no export directory, or if the +/// region cannot be mapped in either image — so a malformed stub can never +/// corrupt an otherwise-good unpack. +fn overlay_exports_from_stub(out: &mut [u8], stub: &[u8]) { + let (export_rva, export_size) = match pe_export_dir(out) { + Some(v) if v.1 != 0 => v, + _ => return, + }; + let dst = match rva_to_file_off(out, export_rva) { + Some(o) => o, + None => return, + }; + let src = match rva_to_file_off(stub, export_rva) { + Some(o) => o, + None => return, + }; + let n = export_size as usize; + if dst + n <= out.len() && src + n <= stub.len() { + out[dst..dst + n].copy_from_slice(&stub[src..src + n]); + } +} + +/// Restore the TLS directory from the loader `stub` onto the unpacked image +/// `out`, for the external-companion layout. +/// +/// Crackproof strips the whole `IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY` from the encrypted payload +/// — the data-directory entry, the directory struct, the raw-data template, and +/// the base relocations for the struct's four 64-bit pointer fields — and +/// re-installs TLS itself from data kept in the stub when it loads the module. +/// A statically-unpacked DLL is loaded by the ordinary Windows loader instead, +/// which needs a valid TLS directory or it never allocates a TLS slot for the +/// module nor writes `_tls_index`. The module's C++ `thread_local` accesses then +/// read a garbage TLS slot — observed as a `0xC0000005` deep in IL2CPP type +/// resolution (a TypeDef token used as a raw `s_TypeInfoTable` index). +/// +/// The stub retains the full plaintext `.rdata` (only `.text`/`il2cpp` are +/// stripped to one page), so the directory struct and its raw-data template are +/// copied back byte-for-byte at their RVAs, the data-directory entry is taken +/// from the stub header (the unpacked image's was overwritten with the zeroed +/// saved-header blob), and four DIR64 relocations are appended to `.reloc`. +/// +/// No-op if the stub declares no TLS directory or if any required region cannot +/// be mapped/relocated — so it can never corrupt an otherwise-good unpack. +fn restore_tls_from_stub(out: &mut [u8], stub: &[u8]) { + let pe = match read_u32(out, 0x3C) { + Some(v) => v as usize, + None => return, + }; + if out.get(pe..pe + 4) != Some(&b"PE\0\0"[..]) { + return; + } + // This restore is PE32+-only: it copies a 40-byte IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY64, + // converts fields with a 64-bit image base, and appends DIR64 relocs. A + // PE32 module needs the 24-byte struct / DIR32 handling (the unpacker core + // does that itself — see `restore_pe32_tls_from_stub`), so bail rather than + // read the data directories at the wrong (PE32+) offset and write garbage. + if read_u16(out, pe + 24) != Some(0x20B) { + return; + } + // TLS is data-directory index 9 (PE32+ directories at optional header +112). + let tls_dd = match pe.checked_add(24 + 112 + 9 * 8) { + Some(v) => v, + None => return, + }; + // The genuine entry survives in the stub header; the unpacked image's copy + // was clobbered by the (zeroed-TLS) saved-header blob. + let (tls_rva, tls_size) = match (read_u32(stub, tls_dd), read_u32(stub, tls_dd + 4)) { + (Some(r), Some(s)) if r != 0 && s != 0 => (r, s), + _ => return, // module has no TLS — nothing to restore + }; + // Image base (PE32+, optional header +24) converts the struct's absolute VAs + // back to RVAs for the raw-data template overlay. + let image_base = match read_u64(out, pe + 24 + 24) { + Some(v) => v, + None => return, + }; + + // 1) Overlay the IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY struct from the stub at its RVA. + let dst = match rva_to_file_off(out, tls_rva) { + Some(o) => o, + None => return, + }; + let src = match rva_to_file_off(stub, tls_rva) { + Some(o) => o, + None => return, + }; + let n = tls_size as usize; + if dst.checked_add(n).is_none_or(|e| e > out.len()) + || src.checked_add(n).is_none_or(|e| e > stub.len()) + { + return; + } + out[dst..dst + n].copy_from_slice(&stub[src..src + n]); + + // 2) Restore the data-directory entry so the loader processes TLS at all. + write_u32_at(out, tls_dd, tls_rva); + write_u32_at(out, tls_dd + 4, tls_size); + + // 3) Overlay the raw-data template [StartAddressOfRawData, EndAddressOfRawData). + if let (Some(start_va), Some(end_va)) = (read_u64(out, dst), read_u64(out, dst + 8)) + && end_va > start_va + && start_va >= image_base + { + let tpl_rva = (start_va - image_base) as u32; + let tpl_len = (end_va - start_va) as usize; + if let (Some(td), Some(ts)) = ( + rva_to_file_off(out, tpl_rva), + rva_to_file_off(stub, tpl_rva), + ) && td.checked_add(tpl_len).is_some_and(|e| e <= out.len()) + && ts.checked_add(tpl_len).is_some_and(|e| e <= stub.len()) + { + out[td..td + tpl_len].copy_from_slice(&stub[ts..ts + tpl_len]); + } + } + + // 4) Append DIR64 relocations for the struct's four 64-bit pointer fields + // (Start/End/Index/CallBacks at +0/+8/+0x10/+0x18). Without them the + // loader would leave preferred-base VAs in a rebased image. + add_tls_relocs(out, pe, tls_rva); +} + +/// Append a single base-relocation block covering the four 64-bit pointer fields +/// of the TLS directory struct at `tls_rva`. The block is written immediately +/// after the existing relocation table (which must be free space and in bounds) +/// and the BaseReloc directory size is grown to include it. No-op if the table +/// is absent, the fields straddle a relocation page, or the slot is not free. +fn add_tls_relocs(out: &mut [u8], pe: usize, tls_rva: u32) { + let reloc_dd = pe + 24 + 112 + 5 * 8; // BaseReloc = directory index 5 + let (reloc_rva, reloc_size) = match (read_u32(out, reloc_dd), read_u32(out, reloc_dd + 4)) { + (Some(r), Some(s)) if r != 0 => (r, s), + _ => return, + }; + // All four fields (last at +0x18) must share one 0x1000 relocation page. + let page = tls_rva & !0xFFF; + if (tls_rva.wrapping_add(0x18)) & !0xFFF != page { + return; + } + const BLOCK: usize = 8 + 4 * 2; // header + four DIR64 entries + let at = match rva_to_file_off(out, reloc_rva.wrapping_add(reloc_size)) { + Some(o) => o, + None => return, + }; + if at.checked_add(BLOCK).is_none_or(|e| e > out.len()) { + return; + } + if out[at..at + BLOCK].iter().any(|&b| b != 0) { + return; // refuse to clobber existing data + } + write_u32_at(out, at, page); + write_u32_at(out, at + 4, BLOCK as u32); + for (i, off) in [0u32, 8, 0x10, 0x18].iter().enumerate() { + let entry = (10u16 << 12) | (((tls_rva.wrapping_add(*off)) & 0xFFF) as u16); + let p = at + 8 + i * 2; + out[p..p + 2].copy_from_slice(&entry.to_le_bytes()); + } + write_u32_at(out, reloc_dd + 4, reloc_size.wrapping_add(BLOCK as u32)); +} + +/// Read the Export data-directory (RVA, size) from a PE image, or `None` if the +/// headers are too short/invalid to parse. +fn pe_export_dir(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<(u32, u32)> { + let pe = read_u32(buf, 0x3C)? as usize; + if buf.get(pe..pe + 4)? != b"PE\0\0" { + return None; + } + // Optional header at pe+24; data directories start at +96 on PE32 (0x10B) + // and +112 on PE32+ (0x20B); Export is index 0. + let dd_base = match read_u16(buf, pe + 24)? { + 0x20B => 112, + 0x10B => 96, + _ => return None, + }; + let dd = pe.checked_add(24 + dd_base)?; + Some((read_u32(buf, dd)?, read_u32(buf, dd + 4)?)) +} + +/// Map an RVA to a file offset using the PE section table. Returns `None` if no +/// section contains the RVA or the headers cannot be parsed. +fn rva_to_file_off(buf: &[u8], rva: u32) -> Option { + let pe = read_u32(buf, 0x3C)? as usize; + if buf.get(pe..pe + 4)? != b"PE\0\0" { + return None; + } + let nsec = read_u16(buf, pe + 6)? as usize; + let opt_size = read_u16(buf, pe + 20)? as usize; + let sh = pe.checked_add(24)?.checked_add(opt_size)?; + for i in 0..nsec { + let o = sh.checked_add(i.checked_mul(40)?)?; + let vsz = read_u32(buf, o + 8)?; + let va = read_u32(buf, o + 12)?; + let raw = read_u32(buf, o + 20)?; + if rva >= va && rva < va.wrapping_add(vsz.max(1)) { + return Some((rva - va).wrapping_add(raw) as usize); + } + } + None +} + +fn read_u32(buf: &[u8], off: usize) -> Option { + let b = buf.get(off..off + 4)?; + Some(u32::from_le_bytes([b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3]])) +} + +fn read_u16(buf: &[u8], off: usize) -> Option { + let b = buf.get(off..off + 2)?; + Some(u16::from_le_bytes([b[0], b[1]])) +} + +fn read_u64(buf: &[u8], off: usize) -> Option { + let b = buf.get(off..off + 8)?; + Some(u64::from_le_bytes([ + b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], b[4], b[5], b[6], b[7], + ])) +} + +/// Write a little-endian `u32` at `off`, silently doing nothing if out of bounds. +fn write_u32_at(buf: &mut [u8], off: usize, val: u32) { + if let Some(slot) = buf.get_mut(off..off + 4) { + slot.copy_from_slice(&val.to_le_bytes()); + } +} + +/// Splice a stub and its external-companion payload into the embedded-payload +/// form the pipelines expect, or `None` if `comp` is not this stub's payload. +/// +/// The companion is byte-for-byte the stub's payload region from the Crackproof +/// header (offset 4096) onward, so the result is `stub[..4096] ++ comp`. The +/// splice fires only when the first 32 bytes of `comp` equal the stub's header +/// at offset 4096 — a 32-byte match on the key-table/magic region that confirms +/// the pairing and leaves ordinary (non-companion) inputs untouched. +fn splice_companion(stub: &[u8], comp: &[u8]) -> Option> { + let hdr_end = HEADER_OFF + 32; + if stub.len() >= hdr_end && comp.len() >= 32 && stub[HEADER_OFF..hdr_end] == comp[..32] { + let mut spliced = Vec::with_capacity(HEADER_OFF + comp.len()); + spliced.extend_from_slice(&stub[..HEADER_OFF]); + spliced.extend_from_slice(comp); + return Some(spliced); + } + None +} + +/// Summary of a folder-mode run. +pub struct Summary { + pub unpacked: usize, + pub skipped: usize, + pub errors: usize, + /// Files that unpacked without error but failed the static integrity check + /// — likely to crash at runtime (e.g. 0xC0000005). Counted in addition to + /// `unpacked` (a suspect file is still written). + pub suspect: usize, + /// il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` files de-obfuscated (method tokens remapped). + pub metadata: usize, + /// Wall-clock duration of the folder run in milliseconds. + pub duration_ms: u128, +} + +/// Default output root for a folder unpack: `/unpack`. +pub fn default_out_root_for_folder(root: &Path) -> PathBuf { + root.join("unpack") +} + +/// Default output root for a single-file unpack: `/unpack` (or `./unpack` +/// when the input has no parent directory). +pub fn default_out_root_for_file(input: &Path) -> PathBuf { + let parent = input + .parent() + .filter(|p| !p.as_os_str().is_empty()) + .unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new(".")); + parent.join("unpack") +} + +/// Unpack all Crackproof-protected files under `root`, writing results into +/// a mirrored subtree under `out_dir` (or `root/unpack` if None). +/// +/// Each file is processed independently: a panic or error in one file is +/// isolated and counted as an error; the loop continues. +pub fn run_folder(root: &Path, out_dir: Option<&Path>, quiet: bool) -> anyhow::Result { + run_folder_v(root, out_dir, if quiet { 1 } else { 0 }, false, false) +} + +/// Like [`run_folder`], but prints detailed `[N/9]` step progress (and a final +/// `Write to ` line) for each EXE when `verbose` is true. +/// +/// `quiet` is a level: `>= 1` suppresses per-file UI lines and the progress bar. +/// When `no_log` is true, no `senbei-*.log` is created under the out root. +pub fn run_folder_v( + root: &Path, + out_dir: Option<&Path>, + quiet: u8, + verbose: bool, + no_log: bool, +) -> anyhow::Result { + run_folder_opts( + root, + out_dir, + quiet, + verbose, + no_log, + crate::scan::scan_all_env(), + ) +} + +/// Like [`run_folder_v`], but with the scan pre-filter explicitly controlled. +/// +/// When `scan_all` is true every regular file under `root` is opened and +/// content-probed, instead of skipping ones the free directory metadata already +/// rules out (too small to hold a Crackproof key table, or a bulk-asset +/// extension). See [`crate::scan::find_targets_opts`] — exhaustive scanning is +/// dramatically slower on asset-heavy game trees and finds the same targets. +pub fn run_folder_opts( + root: &Path, + out_dir: Option<&Path>, + quiet: u8, + verbose: bool, + no_log: bool, + scan_all: bool, +) -> anyhow::Result { + let t0 = std::time::Instant::now(); + let out_root = out_dir + .map(Path::to_path_buf) + .unwrap_or_else(|| default_out_root_for_folder(root)); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&out_root)?; + let log = if no_log { + None + } else { + let log = crate::logfile::Log::create(&out_root)?; + log.step(&format!("Senbei {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))); + log.step(&format!( + "started {}", + crate::logfile::local_stamp_display() + )); + log.step(&format!("input {}", root.display())); + log.step(&format!("out {}", out_root.display())); + Some(log) + }; + // Single merged directory walk: returns Crackproof unpack candidates and + // il2cpp metadata blobs from one traversal (see + // [`crate::scan::find_targets_opts`]). Files the free directory metadata + // already rules out are never opened — on asset-heavy trees the per-file + // open+read latency, not the traversal, is the whole cost. + let (candidates, metas, scan_stats) = crate::scan::find_targets_opts(root, scan_all); + // Files the scan could not classify are potential missed targets, not + // clean skips: an unreadable directory or a locked il2cpp game assembly must + // fail the run (exit 1) rather than report "0 errors" over a partial scan. + let scan_failed = scan_stats.walk_errors + scan_stats.probe_errors; + if scan_failed > 0 && quiet == 0 { + eprintln!( + "warning: {} file(s) could not be read during the scan and may be missed targets", + scan_failed + ); + } + if let Some(log) = &log { + if scan_stats.walk_errors > 0 { + log.step(&format!( + "scan: {} directory entry(s) unreadable", + scan_stats.walk_errors + )); + } + if scan_stats.probe_errors > 0 { + log.step(&format!( + "scan: {} file(s) failed content probe (unreadable or detector panic)", + scan_stats.probe_errors + )); + } + } + let suppress_file_lines = quiet >= 1; + // Quiet wins over verbose: step progress only when quiet == 0 (spec: verbose + // lines only when quiet == 0; quiet ≥ 2 must stay fully silent even with -v). + let verbose_steps = verbose && quiet == 0; + // Verbose mode prints multi-line `[N/9]` step output per file straight to + // stdout; an active progress bar would be clobbered by it, so hide the bar + // (its per-file ok/err lines still print) when verbose is on. + let bar = crate::ui::progress(candidates.len() as u64, quiet >= 1 || verbose); + let mut s = Summary { + unpacked: 0, + skipped: scan_stats.skipped, + errors: scan_failed, + suspect: 0, + metadata: 0, + duration_ms: 0, + }; + + // Silence the default panic hook's stderr spew during per-file processing. + let default_hook = std::panic::take_hook(); + std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|_| {})); // suppress "thread panicked" messages + + for input in &candidates { + let rel = rel_in_tree(root, input); + let dest = out_root.join(out_name(&rel)); + + // Wrap in catch_unwind so a single bad file never aborts the folder run. + let input_owned = input.clone(); + let dest_owned = dest.clone(); + let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + unpack_one_v(&input_owned, &dest_owned, verbose_steps) + })); + + match result { + Ok(Ok((kind, report))) => { + s.unpacked += 1; + crate::ui::ok(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, kind, &dest); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("OK {rel:?} -> {dest:?} ({kind:?})")); + } + if !report.ok() { + s.suspect += 1; + crate::ui::suspect(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &report); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("SUSPECT {rel:?}: {}", report.issues.join("; "))); + } + } + } + Ok(Err(e)) => { + s.errors += 1; + crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("ERR {rel:?}: {e:#}")); + } + } + Err(panic) => { + s.errors += 1; + let e = anyhow::anyhow!("unexpected panic: {}", panic_payload(&panic)); + crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "ERR {rel:?}: panic during unpack: {}", + panic_payload(&panic) + )); + } + } + } + bar.inc(1); + } + + // il2cpp metadata pass. Crackproof's `-GMD` option obfuscates the method + // tokens in `global-metadata.dat`; de-obfuscate any we find so the unpacked + // il2cpp game assembly resolves methods instead of indexing its per-module + // tables out of bounds (see [`crate::metadata`]). This is additive to the + // Crackproof module unpack above — the metadata blob is not itself a + // Crackproof file. + for meta in metas { + let rel = rel_in_tree(root, &meta); + let dest = out_root.join(out_name(&rel)); + let meta_owned = meta.clone(); + let dest_owned = dest.clone(); + let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + deobfuscate_metadata_to(&meta_owned, &dest_owned, verbose_steps) + })); + match result { + Ok(Ok(report)) if report.remapped > 0 => { + s.metadata += 1; + crate::ui::metadata(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, report.remapped, &dest); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META {rel:?} -> {dest:?}: v{} remapped {} method tokens", + report.version, report.remapped + )); + } + } + // Recognised metadata that needed no change (not -GMD-obfuscated): + // leave it untouched and don't write a redundant copy. + Ok(Ok(report)) => { + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META {rel:?}: v{} already de-obfuscated", + report.version + )); + } + } + Ok(Err(e)) => { + // A metadata version we don't handle is NOT a run failure: the + // game is simply not -GMD-obfuscated in a layout we know, the + // file is left untouched, and the PE unpacks around it may be + // fully successful. Count it as skipped (with a visible note), + // matching the "anything that doesn't match is left untouched" + // contract. Genuine corruption (Malformed) stays an error — + // silently exiting 0 would let a failed de-obfuscation pass CI + // while the il2cpp game assembly still crashes. + if let Some(v) = unsupported_version(&e) { + s.skipped += 1; + if !suppress_file_lines { + eprintln!( + "- {} unsupported metadata version {v}, left untouched", + rel.display() + ); + } + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META SKIP {rel:?}: unsupported metadata version {v}" + )); + } + } else { + s.errors += 1; + crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("META ERR {rel:?}: {e:#}")); + } + } + } + Err(panic) => { + s.errors += 1; + let e = anyhow::anyhow!( + "unexpected panic during de-obfuscation: {}", + panic_payload(&panic) + ); + crate::ui::err(&bar, suppress_file_lines, &rel, &e); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META ERR {rel:?}: panic during de-obfuscation: {}", + panic_payload(&panic) + )); + } + } + } + } + + // Restore the original panic hook. + std::panic::set_hook(default_hook); + + bar.finish_and_clear(); + s.duration_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis(); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms)); + log.step(&format!( + "summary: {} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata", + s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata + )); + } + Ok(s) +} + +/// Single-file (PE or metadata) with the same log/header/footer/timing as folder mode. +/// +/// Always returns `Ok(Summary)` for per-file unpack outcomes (including failures, +/// which set `errors: 1`) so callers always receive `duration_ms`. Fatal `Err` +/// only when the out dir / log cannot be created. +pub fn run_file_v( + input: &Path, + out_dir: Option<&Path>, + quiet: u8, + verbose: bool, + no_log: bool, +) -> anyhow::Result { + let t0 = std::time::Instant::now(); + let out_root = out_dir + .map(Path::to_path_buf) + .unwrap_or_else(|| default_out_root_for_file(input)); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&out_root)?; + + let log = if no_log { + None + } else { + let log = crate::logfile::Log::create(&out_root)?; + log.step(&format!("Senbei {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))); + log.step(&format!( + "started {}", + crate::logfile::local_stamp_display() + )); + log.step(&format!("input {}", input.display())); + log.step(&format!("out {}", out_root.display())); + Some(log) + }; + + let name = out_name(Path::new(input.file_name().unwrap_or_default())); + let dest = out_root.join(name); + let mut s = Summary { + unpacked: 0, + skipped: 0, + errors: 0, + suspect: 0, + metadata: 0, + duration_ms: 0, + }; + + let is_meta = { + use std::io::Read; + let mut buf = [0u8; 4]; + std::fs::File::open(input) + .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut buf)) + .map(|_| crate::metadata::is_metadata(&buf)) + .unwrap_or(false) + }; + + if is_meta { + match deobfuscate_metadata_to(input, &dest, verbose && quiet == 0) { + Ok(report) if report.remapped > 0 => { + s.metadata = 1; + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META {:?} -> {:?}: v{} remapped {} method tokens", + input, dest, report.version, report.remapped + )); + } + if quiet == 0 { + println!( + "✓ metadata v{} -> {:?} ({} method tokens remapped)", + report.version, dest, report.remapped + ); + } + } + Ok(report) => { + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "META {:?}: v{} already de-obfuscated", + input, report.version + )); + } + if quiet == 0 { + println!( + "metadata v{}: already de-obfuscated, nothing to do", + report.version + ); + } + } + Err(e) => { + s.errors = 1; + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("META ERR {:?}: {e:#}", input)); + } + // Level 1 quiet: banner/summary/duration only (match folder mode). + if quiet == 0 { + eprintln!("error: {e:#}"); + } + } + } + } else { + match unpack_one_v(input, &dest, verbose && quiet == 0) { + Ok((kind, report)) => { + s.unpacked = 1; + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("OK {:?} -> {:?} ({kind:?})", input, dest)); + } + if quiet == 0 { + println!("✓ {:?} -> {:?}", kind, dest); + } + if !report.ok() { + s.suspect = 1; + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!( + "SUSPECT {:?}: {}", + input, + report.issues.join("; ") + )); + } + if quiet == 0 { + eprintln!( + "! integrity check failed (likely to crash at runtime): {}", + report.issues.join("; ") + ); + } + } + } + Err(e) => { + s.errors = 1; + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("ERR {:?}: {e:#}", input)); + } + if quiet == 0 { + eprintln!("error: {e:#}"); + } + } + } + } + + s.duration_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis(); + if let Some(log) = &log { + log.step(&format!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms)); + log.step(&format!( + "summary: {} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata", + s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata + )); + } + Ok(s) +} + +/// Path of `p` relative to `root`, for mirroring into the output tree. +/// +/// Falls back to just the file name when `p` is not under `root` (e.g. a +/// `\\?\`-prefixed root against plain candidate paths): `Path::join` with an +/// *absolute* path replaces the output root outright, which would write the +/// output back over the source tree instead of under `--out`. +fn rel_in_tree<'a>(root: &Path, p: &'a Path) -> std::borrow::Cow<'a, Path> { + match p.strip_prefix(root) { + Ok(rel) => std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(rel), + Err(_) => std::borrow::Cow::Owned(PathBuf::from(p.file_name().unwrap_or_default())), + } +} + +/// Insert `.unpack` before the last dot in the **file name**, preserving any +/// parent directories. If the file name has no dot, append `.unpack`. +/// +/// The dot search is scoped to the file-name component only: a relative path +/// like `v1.2/launcher` (dotted directory, extension-less file) must become +/// `v1.2/launcher.unpack`, not `v1.unpack.2/launcher`. +pub fn out_name(input: &Path) -> PathBuf { + let file = input + .file_name() + .map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().into_owned()) + .unwrap_or_default(); + let renamed = match file.rfind('.') { + Some(i) => format!("{}.unpack{}", &file[..i], &file[i..]), + None => format!("{file}.unpack"), + }; + match input.parent() { + Some(parent) if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() => parent.join(renamed), + _ => PathBuf::from(renamed), + } +} + +/// Extract a printable message from a caught panic payload. +fn panic_payload(panic: &(dyn std::any::Any + Send)) -> String { + if let Some(s) = panic.downcast_ref::<&str>() { + (*s).to_string() + } else if let Some(s) = panic.downcast_ref::() { + s.clone() + } else { + "".to_string() + } +} + +/// If `e`'s chain contains [`crate::metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion`], +/// return the version. Used to apply the folder-mode "leave untouched, don't +/// fail the run" policy to metadata versions this build can't de-obfuscate. +fn unsupported_version(e: &anyhow::Error) -> Option { + for cause in e.chain() { + if let Some(crate::metadata::Error::UnsupportedVersion(v)) = + cause.downcast_ref::() + { + return Some(*v); + } + } + None +} + +/// Write `bytes` to `dest` atomically: a sibling temp file, then a rename. +/// A direct `std::fs::write` truncates the destination first, so a mid-write +/// failure (disk full, AV lock, quota) destroys a previously good unpack at +/// the same path; the temp+rename keeps the old file until the new one is +/// complete. Best-effort temp cleanup on failure. +fn write_atomic(dest: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> { + let mut tmp_name = dest.as_os_str().to_os_string(); + tmp_name.push(".senbei-tmp"); + let tmp = PathBuf::from(tmp_name); + let r = std::fs::write(&tmp, bytes).and_then(|()| std::fs::rename(&tmp, dest)); + if r.is_err() { + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp); + } + r +} + +/// Detect `bytes` and run the right pipeline. The EXE pipeline is invoked +/// directly (no DLL-pipeline probe) when the input was spliced from an +/// external companion (`spliced`) or when the caller forces it (`force_exe` +/// — the web app's recovery path after a DLL-probe trap; see +/// [`unpack_bytes_force_exe`]). +/// +/// Routing spliced inputs straight to the EXE pipeline is safe: the +/// companion layout is definitionally the EXE-style shell (the runtime +/// loader maps the companion and runs the standard shell unpack), so the DLL +/// pipeline probe can never be right for it — and probing is not a no-op on +/// targets without unwinding (wasm), where the probe's caught panic becomes +/// a fatal trap. Output bytes are identical to the dll-first + exe-fallback +/// route for every input that route handles. +fn unpack_spliced_or_auto( + bytes: &[u8], + spliced: bool, + force_exe: bool, + verbose: bool, +) -> Result<(unpacker::Kind, Vec), unpacker::UnpackError> { + if spliced || force_exe { + let detected = unpacker::detect(bytes).ok_or(unpacker::UnpackError::NotCrackproof)?; + let out = unpacker::unpack_exe_v(bytes, verbose)?; + return Ok((detected.kind, out)); + } + unpacker::unpack_auto_v(bytes, verbose) +} + +/// Unpack a single file to `dest`. Returns the Kind and integrity report on success. +pub fn unpack_one( + input: &Path, + dest: &Path, +) -> anyhow::Result<(unpacker::Kind, unpacker::IntegrityReport)> { + unpack_one_v(input, dest, false) +} + +/// Outcome of a byte-level unpack ([`unpack_bytes`]): the image, its detected +/// kind, and its integrity report. No file I/O is involved. +pub struct UnpackedImage { + pub kind: unpacker::Kind, + pub bytes: Vec, + pub integrity: unpacker::IntegrityReport, + /// True when the input was reconstructed from an external companion (the + /// `._` layout), i.e. the export/TLS overlays ran. + pub companion: bool, +} + +/// Unpack in-memory `input` bytes, optionally paired with an external +/// companion payload `companion` (the `._` file's contents). +/// +/// This is the I/O-free counterpart of [`unpack_one_v`], used by the +/// WebAssembly build: splice (when the companion's first 32 bytes match the +/// stub header), unpack, overlay the export table and TLS directory from the +/// stub, then run the static integrity check. +pub fn unpack_bytes( + input: &[u8], + companion: Option<&[u8]>, +) -> Result { + unpack_bytes_impl(input, companion, false) +} + +/// Like [`unpack_bytes`], but forces the EXE pipeline (no DLL-pipeline +/// probe). This is the web app's recovery path: the DLL-first probe relies +/// on `catch_unwind` to reject EXE-shell-layout DLLs, and panics cannot be +/// caught on wasm — the probe traps the whole call. The web app runs each +/// unpack in a disposable Web Worker and retries trapped DLLs with this +/// entry point, reproducing the CLI's dll-first/exe-fallback routing. +pub fn unpack_bytes_force_exe( + input: &[u8], + companion: Option<&[u8]>, +) -> Result { + unpack_bytes_impl(input, companion, true) +} + +fn unpack_bytes_impl( + input: &[u8], + companion: Option<&[u8]>, + force_exe: bool, +) -> Result { + let spliced = companion.and_then(|c| splice_companion(input, c)); + let bytes: &[u8] = spliced.as_deref().unwrap_or(input); + let (kind, mut out) = unpack_spliced_or_auto(bytes, spliced.is_some(), force_exe, false)?; + if spliced.is_some() { + overlay_exports_from_stub(&mut out, input); + restore_tls_from_stub(&mut out, input); + } + let integrity = unpacker::check_integrity(&out); + Ok(UnpackedImage { + kind, + bytes: out, + integrity, + companion: spliced.is_some(), + }) +} + +/// Like [`unpack_one`], but prints detailed `[N/9]` step progress (and a final +/// `Write to ` line) to stdout when `verbose` is true. +pub fn unpack_one_v( + input: &Path, + dest: &Path, + verbose: bool, +) -> anyhow::Result<(unpacker::Kind, unpacker::IntegrityReport)> { + let UnpackerInput { bytes, stub } = read_unpacker_input(input)?; + let (kind, mut out) = unpack_spliced_or_auto(&bytes, stub.is_some(), false, verbose)?; + // External-companion layout: restore the export table from the stub, which + // the encrypted companion does not carry (the loader rebuilds it at runtime). + if let Some(stub) = stub { + overlay_exports_from_stub(&mut out, &stub); + // ...and the TLS directory, which Crackproof strips from the payload and + // re-installs at runtime; the ordinary loader needs it or thread_local + // access crashes (see [`restore_tls_from_stub`]). + restore_tls_from_stub(&mut out, &stub); + } + let report = unpacker::check_integrity(&out); + if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() { + std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?; + } + write_atomic(dest, &out)?; + if verbose { + println!("Write to {}", dest.display()); + } + Ok((kind, report)) +} + +/// De-obfuscate an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` to `dest`. +/// +/// Crackproof's `-GMD` option scrambles each `Il2CppMethodDefinition`'s token +/// into a sparse, original-metadata-style value; il2cpp expects the contiguous +/// per-module index it indexes its codegen tables with, so a statically-unpacked +/// il2cpp game assembly reads garbage and crashes during init. This rewrites +/// the tokens back to their canonical form (see [`crate::metadata::deobfuscate`]). +/// +/// The output is written only when something actually changed +/// (`report.remapped > 0`); an already-clean metadata is left untouched and no +/// redundant copy is produced. Returns the [`metadata::Report`] either way so +/// the caller can report what happened. +pub fn deobfuscate_metadata_to( + input: &Path, + dest: &Path, + verbose: bool, +) -> anyhow::Result { + let data = std::fs::read(input)?; + // Preserve the metadata::Error in the chain (rather than stringifying it) + // so the folder driver can apply its unsupported-version policy. + let (out, report) = crate::metadata::deobfuscate(&data) + .map_err(|e| anyhow::Error::new(e).context(format!("{input:?}")))?; + if report.remapped > 0 { + if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() { + std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?; + } + write_atomic(dest, &out)?; + if verbose { + println!("Write to {}", dest.display()); + } + } + Ok(report) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + /// Review regression: when the candidate path is not under `root` (e.g. a + /// `\\?\`-prefixed root against plain walk paths), the output name must + /// fall back to the bare file name — joining the absolute path would + /// replace the output root and write back over the source tree. + #[test] + fn rel_in_tree_falls_back_to_file_name_outside_root() { + let root = Path::new(r"D:\out-of-tree-root"); + let abs = Path::new(r"C:\game\bin\app.exe"); + let rel = rel_in_tree(root, abs); + assert_eq!(rel.as_ref(), Path::new("app.exe")); + + // And the normal case still preserves the tree structure. + let under = Path::new(r"D:\out-of-tree-root\bin\app.exe"); + let rel = rel_in_tree(root, under); + assert_eq!(rel.as_ref(), Path::new(r"bin\app.exe")); + } + + fn stub_with_header(header: &[u8; 32], extra: usize) -> Vec { + let mut s = vec![0u8; HEADER_OFF]; + s.extend_from_slice(header); + s.extend_from_slice(&vec![0xAAu8; extra]); + s + } + + #[test] + fn splices_when_header_matches() { + let header = [7u8; 32]; + let stub = stub_with_header(&header, 16); + // Companion: same 32-byte header, then the real (longer) payload. + let mut comp = header.to_vec(); + comp.extend_from_slice(&[0x42u8; 1000]); + + let out = splice_companion(&stub, &comp).expect("should splice"); + assert_eq!(out.len(), HEADER_OFF + comp.len()); + assert_eq!(&out[..HEADER_OFF], &stub[..HEADER_OFF]); + assert_eq!(&out[HEADER_OFF..], &comp[..]); + } + + #[test] + fn no_splice_when_header_differs() { + let stub = stub_with_header(&[7u8; 32], 16); + let mut comp = vec![9u8; 32]; // different header + comp.extend_from_slice(&[0x42u8; 1000]); + assert!(splice_companion(&stub, &comp).is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn no_splice_when_too_short() { + let short_stub = vec![0u8; HEADER_OFF + 8]; // < HEADER_OFF + 32 + let comp = vec![0u8; 64]; + assert!(splice_companion(&short_stub, &comp).is_none()); + + let stub = stub_with_header(&[1u8; 32], 0); + let short_comp = vec![1u8; 16]; // < 32 + assert!(splice_companion(&stub, &short_comp).is_none()); + } +} diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..270c372 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +pub mod job; +pub mod logfile; +pub mod metadata; +pub mod pause; +pub mod scan; +pub mod ui; +pub mod unpacker; diff --git a/src/logfile.rs b/src/logfile.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7027520 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/logfile.rs @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +use std::fs::File; +use std::io::Write; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use std::sync::Mutex; + +pub struct Log { + path: PathBuf, + file: Mutex, +} + +impl Log { + pub fn create(dir: &Path) -> std::io::Result { + let ts = local_stamp_compact(); + // The stamp has one-second granularity and `File::create` truncates, so + // two runs into the same out dir within a second would clobber each + // other's log. Probe for a free name with create_new instead. + let mut path = dir.join(format!("senbei-{ts}.log")); + let mut file = File::create_new(&path); + for n in 2..100 { + if !matches!(&file, Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists) { + break; + } + path = dir.join(format!("senbei-{ts}-{n}.log")); + file = File::create_new(&path); + } + let file = Mutex::new(file?); + Ok(Self { path, file }) + } + + pub fn path(&self) -> &Path { + &self.path + } + + pub fn step(&self, msg: &str) { + if let Ok(mut f) = self.file.lock() { + let _ = writeln!(f, "{msg}"); + } + } +} + +/// Local wall-clock `YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS` for log filenames. +pub fn local_stamp_compact() -> String { + let t = local_parts(); + format!( + "{:04}{:02}{:02}-{:02}{:02}{:02}", + t.year, t.month, t.day, t.hour, t.minute, t.second + ) +} + +/// Local wall-clock `YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS` for log header. +pub fn local_stamp_display() -> String { + let t = local_parts(); + format!( + "{:04}-{:02}-{:02} {:02}:{:02}:{:02}", + t.year, t.month, t.day, t.hour, t.minute, t.second + ) +} + +struct LocalParts { + year: u32, + month: u32, + day: u32, + hour: u32, + minute: u32, + second: u32, +} + +fn local_parts() -> LocalParts { + #[cfg(windows)] + { + use windows::Win32::System::SystemInformation::GetLocalTime; + let st = unsafe { GetLocalTime() }; + LocalParts { + year: st.wYear as u32, + month: st.wMonth as u32, + day: st.wDay as u32, + hour: st.wHour as u32, + minute: st.wMinute as u32, + second: st.wSecond as u32, + } + } + #[cfg(all(not(windows), not(target_arch = "wasm32")))] + { + // Local wall clock via POSIX localtime_r — same semantics as Windows GetLocalTime. + use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + let secs_u = SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .unwrap_or_default() + .as_secs(); + let t: libc::time_t = secs_u as libc::time_t; + let mut tm = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed::() }; + let ok = unsafe { libc::localtime_r(&t, &mut tm) }; + if ok.is_null() { + return utc_parts(secs_u); // emergency only if localtime_r fails + } + LocalParts { + year: (tm.tm_year + 1900) as u32, + month: (tm.tm_mon + 1) as u32, + day: tm.tm_mday as u32, + hour: tm.tm_hour as u32, + minute: tm.tm_min as u32, + second: tm.tm_sec as u32, + } + } + #[cfg(all(not(windows), target_arch = "wasm32"))] + { + // wasm has no local timezone database and SystemTime::now() panics + // without a JS time source. The run log is a CLI concern — the wasm + // build never writes one — so a fixed epoch stamp suffices. + utc_parts(0) + } +} + +/// Convert Unix UTC seconds to civil Y-M-D h:m:s (Howard Hinnant). +/// Used as non-Windows fallback; keep pub(crate) if unit-tested. +fn utc_parts(secs: u64) -> LocalParts { + let s = secs as i64; + let time_of_day = s.rem_euclid(86400) as u32; + let days = s.div_euclid(86400); + let z = days + 719468; + let era = if z >= 0 { z } else { z - 146096 } / 146097; + let doe = (z - era * 146097) as u32; + let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146096) / 365; + let y = yoe as i64 + era * 400; + let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100); + let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153; + let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1; + let m = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 }; + let y = if m <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y }; + LocalParts { + year: y as u32, + month: m, + day: d, + hour: time_of_day / 3600, + minute: (time_of_day % 3600) / 60, + second: time_of_day % 60, + } +} + +/// UTC civil stamp helper (used only as emergency fallback path via `utc_parts`). +#[allow(dead_code)] // retained for unit-style reuse / non-Windows emergency path symmetry +pub(crate) fn fmt_stamp(secs: u64) -> String { + let t = utc_parts(secs); + format!( + "{:04}{:02}{:02}-{:02}{:02}{:02}", + t.year, t.month, t.day, t.hour, t.minute, t.second + ) +} diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da93dcc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +use senbei::{job, pause}; +use std::path::Path; + +fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode { + let mut args = std::env::args().skip(1); + let mut path: Option = None; + let mut out: Option = None; + let mut quiet: u8 = 0; + let mut no_pause = false; + let mut no_log = false; + let mut verbose = false; + let mut scan_all = false; + + while let Some(a) = args.next() { + match a.as_str() { + "-h" | "--help" => { + print_help(); + return std::process::ExitCode::SUCCESS; + } + "-V" | "--version" => { + println!("Senbei {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")); + return std::process::ExitCode::SUCCESS; + } + "-q" | "--quiet" => quiet = quiet.saturating_add(1), + "-v" | "--verbose" => verbose = true, + "--no-pause" => no_pause = true, + "--no-log" => no_log = true, + "--scan-all" => scan_all = true, + "--out" => match args.next() { + // Reject a missing value (and a following flag swallowed as the + // value): previously `--out` at end of argv silently fell back + // to the default output directory. + Some(v) if !v.starts_with('-') => out = Some(v), + _ => { + eprintln!("error: --out requires a directory argument"); + return std::process::ExitCode::from(2); + } + }, + other if other.starts_with('-') => { + eprintln!("error: unknown option '{other}'"); + print_help(); + return std::process::ExitCode::from(2); + } + other => { + // Previously the last positional silently won. + if let Some(prev) = &path { + eprintln!("error: multiple input paths given ('{prev}' and '{other}')"); + return std::process::ExitCode::from(2); + } + path = Some(other.to_string()); + } + } + } + + let code = match path { + None => { + print_help(); + 2 + } + Some(p) => { + if quiet < 2 { + println!("Senbei {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")); + } + let p = Path::new(&p); + let out_path = out.as_deref().map(Path::new); + let r = if p.is_dir() { + job::run_folder_opts( + p, + out_path, + quiet, + verbose, + no_log, + scan_all || senbei::scan::scan_all_env(), + ) + } else { + job::run_file_v(p, out_path, quiet, verbose, no_log) + }; + match r { + Ok(s) => { + if quiet < 2 { + println!( + "{} unpacked · {} skipped · {} errors · {} suspect · {} metadata", + s.unpacked, s.skipped, s.errors, s.suspect, s.metadata + ); + println!("done in {} ms", s.duration_ms); + } + if s.errors > 0 { 1 } else { 0 } + } + Err(e) => { + // Fatal: out-dir/log create, etc. + if quiet < 2 { + eprintln!("error: {e:#}"); + } + 1 + } + } + } + }; + + pause::maybe_pause(no_pause); + std::process::ExitCode::from(code as u8) +} + +fn print_help() { + println!( + "senbei [--out DIR] [-v|--verbose] [-q|--quiet]... [--scan-all] [--no-log] [--no-pause] [-V|--version] [-h|--help]" + ); + println!( + " --scan-all probe every file in a folder, including ones the scan\n\ + \x20 pre-filter skips (under 4128 bytes, or a bulk-asset\n\ + \x20 extension like .ab/.xml/.acb). Much slower on game trees." + ); +} diff --git a/src/metadata.rs b/src/metadata.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8c87d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/metadata.rs @@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ +//! il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` de-obfuscation. +//! +//! Crackproof's `-GMD` option obfuscates the **method-token** field of every +//! `Il2CppMethodDefinition` in `global-metadata.dat`. il2cpp resolves a method's +//! compiled function/invoker by indexing the per-module +//! `Il2CppCodeGenModule.methodPointers` / `invokerIndices` tables — which are +//! sized to the module's *compiled* method count — by `(token_row - 1)`. That +//! only works when each module's method tokens are the **contiguous** range +//! `1..=methodPointerCount`. `-GMD` replaces them with sparse, original-metadata-style +//! tokens (e.g. mscorlib rows reach ~55k for only ~14k compiled methods) and the +//! running game's Crackproof loader remaps them back at load time. +//! +//! A statically-unpacked il2cpp game assembly run without Crackproof reads the +//! tokens raw, so `(token_row - 1)` runs off the end of those tables — an +//! out-of-bounds read that crashes deep in il2cpp init (first hit: +//! `System.Array`'s interface method setup). See the project notes for the full +//! trace. +//! +//! This module reverses the obfuscation purely from the metadata's own +//! structure. Methods are laid out grouped by type, and types grouped by image +//! (module), so a method's correct token row is simply its position within its +//! module's method range. We re-derive that range from the images/types tables +//! and rewrite each method token to `0x06000000 | (local_index + 1)`. +//! +//! Only method tokens are touched: field tokens are already contiguous and type +//! tokens resolve correctly. The transform is a no-op on an unobfuscated +//! metadata (its tokens already equal `local_index + 1`), so it is safe to run on +//! any il2cpp game — `remapped == 0` then reports that nothing changed. + +/// il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` sanity magic (`Il2CppGlobalMetadataHeader.sanity`). +const MAGIC: u32 = 0xFAB1_1BAF; + +/// Metadata format version this de-obfuscator understands. The struct strides +/// and header field offsets below are specific to it; other versions are left +/// untouched rather than risk corrupting a layout we have not verified. +/// (Observed on real games shipping version 31 / Unity 2022.3.) +const SUPPORTED_VERSION: u32 = 31; + +// --- Il2CppGlobalMetadataHeader field byte-offsets (each is an i32 offset/size +// pair). Shared layout across recent versions. --- +const HDR_METHODS: usize = 0x30; // methodsOffset / methodsSize +const HDR_TYPES: usize = 0xA0; // typeDefinitionsOffset / size +const HDR_IMAGES: usize = 0xA8; // imagesOffset / size + +// --- version-31 struct strides and field offsets --- +const METHOD_STRIDE: usize = 0x24; // sizeof(Il2CppMethodDefinition) +const METHOD_TOKEN_OFF: usize = 0x18; // .token (u32) +const TYPE_STRIDE: usize = 0x58; // sizeof(Il2CppTypeDefinition) +const TYPE_METHOD_START_OFF: usize = 0x24; // .methodStart (i32) +const TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFF: usize = 0x40; // .method_count (u16) +const IMAGE_STRIDE: usize = 0x28; // sizeof(Il2CppImageDefinition) +const IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFF: usize = 0x08; // .typeStart (i32) +const IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFF: usize = 0x0C; // .typeCount (u32) + +/// `IMAGE_CODE_GEN_MODULE` method-definition token table id (`0x06 << 24`). +const METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE: u32 = 0x0600_0000; +/// `Il2Cpp*Index` "no value" sentinel (`kTypeIndexInvalid` etc.). +const NO_METHODS: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF; + +/// Outcome of a successful [`deobfuscate`] pass. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +pub struct Report { + pub version: u32, + /// Total `Il2CppMethodDefinition` entries. + pub methods: usize, + /// Number of method tokens actually rewritten (0 ⇒ the input was already + /// de-obfuscated, i.e. not `-GMD`-protected). + pub remapped: usize, + /// Number of modules (images) that own at least one method. + pub modules: usize, +} + +/// Why [`deobfuscate`] declined to process the input. None of these mutate the +/// input; the caller leaves the file untouched. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Error { + /// Missing the il2cpp metadata sanity magic — not a `global-metadata.dat`. + NotMetadata, + /// Recognised metadata, but an unhandled format version. + UnsupportedVersion(u32), + /// Magic/version matched but the table layout is inconsistent with the + /// supported version (truncated, mis-sized, or overlapping ranges). + Malformed, +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for Error { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + Error::NotMetadata => write!(f, "not an il2cpp global-metadata.dat"), + Error::UnsupportedVersion(v) => write!(f, "unsupported metadata version {v}"), + Error::Malformed => write!(f, "malformed metadata for version {SUPPORTED_VERSION}"), + } + } +} +impl std::error::Error for Error {} + +/// Cheap check for the il2cpp metadata sanity magic, for scanning prefixes. +pub fn is_metadata(data: &[u8]) -> bool { + rd_u32(data, 0) == Some(MAGIC) +} + +/// De-obfuscate the method tokens in an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat`. +/// +/// On success returns the (possibly-rewritten) file bytes and a [`Report`]. The +/// transform is idempotent: a metadata that is already de-obfuscated comes back +/// byte-identical with `report.remapped == 0`. +pub fn deobfuscate(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(Vec, Report), Error> { + if rd_u32(data, 0) != Some(MAGIC) { + return Err(Error::NotMetadata); + } + let version = rd_u32(data, 4).ok_or(Error::Malformed)?; + if version != SUPPORTED_VERSION { + return Err(Error::UnsupportedVersion(version)); + } + + let (m_off, m_size) = table(data, HDR_METHODS)?; + let (t_off, t_size) = table(data, HDR_TYPES)?; + let (i_off, i_size) = table(data, HDR_IMAGES)?; + + // The strides must divide their tables exactly and the tables must lie + // within the file: a mismatch means our version-31 layout is wrong for this + // file, so bail without touching it rather than scribble at bad offsets. + if m_size % METHOD_STRIDE != 0 || t_size % TYPE_STRIDE != 0 || i_size % IMAGE_STRIDE != 0 { + return Err(Error::Malformed); + } + let method_count = m_size / METHOD_STRIDE; + let type_count = t_size / TYPE_STRIDE; + let image_count = i_size / IMAGE_STRIDE; + if !fits(data, m_off, m_size) || !fits(data, t_off, t_size) || !fits(data, i_off, i_size) { + return Err(Error::Malformed); + } + + // Map every method to its owning module and record each module's first + // (lowest) method index. A method's correct token row is its 1-based offset + // from that first index (methods are contiguous & grouped per module). + let mut module_of = vec![u32::MAX; method_count]; + let mut module_first = vec![u32::MAX; image_count]; + for (img, first_slot) in module_first.iter_mut().enumerate() { + let ib = i_off + img * IMAGE_STRIDE; + let type_start = rd_u32(data, ib + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFF).ok_or(Error::Malformed)?; + let type_cnt = rd_u32(data, ib + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFF).ok_or(Error::Malformed)?; + let mut first = u32::MAX; + for t in type_start..type_start.saturating_add(type_cnt) { + if t as usize >= type_count { + return Err(Error::Malformed); + } + let tb = t_off + (t as usize) * TYPE_STRIDE; + let ms = rd_u32(data, tb + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFF).ok_or(Error::Malformed)?; + let mc = rd_u16(data, tb + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFF).ok_or(Error::Malformed)? as u32; + if ms == NO_METHODS || mc == 0 { + continue; + } + first = first.min(ms); + for m in ms..ms.saturating_add(mc) { + let mi = m as usize; + if mi >= method_count { + return Err(Error::Malformed); + } + if module_of[mi] != u32::MAX { + return Err(Error::Malformed); // a method in two modules — layout is wrong + } + module_of[mi] = img as u32; + } + } + *first_slot = first; + } + + // Rewrite each owned method's token to `0x06000000 | (local_index + 1)`. + // Any method NOT owned by an image would keep its original (obfuscated) + // token — a silent partial remap that still crashes il2cpp at runtime, so + // treat it as a malformed layout instead of shipping it. + let mut out = data.to_vec(); + let mut remapped = 0usize; + for (mi, &img) in module_of.iter().enumerate() { + if img == u32::MAX { + return Err(Error::Malformed); // method outside every image's range + } + let first = module_first[img as usize]; + let local = (mi as u32) - first; // mi >= first by construction + let new_tok = METHOD_TOKEN_TABLE | ((local + 1) & 0x00FF_FFFF); + let off = m_off + mi * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFF; + // `fits` above guarantees this 4-byte write is in bounds. + if out[off..off + 4] != new_tok.to_le_bytes() { + out[off..off + 4].copy_from_slice(&new_tok.to_le_bytes()); + remapped += 1; + } + } + + let modules = module_first.iter().filter(|&&f| f != u32::MAX).count(); + Ok(( + out, + Report { + version, + methods: method_count, + remapped, + modules, + }, + )) +} + +/// Read the (offset, size) i32 pair of a metadata table from the header. +fn table(data: &[u8], hdr_off: usize) -> Result<(usize, usize), Error> { + let off = rd_u32(data, hdr_off).ok_or(Error::Malformed)? as usize; + let size = rd_u32(data, hdr_off + 4).ok_or(Error::Malformed)? as usize; + Ok((off, size)) +} + +/// True if `[off, off+len)` lies within `data`. +fn fits(data: &[u8], off: usize, len: usize) -> bool { + off.checked_add(len).is_some_and(|end| end <= data.len()) +} + +fn rd_u32(b: &[u8], o: usize) -> Option { + let s = b.get(o..o + 4)?; + Some(u32::from_le_bytes([s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]])) +} + +fn rd_u16(b: &[u8], o: usize) -> Option { + let s = b.get(o..o + 2)?; + Some(u16::from_le_bytes([s[0], s[1]])) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + // Build a minimal but structurally valid v31 metadata with two modules: + // image 0: 1 type, 2 methods (global 0,1) + // image 1: 1 type, 3 methods (global 2,3,4) + // Method tokens are seeded with *obfuscated* (sparse) values; the correct + // de-obfuscated tokens are per-module 1-based: [1,2] and [1,2,3]. + struct Built { + bytes: Vec, + m_off: usize, + } + fn build(method_tokens: &[u32]) -> Built { + // Layout: [header 0x100][images][types][methods] + let hdr = 0x100usize; + let images = hdr; + let i_count = 2; + let i_size = i_count * IMAGE_STRIDE; + let types = images + i_size; + let t_count = 2; + let t_size = t_count * TYPE_STRIDE; + let methods = types + t_size; + let m_count = method_tokens.len(); + let m_size = m_count * METHOD_STRIDE; + let total = methods + m_size; + let mut b = vec![0u8; total]; + + let put32 = |b: &mut [u8], o: usize, v: u32| b[o..o + 4].copy_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + let put16 = |b: &mut [u8], o: usize, v: u16| b[o..o + 2].copy_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + + put32(&mut b, 0, MAGIC); + put32(&mut b, 4, SUPPORTED_VERSION); + put32(&mut b, HDR_METHODS, methods as u32); + put32(&mut b, HDR_METHODS + 4, m_size as u32); + put32(&mut b, HDR_TYPES, types as u32); + put32(&mut b, HDR_TYPES + 4, t_size as u32); + put32(&mut b, HDR_IMAGES, images as u32); + put32(&mut b, HDR_IMAGES + 4, i_size as u32); + + // image 0: typeStart=0 typeCount=1 ; image 1: typeStart=1 typeCount=1 + put32(&mut b, images + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFF, 0); + put32(&mut b, images + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFF, 1); + put32(&mut b, images + IMAGE_STRIDE + IMAGE_TYPE_START_OFF, 1); + put32(&mut b, images + IMAGE_STRIDE + IMAGE_TYPE_COUNT_OFF, 1); + // type 0: methodStart=0 count=2 ; type 1: methodStart=2 count=3 + put32(&mut b, types + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFF, 0); + put16(&mut b, types + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFF, 2); + put32(&mut b, types + TYPE_STRIDE + TYPE_METHOD_START_OFF, 2); + put16(&mut b, types + TYPE_STRIDE + TYPE_METHOD_COUNT_OFF, 3); + // method tokens + for (i, &tok) in method_tokens.iter().enumerate() { + put32(&mut b, methods + i * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFF, tok); + } + Built { + bytes: b, + m_off: methods, + } + } + fn tok(b: &[u8], m_off: usize, i: usize) -> u32 { + rd_u32(b, m_off + i * METHOD_STRIDE + METHOD_TOKEN_OFF).unwrap() + } + + #[test] + fn remaps_obfuscated_method_tokens_per_module() { + // Obfuscated sparse tokens (rows way past each module's method count). + let built = build(&[ + 0x0600_D49F, + 0x0600_FFFF, + 0x0600_1234, + 0x0600_ABCD, + 0x0600_5555, + ]); + let (out, r) = deobfuscate(&built.bytes).expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(r.version, 31); + assert_eq!(r.methods, 5); + assert_eq!(r.modules, 2); + assert_eq!(r.remapped, 5); + // module 0 (methods 0,1) -> rows 1,2 ; module 1 (methods 2,3,4) -> rows 1,2,3 + assert_eq!(tok(&out, built.m_off, 0), 0x0600_0001); + assert_eq!(tok(&out, built.m_off, 1), 0x0600_0002); + assert_eq!(tok(&out, built.m_off, 2), 0x0600_0001); + assert_eq!(tok(&out, built.m_off, 3), 0x0600_0002); + assert_eq!(tok(&out, built.m_off, 4), 0x0600_0003); + } + + #[test] + fn idempotent_on_clean_metadata() { + // Already de-obfuscated: per-module contiguous rows. + let clean = [ + 0x0600_0001, + 0x0600_0002, + 0x0600_0001, + 0x0600_0002, + 0x0600_0003, + ]; + let built = build(&clean); + let (out, r) = deobfuscate(&built.bytes).expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(r.remapped, 0, "no rewrites on already-clean metadata"); + assert_eq!(out, built.bytes, "byte-identical output"); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_non_metadata() { + assert_eq!( + deobfuscate(b"not metadata at all....").unwrap_err(), + Error::NotMetadata + ); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_unsupported_version() { + let mut built = build(&[ + 0x0600_0001, + 0x0600_0002, + 0x0600_0001, + 0x0600_0002, + 0x0600_0003, + ]); + built.bytes[4..8].copy_from_slice(&29u32.to_le_bytes()); + assert_eq!( + deobfuscate(&built.bytes).unwrap_err(), + Error::UnsupportedVersion(29) + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/pause.rs b/src/pause.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34129e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/pause.rs @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +pub fn should_pause() -> bool { + #[cfg(windows)] + { + use windows::Win32::System::Console::GetConsoleProcessList; + let mut buf = [0u32; 4]; + let n = unsafe { GetConsoleProcessList(&mut buf) }; + n == 1 + } + #[cfg(not(windows))] + { + false + } +} + +pub fn maybe_pause(force_skip: bool) { + if force_skip || !should_pause() { + return; + } + use std::io::Write; + eprint!("\nPress Enter to exit…"); + let _ = std::io::stderr().flush(); + let mut buf = String::new(); + let _ = std::io::stdin().read_line(&mut buf); +} diff --git a/src/scan.rs b/src/scan.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0308f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/scan.rs @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +use crate::unpacker::detect; +use std::io::Read; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use walkdir::WalkDir; + +/// Bytes read per file for content detection. `detect` inspects the DOS/PE +/// header and the Crackproof key table at offset 4096; its deepest read is the +/// key-table dword at 4124 (so a candidate must be ≥ 4128 bytes) or the PE +/// data-directory field at `e_lfanew + 252`, which is far below 8 KiB for any +/// real PE (`e_lfanew` is a few hundred bytes). `is_metadata` needs only the +/// first 4 bytes. An 8 KiB prefix therefore yields the same verdict as the whole +/// file while avoiding pulling multi-gigabyte game assets into memory just to +/// reject them — the previous 64 KiB was 8× larger than anything detect reads. +const DETECT_PREFIX: u64 = 8 * 1024; + +/// Smallest file that can possibly be a target, so anything shorter is skipped +/// without ever being opened. +/// +/// A Crackproof module needs ≥ 4128 bytes for [`crate::unpacker::detect`]'s key +/// table (it reads the dword at 4124), so the bound is exact for the unpack +/// path. An il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` only needs 4 bytes to match its magic, +/// but its header alone runs to offset 0xB0 and the images/types/methods tables +/// it indexes make every real one megabytes long — a sub-4 KiB "metadata" could +/// only ever fail [`crate::metadata::deobfuscate`] with `Malformed`, so nothing +/// processable is lost. +const MIN_SIZE: u64 = 4128; + +/// File extensions that are bulk data by construction and can never be a PE +/// image or an il2cpp metadata blob. +/// +/// This is deliberately a **deny**-list, not an allow-list: the default is to +/// probe, so anything unrecognised is still opened. Targets are recognised by +/// content, not extension, and can carry arbitrary names — there is no closed +/// set of target extensions an allow-list of `exe`/`dll` could enumerate. +/// Only extensions that are bulk asset or text formats by construction appear +/// here. +/// +/// Set `SENBEI_SCAN_ALL=1` (or pass `--scan-all`) to probe every file regardless. +const DENY_EXT: &[&str] = &[ + // Unity and other engine asset containers + "ab", + "bundle", + "unity3d", + "manifest", + "resource", + "ress", + "assets", + "sharedassets", + // audio / video / image / font + "acb", + "awb", + "usm", + "wav", + "ogg", + "mp3", + "mp4", + "avi", + "png", + "jpg", + "jpeg", + "bmp", + "gif", + "tga", + "dds", + "svg", + "ttf", + "otf", + // text, markup, config, logs + "xml", + "json", + "txt", + "csv", + "md", + "toml", + "ini", + "yml", + "yaml", + "log", + "html", + "htm", + "css", + "aspx", + "browser", + "config", + "sig", + "map", + "pdb", + // rhythm-game chart/score data + "ma2", + "sr", +]; + +/// Whether `path`'s extension is on [`DENY_EXT`]. Extensionless files are never +/// denied (they could be anything). +fn denied_ext(path: &Path) -> bool { + let Some(ext) = path.extension() else { + return false; + }; + let Some(ext) = ext.to_str() else { + return false; + }; + // Extensions are ASCII in practice; compare case-insensitively without + // allocating for the overwhelmingly common non-match. + DENY_EXT + .iter() + .any(|d| d.len() == ext.len() && d.eq_ignore_ascii_case(ext)) +} + +/// Content classification of a single file. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum Class { + /// Neither a Crackproof module nor il2cpp metadata — left untouched. + None, + /// A Crackproof-protected PE (unpack target). + Crackproof, + /// An il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` (de-obfuscation target). + Metadata, +} + +/// Walk `root` recursively (skipping any directory literally named `"unpack"`) +/// and return, **in walk order**, the Crackproof candidates and the il2cpp +/// metadata blobs found — from a *single* traversal that opens each file at +/// most once. +/// +/// # Why the cheap pre-filter dominates +/// +/// The traversal is not the cost. Measured on a 46,446-file / 61 GB game tree, +/// `readdir` (including each entry's size, which Windows returns from the +/// directory enumeration for free) takes ~0.2 s and opening all 46,446 files +/// takes ~1 s — but *reading* from them takes 40 s. Read size is irrelevant: a +/// 4-byte read costs the same ~900 µs as an 8 KiB one, because the cost is +/// per-file I/O latency, not bandwidth (that tree lives on a user-mode virtual +/// disk that tops out near 1,300 IOPS). Thread count barely moves it either. +/// +/// So the only lever is **probing fewer files**, which is what [`MIN_SIZE`] and +/// [`DENY_EXT`] do — both decided from the free directory metadata, before any +/// file is opened. On that tree they cut 46,446 probes to 1,814 and the scan +/// from ~40 s to ~2 s while still finding every target. +/// +/// The surviving probes (open + short read + magic test) are fanned out across +/// worker threads. Directory traversal itself stays serial (one cheap `readdir` +/// pass, no file opens) because it feeds the parallel probe. +/// +/// Thread count follows [`crate::unpacker::parallel::thread_cap`] (honoring +/// `SENBEI_THREADS`, `1` = fully sequential). Output order is independent of +/// thread count: each worker owns a disjoint contiguous slice of the path list +/// and writes the matching disjoint slice of the class list, so results are +/// deterministic. +pub fn find_targets(root: &Path) -> (Vec, Vec, ScanStats) { + find_targets_opts(root, scan_all_env()) +} + +/// Non-target tallies from a [`find_targets_opts`] walk. +#[derive(Default, Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct ScanStats { + /// Files that were content-probed but matched neither detector (skipped). + pub skipped: usize, + /// Directory entries the walker could not read (permissions, transient + /// I/O errors). These files were never classified — surface this to the + /// user instead of silently reporting a clean scan. + pub walk_errors: usize, + /// Files selected for probing whose bytes could not be read (open/read + /// failure, or a detector panic). Unlike `skipped`, the scan could not + /// determine whether these are targets — a locked il2cpp game assembly + /// looks exactly like this, so the job layer counts them as errors. + pub probe_errors: usize, +} + +/// [`find_targets`], but with the pre-filter explicitly controlled. When +/// `scan_all` is true every regular file is probed, restoring the exhaustive +/// (and on asset-heavy trees, far slower) behavior. +pub fn find_targets_opts(root: &Path, scan_all: bool) -> (Vec, Vec, ScanStats) { + // Phase 1: serial traversal collecting regular-file paths only. No file is + // opened here; `readdir` is fast relative to the content probe that follows, + // and `entry.metadata()` is served from the directory entry on Windows, so + // the size test below costs nothing. + let mut paths: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut stats = ScanStats::default(); + for entry in WalkDir::new(root).into_iter().filter_entry(|e| { + if !e.file_type().is_dir() { + return true; + } + // The root itself is always walked, even if it is named "unpack" or is + // a junction the user pointed us at deliberately. + if e.depth() == 0 { + return true; + } + // Never descend into a previous output tree ("unpack", any case: NTFS + // is case-insensitive, so `Unpack` from an older run is still ours). + if e.file_name().eq_ignore_ascii_case("unpack") { + return false; + } + // Skip reparse-point directories (junctions, symlink-dirs): they point + // outside the scanned tree — walking one would silently unpack an + // entire foreign tree (e.g. a `samples` junction into the golden corpus). + !is_reparse_point(e) + }) { + let entry = match entry { + Ok(e) => e, + Err(_) => { + stats.walk_errors += 1; + continue; + } + }; + if !entry.file_type().is_file() { + continue; + } + if !scan_all { + // Skip on directory metadata alone — never open these. + let too_small = entry + .metadata() + .map(|m| m.len() < MIN_SIZE) + .unwrap_or(false); + if too_small || denied_ext(entry.path()) { + continue; + } + } + paths.push(entry.into_path()); + } + + // Phase 2: parallel content probe over disjoint chunks (no synchronization). + // `classify` yields `None` for unreadable/panicking probes (see ScanStats); + // `Some(Class::None)` means "probed, matched neither detector". + let n = paths.len(); + let mut class: Vec> = vec![Some(Class::None); n]; + let workers = crate::unpacker::parallel::thread_cap().clamp(1, n.max(1)); + if workers <= 1 { + for (p, c) in paths.iter().zip(class.iter_mut()) { + *c = classify(p); + } + } else { + let chunk = n.div_ceil(workers); + std::thread::scope(|scope| { + for (pc, cc) in paths.chunks(chunk).zip(class.chunks_mut(chunk)) { + scope.spawn(move || { + for (p, c) in pc.iter().zip(cc.iter_mut()) { + *c = classify(p); + } + }); + } + }); + } + + let mut candidates = Vec::new(); + let mut metadata = Vec::new(); + for (p, c) in paths.into_iter().zip(class) { + match c { + Some(Class::Crackproof) => candidates.push(p), + Some(Class::Metadata) => metadata.push(p), + Some(Class::None) => stats.skipped += 1, + // Unreadable / panicking probe: NOT skipped — the scan could not + // classify it, so it may be a target we failed to unpack. + None => stats.probe_errors += 1, + } + } + (candidates, metadata, stats) +} + +/// True if a walked directory entry is a reparse point (junction or symlink). +/// +/// `DirEntry::file_type` only flags true symlinks; NTFS junctions report as +/// ordinary directories, so without this check the walker descends into them. +/// Off-Windows there are no junctions — symlink dirs are already excluded +/// because `follow_links` is off (their `file_type().is_dir()` is false). +#[cfg(windows)] +fn is_reparse_point(e: &walkdir::DirEntry) -> bool { + use std::os::windows::fs::MetadataExt; + const FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT: u32 = 0x400; + e.metadata() + .map(|m| m.file_attributes() & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT != 0) + .unwrap_or(false) +} + +#[cfg(not(windows))] +fn is_reparse_point(_e: &walkdir::DirEntry) -> bool { + false +} + +/// Whether the scan pre-filter is disabled via `SENBEI_SCAN_ALL`. Any value +/// other than `0`/empty turns exhaustive scanning on. The `--scan-all` flag is +/// ORed with this. +pub fn scan_all_env() -> bool { + match std::env::var("SENBEI_SCAN_ALL") { + Ok(v) => !matches!(v.trim(), "" | "0"), + Err(_) => false, + } +} + +/// Classify one file by content. Reads a short prefix once and tests the +/// Crackproof detector first, then the il2cpp metadata magic. Returns `None` +/// when the file could not be classified at all — an I/O error opening it +/// (locked, permissions) or a panic inside a detector — so the caller counts +/// it as a probe error rather than a clean "not a target" skip. +/// +/// The detector is wrapped in `catch_unwind` because a panic in a scan worker +/// thread would otherwise abort the whole folder run (a scoped-thread panic +/// re-raises on join, before any per-file isolation exists). The default panic +/// hook still prints the message, keeping the bug diagnosable. +/// +/// A Crackproof PE never matches the metadata magic (it is a PE, not a +/// metadata blob) and vice versa, so the order is immaterial. +fn classify(path: &Path) -> Option { + let head = read_prefix(path, DETECT_PREFIX)?; + let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + if detect(&head).is_some() { + Class::Crackproof + } else if crate::metadata::is_metadata(&head) { + Class::Metadata + } else { + Class::None + } + })); + r.ok() +} + +/// Read up to `max` bytes from the start of `path`. Returns `None` on any I/O +/// error (the file is simply not treated as a candidate). +fn read_prefix(path: &Path, max: u64) -> Option> { + let file = std::fs::File::open(path).ok()?; + let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(max as usize); + file.take(max).read_to_end(&mut buf).ok()?; + Some(buf) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn denies_bulk_asset_extensions_case_insensitively() { + for p in ["a.ab", "a.XML", "a.Acb", "a.ma2", "a.manifest", "a.PNG"] { + assert!(denied_ext(Path::new(p)), "{p} should be denied"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn never_denies_what_a_target_can_be_named() { + // Targets are recognised by content, not name — a protected module + // can carry any extension, or none — so names like these must always + // be probed. An allow-list would have skipped them. + for p in [ + "app.exe.bak", + "managed.dll.bak", + "daemon.exe", + "GameLib.dll", + "global-metadata.dat", + "noextension", + "a.so", + "a.bin", + ] { + assert!(!denied_ext(Path::new(p)), "{p} must still be probed"); + } + } + + /// A file below the Crackproof key-table bound is skipped without being + /// opened, but a large non-asset file is still probed. + #[test] + fn prefilter_skips_small_and_denied_files_only() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let root = td.path(); + std::fs::write(root.join("tiny.dll"), vec![0u8; 100]).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(root.join("assets.ab"), vec![0u8; 100_000]).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(root.join("plain.dll"), vec![0u8; 100_000]).unwrap(); + + // None of them are Crackproof, so both modes find nothing; the point is + // that the filtered walk does not panic and honors `scan_all`. + let (c, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, false); + assert!(c.is_empty() && m.is_empty()); + let (c, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, true); + assert!(c.is_empty() && m.is_empty()); + } + + /// An il2cpp metadata blob is found by the filtered scan: `.dat` is not on + /// the deny-list and a real one is far above `MIN_SIZE`. + #[test] + fn finds_metadata_through_the_prefilter() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let root = td.path(); + let mut blob = vec![0u8; MIN_SIZE as usize + 1]; + blob[..4].copy_from_slice(&0xFAB1_1BAFu32.to_le_bytes()); + std::fs::write(root.join("global-metadata.dat"), &blob).unwrap(); + // Same magic but too small to be processable — skipped by the size floor. + std::fs::write(root.join("stub.dat"), &blob[..64]).unwrap(); + + let (_, m, _) = find_targets_opts(root, false); + assert_eq!(m.len(), 1); + assert!(m[0].ends_with("global-metadata.dat")); + } + + /// Review regression: a previous output tree is pruned case-insensitively + /// (NTFS is case-insensitive, so `UNPACK` from an older run is still our + /// output), and probed non-targets are counted as skipped. + #[test] + fn prunes_unpack_dir_case_insensitively_and_counts_skipped() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let root = td.path(); + let out_dir = root.join("UNPACK"); + std::fs::create_dir(&out_dir).unwrap(); + // A metadata-magic file inside the old output tree: must NOT be found. + let mut blob = vec![0u8; MIN_SIZE as usize + 1]; + blob[..4].copy_from_slice(&0xFAB1_1BAFu32.to_le_bytes()); + std::fs::write(out_dir.join("global-metadata.dat"), &blob).unwrap(); + // A big non-target file at the root: probed, then skipped. + std::fs::write(root.join("plain.dll"), vec![0u8; 100_000]).unwrap(); + + let (c, m, stats) = find_targets_opts(root, false); + assert!( + c.is_empty() && m.is_empty(), + "old output tree must be pruned" + ); + assert_eq!(stats.skipped, 1, "the probed non-target counts as skipped"); + assert_eq!(stats.walk_errors, 0); + } +} diff --git a/src/ui.rs b/src/ui.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d882745 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ui.rs @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +use crate::unpacker::{IntegrityReport, Kind}; +use indicatif::{ProgressBar, ProgressStyle}; +use owo_colors::OwoColorize; +use std::path::Path; + +/// Create a progress bar for `n` items. Hidden when `quiet` is true. +pub fn progress(n: u64, quiet: bool) -> ProgressBar { + if quiet || n == 0 { + return ProgressBar::hidden(); + } + let bar = ProgressBar::new(n); + bar.set_style( + ProgressStyle::default_bar() + .template("[{elapsed_precise}] {bar:40.cyan/blue} {pos}/{len} {msg}") + .unwrap_or_else(|_| ProgressStyle::default_bar()), + ); + bar +} + +/// Print a green success line, suspending the progress bar. +pub fn ok(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &Path, kind: Kind, dest: &Path) { + if quiet { + return; + } + let msg = format!( + "{} {:?} {} -> {}", + "✓".green(), + kind, + rel.display(), + dest.display() + ); + bar.suspend(|| println!("{msg}")); +} + +/// Print a green success line for a de-obfuscated il2cpp `global-metadata.dat`, +/// reporting how many method tokens were remapped. +pub fn metadata(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &Path, remapped: usize, dest: &Path) { + if quiet { + return; + } + let msg = format!( + "{} metadata {} -> {} ({} method tokens remapped)", + "✓".green(), + rel.display(), + dest.display(), + remapped + ); + bar.suspend(|| println!("{msg}")); +} + +/// Print a red error line, suspending the progress bar. +pub fn err(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &Path, e: &anyhow::Error) { + if quiet { + return; + } + let msg = format!("{} {} {e:#}", "✗".red(), rel.display()); + bar.suspend(|| eprintln!("{msg}")); +} + +/// Print a yellow warning line for a file that unpacked but failed the static +/// integrity check (likely to crash at runtime), suspending the progress bar. +pub fn suspect(bar: &ProgressBar, quiet: bool, rel: &Path, report: &IntegrityReport) { + if quiet { + return; + } + let msg = format!( + "{} {} integrity check failed: {}", + "!".yellow(), + rel.display(), + report.issues.join("; ") + ); + bar.suspend(|| eprintln!("{msg}")); +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/bytecode.rs b/src/unpacker/bytecode.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f662c6e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/bytecode.rs @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +// Bytecode interpreter for the custom-decryptor stages. Those stages are tiny +// instruction programs embedded in the decrypted buffer; we compile each +// program down to a Vec and interpret it. + +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub enum Op { + Add(u8), + Sub(u8), + Xor(u8), + Rol(u32), + Ror(u32), + Inc, + Dec, +} + +pub fn apply(ops: &[Op], mut x: u8) -> u8 { + for &op in ops { + x = match op { + Op::Add(n) => x.wrapping_add(n), + Op::Sub(n) => x.wrapping_sub(n), + Op::Xor(n) => x ^ n, + Op::Rol(n) => x.rotate_left(n & 7), + Op::Ror(n) => x.rotate_right(n & 7), + Op::Inc => x.wrapping_add(1), + Op::Dec => x.wrapping_sub(1), + }; + } + x +} + +/// A precomputed 256-entry byte→byte translation table for a fixed op list. +/// +/// `apply` is a pure function of a single byte, but the hot decrypt paths run it +/// over multi-megabyte regions. Building the full table once and translating +/// each byte with a single lookup turns an O(region × ops) walk into O(region) — +/// a large constant-factor win on those paths. +pub struct OpsLut { + t: [u8; 256], +} + +impl OpsLut { + pub fn new(ops: &[Op]) -> Self { + let mut t = [0u8; 256]; + let mut i = 0; + while i < 256 { + t[i] = apply(ops, i as u8); + i += 1; + } + Self { t } + } + + /// Translate `d[off .. off + n]` in place through the table. + #[inline] + pub fn map_region(&self, d: &mut [u8], off: usize, n: usize) { + for b in &mut d[off..off + n] { + *b = self.t[*b as usize]; + } + } +} + +pub fn generate(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> Option> { + // Bounds-checked cursor: a corrupt `data_offset` (bad decrypt_data6 / the + // alignment fallback) must yield `None`, not an out-of-bounds panic — the + // panic path would surface as a misleading `UnpackError::Corrupt` instead + // of the precise `BytecodeGenFailed`, and any future caller without a + // `catch_unwind` wrapper would abort outright. + let mut pos = offset as usize; + let mut next = move || { + let b = data.get(pos).copied()?; + pos += 1; + Some(b) + }; + let mut ops = Vec::new(); + loop { + match next()? { + 4 => ops.push(Op::Add(next()?)), + 44 => ops.push(Op::Sub(next()?)), + 52 => ops.push(Op::Xor(next()?)), + 144 => {} // nop + 192 => { + let mb = next()?; + let rm = mb & 7; + let reg = (mb >> 3) & 7; + let mod_ = (mb >> 6) & 3; + if mod_ != 3 || rm != 0 { + return None; + } + let imm = next()? as u32; + match reg { + 0 => ops.push(Op::Rol(imm)), + 1 => ops.push(Op::Ror(imm)), + _ => { + return None; + } + } + } + 254 => { + let mb = next()?; + let rm = mb & 7; + let reg = (mb >> 3) & 7; + let mod_ = (mb >> 6) & 3; + if mod_ != 3 || rm != 0 { + return None; + } + match reg { + 0 => ops.push(Op::Inc), + 1 => ops.push(Op::Dec), + _ => { + return None; + } + } + } + 195 => return Some(ops), + _ => { + return None; + } + } + } +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/crc32.rs b/src/unpacker/crc32.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..beb69a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/crc32.rs @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +const fn build_table() -> [u32; 256] { + let mut table = [0u32; 256]; + let mut i = 0; + while i < 256 { + let mut c = i as u32; + let mut k = 0; + while k < 8 { + c = if c & 1 != 0 { + 0xEDB8_8320 ^ (c >> 1) + } else { + c >> 1 + }; + k += 1; + } + table[i] = c; + i += 1; + } + table +} + +const TABLE: [u32; 256] = build_table(); + +pub fn append(initial: u32, data: &[u8]) -> u32 { + let mut crc = !initial; + for &b in data { + crc = TABLE[((crc ^ b as u32) & 0xFF) as usize] ^ (crc >> 8); + } + !crc +} + +pub fn compute(data: &[u8]) -> u32 { + append(0, data) +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/dll.rs b/src/unpacker/dll.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bc0894 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/dll.rs @@ -0,0 +1,745 @@ +//! Native/managed-DLL unpack pipeline for the older protected-DLL layout. +//! +//! Naming note: the stage names used by this layout do NOT line up 1:1 with the +//! shared primitives. Mapping used here: +//! DecryptData1 (XOR+ROR over dwords) -> primitives::decrypt_data3 +//! DecryptData3 (shift-5 byte rotate) -> local `decrypt_data3_shift5` +//! DecryptData4/5 (AES+XORROR+huff) -> local `decrypt_data4` +//! DecryptData6 (shift-6 byte rotate) -> local `decrypt_data6_shift6` +//! DecryptData7 (nibble-swap rolling) -> primitives::decrypt_data7 +//! Decompress (LFSR keystream) -> primitives::decrypt_data6 +//! HuffmanDecompress -> primitives::decompress +//! AesDecrypt -> primitives::aes_decrypt +//! CalculateChecksumWithSizeXor -> primitives::calculate_checksum +//! CalculateCrc32 -> crc32::compute (via above) + +use super::UnpackError; +use super::bytecode::{Op, OpsLut, generate}; +use super::primitives::{self, *}; + +/// Read a signed 32-bit little-endian value. +fn get_i32(d: &[u8], offset: i32) -> i32 { + get_u32(d, offset as u32) as i32 +} + +/// Write a signed 32-bit little-endian value. +fn write_i32(d: &mut [u8], offset: i32, value: i32) { + write_u32(d, offset as u32, value as u32); +} + +/// `DecryptData3` (shift-5): byte-level bit rotation over a (addr,size) pair. +fn decrypt_data3_shift5(d: &mut [u8], offset: i32) { + let addr = get_i32(d, offset); + let size = get_i32(d, offset + 4); + let mut key1: u8 = (addr as u8).wrapping_add((addr >> 8) as u8); + let mut key2: u8 = key1.wrapping_add(1); + for i in 0..size { + let idx = (addr + i) as usize; + let val = d[idx]; + let step1 = key2 ^ val.rotate_left(3); + let step2 = key1 ^ step1.rotate_left(3); + d[idx] = step2.rotate_left(3); + key1 = key1.wrapping_add(1); + key2 = key2.wrapping_add(1); + } +} + +/// `DecryptData6` (shift-6): byte-level bit rotation over an explicit +/// (offset, size) range, with the low byte of `offset` as the rolling key. +fn decrypt_data6_shift6(d: &mut [u8], offset: i32, size: i32) { + let mut key1: u8 = offset as u8; + let mut key2: u8 = (offset as u8).wrapping_add(1); + for i in 0..size { + let idx = (offset + i) as usize; + let val = d[idx]; + let step1 = key2 ^ val.rotate_left(2); + let step2 = key1 ^ step1.rotate_left(2); + d[idx] = step2.rotate_left(2); + key1 = key1.wrapping_add(1); + key2 = key2.wrapping_add(1); + } +} + +/// `DecryptData4`/`DecryptData5`: AES-CBC decrypt + XOR/ROR (DecryptData1 +/// with rotate 19) + optional per-byte transform + Huffman decompress. +fn decrypt_data4( + d: &mut [u8], + offset: i32, + key: i32, + decomp_params: &[i32; 4], + transform: Option<&[Op]>, +) -> Result<(), UnpackError> { + let addr = get_i32(d, offset); + let size = get_i32(d, offset + 4); + let compressed_addr = get_i32(d, offset + 8); + let decompressed_size = get_i32(d, offset + 12); + + aes_decrypt(d, addr as u32, size as u32, decomp_params[3] as u32); + // DecryptData1(offset, key, 19) == primitives::decrypt_data3 with shift 19 + decrypt_data3(d, offset as u32, key as u32, 19); + + if let Some(ops) = transform + && size > 0 + { + OpsLut::new(ops).map_region(d, addr as usize, size as usize); + } + + if size != decompressed_size { + // decompress reports corruption (after partial writes) via its bool; + // surface it instead of shipping a garbage block. + if !decompress( + d, + addr as u32, + compressed_addr as u32, + decomp_params[1] as u32, + size as u32, + decompressed_size as u32, + ) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// `InitializeKeys`. +fn initialize_keys(file_data: &[u8]) -> [i32; 8] { + let mut keys = [0i32; 8]; + keys[0] = get_i32(file_data, 4096); + let mut prev_key = keys[0]; + for i in 0..7i32 { + let val = get_i32(file_data, 4 * i + 4100); + keys[(i + 1) as usize] = val ^ prev_key; + prev_key = (i * i) ^ (val.wrapping_add(prev_key).wrapping_sub(i)); + } + keys +} + +/// `ProcessRelocBlock`. +fn process_reloc_block(d: &mut [u8], mut pos: i32) { + loop { + decrypt_data6_shift6(d, pos, 16); + let src_addr = get_i32(d, pos); + let size = get_i32(d, pos + 4); + let dst_addr = get_i32(d, pos + 8); + let verify = get_i32(d, pos + 12); + pos += 16; + + if src_addr != 0 && size != 0 && dst_addr != 0 && verify == size { + let s = src_addr as usize; + let dd = dst_addr as usize; + let n = size as usize; + d.copy_within(s..s + n, dd); + } + if size == 0 { + break; + } + } +} + +/// Number of section headers to walk, and the guard the walks share. +/// +/// The section table has no sentinel entry, so "iterate until VirtualSize is 0" +/// silently truncates the walk at the first section with a legitimately zero +/// VirtualSize (or a corrupt early field) — the later sections then keep the +/// packer's raw pointers and the image is broken with no error. Walk by +/// `NumberOfSections` instead, capped, with an all-zero-name break to guard the +/// other direction (a corrupt, overstated count): real sections always have a +/// name, header padding is all zero. +const MAX_SECTIONS: i32 = 96; + +fn section_count(file_data: &[u8], pe_offset: i32) -> i32 { + (get_u16(file_data, (pe_offset + 6) as u32) as i32).min(MAX_SECTIONS) +} + +fn section_header_blank(file_data: &[u8], off: i32) -> bool { + let s = off as usize; + match file_data.get(s..s + 8) { + Some(name) => name.iter().all(|&b| b == 0), + None => true, + } +} + +/// `ProcessImportTable`. +fn process_import_table(d: &mut [u8], mut import_table_offset: i32) { + while get_i32(d, import_table_offset + 12) != 0 { + let name_offset = get_i32(d, import_table_offset + 12); + decrypt_data7(d, name_offset as u32, name_offset as u8); + + let thunk_addr0 = get_i32(d, import_table_offset); + let orig_thunk_addr = get_i32(d, import_table_offset + 16); + let mut thunk_addr = if thunk_addr0 == 0 { + orig_thunk_addr + } else { + thunk_addr0 + }; + + loop { + // PE32+ thunks are 8 bytes: an ordinal import carries bit 63 with + // the ordinal in the low word; only a by-name thunk holds a + // hint/name RVA (in the low dword). Reading just the low dword + // would mistake an ordinal for a tiny RVA and scribble over the + // image header. + let v = get_u64(d, thunk_addr as u32); + if v == 0 { + break; + } + if (v & 0x8000_0000_0000_0000) == 0 { + let entry = v as u32; + decrypt_data7(d, entry.wrapping_add(2), entry as u8); + d[entry as usize] = 0; + d[entry.wrapping_add(1) as usize] = 0; + } + thunk_addr += 8; + } + import_table_offset += 20; + } +} + +/// `DecryptAndDecompressData`. +fn decrypt_and_decompress_data( + d: &mut [u8], + clean: &[u8], + section_image_base: i32, + mut section_data_offset: i32, + decrypt_func: &[Op], + decomp_params: &[i32; 4], +) -> Result<(), UnpackError> { + // Entry loop — Pass 1 (sequential): the 16-byte descriptors are decrypted + // in a position-keyed chain (decrypt_data6_shift6) terminated by a zero-size + // record, so collection cannot be parallelized. + struct Blk { + dest_offset: i32, + size: i32, + src_offset: i32, + expected_crc: i32, + } + let mut blocks: Vec = Vec::new(); + loop { + // Guard: need 16 bytes at section_data_offset in `d` + let off = section_data_offset as usize; + if off.saturating_add(16) > d.len() { + return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(off)); + } + decrypt_data6_shift6(d, section_data_offset, 16); + let dest_offset = get_i32(d, section_data_offset); + let size = get_i32(d, section_data_offset + 4); + let src_offset = get_i32(d, section_data_offset + 8); + let expected_crc = get_i32(d, section_data_offset + 12); + section_data_offset += 16; + + if size == 0 { + break; + } + blocks.push(Blk { + dest_offset, + size, + src_offset, + expected_crc, + }); + } + // Pass 2: each block writes only [src_offset, src_offset+max(size,crc)) and + // reads only immutable input + the (snapshotted) key tables, so blocks with + // disjoint write spans are independent. `parallel_for` carves the spans + // into safe disjoint &mut slices (these blocks are only ever laid out + // disjointly; overlapping spans degrade to a sequential pass). + { + let lut = OpsLut::new(decrypt_func); + let ko0 = decomp_params[0]; + let ko2 = decomp_params[2]; + let ks_snap = + primitives::aes_schedule_snapshot(d, ko2 as u32).ok_or(UnpackError::Corrupt)?; + let tab_snap = primitives::huffman_table_snapshot(d, ko0 as u32) + .ok_or(UnpackError::DecompressFailed)?; + let spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = blocks + .iter() + .map(|b| { + let s = b.src_offset as usize; + (s, s + b.size.max(b.expected_crc) as usize) + }) + .collect(); + let do_block = |i: usize, base: usize, span: &mut [u8]| -> Result<(), UnpackError> { + let b = &blocks[i]; + let src = (b.dest_offset as i64 + section_image_base as i64) as usize; + let rel = (b.src_offset as usize) - base; + let n = b.size as usize; + // Bounds-checked copy from `clean` (potentially truncated input). + primitives::try_copy_from_slice(span, rel, n, clean, src)?; + aes_decrypt_ks(&ks_snap, span, rel as u32, b.size as u32); + lut.map_region(span, rel, n); + if b.size != b.expected_crc { + // decompress reports corruption (after partial writes) via its + // bool; surface it instead of shipping a garbage block. + if !decompress_tbl( + &tab_snap, + span, + rel as u32, + rel as u32, + b.size as u32, + b.expected_crc as u32, + ) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + } + Ok(()) + }; + super::parallel::parallel_for(d, &spans, 1, do_block)?; + } + + // Zero-fill loop. + loop { + let off = section_data_offset as usize; + // The entry block loop above correctly requires 16 bytes; this loop + // decrypts 16 too, so guard 16 (an 8-byte guard would let + // decrypt_data6_shift6 index past the end of a truncated descriptor). + if off.saturating_add(16) > d.len() { + return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(off)); + } + decrypt_data6_shift6(d, section_data_offset, 16); + let zero_offset = get_i32(d, section_data_offset); + let zero_size = get_i32(d, section_data_offset + 4); + section_data_offset += 16; + + if zero_size == 0 { + break; + } + for i in 0..zero_size { + let idx = (zero_offset + i) as usize; + if idx >= d.len() { + return Err(UnpackError::OutOfBounds(idx)); + } + d[idx] = 0; + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// Unpack a native/managed DLL in the older protected-DLL layout. Returns the +/// unpacked image bytes. +pub fn unpack_dll(input: &[u8]) -> Result, UnpackError> { + unpack_dll_v(input, false) +} + +/// Like [`unpack_dll`], but prints detailed `[N/9]` step progress to stdout when +/// `verbose` is true. Output bytes are identical regardless. +pub fn unpack_dll_v(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result, UnpackError> { + // Trap any out-of-bounds panic from a truncated/garbled file and report it + // as a clean error so the public API stays panic-free. + super::catch_unpack(move || unpack_dll_inner(input, verbose)) +} + +fn unpack_dll_inner(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result, UnpackError> { + if input.len() < 4096 { + return Err(UnpackError::InputTooShort(input.len())); + } + + // `file_data` and `original_file_data` both borrow the same protected input. + let file_data = input; + let original_file_data = input; + + let keys = initialize_keys(file_data); + if verbose { + println!("[1/9] Initializing keys..."); + println!(" keys[0] key = 0x{:08X}", keys[0] as u32); + println!(" keys[1] signature = 0x{:08X}", keys[1] as u32); + println!(" keys[3] base = 0x{:08X}", keys[3] as u32); + println!(" keys[4] src_off = 0x{:08X}", keys[4] as u32); + println!(" keys[5] size = 0x{:08X}", keys[5] as u32); + println!(" keys[6] anchor = 0x{:08X}", keys[6] as u32); + } + + if !super::is_supported_magic(keys[1] as u32) { + return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack( + "Not a Crackproof protected file (KONN magic mismatch)".into(), + )); + } + + let pe_offset = get_i32(file_data, 60); + if pe_offset < 0 || (pe_offset as usize).saturating_add(84) > file_data.len() { + return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack("implausible PE offset".into())); + } + // This pipeline is PE32+-only: its header fixups write the data + // directories at PE32+ offsets (pe+144..180, pe+136 for the DD blob). On a + // PE32 image those land in the wrong optional-header fields and produce a + // structurally plausible but unloadable file. Reject early with a clear + // error so `unpack_auto`'s EXE-pipeline fallback handles PE32 DLLs (that + // path is PE32-aware — see run_pe32), instead of us mangling them here. + if get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 24) & 0xFFFF != 0x20B { + return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack( + "not a PE32+ image (the DLL pipeline handles 64-bit only)".into(), + )); + } + let size_of_image = get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 80); + if size_of_image <= 0 || size_of_image as u64 > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return Err(UnpackError::DllUnpack("implausible SizeOfImage".into())); + } + let mut out = vec![0u8; size_of_image as usize]; + let base_offset = keys[6] - keys[3] + 0x2000; + if verbose { + println!("[2/9] Decrypting key table..."); + println!(" size_of_image = 0x{:08X}", size_of_image as u32); + println!(" base_offset = 0x{:08X}", base_offset as u32); + } + + // DecryptKeyTable. + { + let src_base = keys[4] + 4096; + let mut scramble = (!base_offset).wrapping_add(keys[0]); + let count = base_offset >> 2; + for i in 0..count { + let dst_offset = keys[3] + 4 * i; + let src_val = get_i32(file_data, src_base + 4 * i); + write_i32(&mut out, dst_offset, src_val ^ scramble); + scramble = (i * i) ^ (i.wrapping_add(src_val).wrapping_add(scramble)); + } + } + + // Array.Copy(fileData, keys[4]+baseOffset+4096, outputData, keys[3]+baseOffset, keys[5]-baseOffset) + { + let src = (keys[4] + base_offset + 4096) as usize; + let dst = (keys[3] + base_offset) as usize; + let n = (keys[5] - base_offset) as usize; + primitives::try_copy_from_slice(&mut out, dst, n, file_data, src)?; + } + write_i32(&mut out, keys[3], 4096); + out[..4096].copy_from_slice(&file_data[..4096]); + + let v144 = get_i32(&out, keys[6] + 5600); + let v148 = get_i32(&out, keys[6] + 5596); + let v152 = get_i32(&out, keys[6] + 5632); + let v156 = get_i32(&out, keys[6] + 5636); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 144, v144); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 148, v148); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 152, v152); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 156, v156); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 176, 0); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset + 180, 0); + + let mut checksum_offset1 = keys[6] + 5776; + let mut xor_accumulator: u32 = 0; + while get_i32(&out, checksum_offset1 + 4) != 0 { + xor_accumulator ^= calculate_checksum(&out, checksum_offset1 as u32); + checksum_offset1 += 8; + } + + let checksum1 = calculate_checksum(&out, (keys[6] + 5648) as u32) as i32; + let enc_key = get_u32(&out, (keys[6] + 5612) as u32); + let decrypt_offset1 = keys[6] + 5712; + decrypt_data3( + &mut out, + decrypt_offset1 as u32, + xor_accumulator ^ (checksum1 as u32) ^ enc_key, + 21, + ); + + let decrypted_addr1 = get_i32(&out, decrypt_offset1); + if verbose { + println!("[3/9] Decrypting primary descriptor..."); + println!(" xor_accumulator = 0x{:08X}", xor_accumulator); + println!(" checksum1 = 0x{:08X}", checksum1 as u32); + println!(" decrypted_addr1 = 0x{:08X}", decrypted_addr1 as u32); + } + let import_offset = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3444); + let decrypted_addr2_size = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3632); + decrypt_data3( + &mut out, + (decrypted_addr1 + 3632) as u32, + import_offset as u32, + 19, + ); + + let addr2 = decrypted_addr2_size; + let reloc_block_offset = addr2 + 9248; + let reloc_type = get_i32(&out, reloc_block_offset); + + if (reloc_type & 0x0F) == 1 { + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, addr2 + 9252); + } else if reloc_type == 2 { + let p = get_i32(&out, addr2 + 9252); + process_reloc_block(&mut out, p); + } + + let reloc_block_offset2 = reloc_block_offset + 16; + let reloc_type2 = get_i32(&out, reloc_block_offset2); + + if (reloc_type2 & 0x0F) == 1 { + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, reloc_block_offset2 + 4); + } else if reloc_type2 == 2 { + let p = get_i32(&out, reloc_block_offset2 + 4); + process_reloc_block(&mut out, p); + } + + let mut decomp_params = [0i32; 4]; + let param_base = addr2 + 9160; + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, param_base); + decomp_params[0] = get_i32(&out, param_base); + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, param_base + 8); + decomp_params[1] = get_i32(&out, param_base + 8); + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, param_base + 32); + decomp_params[2] = get_i32(&out, param_base + 32); + decrypt_data3_shift5(&mut out, param_base + 40); + decomp_params[3] = get_i32(&out, param_base + 40); + if verbose { + println!("[4/9] Processing relocations & decomp params..."); + println!(" addr2 = 0x{:08X}", addr2 as u32); + println!( + " decomp_params = [0x{:08X}, 0x{:08X}, 0x{:08X}, 0x{:08X}]", + decomp_params[0] as u32, + decomp_params[1] as u32, + decomp_params[2] as u32, + decomp_params[3] as u32 + ); + } + + let checksum2 = calculate_checksum(&out, (keys[6] + 5640) as u32) as i32; + let mut table_val = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3448); + for k in 1..=100 { + table_val = table_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + for k in 1..=200 { + table_val = table_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + for k in 1..=300 { + table_val = table_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + for k in 1..=400 { + table_val = table_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + + let addr3_offset = decrypted_addr1 + 3712; + decrypt_data4( + &mut out, + addr3_offset, + table_val ^ checksum2 ^ (xor_accumulator as i32), + &decomp_params, + None, + )?; + + let addr3b = get_i32(&out, decrypted_addr1 + 3728); + if verbose { + println!("[5/9] Decrypting code block 1 (addr3)..."); + println!(" checksum2 = 0x{:08X}", checksum2 as u32); + println!(" addr3b = 0x{:08X}", addr3b as u32); + } + + let crc_data_offset = decrypted_addr1 + 3488; + let crc_data_addr = get_i32(&out, crc_data_offset); + let crc_data_size = get_i32(&out, crc_data_offset + 4); + let crc_val = { + let a = crc_data_addr as usize; + let n = crc_data_size as usize; + super::crc32::compute(&out[a..a + n]) as i32 + }; + let crc_xored = crc_data_size ^ crc_val; + let trailing_val = get_i32(&out, crc_data_addr + crc_data_size - 4); + decrypt_data4( + &mut out, + decrypted_addr1 + 3728, + crc_xored ^ (xor_accumulator as i32) ^ trailing_val, + &decomp_params, + None, + )?; + + let checksum3 = calculate_checksum(&out, (decrypted_addr1 + 3480) as u32) as i32; + let not_val = !get_u32(&out, (addr3b + 1968) as u32); + let addr4_offset = decrypted_addr1 + 3760; + let xor_key = (xor_accumulator as i32) ^ checksum3; + decrypt_data4( + &mut out, + addr4_offset, + (not_val ^ (xor_key as u32)) as i32, + &decomp_params, + None, + )?; + + let addr4 = get_i32(&out, addr4_offset); + let lfsr = addr4 + 3200; + // Decompress == primitives::decrypt_data6 (LFSR keystream, len at +95). + decrypt_data6(&mut out, lfsr as u32); + if verbose { + println!("[6/9] Decrypting code blocks 2-3 (addr3b, addr4)..."); + println!(" crc_val = 0x{:08X}", crc_val as u32); + println!(" checksum3 = 0x{:08X}", checksum3 as u32); + println!(" addr4 = 0x{:08X}", addr4 as u32); + } + + let checksum4 = calculate_checksum(&out, (decrypted_addr1 + 3472) as u32) as i32; + let mut lfsr_seed_val = get_i32(&out, addr4 + 3160); + for k in 1..=100 { + lfsr_seed_val = lfsr_seed_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + for k in 1..=200 { + lfsr_seed_val = lfsr_seed_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + for k in 1..=300 { + lfsr_seed_val = lfsr_seed_val.wrapping_add(k); + } + + let decrypt_func = generate(&out, lfsr as u32) + .ok_or_else(|| UnpackError::DllUnpack("Failed to build decryption expression".into()))?; + + let addr5_offset = decrypted_addr1 + 3840; + let addr5 = get_i32(&out, addr5_offset); + decrypt_data4( + &mut out, + addr5_offset, + lfsr_seed_val ^ xor_key ^ checksum4, + &decomp_params, + Some(&decrypt_func), + )?; + if verbose { + println!("[7/9] Decrypting code block 4 (addr5)..."); + println!(" checksum4 = 0x{:08X}", checksum4 as u32); + println!(" addr5 = 0x{:08X}", addr5 as u32); + } + + let metadata_offset = addr5 + 12312; + let mut metadata_addr = get_i32(&out, metadata_offset); + + while get_i32(&out, metadata_addr + 4) != 0 { + decrypt_data6_shift6(&mut out, metadata_addr, 16); + metadata_addr += 16; + } + + let lfsr2 = metadata_offset + 88; + decrypt_data6(&mut out, lfsr2 as u32); + + let decrypt_func2 = generate(&out, lfsr2 as u32).ok_or_else(|| { + UnpackError::DllUnpack("Failed to build second decryption expression".into()) + })?; + + let section_image_base = 4095 - get_i32(original_file_data, 4224); + let section_data_offset = get_i32(&out, addr5 + 11976); + if verbose { + println!("[8/9] Decrypting & decompressing sections..."); + println!( + " section_image_base = 0x{:08X}", + section_image_base as u32 + ); + println!( + " section_data_offset = 0x{:08X}", + section_data_offset as u32 + ); + } + + // Managed-only pre-fill of .text (Task 3.2). No-op for native (clr_rva == 0). + // Data directories start at optional-header +96 on PE32, +112 on PE32+ — + // hardcoding +112 misreads the CLR RVA on a 32-bit image. + let dd_base = if get_u16(file_data, (pe_offset + 24) as u32) == 0x20B { + 112 + } else { + 96 + }; + let clr_dir_rva = get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 24 + dd_base + 14 * 8); + if clr_dir_rva != 0 { + let sh_start = get_u16(file_data, (pe_offset + 20) as u32) as i32 + pe_offset + 24; + for i in 0..section_count(file_data, pe_offset) { + let off = sh_start + i * 40; + if section_header_blank(file_data, off) { + break; + } + let sec_va = get_i32(file_data, off + 12); + let sec_vsize = get_i32(file_data, off + 8); + let sec_raw = get_i32(file_data, off + 20); + let sec_raw_size = get_i32(file_data, off + 16); + if clr_dir_rva >= sec_va && clr_dir_rva < sec_va + sec_vsize { + let avail = sec_raw_size.min(file_data.len() as i32 - sec_raw); + let copy_len = avail.min(out.len() as i32 - sec_va); + if copy_len > 0 { + let s = sec_raw as usize; + let dd = sec_va as usize; + let n = copy_len as usize; + out[dd..dd + n].copy_from_slice(&file_data[s..s + n]); + } + break; + } + } + } + + decrypt_and_decompress_data( + &mut out, + original_file_data, + section_image_base, + section_data_offset, + &decrypt_func2, + &decomp_params, + )?; + + let import_table_offset = get_i32(&out, addr5 + 12016); + if import_table_offset != 0 { + process_import_table(&mut out, import_table_offset); + } + + out[..4096].copy_from_slice(&file_data[..4096]); + if verbose { + println!("[9/9] Fixing up PE header & section table..."); + } + + let section_header_base = get_u16(file_data, (pe_offset + 20) as u32) as i32 + pe_offset; + let section_start = section_header_base + 24; + let image_data_addr = get_i32(original_file_data, section_start - 128); + let image_data_size = get_i32(original_file_data, section_start - 124); + + let mut entry_point_adjustment = 0i32; + { + for i in 0..section_count(file_data, pe_offset) { + let offset = section_start + i * 40; + if section_header_blank(file_data, offset) { + break; + } + let virtual_size = get_i32(file_data, offset + 8); + let virtual_addr = get_i32(file_data, offset + 12); + let raw_data_offset = get_i32(file_data, offset + 20); + + if image_data_addr >= virtual_addr + && image_data_addr + image_data_size <= virtual_addr + virtual_size + { + entry_point_adjustment = raw_data_offset + image_data_addr - virtual_addr; + } + + write_i32(&mut out, offset + 16, virtual_size); + write_i32(&mut out, offset + 20, virtual_addr); + } + } + + if image_data_size != 0 { + let s = entry_point_adjustment as usize; + let dd = image_data_addr as usize; + let n = image_data_size as usize; + out[dd..dd + n].copy_from_slice(&file_data[s..s + n]); + } + + // Managed-only CLR header recopy (Task 3.2). No-op for native. + let clr_rva = get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 24 + dd_base + 14 * 8); + let clr_size = get_i32(file_data, pe_offset + 24 + dd_base + 14 * 8 + 4); + if clr_rva != 0 && clr_size != 0 { + for i in 0..section_count(file_data, pe_offset) { + let offset = section_start + i * 40; + if section_header_blank(file_data, offset) { + break; + } + let sec_va = get_i32(file_data, offset + 12); + let sec_raw = get_i32(file_data, offset + 20); + let sec_vsize = get_i32(file_data, offset + 8); + if clr_rva >= sec_va && clr_rva + clr_size <= sec_va + sec_vsize { + let clr_file_off = sec_raw + (clr_rva - sec_va); + let s = clr_file_off as usize; + let dd = clr_rva as usize; + let n = clr_size as usize; + out[dd..dd + n].copy_from_slice(&file_data[s..s + n]); + break; + } + } + } + + decrypt_data6_shift6(&mut out, keys[3] + 16, 656); + let pe_offset2 = get_i32(&out, 60); + let final_size_of_image = get_i32(&out, keys[3] + 32); + write_i32(&mut out, pe_offset2 + 40, final_size_of_image); + { + let s = (keys[3] + 48) as usize; + let dd = (pe_offset2 + 136) as usize; + out.copy_within(s..s + 128, dd); + } + + Ok(out) +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/exe.rs b/src/unpacker/exe.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdf0470 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/exe.rs @@ -0,0 +1,2812 @@ +use super::bytecode::{Op, OpsLut, generate}; +use super::primitives; +use super::primitives::*; + +#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] +pub enum UnpackError { + #[error("input too short for header (need at least 4096 bytes, got {0})")] + InputTooShort(usize), + + #[error("info[1] mismatch — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + HeaderMismatch, + + #[error("anchor field not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + AnchorNotFound, + + #[error("stage2 field not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + Stage2NotFound, + + #[error("chk_src_start not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + ChkSrcStartNotFound, + + #[error("table_start not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + TableStartNotFound, + + #[error("stage4 bytecode generation failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + BytecodeGenFailed, + + #[error("stage5 marker not found — this build's layout is not supported by this unpacker")] + Stage5MarkerNotFound, + + #[error("stage5 bytecode generation failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + Stage5BytecodeGenFailed, + + #[error("DLL unpack failed: {0}")] + DllUnpack(String), + + #[error("not a Crackproof-protected file")] + NotCrackproof, + + #[error("out-of-bounds access at offset {0}")] + OutOfBounds(usize), + + #[error("PE32 tbl not found — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + Pe32TblNotFound, + + #[error("PE32 thirdStage decrypt failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + Pe32ThirdStageFailed, + + #[error("PE32 customDecryptor not found in sevenStage")] + Pe32CustomDecryptorNotFound, + + #[error("PE32 stage bytecode generation failed")] + Pe32BytecodeGenFailed, + + #[error("PE32 eighthStageKey not found")] + Pe32EighthKeyNotFound, + + #[error("PE32 file LFSR not found in eighthStage")] + Pe32FileLfsrNotFound, + + #[error("decompression failed — corrupt data or wrong offset")] + DecompressFailed, + + #[error("input is corrupt or not a supported Crackproof layout")] + Corrupt, +} + +pub fn unpack(input: &[u8]) -> Result, UnpackError> { + unpack_v(input, false) +} + +/// Map an RVA to a file offset using the protected file's section table. +/// Used by the new-layout managed (CLR) metadata restore to locate the COR20 +/// header and BSJB MetaData stream in the original protected file. +fn prot_rva_to_off(file_data: &[u8], pe_header: u32, rva: u32) -> Option { + let nsec = get_u16(file_data, pe_header + 6) as u32; + let opt = get_u16(file_data, pe_header + 20) as u32; + let tab = pe_header + 24 + opt; + for i in 0..nsec { + let s = tab + i * 40; + if (s as usize + 24) > file_data.len() { + return None; + } + let va = get_u32(file_data, s + 12); + let vs = get_u32(file_data, s + 8); + let rsz = get_u32(file_data, s + 16); + let rp = get_u32(file_data, s + 20); + if va <= rva && rva < va + vs.max(rsz) { + return Some(rp + (rva - va)); + } + } + None +} + +pub fn unpack_v(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result, UnpackError> { + if input.len() < 4096 { + return Err(UnpackError::InputTooShort(input.len())); + } + // The pipeline chases offsets read out of the decrypted image; on a + // truncated/garbled-but-detected file those run out of bounds. Trap any + // such panic and report it as corrupt input so the library never unwinds + // into the caller (same role as the DLL path's explicit bounds checks). + // `input` is read-only for the entire unpack (the payload is decrypted into a + // separate `decompressed` buffer), so the unpacker borrows it directly — no + // owned copy is made here. catch_unwind uses AssertUnwindSafe, so a borrowing + // (non-'static) closure is fine. + super::catch_unpack(move || Unpacker::run(input, verbose)) +} + +struct Unpacker<'a> { + file_data: &'a [u8], + decompressed: Vec, + info: [u32; 8], + key_offsets: [u32; 4], + decrypt_size: u32, +} + +impl<'a> Unpacker<'a> { + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::aes_decrypt + fn aes_decrypt(&mut self, pos: u32, size: u32, key_offset: u32) { + primitives::aes_decrypt(&mut self.decompressed, pos, size, key_offset); + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::calculate_checksum + fn calculate_checksum(&self, pos: u32) -> u32 { + primitives::calculate_checksum(&self.decompressed, pos) + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::calculate_checksum2 + fn calculate_checksum2(&self, pos: u32, start: u32) -> u32 { + primitives::calculate_checksum2(&self.decompressed, self.file_data, pos, start) + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::decrypt_data1 + fn decrypt_data(&mut self) { + primitives::decrypt_data1(self.file_data, &mut self.info); + } + + // Strategy (b): decrypt_data2 is tightly coupled to Unpacker fields + // (file_data, decompressed, info, decrypt_size); left on Unpacker. + // The DLL port will need a different driver state anyway. + fn decrypt_data2(&mut self) { + let base_src = self.info[4].wrapping_add(4096); + let mut k = self.info[0].wrapping_add(!self.decrypt_size); + let words = self.decrypt_size >> 2; + for i in 0..words { + let off = i.wrapping_mul(4); + let cell = get_u32(self.file_data, base_src.wrapping_add(off)); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + self.info[3].wrapping_add(off), + k ^ cell, + ); + k = i.wrapping_mul(i) ^ (k.wrapping_add(cell).wrapping_add(i)); + } + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::decrypt_data3 + fn decrypt_data3(&mut self, pos: u32, key: u32, shift: u32) { + primitives::decrypt_data3(&mut self.decompressed, pos, key, shift); + } + + // Strategy (b): decrypt_data4 is specific to EXE key-offset layout; + // left on Unpacker. DLL port will need its own variant. + fn decrypt_data4(&mut self, pos: u32) { + let base_addr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pos); + let length = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pos.wrapping_add(4)); + let mut b: u8 = (((base_addr >> 8).wrapping_add(base_addr)) & 0xFF) as u8; + let mut b2: u8 = b.wrapping_add(1); + for i in 0..length { + let idx = (base_addr + i) as usize; + let b3 = self.decompressed[idx]; + let b4 = b3.rotate_left(3) ^ b2; + let b5 = b4.rotate_left(3) ^ b; + self.decompressed[idx] = b5.rotate_left(3); + b = b.wrapping_add(1); + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + + // Strategy (b): decrypt_data5 is frequently called with the EXE's virtual + // address convention; kept on Unpacker to avoid signature changes at call + // sites. DLL port can call primitives directly with explicit slice. + fn decrypt_data5(&mut self, va: u32, size: u32) { + let mut b: u8 = va as u8; + let mut b2: u8 = b.wrapping_add(1); + for i in 0..size { + let idx = (va + i) as usize; + let b3 = self.decompressed[idx]; + let b4 = b3.rotate_left(2) ^ b2; + let b5 = b4.rotate_left(2) ^ b; + self.decompressed[idx] = b5.rotate_left(2); + b = b.wrapping_add(1); + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::decrypt_data6 + fn decrypt_data6(&mut self, pos: u32) { + primitives::decrypt_data6(&mut self.decompressed, pos); + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::decrypt_data7 + fn decrypt_data7(&mut self, pos: u32, key: u8) { + primitives::decrypt_data7(&mut self.decompressed, pos, key); + } + + // Strategy (b): decrypt_data8 is specific to the EXE's .text page-level + // XOR pass; left on Unpacker. DLL port won't need this. + fn decrypt_data8(&mut self, va: u32, size: u32, mut key: u32) { + let blocks = size >> 4; + for i in 0..blocks { + let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(i); + key = mixed.wrapping_add(i); + // The packer's dd8 loop does not XOR block i=0; its key state still + // advances. For shift-0 builds the i=0 XOR value is always 0 (a + // no-op), so this is byte-identical for the older EXE-64 family; + // for shift-15 builds it is the difference between a clean + // .text and one corrupt byte per page. + if i == 0 { + continue; + } + let target = va + .wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(16)) + .wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF); + self.decompressed[target as usize] ^= key as u8; + } + } + + // Strategy (a): delegate to primitives::decrypt_and_decompress_data + fn decrypt_and_decompress_data(&mut self, pos: u32, key: u32, custom: Option<&[Op]>) -> bool { + primitives::decrypt_and_decompress_data( + &mut self.decompressed, + pos, + key, + self.key_offsets[1], + self.key_offsets[3], + custom, + ) + } + + /// New-layout (marker-less) import reconstruction from the PE Import Directory. + /// Walks each IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR at `import_rva`, decrypt_data7-decrypts + /// and lowercases the DLL name, then walks the (OFT|IFT) thunk array + /// decrypting each by-name import's hint/name string, and recovers the IAT + /// directory (DD[12]) bounds. + fn process_imports_idt(&mut self, import_rva: u32, mut import_size: u32, pe_off2: u32) { + let len = self.decompressed.len() as u32; + let mut dll_count: u32 = 0; + let mut iat_min: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF; + let mut iat_max: u32 = 0; + let mut pos = import_rva; + let find_nul = |d: &[u8], from: u32, to: u32| -> u32 { + let hi = (to as usize).min(d.len()); + let mut i = from as usize; + while i < hi { + if d[i] == 0 { + return i as u32; + } + i += 1; + } + hi as u32 + }; + let all_ascii = |d: &[u8], a: u32, b: u32| -> bool { + d[a as usize..b as usize] + .iter() + .all(|&c| (0x20..0x7F).contains(&c)) + }; + while pos + 20 <= len { + let name_rva = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pos + 12); + if name_rva == 0 || name_rva >= len { + break; + } + // Decrypt the DLL name unless it already reads as a plain ASCII + // *.dll / *.exe string. + let end = find_nul(&self.decompressed, name_rva, name_rva + 64); + let mut already_plain = false; + if end > name_rva + && end - name_rva <= 60 + && all_ascii(&self.decompressed, name_rva, end) + { + let s = &self.decompressed[name_rva as usize..end as usize]; + let lower: Vec = s.iter().map(|c| c.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect(); + if lower.ends_with(b".dll") || lower.ends_with(b".exe") { + already_plain = true; + } + } + if !already_plain { + self.decrypt_data7(name_rva, name_rva as u8); + } + // Normalize to lowercase. + let end = find_nul(&self.decompressed, name_rva, name_rva + 64); + if end > name_rva && all_ascii(&self.decompressed, name_rva, end) { + for b in &mut self.decompressed[name_rva as usize..end as usize] { + b.make_ascii_lowercase(); + } + } + + let oft = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pos); + let ift = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pos + 16); + let mut thunk = if oft != 0 { oft } else { ift }; + if 0 < ift && ift < len { + iat_min = iat_min.min(ift); + } + while thunk != 0 && thunk + 8 <= len { + let v = get_u64(&self.decompressed, thunk); + if v == 0 { + break; + } + if (v & 0x8000_0000_0000_0000) == 0 { + let r = (v & 0xFFFF_FFFF) as u32; + if r + 2 < len { + let fend = find_nul(&self.decompressed, r + 2, r + 2 + 256); + let already = fend > r + 2 + && fend - (r + 2) <= 250 + && all_ascii(&self.decompressed, r + 2, fend); + if !already { + self.decrypt_data7(r + 2, r as u8); + write_u16(&mut self.decompressed, r, 0); + } + } + } + thunk += 8; + } + if 0 < ift && ift < len { + let mut tp = ift; + while tp + 8 <= len { + let v2 = get_u64(&self.decompressed, tp); + tp += 8; + if v2 == 0 { + break; + } + } + iat_max = iat_max.max(tp); + } + dll_count += 1; + pos += 20; + } + if import_size == 0 { + import_size = (dll_count + 1) * 20; + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x94), + import_size, + ); + } + if iat_min < iat_max { + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xE8), iat_min); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xEC), + iat_max - iat_min, + ); + } + } + + fn run(file_data: &'a [u8], verbose: bool) -> Result, UnpackError> { + let mut u = Unpacker { + file_data, + decompressed: Vec::new(), + info: [0u32; 8], + key_offsets: [0u32; 4], + decrypt_size: 0, + }; + + u.decrypt_data(); + if verbose { + println!("[1/9] Decrypting file header..."); + println!(" info[0] key = 0x{:08X}", u.info[0]); + println!(" info[1] signature = 0x{:08X}", u.info[1]); + println!(" info[2] = 0x{:08X}", u.info[2]); + println!(" info[3] base = 0x{:08X}", u.info[3]); + println!(" info[4] src_off = 0x{:08X}", u.info[4]); + println!(" info[5] total_size = 0x{:08X}", u.info[5]); + println!(" info[6] end_mark = 0x{:08X}", u.info[6]); + println!(" info[7] = 0x{:08X}", u.info[7]); + } + if !super::is_supported_magic(u.info[1]) { + return Err(UnpackError::HeaderMismatch); + } + + let pe_off = get_u32(u.file_data, 60); + let size_of_image = get_u32(u.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(80)); + if size_of_image == 0 || size_of_image as u64 > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return Err(UnpackError::Corrupt); + } + u.decompressed = vec![0u8; size_of_image as usize]; + u.decrypt_size = u.info[6].wrapping_sub(u.info[3]).wrapping_add(8192); + if verbose { + println!("[2/9] Decrypting payload..."); + } + u.decrypt_data2(); + + { + let src_start = u.info[4].wrapping_add(4096).wrapping_add(u.decrypt_size) as usize; + let dst_start = u.info[3].wrapping_add(u.decrypt_size) as usize; + let len = u.info[5].wrapping_sub(u.decrypt_size) as usize; + u.decompressed[dst_start..dst_start + len] + .copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[src_start..src_start + len]); + } + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, u.info[3], 4096); + u.decompressed[..4096].copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[..4096]); + + // PE32 (32-bit) images use an entirely different config layout and + // final-output transform than PE32+ (64-bit). Dispatch here, after the + // shared header/payload setup (the PE32 branch follows the common + // Stage 1/2 work). pe_magic at pe_off+24: 0x10B = PE32, 0x20B = PE32+. + if get_u16(u.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(24)) == 0x10B { + return u.run_pe32(pe_off, verbose); + } + + // The config block layout in the decrypted region varies between Crackproof + // versions. Find the anchor field — a dword equal to info[3], immediately + // followed by 0x28 and then info[6]-0x200 — and derive every other field + // offset relative to it. Observed anchor positions: +6728 (older EXE + // builds), +6744 (another old-layout build, +16), +5592 (managed-assembly + // builds, -1136). + let info6 = u.info[6]; + let mut anchor: Option = None; + let mut probe = info6.wrapping_add(1000); + let probe_end = info6.wrapping_add(8000); + while probe + 12 <= probe_end && (probe as usize + 12) <= u.decompressed.len() { + if get_u32(&u.decompressed, probe) == u.info[3] { + let v8 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, probe.wrapping_add(8)); + // v8 must be slightly less than info[6], aligned to 0x200, and + // close to it. Older EXE builds stay within 0x800; the + // external-companion DLLs reach 0xC00, so the window is 0x1000. + // The dword==info[3] equality is already a 32-bit match on the + // base RVA, making this secondary bound's exact value + // non-critical for false-positive rejection. + if v8 < info6 { + let delta = info6.wrapping_sub(v8); + if delta <= 0x1000 && delta.is_multiple_of(0x200) { + anchor = Some(probe); + break; + } + } + } + probe = probe.wrapping_add(4); + } + let anchor = match anchor { + Some(a) => a, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::AnchorNotFound); + } + }; + + // Detect config-block layout version. Newer Crackproof builds (observed + // across several EXE families) shift every anchor-relative field from + // offset 40 onward by +8 bytes. The config-version stamp sits at + // anchor+104 in the old layout and anchor+112 in the new one. Across + // the whole corpus the stamp's top nibble is always 0x4 (top byte 0x40 + // or 0x44), whereas the +8 layout's anchor+104 holds an inserted small + // count (top nibble 0), so the stamp position is a reliable layout + // discriminator. + let stamp_at = |off: u32| -> bool { + (anchor + off + 4) as usize <= u.decompressed.len() + && (get_u32(&u.decompressed, anchor + off) >> 28) == 0x4 + }; + let magic_off: u32 = if stamp_at(104) { + 104 + } else if stamp_at(112) { + 112 + } else { + 104 + }; + let anchor_extra: u32 = magic_off - 104; + + let p1 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, anchor.wrapping_add(8)); + let p2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, anchor.wrapping_add(4)); + let p3 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, anchor.wrapping_add(40 + anchor_extra)); + let p4 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, anchor.wrapping_add(44 + anchor_extra)); + // Save the anchor-stage import dir (`saved_import_rva` / `saved_import_size`). + // On the new layout the metadata data-dirs may carry a zero import entry + // (esp. managed DLLs); this anchor value is the fallback. + let saved_import_rva = p1; + let saved_import_size = p2; + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(144), p1); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(148), p2); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(152), p3); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(156), p4); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(176), 0); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(180), 0); + + let mut walk = anchor.wrapping_add(184 + anchor_extra); + let mut xor_acc: u32 = 0; + while get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk.wrapping_add(4)) != 0 { + xor_acc ^= u.calculate_checksum(walk); + walk = walk.wrapping_add(8); + } + let chk1 = u.calculate_checksum(anchor.wrapping_add(56 + anchor_extra)); + let v_at = anchor.wrapping_add(20); + let v = get_u32(&u.decompressed, v_at); + let tgt = anchor.wrapping_add(120 + anchor_extra); + u.decrypt_data3(tgt, xor_acc ^ chk1 ^ v, 21); + let stage1 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, tgt); + if verbose { + println!("[3/9] Locating config layout..."); + println!(" stage1 = 0x{:08X}", stage1); + } + + // Field offsets inside stage1 vary between Crackproof versions. Locate + // stage2 (the only 16-byte entry where dword[0]==dword[2], dword[1] is the + // large encrypted size and dword[3] is a smaller decompressed size), then + // derive every other field as fixed offsets from there. Observed + // stage2_off: 3632 (older EXE builds), 3616 (another old-layout build), + // 3624 (managed-assembly builds). + let stage1_len = get_u32(&u.decompressed, tgt.wrapping_add(4)); + let info3 = u.info[3]; + let info5 = u.info[5]; + // Use the full info[3]..info[3]+info[5] range: stage entries may live in + // either the decrypt_data2 zone or the raw-copy zone (managed-assembly + // builds' stage3 sits just before the raw-copy boundary). + let raw_lo = info3; + let raw_hi = info3.wrapping_add(info5); + let mut stage2_off: Option = None; + let scan_lo: u32 = 3000; + let scan_hi: u32 = stage1_len.saturating_sub(16); + let mut off = scan_lo; + while off < scan_hi { + let p = stage1.wrapping_add(off); + if (p as usize + 16) <= u.decompressed.len() { + let d0 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p); + let d1 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(4)); + let d2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(8)); + let d3 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(12)); + if d0 == d2 && d0 >= raw_lo && d0 < raw_hi && d1 > 0x10000 && d3 > 0 && d3 < d1 { + stage2_off = Some(off); + break; + } + } + off = off.wrapping_add(4); + } + let stage2_off = match stage2_off { + Some(x) => x, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::Stage2NotFound); + } + }; + + // Find chk_src_start by walking back from stage2 looking for the first + // position where 4 consecutive (src, len) entries all sit in the raw-copy + // range with sensible lengths. The table holds chks for stage5/4/3b/3 in + // that order; stage1+3472/3480/3488 correspond to chk_src_start + 8 / +16 + // / +24. + let mut chk_src_start: Option = None; + let mut probe = stage2_off.wrapping_sub(200); + while probe + 32 <= stage2_off { + let mut all_valid = true; + for i in 0..4u32 { + let pp = stage1.wrapping_add(probe + i * 8); + let s = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pp); + let l = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pp.wrapping_add(4)); + if s < raw_lo || s >= raw_hi || l == 0 || l >= 0x10000 { + all_valid = false; + break; + } + } + if all_valid { + chk_src_start = Some(probe); + break; + } + probe = probe.wrapping_add(4); + } + let chk_src_start = match chk_src_start { + Some(x) => x, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::ChkSrcStartNotFound); + } + }; + + let key_at = stage1.wrapping_add(chk_src_start.wrapping_sub(20)); + let key2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, key_at); + let stage1b = stage1.wrapping_add(stage2_off); + u.decrypt_data3(stage1b, key2, 19); + let stage2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, stage1b); + if verbose { + println!("[4/9] Decrypting stage2..."); + println!(" stage2 = 0x{:08X}", stage2); + } + + // The stage2 head/walk2 tables shift between Crackproof versions. The 4-entry + // table starts with a `kind=1, 0, info[3], 0` 16-byte entry; head is two + // entries (32 bytes) past that, walk2 sits 88 bytes before head. Observed + // table_start: 9136 (older EXE builds) and 9216 (another old-layout build + // / managed-assembly builds). + let mut table_start: Option = None; + let mut sc = 8000u32; + while sc + 16 < 12000 { + let p = stage2.wrapping_add(sc); + if (p as usize + 16) <= u.decompressed.len() { + let d0 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p); + let d1 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(4)); + let d2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(8)); + let d3 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(12)); + if d0 == 1 && d1 == 0 && d2 == info3 && d3 == 0 { + table_start = Some(sc); + break; + } + } + sc = sc.wrapping_add(4); + } + let table_start = match table_start { + Some(x) => x, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::TableStartNotFound); + } + }; + let head_off = table_start.wrapping_add(32); + let walk2_off = head_off.wrapping_sub(88); + + let mut head = stage2.wrapping_add(head_off); + for _iter in 0..2 { + let kind = get_u32(&u.decompressed, head); + // Some builds use kind=0x11 in place of kind=1 for the same operation + // (the upper nibble appears to be a build-version stamp). + if kind & 0x0F == 1 { + u.decrypt_data4(head.wrapping_add(4)); + } else if kind == 2 { + let mut p = get_u32(&u.decompressed, head.wrapping_add(4)); + loop { + u.decrypt_data5(p, 16); + let p0 = p; + let s = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p0); + let n = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p0.wrapping_add(4)); + let dst = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p0.wrapping_add(8)); + let chk = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p0.wrapping_add(12)); + p = p.wrapping_add(16); + if s != 0 && n != 0 && dst != 0 && chk == n { + let ss = s as usize; + let dd = dst as usize; + let nn = n as usize; + u.decompressed.copy_within(ss..ss + nn, dd); + } + if get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_sub(16).wrapping_add(4)) == 0 { + break; + } + } + } + head = head.wrapping_add(16); + } + + let mut walk2 = stage2.wrapping_add(walk2_off); + for j in 0..2usize { + let mut p = walk2; + for k in 0..2usize { + u.decrypt_data4(p); + u.key_offsets[j * 2 + k] = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p); + p = p.wrapping_add(8); + } + walk2 = walk2.wrapping_add(32); + } + + let chk2 = u.calculate_checksum(anchor.wrapping_add(48 + anchor_extra)); + let accum_at = stage1.wrapping_add(chk_src_start.wrapping_sub(16)); + let mut accum = get_u32(&u.decompressed, accum_at); + for l in 0..4u32 { + let bound = (l + 1).wrapping_mul(25) << 2; + let mut i: u32 = 1; + while i <= bound { + accum = accum.wrapping_add(i); + i = i.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + + let at1 = stage1.wrapping_add(stage2_off.wrapping_add(88)); + let stage3_field = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at1); + let stage3_dlen = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at1.wrapping_add(12)); + if verbose { + println!("[5/9] Decrypting stages 3-5..."); + println!(" stage3 = 0x{:08X}", stage3_field); + } + if !u.decrypt_and_decompress_data(at1, xor_acc ^ chk2 ^ accum, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + let at2 = stage1.wrapping_add(stage2_off.wrapping_add(104)); + let stage3b_field = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at2); + let stage3b_dlen = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at2.wrapping_add(12)); + if verbose { + println!(" stage3b = 0x{:08X}", stage3b_field); + } + let chk3 = u.calculate_checksum(stage1.wrapping_add(chk_src_start.wrapping_add(24))); + // v4_val lives at the end of stage3, immediately following `C3 CC CC CC` + // (function epilogue + 3-byte int3 padding), with zeros to end of buffer. + // Scan stage3 from the end for the last non-zero dword anchored by the + // C3+CC pattern. + let v4 = find_v4_offset(&u.decompressed, stage3_field, stage3_dlen) + .unwrap_or_else(|| stage3_field.wrapping_add(4692)); + let v4_val = get_u32(&u.decompressed, v4); + if !u.decrypt_and_decompress_data(at2, xor_acc ^ chk3 ^ v4_val, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + let chk4 = u.calculate_checksum(stage1.wrapping_add(chk_src_start.wrapping_add(16))); + // v5_val sits 8 bytes before the first API name string in stage3b's + // hash/slot/name table. The table starts with hash(VirtualFree) + + // slot(8 bytes total before the "Virtual..." ASCII). The hardcoded + // offset 1960 corresponds to (string_pos - 8) for older EXE builds. + let v5 = find_str_pos(&u.decompressed, stage3b_field, stage3b_dlen, b"Virtual") + .map(|p| p.wrapping_sub(8)) + .unwrap_or_else(|| stage3b_field.wrapping_add(1960)); + let v5_val = !get_u32(&u.decompressed, v5); + let at3 = stage1.wrapping_add(stage2_off.wrapping_add(136)); + let stage4_field = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at3); + let stage4_dlen = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at3.wrapping_add(12)); + if verbose { + println!(" stage4 = 0x{:08X}", stage4_field); + } + if !u.decrypt_and_decompress_data(at3, xor_acc ^ chk4 ^ v5_val, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + // Inside stage4, two locations vary by build: + // accum2 source (offset 3504) sits 24 bytes before "IsDebuggerPresent" + // bytecode block (offset 3584) sits at the first 16-byte aligned + // boundary at or after the end of "CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent\0". + let idb_pos = find_str_pos( + &u.decompressed, + stage4_field, + stage4_dlen, + b"IsDebuggerPresent", + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|| stage4_field.wrapping_add(3528)); + let crdp_pos = find_str_pos( + &u.decompressed, + stage4_field, + stage4_dlen, + b"CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent", + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|| stage4_field.wrapping_add(3553)); + // Trial-decrypt every 16-byte aligned position to find the bytecode block. + // Works whether or not the build has IsDebuggerPresent/CRDP API strings. + let data_offset = find_bytecode_offset(&u.decompressed, stage4_field, stage4_dlen) + .or_else(|| { + find_bytecode_offset(&u.decompressed, stage4_field, stage4_dlen.saturating_mul(2)) + }) + .unwrap_or_else(|| { + let crdp_end = crdp_pos.wrapping_add("CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent\0".len() as u32); + (crdp_end.wrapping_add(15)) & !15u32 + }); + u.decrypt_data6(data_offset); + let chk5 = u.calculate_checksum(stage1.wrapping_add(chk_src_start.wrapping_add(8))); + // accum2 sits 4 bytes past the function-end `48 EB 01 B9` + any CC padding + // (i.e., the 4 bytes immediately after the last instance of that pattern). + let v6 = find_v_after_pad(&u.decompressed, stage4_field, stage4_dlen) + .unwrap_or_else(|| idb_pos.wrapping_sub(24)); + let mut accum2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, v6); + for m in 0..3u32 { + let bound = (m + 1).wrapping_mul(25) << 2; + let mut i: u32 = 1; + while i <= bound { + accum2 = accum2.wrapping_add(i); + i = i.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + + let ops1 = match generate(&u.decompressed, data_offset) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::BytecodeGenFailed); + } + }; + + let at4 = stage1.wrapping_add(stage2_off.wrapping_add(216)); + let stage5_field = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at4); + // at4 is a (src, src_len, dest, dest_len) quad; only src and dest_len + // are needed here, the other two are consumed by the decrypt below. + let stage5_dlen = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at4.wrapping_add(12)); + if verbose { + println!(" stage5 = 0x{:08X}", stage5_field); + } + if !u.decrypt_and_decompress_data(at4, xor_acc ^ chk4 ^ chk5 ^ accum2, Some(&ops1)) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + // Inside stage5, the loader stores a table of (ptr, size) pairs at a + // fixed offset from the `70 6D 00 00 63 6D 00 00` marker. The first two + // pairs are walk4 (raw data load) and walk3 (chk2 chain). Then a variable + // number of additional entries, followed by a `0x40000000, 0x1` kind + // marker, then walk5 (string-table pointer). The secondary custom + // decryptor bytecode sits at marker+960. + let s5_marker_opt = find_str_pos( + &u.decompressed, + stage5_field, + stage5_dlen, + &[0x70, 0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x00, 0x00], + ); + // Older builds embed the `pm\0\0cm\0\0` marker right before the stage5 + // (ptr,size) table, so it's a tight search base. Newer builds + // (marker-less native/managed DLLs) omit the marker entirely — the slots + // are discovered by scanning the whole eighthStage instead. When the + // marker is absent, fall back to the start of the stage5 region as the + // search base; the downstream kind-marker + bytecode scans (which derive + // the real walk3/walk4/walk5 slots) then run over the full region. + let s5_marker = s5_marker_opt.unwrap_or(stage5_field); + // The (ptr, size) entry table after the marker ends with a fixed tail: + // walk4 (raw data load) = kind_pos - 0x20 + // walk3 (checksum chain) = kind_pos - 0x18 + // = kind_pos - 0x10 + // <0x40000000, 0x1 kind> = kind_pos (walk5 = kind_pos + 8) + // The kind-marker is the only stable anchor: older builds place it at + // marker+0x58, newer ones at marker+0x60, and walk3's entry size differs + // (0x50 vs 0x30). Deriving walk3/walk4 relative to the kind-marker + // handles every observed variant. + let kind_pos_opt = find_str_pos( + &u.decompressed, + s5_marker, + stage5_dlen.saturating_sub(s5_marker.wrapping_sub(stage5_field)), + &[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00], + ); + // Layout discriminator. Older builds (the 7 EXE + 2 DLL goldens) embed + // the `00 00 00 40 01 00 00 00` kind-marker, from which walk3/walk4/walk5 + // are derived at fixed offsets. Newer builds (marker-less native + + // managed DLLs) omit BOTH the `pm\0\0cm\0\0` and kind markers; their + // eighthStage slots are discovered structurally (LFSR scan + + // trial-decrypt), and imports are rebuilt from the PE Import Directory + // rather than the walk5 encrypted-pointer table. `new_layout` selects + // that path. + let new_layout = kind_pos_opt.is_none(); + let kind_pos = kind_pos_opt.unwrap_or_else(|| s5_marker.wrapping_add(88)); + let walk4_slot = kind_pos.wrapping_sub(0x20); + let walk3_slot = kind_pos.wrapping_sub(0x18); + let walk5_slot = kind_pos.wrapping_add(8); + // Stage5 bytecode block. Anchor by trial-decryption + parse; fall back to + // marker+960 (older EXE build layout). + let bc2_search_base = s5_marker; + let bc2_search_len = stage5_dlen.saturating_sub(s5_marker.wrapping_sub(stage5_field)); + let mut bc2_off = find_bytecode_offset(&u.decompressed, bc2_search_base, bc2_search_len) + .or_else(|| { + find_bytecode_offset( + &u.decompressed, + bc2_search_base, + bc2_search_len.saturating_mul(2), + ) + }) + .unwrap_or_else(|| s5_marker.wrapping_add(960)); + // walk4 is the section-load (compressedInfo) descriptor table; in the + // old layout it sits at a fixed offset from the kind-marker. + let mut walk4_slot = walk4_slot; + // New-layout discovery: the kind-marker is absent, so derive the + // compressedInfo table pointer (walk4) and file-decryptor LFSR (bc2) + // structurally. fileCS stays at bc2_off-0x58 as in the old layout. + if new_layout { + let compress_data_offset = (!get_u32(u.file_data, 0x1080)).wrapping_add(0x1000); + let slots = primitives::discover_eighth_slots( + &u.decompressed, + stage5_field, + stage5_dlen, + u.info[3], + compress_data_offset, + u.file_data.len() as u32, + ) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Stage5MarkerNotFound)?; + walk4_slot = slots.compressed_info_ptr; + bc2_off = slots.file_lfsr; + } + let at5 = walk3_slot; + let mut walk3 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at5); + // walk3 is a checksum-validation walk: its chain_crc is computed and + // discarded. Each 16-byte entry is decrypted only transiently (to feed + // the checksum); the on-disk bytes stay encrypted. Back up each block + // before decrypting and restore after, so the output matches the golden + // (which keeps this chain encrypted). The new layout has no walk3 chain + // (the kind-marker that anchors it is absent), so this whole transient + // checksum walk is skipped there. + let mut walk3_backups: Vec<(usize, [u8; 16])> = Vec::new(); + let snap16 = |buf: &[u8], addr: u32| -> [u8; 16] { + let s = addr as usize; + let mut b = [0u8; 16]; + b.copy_from_slice(&buf[s..s + 16]); + b + }; + if !new_layout { + walk3_backups.push((walk3 as usize, snap16(&u.decompressed, walk3))); + u.decrypt_data5(walk3, 16); + walk3 = walk3.wrapping_add(16); + let mut chain_crc: u32 = 0; + loop { + walk3_backups.push((walk3 as usize, snap16(&u.decompressed, walk3))); + u.decrypt_data5(walk3, 16); + let p = walk3; + let n = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(4)); + walk3 = walk3.wrapping_add(16); + if n != 0 { + chain_crc = u.calculate_checksum2(walk3.wrapping_sub(16), chain_crc); + } + if get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk3.wrapping_sub(16).wrapping_add(4)) == 0 { + break; + } + } + if verbose { + println!("[6/9] Decrypting section data..."); + println!( + " integrity = 0x{:08X}", + get_u32(u.file_data, 56).wrapping_add(1985229329) + ); + println!(" chain_crc = 0x{:08X}", chain_crc); + } + for (addr, bytes) in walk3_backups { + u.decompressed[addr..addr + 16].copy_from_slice(&bytes); + } + } else if verbose { + println!("[6/9] Decrypting section data (new layout)..."); + } + + let data_offset2 = bc2_off; + // fileCS chain: the file-checksum table is permanently decrypted in + // place. Its pointer lives 0x58 bytes before the file LFSR/decryptor + // block (fileDecryptorAddress = fileChecksumAddresses + 0x58). Walk + // 16-byte entries until the size dword (offset +4) is zero, decrypting + // each. + { + let mut fcs = get_u32(&u.decompressed, bc2_off.wrapping_sub(0x58)); + while get_u32(&u.decompressed, fcs.wrapping_add(4)) != 0 { + u.decrypt_data5(fcs, 16); + fcs = fcs.wrapping_add(16); + } + } + u.decrypt_data6(data_offset2); + let ops2 = match generate(&u.decompressed, data_offset2) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + return Err(UnpackError::Stage5BytecodeGenFailed); + } + }; + // The new layout picked its file decryptor by distance (no marker, no + // content check). Prove the choice before shipping it: a wrong pick + // would garble every section block, and raw blocks would carry that + // garbling into the output without any error (see the validator). + let rebase = (!get_u32(u.file_data, 4224)).wrapping_add(4096); + if new_layout && !u.new_layout_file_ops_validate(walk4_slot, &ops2, rebase) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + let at6 = walk4_slot; + if verbose { + println!("[7/9] Loading and decompressing sections..."); + } + let mut walk4 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at6); + // Pass 1 (sequential): the 16-byte descriptors are decrypted in a + // position-keyed chain (`decrypt_data5`) that terminates on the next + // record's length field, so collection cannot be parallelized. + struct Blk { + src: u32, + len: u32, + dst: u32, + plain_len: u32, + } + let mut blocks: Vec = Vec::new(); + loop { + u.decrypt_data5(walk4, 16); + let p = walk4; + let src = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p); + let len = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(4)); + let dst = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(8)); + let plain_len = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(12)); + walk4 = walk4.wrapping_add(16); + if len != 0 { + blocks.push(Blk { + src, + len, + dst, + plain_len, + }); + } + if get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk4.wrapping_sub(16).wrapping_add(4)) == 0 { + break; + } + } + // Pass 2: each block writes only its own [dst, dst+max(len,plain_len)) + // span and reads only immutable input + the (snapshotted) key tables, + // so blocks with disjoint dst spans are independent. `parallel_for` + // carves the spans into safe disjoint &mut slices and fans out when + // worthwhile (see its docs for the soundness argument). + { + let lut = OpsLut::new(&ops2); + let clean = &u.file_data; + let ko = u.key_offsets; + // Snapshot the shared tables before the fan-out: workers get + // disjoint span slices, not the whole buffer. + let ks_snap = primitives::aes_schedule_snapshot(&u.decompressed, ko[2]) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Corrupt)?; + let tab_snap = primitives::huffman_table_snapshot(&u.decompressed, ko[0]) + .ok_or(UnpackError::DecompressFailed)?; + let spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = blocks + .iter() + .map(|b| { + let s = b.dst as usize; + (s, s + b.len.max(b.plain_len) as usize) + }) + .collect(); + let do_block = |i: usize, base: usize, span: &mut [u8]| -> Result<(), UnpackError> { + let b = &blocks[i]; + let cs = b.src.wrapping_add(rebase) as usize; + let rel = b.dst as usize - base; + let ll = b.len as usize; + span[rel..rel + ll].copy_from_slice(&clean[cs..cs + ll]); + primitives::aes_decrypt_ks(&ks_snap, span, rel as u32, b.len); + lut.map_region(span, rel, ll); + if b.len != b.plain_len { + // decompress reports corruption (after partial writes) via + // its bool; surface it instead of shipping a garbage block. + if !primitives::decompress_tbl( + &tab_snap, + span, + rel as u32, + rel as u32, + b.len, + b.plain_len, + ) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + } + Ok(()) + }; + super::parallel::parallel_for(&mut u.decompressed, &spans, 1, do_block)?; + } + loop { + u.decrypt_data5(walk4, 16); + let p = walk4; + let dst = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p); + let len = get_u32(&u.decompressed, p.wrapping_add(4)); + walk4 = walk4.wrapping_add(16); + if len != 0 { + for k in 0..len { + u.decompressed[(dst + k) as usize] = 0; + } + } + if get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk4.wrapping_sub(16).wrapping_add(4)) == 0 { + break; + } + } + + let at7 = walk5_slot; + if verbose { + println!("[8/9] Decrypting import strings..."); + } + // walk5 is the old layout's encrypted import-name pointer table. The new + // layout has no such table — imports are rebuilt from the PE Import + // Directory after the header is reconstructed (see `process_imports_idt` + // below). Skip the walk5 pass entirely for the new layout. + let mut walk5 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, at7); + if !new_layout { + loop { + let outer = get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk5.wrapping_add(12)); + if outer == 0 { + break; + } + u.decrypt_data7(outer, outer as u8); + // Normalize the DLL name to lowercase (e.g. 'UnityPlayer.dll' -> + // 'unityplayer.dll'). Only when the name is all printable ASCII. + { + let start = outer as usize; + let mut end = start; + while end < u.decompressed.len() && u.decompressed[end] != 0 { + end += 1; + } + if end > start + && u.decompressed[start..end] + .iter() + .all(|&b| (0x20..0x7F).contains(&b)) + { + for b in &mut u.decompressed[start..end] { + b.make_ascii_lowercase(); + } + } + } + let a = get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk5); + let b = get_u32(&u.decompressed, walk5.wrapping_add(16)); + let mut chain = if a == 0 { b } else { a }; + loop { + // PE32+ thunks are 8 bytes: an ordinal import carries bit 63 + // with the ordinal in the low word; only a by-name thunk holds + // a hint/name RVA (in the low dword). Reading just the low + // dword would mistake an ordinal for a tiny RVA and scribble + // over the image header. + let v = get_u64(&u.decompressed, chain); + if v == 0 { + break; + } + if (v & 0x8000_0000_0000_0000) == 0 { + let inner = v as u32; + u.decrypt_data7(inner.wrapping_add(2), inner as u8); + write_u16(&mut u.decompressed, inner, 0); + } + chain = chain.wrapping_add(8); + } + walk5 = walk5.wrapping_add(20); + } + } // end !new_layout (walk5) + + if verbose { + println!("[9/9] Reconstructing PE headers..."); + } + u.decompressed[..4096].copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[..4096]); + let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(u.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(20)); + let sect_table = pe_off.wrapping_add(24).wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size as u32); + let payload_va = get_u32( + u.file_data, + pe_off + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size as u32) + .wrapping_sub(128), + ); + let payload_size = get_u32( + u.file_data, + pe_off + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size as u32) + .wrapping_sub(124), + ); + // Walk the section table by NumberOfSections, not "until a zero + // VirtualSize": PE has no sentinel entry, so a section whose + // VirtualSize is legitimately 0 (or a corrupt early field) would + // silently truncate the fixups — .text, and the export payload below, + // would then be missed entirely. The all-zero-name break guards the + // other direction (a corrupt, overstated NumberOfSections): real + // sections always have a name, header padding is all zero. + let num_sections = get_u16(u.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + let mut text_va: u32 = 0; + let mut text_size: u32 = 0; + let mut payload_off: u32 = 0; + for i in 0..num_sections.min(96) { + let sect = sect_table.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(40)); + if u.file_data[sect as usize..sect as usize + 8] + .iter() + .all(|&b| b == 0) + { + break; + } + let sec_va = get_u32(u.file_data, sect.wrapping_add(12)); + let sec_size = get_u32(u.file_data, sect.wrapping_add(8)); + let sec_raw = get_u32(u.file_data, sect.wrapping_add(20)); + if section_name(u.file_data, sect) == ".text" { + text_size = sec_size; + text_va = sec_va; + } + if payload_size != 0 + && payload_va >= sec_va + && payload_va.wrapping_add(payload_size) <= sec_va.wrapping_add(sec_size) + { + payload_off = payload_va.wrapping_sub(sec_va).wrapping_add(sec_raw); + } + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, sect.wrapping_add(16), sec_size); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, sect.wrapping_add(20), sec_va); + // NOTE: do NOT flag .rdata writable. The Windows loader already + // makes the IAT pages temporarily writable while snapping imports + // (it knows the range from the IAT data directory DD[12]), so the + // original read-only .rdata characteristics are sufficient. + // + // Marking .rdata MEM_WRITE actively breaks statically-linked + // MSVC/UCRT EXEs: the CRT's float-format init (`_cfltcvt_init`, + // which populates `_cfltcvt_tab`) is gated by a security check that + // refuses to call an init function whose descriptor lives in a + // *writable* section. With .rdata writable that init is skipped, + // `_cfltcvt_tab` keeps its R6002 stubs, and the first `%f` aborts + // with "R6002 - floating point support not loaded" (observed on some + // statically-linked MSVC/UCRT EXEs). + } + // Guard `payload_off != 0` like the PE32 path does: if no section + // contained the export range, offset 0 would copy the DOS stub over + // the image's export directory. + if payload_size != 0 && payload_off != 0 { + let s = payload_off as usize; + let d = payload_va as usize; + let n = payload_size as usize; + u.decompressed[d..d + n].copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[s..s + n]); + } + // EP/data-directory layout. For the new layout (marker-less), the + // metadata block (EP@info[3]+0x20, dirs@info[3]+0x30, "Layout B") is read + // BEFORE running the .text dd8 pass, then the encrypted bytes are + // restored so dd8 operates on them like the golden. Because info[3] + // sits inside .text on these builds, reading after dd8 (as the old + // layout does) would see dd8-corrupted metadata. So capture EP + 128 + // dir bytes here, pre-dd8. + let new_ep_dirs: Option<(u32, [u8; 128])> = if new_layout { + let ms = u.info[3].wrapping_add(32) as usize; + let backup: Vec = u.decompressed[ms..ms + 144].to_vec(); + u.decrypt_data5(u.info[3].wrapping_add(32), 144); + let ep = get_u32(&u.decompressed, u.info[3].wrapping_add(32)); + let mut dirs = [0u8; 128]; + dirs.copy_from_slice( + &u.decompressed[(u.info[3] + 48) as usize..(u.info[3] + 48 + 128) as usize], + ); + u.decompressed[ms..ms + 144].copy_from_slice(&backup); + Some((ep, dirs)) + } else { + None + }; + // Old layout runs dd8 here (its metadata/.text regions don't overlap the + // not-yet-restored COR20/BSJB metadata). The new layout defers dd8 until + // AFTER the CLR metadata restore + section fixup (dd8 is the final .text + // step), because on managed DLLs the restored BSJB stream lives inside + // .text and must itself be dd8-processed to match the golden — and the + // shift is re-selected there over the restored bytes, so selecting it + // here would be wasted work on stale content. + if !new_layout { + // The packer keys the dd8 page-XOR with `page_idx << shift`. Most + // builds use shift 0; some newer builds use shift 15. The shift is + // NOT recorded in any header/config field — some older and newer + // builds carry byte-identical config-version stamps yet need + // different shifts — so it must be derived from the .text content + // (see `select_dd8_shift`). An explicit DD8_SHIFT env var (incl. + // 99 = skip) overrides for analysis. + let dd8_shift: u32 = match std::env::var("DD8_SHIFT").ok().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()) + { + Some(s) => s, + None => { + primitives::select_dd8_shift(&u.decompressed, text_va, text_size, u.info[3]) + } + }; + if dd8_shift != 99 { + let mut page = text_va >> 12; + let end_page = text_va.wrapping_add(text_size) >> 12; + while page < end_page { + u.decrypt_data8(page << 12, 4096, page << dd8_shift); + page = page.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + } + // EP/DD layout in info[3] varies between Crackproof versions. Old + // layout: EP at info[3]+64, ImageBase at info[3]+68, DD[0..15] at + // info[3]+80..info[3]+208 — total 144 bytes encrypted starting at +64. + // New layout: everything shifts 32 bytes earlier — EP at info[3]+32, + // DD at info[3]+48, encrypted region at info[3]+32..info[3]+176. Probe + // both candidates and pick the one whose ImageBase-low matches info[3] + // (the dword right after EP in the PE optional header). + let ep_off: u32 = if new_layout { + // New-layout (marker-less) builds always use "Layout B": EP at + // info[3]+0x20, data dirs at info[3]+0x30. The old ImageBase-low + // probe assumes ImageBase==info[3], which does not hold for these + // builds (esp. managed DLLs), so pin the offset directly. + 32 + } else { + [32u32, 64] + .iter() + .copied() + .find(|&off| { + trial_decrypt5_u32(&u.decompressed, u.info[3].wrapping_add(off + 4)) + == u.info[3] + }) + .unwrap_or(64) + }; + let dd_off = ep_off.wrapping_add(16); + // The metadata block (EP + data directories) is read transiently: decrypt + // it, copy EP and dirs into the PE header, then RESTORE the original + // encrypted bytes. The packer leaves this region encrypted in its output, + // so leaving it decrypted in-place would diverge from the golden (the + // first byte at info[3]+ep_off would carry the decrypted EP low byte). + let pe_off2 = get_u32(&u.decompressed, 60); + if let Some((ep, dirs)) = new_ep_dirs { + // New layout: EP and dirs were captured pre-dd8 (Layout B). Write the + // EP and the 128-byte data-directory block into the PE header. + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(40), ep); + u.decompressed[(pe_off2 + 136) as usize..(pe_off2 + 136) as usize + 128] + .copy_from_slice(&dirs); + // Import-RVA selection. Prefer the metadata import dir (dirs[1] @ +8) + // when it points at a plausible IDT; otherwise fall back to the + // anchor-stage value saved earlier whenever it is set at all (a + // non-zero-but-implausible anchor value still beats a metadata dir + // we already rejected). Managed DLLs leave the metadata import dir + // zero, so the anchor value is used there. + let image_size = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(80)); + let meta_imp_rva = u32::from_le_bytes([dirs[8], dirs[9], dirs[10], dirs[11]]); + let meta_imp_size = u32::from_le_bytes([dirs[12], dirs[13], dirs[14], dirs[15]]); + let idt_plausible = |rva: u32, sz: u32, d: &[u8]| -> bool { + if !(0x1000 < rva && rva < image_size && 0 < sz && sz < 0x10000) { + return false; + } + ((rva + 12) as usize + 4) <= d.len() && get_u32(d, rva + 12) != 0 + }; + let (imp_rva, imp_size) = if idt_plausible(meta_imp_rva, meta_imp_size, &u.decompressed) + || saved_import_rva == 0 + { + (meta_imp_rva, meta_imp_size) + } else { + (saved_import_rva, saved_import_size) + }; + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x90), imp_rva); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x94), imp_size); + } else { + // The metadata block (EP + data directories) is read transiently: + // decrypt it, copy EP and dirs into the PE header, then RESTORE the + // original encrypted bytes. The packer leaves this region encrypted + // in its output, so leaving it decrypted in-place would diverge from + // the golden (the first byte at info[3]+ep_off would carry the + // decrypted EP low byte). + let meta_start = u.info[3].wrapping_add(ep_off) as usize; + let backup: Vec = u.decompressed[meta_start..meta_start + 144].to_vec(); + u.decrypt_data5(u.info[3].wrapping_add(ep_off), 144); + let ep = get_u32(&u.decompressed, u.info[3].wrapping_add(ep_off)); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(40), ep); + for n in 0..128 { + u.decompressed[(pe_off2 + 136 + n) as usize] = + u.decompressed[(u.info[3] + dd_off + n) as usize]; + } + u.decompressed[meta_start..meta_start + 144].copy_from_slice(&backup); + } + + // New-layout import reconstruction runs AFTER the deferred .text dd8 + // pass (see below): dd8 precedes the IDT name/thunk decryption. The + // import RVA lives inside .text on these builds, so decrypting names + // before dd8 would let dd8 re-scramble them. The actual call is placed + // after the dd8 block. + + // New-layout managed (CLR) metadata restore happens AFTER the .text dd8 + // pass below. CrackProof preserves the COR20 header + BSJB MetaData + // verbatim in the protected file; both live inside .text on these + // builds. Restoring them before dd8 would let dd8 corrupt the metadata + // (~1 byte per 16) and leave an invalid COR20 header signature. We + // restore after dd8 so the copied-back bytes are final. `restored_clr` + // (set in that later block) suppresses the native COR20-directory + // clearing. + let mut restored_clr = false; + + // Deferred .text dd8 for the new layout (dd8 is the final .text step). + // The shift/formula is re-selected here over the now-fully-restored + // .text so the 0xCC-padding heuristic scores the real post-restore + // bytes. Only run dd8 when the entry point falls inside .text. + if new_layout { + let ep_final = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(40)); + let ep_in_text = text_size > 0 + && text_va > 0 + && text_va <= ep_final + && ep_final < text_va + text_size; + if ep_in_text { + let shift = match std::env::var("DD8_SHIFT").ok().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()) { + Some(s) => s, + None => { + primitives::select_dd8_shift(&u.decompressed, text_va, text_size, u.info[3]) + } + }; + if shift != 99 { + let mut page = text_va >> 12; + let end_page = text_va.wrapping_add(text_size) >> 12; + while page < end_page { + u.decrypt_data8(page << 12, 4096, page << shift); + page = page.wrapping_add(1); + } + } + } + // IDT name/thunk decryption, after dd8. The PE Import Directory + // points at the IDT; decrypt+lowercase each DLL name and each + // by-name import's hint/name, and recover the IAT (DD[12]). + let import_rva = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x90)); + let import_size = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x94)); + if import_rva != 0 { + u.process_imports_idt(import_rva, import_size, pe_off2); + } + + // Managed (CLR) COR20 + BSJB MetaData restore — AFTER dd8 so the + // verbatim-copied bytes are final. CrackProof preserves these regions + // in the protected file at their RVA-mapped offsets; they live inside + // .text but must NOT be dd8-processed (they are not packer-encrypted + // code, just copied through). Restoring post-dd8 overwrites whatever + // dd8 scribbled, yielding a valid CLR header + BSJB stream. + let clr_rva = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xF8)); + let clr_size = get_u32(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xFC)); + if clr_rva != 0 + && clr_size != 0 + && (clr_rva as u64 + clr_size as u64) <= u.decompressed.len() as u64 + && let Some(cor_off) = prot_rva_to_off(u.file_data, pe_off, clr_rva) + && (cor_off as u64 + 0x48) <= u.file_data.len() as u64 + && get_u32(u.file_data, cor_off) == 0x48 + { + // Restore the COR20 header from the protected file (its + // MetaData RVA/size fields are authoritative). + let s = cor_off as usize; + let d = clr_rva as usize; + u.decompressed[d..d + 0x48].copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[s..s + 0x48]); + restored_clr = true; + // Read MetaData RVA/size from the just-restored header. + let md_rva = get_u32(&u.decompressed, clr_rva + 0x08); + let md_size = get_u32(&u.decompressed, clr_rva + 0x0C); + if md_rva != 0 + && md_size != 0 + && (md_rva as u64 + md_size as u64) <= u.decompressed.len() as u64 + && let Some(md_off) = prot_rva_to_off(u.file_data, pe_off, md_rva) + && (md_off as u64 + md_size as u64) <= u.file_data.len() as u64 + && &u.file_data[md_off as usize..md_off as usize + 4] == b"BSJB" + { + let s = md_off as usize; + let d = md_rva as usize; + let n = md_size as usize; + u.decompressed[d..d + n].copy_from_slice(&u.file_data[s..s + n]); + } + } + } + + // The payload's TLS directory (DD[9]) arrives blanked: Crackproof strips + // the struct and re-installs TLS itself when it maps the module. Prefer + // recovering the real one from the stub's plaintext `.rdata` — dropping + // DD[9] leaves `_tls_index` unwritten, so every `thread_local` access + // resolves through TLS slot 0 (another module's block, or NULL). Only if + // the stub can't supply it do we clear the entry, which at least stops + // the loader writing through a NULL `AddressOfIndex`. + // + // Old builds have no TLS directory at all (DD[9] already 0), so this is + // a no-op for them. Restricted to the old, `/FIXED` layout: the caller + // zeroes BaseReloc/DllCharacteristics below, so the restored absolute + // VAs stay valid without relocations. The new-layout companion case is + // handled by `job::restore_tls_from_stub`. + let tls_dd_off = pe_off2.wrapping_add(136 + 9 * 8); + let tls_rva = get_u32(&u.decompressed, tls_dd_off); + if tls_rva != 0 && (tls_rva as usize + 40) <= u.decompressed.len() { + let tls_all_zero = u.decompressed[tls_rva as usize..tls_rva as usize + 40] + .iter() + .all(|&b| b == 0); + if tls_all_zero { + let image_base = get_u64(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(48)); + if new_layout || !u.restore_pe64_tls_from_stub(pe_off, tls_rva, image_base) { + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, tls_dd_off, 0); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, tls_dd_off.wrapping_add(4), 0); + } + } + } + + // If the COR20 (CLR) directory points at a zero-cb header, clear it so + // the loader treats the image as native instead of handing off to + // mscoree._CorExeMain (which crashes on the empty header). Skipped when + // the new-layout managed restore above repopulated a real COR20 header. + let cor20_dd_off = pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xF8); + let cor20_rva = get_u32(&u.decompressed, cor20_dd_off); + if !restored_clr + && cor20_rva != 0 + && (cor20_rva as usize + 4) <= u.decompressed.len() + && get_u32(&u.decompressed, cor20_rva) == 0 + { + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, cor20_dd_off, 0); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, cor20_dd_off.wrapping_add(4), 0); + } + + // Old-layout CrackProof binaries are /FIXED: the shell discards the + // relocation table and clears DllCharacteristics, so the loader needs no + // relocations (exe_pe+0x5E / +0xB0). The new-layout (external-companion) + // modules are *not* /FIXED — they keep a real DllCharacteristics + // (ASLR/high-entropy) and a valid BaseReloc table (DD[5]); zeroing those + // produces a DLL that the loader can only place at its preferred base, + // and any rebase leaves every pointer — including the restored TLS + // directory — unrelocated and the module crashes. So preserve both for + // the new layout. + // + // The same applies to a *DLL* on the old layout: EXEs load at their + // preferred base, but a DLL is almost always rebased, so stripping its + // BaseReloc/DllCharacteristics makes it unloadable. The PE32 pipeline + // already gates this on IMAGE_FILE_DLL (see run_pe32); this is the + // PE32+ counterpart of that fix. EXEs keep the original /FIXED zeroing. + let is_dll = (get_u16(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(22)) & 0x2000) != 0; + if !new_layout && !is_dll { + write_u16(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x5E), 0); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xB0), 0); + write_u32(&mut u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0xB4), 0); + } else if !new_layout { + // Old-layout DLL: keep whatever BaseReloc the header restore + // produced and make sure DYNAMIC_BASE is set (same as run_pe32). + let mut dll_chars = get_u16(&u.decompressed, pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x5E)); + if dll_chars == 0 { + dll_chars = 0x0040; // IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE + } + write_u16( + &mut u.decompressed, + pe_off2.wrapping_add(0x5E), + dll_chars as u32, + ); + } + + Ok(u.decompressed) + } + + /// Validate the new-layout (marker-less) file-decryptor choice by + /// trial-decompression, same approach as [`Self::pe32_file_lfsr_validates`]. + /// + /// The marker-less discovery picks the file LFSR by *distance* (the LFSR + /// whose fileCS pointer sits just past `info[3]`), not by content. A + /// coincidental LFSR-shaped block at a shorter distance would decode to a + /// wrong `ops2` translate and silently garble every section block — raw + /// blocks never hit `DecompressFailed`, so the failure would ship as a + /// plausible but wrong image. Replay the first *compressed* block's full + /// transform (raw copy, AES, translate, decompress) on a snapshot and + /// require decompression to succeed; restore the region afterwards. + /// + /// `walk4_slot` holds the compressedInfo table pointer; entries are read + /// with the non-mutating `trial_decrypt5_u32` (the position-keyed cipher + /// has no cross-byte state, so trial reads equal the real pass's + /// in-place decrypts). Returns `true` when no compressed block exists + /// (nothing to validate against). + fn new_layout_file_ops_validate(&mut self, walk4_slot: u32, ops: &[Op], rebase: u32) -> bool { + let mut walk4 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, walk4_slot); + for _ in 0..4096 { + if walk4 as usize + 16 > self.decompressed.len() { + return false; + } + let src = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, walk4); + let len = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, walk4.wrapping_add(4)); + let dst = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, walk4.wrapping_add(8)); + let plain_len = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, walk4.wrapping_add(12)); + if len == 0 { + return true; // terminator: no compressed block to validate against + } + if len != plain_len { + let cs = src.wrapping_add(rebase) as usize; + let dd = dst as usize; + let ll = len as usize; + let touch = len.max(plain_len) as usize; + if dd < 0x1000 + || cs.checked_add(ll).is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) + || dd + .checked_add(touch) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.decompressed.len()) + { + return false; + } + let snap: Vec = self.decompressed[dd..dd + touch].to_vec(); + self.decompressed[dd..dd + ll].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[cs..cs + ll]); + self.aes_decrypt(dst, len, self.key_offsets[2]); + for k in 0..len { + let idx = (dst + k) as usize; + self.decompressed[idx] = super::bytecode::apply(ops, self.decompressed[idx]); + } + let ok = primitives::decompress( + &mut self.decompressed, + dst, + dst, + self.key_offsets[0], + len, + plain_len, + ); + self.decompressed[dd..dd + touch].copy_from_slice(&snap); + return ok; + } + walk4 = walk4.wrapping_add(16); + } + true + } + + /// Validate a candidate PE32 file-decryptor LFSR block by trial-decompression. + /// + /// `file_dec_addr` is the absolute address of the candidate bytecode block; + /// `ci_slot` is the absolute address of the compressedInfo pointer slot + /// (`eighth_start + off_compressed_info`). Decodes the candidate's `file_ops` + /// (the per-byte translate applied to every data block before Huffman + /// decompression), then replays the first *compressed* data block's full + /// transform — raw copy, AES, translate, decompress — on a snapshot and + /// reports whether decompression succeeded. The correct fileLFSR yields a + /// translate that lets every block decompress; a coincidental valid-opcode + /// block decodes to a bogus translate that makes decompression fail. + /// + /// Non-destructive: the 96-byte LFSR block and the touched destination + /// region are snapshotted and restored before returning. + fn pe32_file_lfsr_validates(&mut self, file_dec_addr: u32, ci_slot: u32) -> bool { + let da = file_dec_addr as usize; + if da + 96 > self.decompressed.len() { + return false; + } + // Decode file_ops transiently (decrypt_data6 mutates 96 bytes in place). + let lfsr_snap: Vec = self.decompressed[da..da + 96].to_vec(); + self.decrypt_data6(file_dec_addr); + let ops = generate(&self.decompressed, file_dec_addr); + self.decompressed[da..da + 96].copy_from_slice(&lfsr_snap); + let ops = match ops { + Some(o) => o, + None => return false, + }; + + let cdo = (!get_u32(self.file_data, 0x1080)).wrapping_add(0x1000); + let table = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ci_slot); + if table == 0 || table as usize + 16 > self.decompressed.len() { + return false; + } + // Walk the compressedInfo table (entries read via the non-mutating + // trial decrypt) to the first compressed block, then test it. + let mut entry = table; + for _ in 0..256 { + if entry as usize + 16 > self.decompressed.len() { + return false; + } + let src2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, entry); + let s_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, entry.wrapping_add(4)); + let dst2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, entry.wrapping_add(8)); + let d_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(&self.decompressed, entry.wrapping_add(12)); + if s_sz2 == 0 { + return false; // terminator: no compressed block to validate against + } + if s_sz2 != d_sz2 { + let file_src = src2.wrapping_add(cdo) as usize; + let dd = dst2 as usize; + let n = s_sz2 as usize; + let dlen = self.decompressed.len(); + // The trial transform writes `s_sz2` bytes starting at dd + // (copy + AES + translate) before decompress reads them, so + // the snapshot/restore must cover max(s_sz2, d_sz2) — restoring + // only d_sz2 leaves [dd+d_sz2, dd+s_sz2) permanently corrupted + // for the wrong-candidate case (s_sz2 > d_sz2), and every + // later candidate is then validated against a polluted buffer. + let touch = (s_sz2.max(d_sz2)) as usize; + if dst2 < 0x1000 + || file_src + .checked_add(n) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) + || dd.checked_add(touch).is_none_or(|e| e > dlen) + { + return false; + } + let dst_snap: Vec = self.decompressed[dd..dd + touch].to_vec(); + self.decompressed[dd..dd + n] + .copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[file_src..file_src + n]); + self.aes_decrypt(dst2, s_sz2, self.key_offsets[2]); + for k in 0..s_sz2 { + let idx = (dst2 + k) as usize; + self.decompressed[idx] = super::bytecode::apply(&ops, self.decompressed[idx]); + } + let ok = primitives::decompress( + &mut self.decompressed, + dst2, + dst2, + self.key_offsets[0], + s_sz2, + d_sz2, + ); + self.decompressed[dd..dd + touch].copy_from_slice(&dst_snap); + return ok; + } + entry = entry.wrapping_add(16); + } + false + } + + /// PE32+ counterpart of [`Self::restore_pe32_tls_from_stub`]: recover the + /// genuine 40-byte `IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY64` and its raw-data template from the + /// loader stub, which keeps `.rdata` in plaintext at the same RVAs. + /// + /// Only meaningful for the old (single-file, `/FIXED`) layout, where the + /// caller goes on to zero `DllCharacteristics` and `BaseReloc` — the image + /// then loads at `image_base`, so the struct's absolute VAs are already + /// correct and need no relocations. The external-companion layout keeps its + /// relocations and is handled separately by `job::restore_tls_from_stub`, + /// which also synthesizes the four DIR64 fixups. + /// + /// Returns `false` without touching the image if the stub cannot supply a + /// plausible directory, so the caller can fall back to clearing DD[9]. + fn restore_pe64_tls_from_stub( + &mut self, + pe_off: u32, + tls_dir_rva: u32, + image_base: u64, + ) -> bool { + let src = match prot_rva_to_off(self.file_data, pe_off, tls_dir_rva) { + Some(o) => o as usize, + None => return false, + }; + if src.checked_add(40).is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) { + return false; + } + let field = |i: u32| get_u64(self.file_data, (src as u32).wrapping_add(i)); + let (start_va, end_va, idx_va, cb_va) = (field(0), field(8), field(16), field(24)); + + let img_len = self.decompressed.len() as u64; + let in_image = |va: u64| va > image_base && (va - image_base) < img_len; + if !in_image(start_va) || !in_image(idx_va) || !in_image(cb_va) { + return false; + } + if end_va < start_va || (end_va - start_va) > 0x10_0000 { + return false; + } + + // Template first: bail before touching the struct so a failure leaves the + // caller's all-zero directory intact. + let tpl_len = (end_va - start_va) as usize; + if tpl_len > 0 { + let tpl_rva = (start_va - image_base) as u32; + let ts = match prot_rva_to_off(self.file_data, pe_off, tpl_rva) { + Some(o) => o as usize, + None => return false, + }; + let td = tpl_rva as usize; + if ts + .checked_add(tpl_len) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) + || td + .checked_add(tpl_len) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.decompressed.len()) + { + return false; + } + self.decompressed[td..td + tpl_len].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[ts..ts + tpl_len]); + } + + let d = tls_dir_rva as usize; + self.decompressed[d..d + 40].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[src..src + 40]); + true + } + + /// Restore the genuine `IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY32` — and the raw-data template + /// it points at — from the loader stub. + /// + /// Crackproof zeroes the TLS directory struct inside the encrypted payload + /// and re-installs TLS itself when it maps the module, so a statically + /// unpacked image reaches the ordinary Windows loader with a blank struct. + /// Synthesizing a placeholder (empty template, index/callbacks aimed at + /// scratch) makes the image *load*, but it is not equivalent to the + /// original: the module's initialized thread-local bytes are never copied, + /// `_tls_index` is written somewhere the code never reads, and the TLS + /// callback array — which is where the CRT runs `__dyn_tls_init` — is empty. + /// Every `thread_local` access then hits a garbage slot (the same class of + /// `0xC0000005` documented for the companion-DLL path in `job.rs`). + /// + /// The stub keeps the module's original `.rdata` and `.tls` in plaintext, so + /// both the 24-byte struct and its template are copied back byte-for-byte at + /// their RVAs. EXE images are emitted without base relocations and therefore + /// load at `image_base`, so the struct's absolute VAs stay correct as-is; + /// DLLs keep the original relocation table, which already covered these four + /// fields before packing. + /// + /// Returns `false` without touching the image when the stub cannot supply a + /// plausible directory, so the caller can fall back to the placeholder. + fn restore_pe32_tls_from_stub( + &mut self, + pe_off: u32, + tls_dir_rva: u32, + image_base: u32, + ) -> bool { + let src = match prot_rva_to_off(self.file_data, pe_off, tls_dir_rva) { + Some(o) => o as usize, + None => return false, + }; + if src.checked_add(24).is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) { + return false; + } + let field = |i: u32| get_u32(self.file_data, (src as u32).wrapping_add(i)); + let (start_va, end_va, idx_va, cb_va) = (field(0), field(4), field(8), field(12)); + + // Sanity-check before trusting it: a stub whose `.rdata` is not plaintext + // at this RVA yields noise, and installing noise is worse than the + // placeholder. All three pointers must land inside the image at its + // preferred base, and the template must be a sane, non-inverted range. + let img_len = self.decompressed.len() as u64; + let in_image = |va: u32| va > image_base && ((va - image_base) as u64) < img_len; + if !in_image(start_va) || !in_image(idx_va) || !in_image(cb_va) { + return false; + } + if end_va < start_va || (end_va - start_va) as u64 > 0x10_0000 { + return false; + } + + // Template first: a failure here must leave the struct untouched so the + // caller's fallback still sees an all-zero directory. + let tpl_len = (end_va - start_va) as usize; + if tpl_len > 0 { + let tpl_rva = start_va - image_base; + let ts = match prot_rva_to_off(self.file_data, pe_off, tpl_rva) { + Some(o) => o as usize, + None => return false, + }; + let td = tpl_rva as usize; + if ts + .checked_add(tpl_len) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.file_data.len()) + || td + .checked_add(tpl_len) + .is_none_or(|e| e > self.decompressed.len()) + { + return false; + } + self.decompressed[td..td + tpl_len].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[ts..ts + tpl_len]); + } + + let d = tls_dir_rva as usize; + self.decompressed[d..d + 24].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[src..src + 24]); + true + } + + /// PE32 (32-bit) unpack pipeline. The shared Stage 1/2 setup (info decrypt, + /// payload decrypt, raw copy, header restore) has already run in `run()` + /// before dispatch; this takes over from "Locating shell offsets". + fn run_pe32(&mut self, pe_off: u32, verbose: bool) -> Result, UnpackError> { + let info = self.info; + let info3 = info[3]; + + // advance_key: replays the packer's per-iteration key walk. + let advance_key = |mut key: u32, iterations: u32| -> u32 { + for m in 0..iterations { + let bound = (m + 1).wrapping_mul(25) << 2; + let mut n: u32 = 1; + while n <= bound { + key = key.wrapping_add(n); + n += 1; + } + } + key + }; + + // ---- Locate tbl in shell ---- + let tbl = primitives::find_tbl_pe32(&self.decompressed, &info) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32TblNotFound)?; + if verbose { + println!("[3/9] Locating config layout (PE32)..."); + println!(" tbl = 0x{:X}", tbl); + } + + // ---- PE header restore ---- + let val_bc = get_u32(&self.decompressed, tbl.wrapping_add(0xBC)); + let val_c8 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, tbl.wrapping_add(0xC8)); + let val_cc = get_u32(&self.decompressed, tbl.wrapping_add(0xCC)); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(0x80), val_bc); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(0x88), val_c8); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(0x8C), val_cc); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(0xB0), 0); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pe_off.wrapping_add(0xB4), 0); + + // ---- Header-independent checksum inputs ---- + let first_stage_cs = self.calculate_checksum(tbl.wrapping_add(0xA8)); + let second_stage_key = get_u32(&self.decompressed, tbl.wrapping_add(0x40)); + + // ---- Stage 3: SecondStage ---- + // + // ss_key = headerChecksum ^ firstStageCS ^ secondStageKey, where the + // header checksum (a XOR of crc32(region)^size over the sub-regions at + // tbl+0x58) is taken over the *original* pre-pack PE header. For EXEs the + // import/resource restore above reconstructs that header exactly. Native + // DLLs additionally carry a packer-added BaseReloc data-directory entry + // (dir 5) that was absent from the checksummed original, so the header + // checksum only matches once that entry is treated as zero. EXEs have no + // dir-5 entry, so zeroing it is a no-op for them. + // + // Rather than branch on EXE-vs-DLL, try the header as-is and, on failure, + // with the BaseReloc entry zeroed; keep whichever ss_key decrypts a + // SecondStage whose ThirdStage (off,size) pair lands inside the image. + // This uses the same shift/key trial-and-validate the later stages + // already use, and keeps EXE output byte-identical (the as-is variant + // wins first). + let ss_pair = tbl.wrapping_add(0x98); + let ss = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ss_pair); + let ss_size = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ss_pair.wrapping_add(4)); + let ss_shift = ss_size.wrapping_sub(0xBC0); + // Back up the SecondStage ciphertext so a failed trial can be retried. + let ss_lo = ss as usize; + let ss_hi = ss_lo.wrapping_add(ss_size as usize); + if ss_hi < ss_lo || ss_hi > self.decompressed.len() { + return Err(UnpackError::Corrupt); + } + let ss_ct: Vec = self.decompressed[ss_lo..ss_hi].to_vec(); + // PE32 data dir 5 (BaseReloc) = optional_header(pe+24) + 0x60 + 5*8 = pe+0xA0. + let reloc_dir = pe_off.wrapping_add(0xA0); + let len = self.decompressed.len() as u64; + let pair_off = 0xB8Cu32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + let mut found = false; + // Holds the winning variant's header checksum; the later stages + // (Forth/Fifth/Seven/Eighth) reuse it as a key component. + let mut header_checksum: u32 = 0; + for zero_reloc in [false, true] { + if zero_reloc { + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, reloc_dir, 0); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, reloc_dir.wrapping_add(4), 0); + } + let mut hcs_addr = tbl.wrapping_add(0x58); + header_checksum = 0; + while get_u32(&self.decompressed, hcs_addr.wrapping_add(4)) != 0 { + header_checksum ^= self.calculate_checksum(hcs_addr); + hcs_addr = hcs_addr.wrapping_add(8); + } + let ss_key = header_checksum ^ first_stage_cs ^ second_stage_key; + self.decompressed[ss_lo..ss_hi].copy_from_slice(&ss_ct); + self.decrypt_data3(ss_pair, ss_key, 21); + // Validate: the ThirdStage (off,size) pair must reference the image. + let pair = ss.wrapping_add(pair_off); + let off = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pair) as u64; + let sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pair.wrapping_add(4)) as u64; + if off > 0x1000 && off < len && sz >= 4 && off.saturating_add(sz) <= len { + found = true; + break; + } + } + if !found { + return Err(UnpackError::Corrupt); + } + if verbose { + println!( + " ss = 0x{:08X}, size = 0x{:X}, shift = 0x{:X}", + ss, ss_size, ss_shift + ); + } + + // ---- PE32 fixed offsets ---- + let third_key_off = 0x968u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + let forth_key_off = 0x964u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + let cs_base_off = 0x96Cu32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + let dp_base_off = 0xA9Cu32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + + // ---- Stage 4: ThirdStage (brute-force the rotate shift) ---- + let third_pair_off = 0xB8Cu32.wrapping_add(ss_shift); + let key = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ss.wrapping_add(third_key_off)); + let pair_addr = ss.wrapping_add(third_pair_off); + let ts_addr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pair_addr); + let ts_size_raw = get_u32(&self.decompressed, pair_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + let backup: Vec = + self.decompressed[ts_addr as usize..(ts_addr + ts_size_raw) as usize].to_vec(); + let mut info_table: Option = None; + let mut keys_addr: u32 = 0; + let mut ts: u32 = 0; + for &shift in &[19u32, 21, 17, 23, 15, 25, 13, 11] { + self.decompressed[ts_addr as usize..(ts_addr + ts_size_raw) as usize] + .copy_from_slice(&backup); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, pair_addr, ts_addr); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + pair_addr.wrapping_add(4), + ts_size_raw, + ); + self.decrypt_data3(pair_addr, key, shift); + let mut off = 0u32; + while off + 32 < ts_size_raw { + let t0 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ts_addr.wrapping_add(off)); + if t0 == 1 || t0 == 0x11 { + let t1 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ts_addr.wrapping_add(off + 16)); + if t1 == 2 { + let addr0 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ts_addr.wrapping_add(off + 4)); + if 0x1000 < addr0 && (addr0 as usize) < self.decompressed.len() { + let it = ts_addr.wrapping_add(off); + info_table = Some(it); + keys_addr = it.wrapping_sub(0x58); + ts = ts_addr; + break; + } + } + } + off = off.wrapping_add(4); + } + if info_table.is_some() { + break; + } + } + let info_table = info_table.ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32ThirdStageFailed)?; + if verbose { + println!("[4/9] Decrypting stages (PE32)..."); + println!( + " thirdStage start = 0x{:X}, infoTable = 0x{:X}", + ts, info_table + ); + } + + // ---- Process infoTable ---- + let mut it_addr = info_table; + for _ in 0..2 { + let tval = get_u32(&self.decompressed, it_addr); + if tval == 1 || tval == 0x11 { + self.decrypt_data4(it_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + } else if tval == 2 { + let mut copy_addr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, it_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + loop { + self.decrypt_data5(copy_addr, 16); + let s_a = get_u32(&self.decompressed, copy_addr); + let s_sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, copy_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + let d_a = get_u32(&self.decompressed, copy_addr.wrapping_add(8)); + let d_sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, copy_addr.wrapping_add(12)); + copy_addr = copy_addr.wrapping_add(16); + if s_sz == 0 { + break; + } + if s_a != 0 && d_a != 0 && d_sz == s_sz { + let sa = s_a as usize; + let da = d_a as usize; + let n = s_sz as usize; + self.decompressed.copy_within(sa..sa + n, da); + } + } + } + it_addr = it_addr.wrapping_add(16); + } + + // ---- keyOffsets ---- + let mut ka = keys_addr; + for k in 0..2usize { + let mut ka2 = ka; + for l in 0..2usize { + self.decrypt_data4(ka2); + self.key_offsets[k * 2 + l] = get_u32(&self.decompressed, ka2); + ka2 = ka2.wrapping_add(8); + } + ka = ka.wrapping_add(32); + } + + // ---- Checksum addresses ---- + let second_stage_cs_addr = tbl.wrapping_add(0xB0); + let forth_stage_cs_addr = ss.wrapping_add(cs_base_off); + let fifth_stage_cs_addr = ss.wrapping_add(cs_base_off).wrapping_add(0x08); + let seven_stage_cs_addr = ss.wrapping_add(cs_base_off).wrapping_add(0x10); + + // ---- ForthStage ---- + let second_stage_cs = self.calculate_checksum(second_stage_cs_addr); + let forth_stage_key = advance_key( + get_u32(&self.decompressed, ss.wrapping_add(forth_key_off)), + 4, + ); + let dp_base = ss.wrapping_add(dp_base_off); + let forth_addr = dp_base.wrapping_add(0x40); + let fk = header_checksum ^ second_stage_cs ^ forth_stage_key; + if !self.decrypt_and_decompress_data(forth_addr, fk, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + // ---- FifthStage ---- + let fifth_addr = dp_base.wrapping_add(0x50); + let forth_cs = self.calculate_checksum(forth_stage_cs_addr); + let forth_region_off = get_u32(&self.decompressed, forth_stage_cs_addr); + let forth_region_sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, forth_stage_cs_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + let fifth_key = get_u32( + &self.decompressed, + forth_region_off + .wrapping_add(forth_region_sz) + .wrapping_sub(4), + ); + let fk5 = header_checksum ^ forth_cs ^ fifth_key; + if !self.decrypt_and_decompress_data(fifth_addr, fk5, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + // ---- SevenStage ---- + let seven_addr = dp_base.wrapping_add(0x70); + let seven_dsz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_addr.wrapping_add(12)); + let fifth_cs = self.calculate_checksum(fifth_stage_cs_addr); + let cs1_addr = get_u32( + &self.decompressed, + ss.wrapping_add(cs_base_off).wrapping_add(0x08), + ); + let cs1_size = get_u32( + &self.decompressed, + ss.wrapping_add(cs_base_off) + .wrapping_add(0x08) + .wrapping_add(4), + ); + let seven_key = !get_u32( + &self.decompressed, + cs1_addr.wrapping_add(cs1_size).wrapping_sub(0x10), + ); + let fk7 = header_checksum ^ fifth_cs ^ seven_key; + if !self.decrypt_and_decompress_data(seven_addr, fk7, None) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + + // ---- EighthStage ---- + let seven_start_actual = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_addr); + if verbose { + println!("[5/9] Decrypting eighthStage (PE32)..."); + println!( + " sevenStart = 0x{:X}, sevenDsz = 0x{:X}", + seven_start_actual, seven_dsz + ); + } + // Locate the customDecryptor LFSR block (scan backward from middle, then + // forward as fallback). + let scan_start = seven_dsz / 2; + let custom_dec_off = primitives::find_lfsr_block( + &self.decompressed, + seven_start_actual, + seven_dsz, + scan_start, + true, + ) + .or_else(|| { + primitives::find_lfsr_block(&self.decompressed, seven_start_actual, seven_dsz, 0, false) + }) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32CustomDecryptorNotFound)?; + let custom_dec_addr = seven_start_actual.wrapping_add(custom_dec_off); + self.decrypt_data6(custom_dec_addr); + let custom_ops = generate(&self.decompressed, custom_dec_addr) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32BytecodeGenFailed)?; + + let seven_cs = self.calculate_checksum(seven_stage_cs_addr); + let eighth_addr = dp_base.wrapping_add(0xC0); + let eighth_dsz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_addr.wrapping_add(12)); + let eighth_src = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_addr); + let eighth_ssz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + let eighth_backup: Vec = + self.decompressed[eighth_src as usize..(eighth_src + eighth_ssz) as usize].to_vec(); + let eighth_pair_bak: Vec = + self.decompressed[eighth_addr as usize..(eighth_addr + 16) as usize].to_vec(); + let data_len = self.decompressed.len() as u32; + + // Build the eighthStageKey candidate list (offsets relative to + // sevenStart) using gap heuristics + scan. + let mut candidates: Vec = Vec::new(); + let push_cand = |c: &mut Vec, off: u32| { + if !c.contains(&off) { + c.push(off); + } + }; + for &end_gap in &[0xD0u32, 0xC0, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xA0, 0xF0, 0x100] { + if end_gap <= seven_dsz { + let off = seven_dsz - end_gap; + if off < seven_dsz { + let val = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_start_actual.wrapping_add(off)); + if val != 0 && val != 0xCCCC_CCCC { + push_cand(&mut candidates, off); + } + } + } + } + for &gap in &[ + 0x70u32, 0xD0, 0x28, 0x50, 0x48, 0x30, 0x40, 0x58, 0x60, 0x20, 0x38, 0x80, 0x90, 0xA0, + 0xB0, + ] { + if gap <= custom_dec_off { + let off = custom_dec_off - gap; + if off + 4 <= seven_dsz && !candidates.contains(&off) { + let val = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_start_actual.wrapping_add(off)); + if val != 0 && val != 0xCCCC_CCCC { + push_cand(&mut candidates, off); + } + } + } + } + let scan_lo = custom_dec_off.saturating_sub(0x100); + let mut off = scan_lo; + while off < custom_dec_off { + if !candidates.contains(&off) { + let val = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_start_actual.wrapping_add(off)); + let all_printable = (0..4u32).all(|i| { + let b = (val >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF; + (32..127).contains(&b) + }); + if val != 0 && val != 0xCCCC_CCCC && !all_printable { + push_cand(&mut candidates, off); + } + } + off = off.wrapping_add(4); + } + + let k1 = self.key_offsets[1]; + let k3 = self.key_offsets[3]; + let mut eighth_ok = false; + for ek_off in candidates { + self.decompressed[eighth_src as usize..(eighth_src + eighth_ssz) as usize] + .copy_from_slice(&eighth_backup); + self.decompressed[eighth_addr as usize..(eighth_addr + 16) as usize] + .copy_from_slice(&eighth_pair_bak); + let raw = get_u32(&self.decompressed, seven_start_actual.wrapping_add(ek_off)); + let test_key = advance_key(raw, 3); + let fk8 = header_checksum ^ fifth_cs ^ seven_cs ^ test_key; + let result = primitives::decrypt_and_decompress_data( + &mut self.decompressed, + eighth_addr, + fk8, + k1, + k3, + Some(&custom_ops), + ); + if result { + let est = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_addr); + if 0x1000 < est && est < data_len { + eighth_ok = true; + break; + } + } + } + if !eighth_ok { + return Err(UnpackError::Pe32EighthKeyNotFound); + } + let eighth_start = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_addr); + if verbose { + println!( + " eighthStart = 0x{:08X}, dsz = 0x{:X}", + eighth_start, eighth_dsz + ); + } + + // ---- Final processing offsets (anchored on the eighthStage config cluster) ---- + // + // The eighthStage holds a config cluster — importTable, fileCS, + // compressedInfo, zeroList — at fixed offsets from a cluster base + // (base+0x18 / +0x30 / +0x40 / +0x48) with the fileLFSR at +0x4B4. + // Classic builds stamp a 0x00007679 dword at that base; native DLLs and + // some older PE32 EXEs (ss_size=0xBE8) omit the stamp. + // Locate the cluster by stamp when present (validated by fileCS at + // base+0x30 pointing past info[3]); otherwise fall back to finding the + // fileCS slot by shape — (addr, size) with addr just past info[3] and a + // small 16-aligned size — and back-derive base = fileCS_off - 0x30. + // Hardcoded eighthStart-relative constants remain as a last-resort + // fallback for builds where neither discovery path fires. + let marker = { + let mut m: Option = None; + let hi = eighth_dsz.saturating_sub(0x4C); + let mut o = 0u32; + while o < hi { + if get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_start.wrapping_add(o)) == 0x7679 { + let fc = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_start.wrapping_add(o + 0x30)); + if fc > info3 && (fc as usize) < self.decompressed.len() { + m = Some(o); + break; + } + } + o = o.wrapping_add(4); + } + if m.is_none() { + // fileCS-shaped slot: addr in (info3, info3+0x2000], size in + // 0x10..=0x200 and 16-aligned. Prefer the candidate whose addr + // is closest to (but past) info3 — matches every observed + // build (one PE32 EXE family dist ~0x1C0, another ~0x1A0). + let mut best: Option<(u32 /*dist*/, u32 /*off*/)> = None; + let mut o = 0u32; + let dlen = self.decompressed.len() as u32; + while o + 8 <= eighth_dsz.saturating_sub(0x4B4u32.saturating_sub(0x30)) { + let fc = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_start.wrapping_add(o)); + let sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, eighth_start.wrapping_add(o + 4)); + if fc > info3 + && fc <= info3.wrapping_add(0x2000) + && fc < dlen + && (0x10..=0x200).contains(&sz) + && (sz & 0xF) == 0 + { + // Cluster base must leave room for the +0x4B4 LFSR slot + // (even if the exact LFSR is later adjusted by scan). + if o >= 0x30 { + let base = o - 0x30; + if base.wrapping_add(0x4C) <= eighth_dsz { + let dist = fc - info3; + match best { + None => best = Some((dist, base)), + Some((bd, _)) if dist < bd => best = Some((dist, base)), + _ => {} + } + } + } + } + o = o.wrapping_add(4); + } + if let Some((dist, base)) = best { + if verbose { + println!( + " pe32 cluster via fileCS (no 0x7679): base=+0x{:X} dist_info3=0x{:X}", + base, dist + ); + } + m = Some(base); + } + } + m + }; + let (off_import_table, off_file_cs, off_compressed_info, off_zero_list, off_file_lfsr) = + match marker { + Some(m) => (m + 0x18, m + 0x30, m + 0x40, m + 0x48, m + 0x4B4), + None => ( + 0x3C50u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift), + 0x3C68u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift), + 0x3C78u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift), + 0x3C80u32.wrapping_add(ss_shift), + 0x40ECu32.wrapping_add(ss_shift), + ), + }; + + // ---- File checksums (permanent decrypt) ---- + let file_cs_addr_ptr = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_file_cs); + let mut file_cs_addr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, file_cs_addr_ptr); + let file_cs_size = get_u32(&self.decompressed, file_cs_addr_ptr.wrapping_add(4)); + if file_cs_size > 0 { + let file_cs_end = file_cs_addr.wrapping_add(file_cs_size); + while file_cs_addr < file_cs_end { + self.decrypt_data5(file_cs_addr, 16); + file_cs_addr = file_cs_addr.wrapping_add(16); + } + } else { + while get_u32(&self.decompressed, file_cs_addr.wrapping_add(4)) != 0 { + self.decrypt_data5(file_cs_addr, 16); + file_cs_addr = file_cs_addr.wrapping_add(16); + } + } + + // ---- File decryptor LFSR ---- + // + // When the marker-relative off_file_lfsr is in range, try that slot + // first (exact). If it is not a valid LFSR block, trial-and-validate + // candidates from off_zero_list forward — required for older PE32 EXEs + // without the 0x7679 stamp where the expected slot is empty and a loose + // decoded[0]+0xC3 nearest-hit picks the wrong decryptor. Fall back to + // the legacy loose scan only if no candidate trial-decompresses. Native + // DLLs have a smaller eighthStage where off_file_lfsr lands out of range + // and use the same trial-validate scan from just past the cluster (else + // branch). + let lfsr_off = if off_file_lfsr.wrapping_add(96) <= eighth_dsz { + let mut lfsr_off = off_file_lfsr; + let exact = primitives::find_lfsr_block( + &self.decompressed, + eighth_start, + eighth_dsz, + off_file_lfsr, + false, + ); + if exact != Some(off_file_lfsr) { + // Prefer trial-and-validate (same as the DLL branch): a loose + // decoded[0]+0xC3 scan can land on coincidental LFSR-shaped + // blocks that decode to a wrong file_ops and scramble every + // compressed block. Observed on older PE32 EXEs without the + // 0x7679 cluster stamp: the expected slot is empty and the + // nearest loose hit is not the real decryptor. + let ci_slot = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_compressed_info); + let mut scan = off_zero_list; + let mut chosen: Option = None; + let mut considered = 0u32; + while let Some(cand) = primitives::find_lfsr_block( + &self.decompressed, + eighth_start, + eighth_dsz, + scan, + false, + ) { + considered = considered.wrapping_add(1); + if self.pe32_file_lfsr_validates(eighth_start.wrapping_add(cand), ci_slot) { + chosen = Some(cand); + break; + } + scan = cand + 1; + } + if let Some(c) = chosen { + if verbose { + println!( + " pe32 fileLFSR via trial-validate: +0x{:X} (expected +0x{:X}, considered {})", + c, off_file_lfsr, considered + ); + } + lfsr_off = c; + } else { + // No candidate trial-decompresses: fail loudly. The old + // "legacy loose scan" picked the nearest LFSR-shaped block + // by offset distance without any validation — that is + // exactly how a wrong file_ops got applied to every data + // block (uncompressed blocks never hit DecompressFailed), + // producing a plausible but fully wrong image (the PE32 + // .text scramble root cause). Trial-and-validate or error. + return Err(UnpackError::Pe32FileLfsrNotFound); + } + } + lfsr_off + } else { + // Native DLL: the marker-relative off_file_lfsr (EXE-tuned, marker + + // 0x4B4) overshoots the smaller DLL eighthStage, so the exact slot is + // unavailable. A plain forward scan returns the FIRST valid-opcode + // block, but the DLL eighthStage contains coincidental valid-opcode + // blocks that decode to trivial programs (e.g. a constant byte add) + // ahead of the real file decryptor. A wrong file_ops corrupts the + // per-block translate (applied before decompression), so every data + // block fails to decompress. Enumerate every candidate forward and + // keep the first whose decoded file_ops actually decompresses the + // first compressed data block — trial-and-validate, same idea as the + // D1/D2 fixes. Non-DLL (EXE) builds never reach this branch. + let ci_slot = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_compressed_info); + let mut scan = off_zero_list.wrapping_add(8); + let mut chosen: Option = None; + while let Some(cand) = primitives::find_lfsr_block( + &self.decompressed, + eighth_start, + eighth_dsz, + scan, + false, + ) { + if self.pe32_file_lfsr_validates(eighth_start.wrapping_add(cand), ci_slot) { + chosen = Some(cand); + break; + } + scan = cand + 1; + } + chosen.ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32FileLfsrNotFound)? + }; + let file_dec_addr = eighth_start.wrapping_add(lfsr_off); + self.decrypt_data6(file_dec_addr); + let file_ops = generate(&self.decompressed, file_dec_addr) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Pe32BytecodeGenFailed)?; + + // ---- PE32 metadata: EP and data dirs from info[3] ---- + let test_val = get_u32(&self.decompressed, info3.wrapping_add(0x10)); + let metadata_ep: u32; + let mut metadata_dirs = [0u8; 128]; + if test_val > 0x10000 { + // Layout B + let s = info3.wrapping_add(0x10) as usize; + let backup_meta = self.decompressed[s..s + 0x290].to_vec(); + self.decrypt_data5(info3.wrapping_add(0x10), 0x290); + metadata_ep = get_u32(&self.decompressed, info3.wrapping_add(0x20)); + let d = info3.wrapping_add(0x30) as usize; + metadata_dirs.copy_from_slice(&self.decompressed[d..d + 128]); + self.decompressed[s..s + 0x290].copy_from_slice(&backup_meta); + } else { + // Layout A + let s = info3.wrapping_add(0x40) as usize; + let backup_meta = self.decompressed[s..s + 144].to_vec(); + self.decrypt_data5(info3.wrapping_add(0x40), 144); + metadata_ep = get_u32(&self.decompressed, info3.wrapping_add(0x40)); + let d = info3.wrapping_add(0x50) as usize; + metadata_dirs.copy_from_slice(&self.decompressed[d..d + 128]); + self.decompressed[s..s + 144].copy_from_slice(&backup_meta); + } + + // ---- Zero-out list (runs BEFORE decompression) ---- + let zero_list_addr = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_zero_list); + let mut zero_ptr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, zero_list_addr); + loop { + self.decrypt_data5(zero_ptr, 16); + let src3 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, zero_ptr); + let s_sz3 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, zero_ptr.wrapping_add(4)); + zero_ptr = zero_ptr.wrapping_add(16); + if s_sz3 == 0 { + break; + } + if src3.wrapping_add(s_sz3) as usize > self.decompressed.len() { + break; + } + for b in &mut self.decompressed[src3 as usize..(src3 + s_sz3) as usize] { + *b = 0; + } + } + + // ---- File data decompression ---- + if verbose { + println!("[6/9] Loading and decompressing file data (PE32)..."); + } + let compress_data_offset = (!get_u32(self.file_data, 0x1080)).wrapping_add(0x1000); + let compressed_info_addr = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_compressed_info); + let mut compressed_info = get_u32(&self.decompressed, compressed_info_addr); + // Pass 1 (sequential): position-keyed descriptor chain (decrypt_data5), + // terminated by a zero source-size record. + struct Blk { + src: u32, + ssz: u32, + dst: u32, + dsz: u32, + } + let mut blocks: Vec = Vec::new(); + loop { + self.decrypt_data5(compressed_info, 16); + let src2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, compressed_info); + let s_sz2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, compressed_info.wrapping_add(4)); + let dst2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, compressed_info.wrapping_add(8)); + let d_sz2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, compressed_info.wrapping_add(12)); + compressed_info = compressed_info.wrapping_add(16); + if s_sz2 == 0 { + break; + } + blocks.push(Blk { + src: src2, + ssz: s_sz2, + dst: dst2, + dsz: d_sz2, + }); + } + // Pass 2: independent per-block work over disjoint dst spans (see + // `parallel_for` for how the spans are carved safely). + { + let lut = OpsLut::new(&file_ops); + let clean = &self.file_data; + let ko = self.key_offsets; + let ks_snap = primitives::aes_schedule_snapshot(&self.decompressed, ko[2]) + .ok_or(UnpackError::Corrupt)?; + let tab_snap = primitives::huffman_table_snapshot(&self.decompressed, ko[0]) + .ok_or(UnpackError::DecompressFailed)?; + let spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = blocks + .iter() + .map(|b| { + let s = b.dst as usize; + (s, s + b.ssz.max(b.dsz) as usize) + }) + .collect(); + let do_block = |i: usize, base: usize, span: &mut [u8]| -> Result<(), UnpackError> { + let b = &blocks[i]; + let file_src = b.src.wrapping_add(compress_data_offset) as usize; + let rel = b.dst as usize - base; + let n = b.ssz as usize; + span[rel..rel + n].copy_from_slice(&clean[file_src..file_src + n]); + primitives::aes_decrypt_ks(&ks_snap, span, rel as u32, b.ssz); + lut.map_region(span, rel, n); + if b.ssz != b.dsz { + // decompress reports corruption (after partial writes) via + // its bool; surface it instead of shipping a garbage block. + if !primitives::decompress_tbl( + &tab_snap, span, rel as u32, rel as u32, b.ssz, b.dsz, + ) { + return Err(UnpackError::DecompressFailed); + } + } + Ok(()) + }; + super::parallel::parallel_for(&mut self.decompressed, &spans, 1, do_block)?; + } + + // ---- Section fixup ---- + self.decompressed[..0x1000].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[..0x1000]); + let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(self.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(20)) as u32; + let sec_hdr_table = pe_off.wrapping_add(24).wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size); + let export_va = get_u32( + self.file_data, + pe_off + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size) + .wrapping_sub(128), + ); + let export_size = get_u32( + self.file_data, + pe_off + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size) + .wrapping_sub(124), + ); + let mut export_file_off: u32 = 0; + let mut text_off: u32 = 0; + let mut text_size: u32 = 0; + // Walk by NumberOfSections (PE has no zero-VS sentinel; a real + // VirtualSize==0 section would truncate these fixups early), stopping + // at the all-zero padding in case NumberOfSections is overstated. + let num_sections = get_u16(self.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + for i in 0..num_sections.min(96) { + let sec_hdr = sec_hdr_table.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(40)); + if self.file_data[sec_hdr as usize..sec_hdr as usize + 8] + .iter() + .all(|&b| b == 0) + { + break; + } + let va = get_u32(self.file_data, sec_hdr.wrapping_add(12)); + let sz = get_u32(self.file_data, sec_hdr.wrapping_add(8)); + let f_off = get_u32(self.file_data, sec_hdr.wrapping_add(20)); + let name = section_name(self.file_data, sec_hdr); + if name.starts_with(".text") { + text_size = sz; + text_off = va; + } + if export_size != 0 + && export_va >= va + && export_va.wrapping_add(export_size) <= va.wrapping_add(sz) + { + export_file_off = export_va.wrapping_sub(va).wrapping_add(f_off); + } + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, sec_hdr.wrapping_add(16), sz); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, sec_hdr.wrapping_add(20), va); + if name.starts_with(".idata") { + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + sec_hdr.wrapping_add(36), + 0xC000_0040, + ); + } + } + if export_size != 0 && export_file_off != 0 { + let d = export_va as usize; + let s = export_file_off as usize; + let n = export_size as usize; + self.decompressed[d..d + n].copy_from_slice(&self.file_data[s..s + n]); + } + + // ---- .text decrypt with decrypt_data8 (PE32 auto-detected formula) ---- + // `select_dd8_formula_pe32` returns None when `.text` was not packer-dd8- + // encrypted (native DLLs leave it plaintext); applying dd8 there would + // scramble valid code, so skip it entirely in that case. + if text_size > 0 && text_off > 0 { + if let Some(big) = + primitives::select_dd8_formula_pe32(&self.decompressed, text_off, text_size) + { + if verbose { + println!( + "[7/9] Decrypting .text (PE32 dd8, formula={})...", + if big { "0x8000*(page+1)" } else { "page+1" } + ); + } + let num_pages = text_size / 0x1000; + for page in 0..num_pages { + let pk = if big { + 0x8000u32.wrapping_mul(page.wrapping_add(1)) + } else { + page.wrapping_add(1) + }; + let pa = text_off.wrapping_add(page.wrapping_mul(0x1000)); + let mut k = pk; + let rk = k.rotate_right(15); + k = rk; + for bi in 1..256u32 { + let rk = k.rotate_right(15); + let ri = rk.wrapping_add(bi); + k = ri.wrapping_add(bi); + let tidx = + pa.wrapping_add(bi.wrapping_mul(16)).wrapping_add(ri & 0xF) as usize; + self.decompressed[tidx] ^= k as u8; + } + } + } else if verbose { + println!("[7/9] Skipping .text dd8 (already plaintext)..."); + } + } + + // ---- Fix data directories (PE32: data dirs at pe+0x78) ---- + let exe_pe = get_u32(&self.decompressed, 60); + for i in 0..128u32 { + self.decompressed[(exe_pe + 0x78 + i) as usize] = metadata_dirs[i as usize]; + } + // DLL-aware reloc / DllCharacteristics handling. An EXE's packer rebuilds + // the relocation table and clears DllCharacteristics, so the loader needs + // no relocations. A DLL, by contrast, is almost always mapped at a + // non-preferred base, so it MUST keep its base-relocation directory + // (restored above from metadata_dirs) and a valid DllCharacteristics + // (DYNAMIC_BASE) — zeroing them leaves the DLL unrelocatable and its + // imports pinned to the packer stub, so it fails to load (which looks + // like a missing/broken export table). + let is_dll = (get_u16(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(22)) & 0x2000) != 0; + if !is_dll { + // EXE: clear BaseReloc (index 5 = pe+0xA0) and DllCharacteristics (pe+0x5E). + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xA0), 0); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xA4), 0); + write_u16(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0x5E), 0); + } else { + // DLL: keep the BaseReloc dir from metadata; ensure DYNAMIC_BASE. + let mut dll_chars = get_u16(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0x5E)); + if dll_chars == 0 { + dll_chars = 0x0040; // IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE + } + write_u16( + &mut self.decompressed, + exe_pe.wrapping_add(0x5E), + dll_chars as u32, + ); + } + + // ---- TLS directory reconstruction (PE32: index 9 = pe+0xC0) ---- + let tls_dir_rva = get_u32(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xC0)); + let tls_dir_sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xC4)); + if tls_dir_rva > 0 + && tls_dir_sz >= 24 + && (tls_dir_rva as usize + 24) <= self.decompressed.len() + { + let all_zero = (0..6u32) + .all(|i| get_u32(&self.decompressed, tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(i * 4)) == 0); + if all_zero { + let image_base = get_u32(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(52)); + // Prefer the module's real TLS directory, which survives in the + // loader stub's plaintext `.rdata`/`.tls`. Only when the stub + // cannot supply one does a placeholder get synthesized: it keeps + // the image loadable, but drops the initialized TLS template, + // `_tls_index` and the TLS callback array, so any module that + // actually uses `thread_local` faults once it runs. + if !self.restore_pe32_tls_from_stub(pe_off, tls_dir_rva, image_base) { + let mut tls_sec_va: u32 = 0; + let mut data_sec_va: u32 = 0; + let mut data_sec_sz: u32 = 0; + let sh = exe_pe + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(get_u16(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(20)) as u32); + let ns = get_u16(&self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + for i in 0..ns { + let s = sh.wrapping_add(i * 40); + let nm = get_string_to_null(&self.decompressed, s); + let va = get_u32(&self.decompressed, s.wrapping_add(12)); + let sz = get_u32(&self.decompressed, s.wrapping_add(16)); + if nm.starts_with(".tls") { + tls_sec_va = va; + } + if nm.starts_with(".data") { + data_sec_va = va; + data_sec_sz = sz; + } + } + if tls_sec_va > 0 && data_sec_va > 0 { + let start_raw = image_base.wrapping_add(tls_sec_va); + let end_raw = start_raw; + let idx_addr = image_base + .wrapping_add(data_sec_va) + .wrapping_add(data_sec_sz) + .wrapping_sub(16); + let cb_addr = image_base + .wrapping_add(data_sec_va) + .wrapping_add(data_sec_sz) + .wrapping_sub(8); + let scratch = (data_sec_va + data_sec_sz - 16) as usize; + for b in &mut self.decompressed[scratch..scratch + 16] { + *b = 0; + } + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, tls_dir_rva, start_raw); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(4), end_raw); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(8), + idx_addr, + ); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(12), + cb_addr, + ); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(16), 0); + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + tls_dir_rva.wrapping_add(20), + 0x30_0000, + ); + } else { + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xC0), 0); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xC4), 0); + } + } + } + } + + // ---- Import table (PE32, 4-byte thunks) ---- + if verbose { + println!("[8/9] Decrypting import strings (PE32)..."); + } + let import_table_addr = eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_import_table); + let mut import_table_ptr = get_u32(&self.decompressed, import_table_addr); + let mut idt_size = get_u32(&self.decompressed, import_table_addr.wrapping_add(4)); + + let metadata_import_rva = get_u32(&metadata_dirs, 8); + let metadata_import_size = get_u32(&metadata_dirs, 12); + let dlen = self.decompressed.len() as u32; + + let mut eighth_import_valid = false; + if 0 < import_table_ptr && import_table_ptr < dlen && 0 < idt_size && idt_size < 0x10000 { + let test_name = if import_table_ptr + 20 <= dlen { + get_u32(&self.decompressed, import_table_ptr.wrapping_add(12)) + } else { + 0 + }; + let test_ilt = if import_table_ptr + 4 <= dlen { + get_u32(&self.decompressed, import_table_ptr) + } else { + 0 + }; + if 0x1000 < test_name && test_name < dlen && 0x1000 < test_ilt && test_ilt < dlen { + eighth_import_valid = true; + } + } + let mut metadata_import_valid = false; + if 0x1000 < metadata_import_rva && metadata_import_rva < dlen.wrapping_sub(20) { + let test_name2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, metadata_import_rva.wrapping_add(12)); + let test_ilt2 = get_u32(&self.decompressed, metadata_import_rva); + if 0x1000 < test_name2 && test_name2 < dlen && 0x1000 < test_ilt2 && test_ilt2 < dlen { + metadata_import_valid = true; + } + } + if metadata_import_valid + && (!eighth_import_valid || metadata_import_rva != import_table_ptr) + { + import_table_ptr = metadata_import_rva; + idt_size = metadata_import_size; + } + + if 0 < import_table_ptr && import_table_ptr < dlen && 0 < idt_size && idt_size < 0x10000 { + let mut idt_pos = import_table_ptr; + let idt_end = import_table_ptr.wrapping_add(idt_size); + while idt_pos.wrapping_add(20) <= idt_end { + let ilt_rva = get_u32(&self.decompressed, idt_pos); + let name_rva = get_u32(&self.decompressed, idt_pos.wrapping_add(12)); + let iat_rva = get_u32(&self.decompressed, idt_pos.wrapping_add(16)); + if ilt_rva == 0 && name_rva == 0 && iat_rva == 0 { + break; + } + if 0 < name_rva && name_rva < dlen { + self.decrypt_data7(name_rva, name_rva as u8); + } + let thunk_base = if 0 < ilt_rva && ilt_rva < dlen { + ilt_rva + } else { + iat_rva + }; + if 0 < thunk_base && thunk_base < dlen.wrapping_sub(4) { + let mut thunk_pos = thunk_base; + while thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4) <= dlen { + let thunk_val = get_u32(&self.decompressed, thunk_pos); + if thunk_val == 0 { + break; + } + if thunk_val & 0x8000_0000 == 0 && thunk_val.wrapping_add(2) < dlen { + self.decrypt_data7(thunk_val.wrapping_add(2), thunk_val as u8); + write_u16(&mut self.decompressed, thunk_val, 0); + } + thunk_pos = thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4); + } + } + idt_pos = idt_pos.wrapping_add(20); + } + } + + // Update PE header: Import directory (index 1 = pe+0x80), clear IAT + // directory (index 12 = pe+0xD8). + write_u32( + &mut self.decompressed, + exe_pe.wrapping_add(0x80), + import_table_ptr, + ); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0x84), idt_size); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xD8), 0); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(0xDC), 0); + + // ---- EP (from metadata) ---- + if metadata_ep > 0 { + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(40), metadata_ep); + } else { + let real_ep = get_u32(self.file_data, pe_off.wrapping_add(40)); + write_u32(&mut self.decompressed, exe_pe.wrapping_add(40), real_ep); + } + + // ---- Output transforms ---- + if verbose { + println!("[9/9] Rebuilding PE file layout (PE32)..."); + } + let mut out = std::mem::take(&mut self.decompressed); + // kmiat import relocation is an EXE-only fixup: it discards the original + // import directory in favour of the loader-written IAT stub. A DLL keeps + // its real import table (restored above from metadata), so skip kmiat for + // DLLs (`!is_dll` guard). + let is_dll = (get_u16(&out, pe_off.wrapping_add(22)) & 0x2000) != 0; + if !is_dll && !primitives::pe32_imports_already_match_idata_layout(&mut out, pe_off) { + primitives::move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat(&mut out, pe_off); + } + let compact = + primitives::compact_memory_image_to_pe(&out, pe_off).ok_or(UnpackError::Corrupt)?; + Ok(compact) + } +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/integrity.rs b/src/unpacker/integrity.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b49cecb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/integrity.rs @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +//! Static sanity check for unpacked PE images. +//! +//! The unpack pipelines can succeed structurally (no error, no panic) yet emit +//! a binary the OS loader rejects at runtime with `0xC0000005` +//! (STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION) — e.g. when the entry-point stub or import strings +//! were left encrypted because a layout heuristic picked the wrong offset. This +//! module inspects the *output* bytes alone (no reference, no execution) and +//! reports defects that are near-certain runtime crashes. +//! +//! It is intentionally conservative: it only flags conditions that cannot occur +//! in a correctly unpacked image, so a clean report is not a guarantee of +//! correctness, but a non-clean report is a reliable "this is broken" signal. +//! +//! All reads are bounds-checked; the check never panics on any input. + +/// Result of a static integrity check over an unpacked image. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)] +pub struct IntegrityReport { + /// Each entry describes one detected defect. Empty means no defect found. + pub issues: Vec, +} + +impl IntegrityReport { + /// True when no defects were detected. + pub fn ok(&self) -> bool { + self.issues.is_empty() + } +} + +// `checked_add`, not `+`: `usize` is 32-bit on wasm32, so a header-derived +// offset near `u32::MAX` would wrap the range and panic (`start > end`) in a +// module documented never to panic on any input. +fn rd_u16(d: &[u8], off: u32) -> Option { + let i = off as usize; + d.get(i..i.checked_add(2)?) + .map(|s| u16::from_le_bytes([s[0], s[1]])) +} + +fn rd_u32(d: &[u8], off: u32) -> Option { + let i = off as usize; + d.get(i..i.checked_add(4)?) + .map(|s| u32::from_le_bytes([s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]])) +} + +/// A parsed section-table entry (only the fields we translate against). +struct Section { + va: u32, + vsize: u32, + raw_ptr: u32, + raw_size: u32, + chars: u32, +} + +/// Walk the output's own section table and translate an RVA to a file offset. +/// Works for both memory-image output (raw_ptr == va) and compacted disk +/// output (real raw pointers), because it consults whatever the output declares. +/// Returns the offset only if the translated range `[off, off+need)` lies inside +/// the file. +fn rva_to_off(secs: &[Section], file_len: usize, rva: u32, need: u32) -> Option { + for s in secs { + // The mapped span is the larger of virtual and raw size, so an RVA that + // falls in the virtual tail of a section still resolves. + let span = s.vsize.max(s.raw_size); + if span == 0 { + continue; + } + if rva >= s.va && rva < s.va.wrapping_add(span) { + let delta = rva - s.va; + let off = s.raw_ptr.checked_add(delta)?; + let end = off.checked_add(need)?; + if (end as usize) <= file_len { + return Some(off); + } + return None; + } + } + None +} + +/// Inspect an unpacked PE image and report any defect that would make the OS +/// loader fault at runtime. `out` is the bytes the unpacker produced. +pub fn check(out: &[u8]) -> IntegrityReport { + let mut r = IntegrityReport::default(); + let file_len = out.len(); + + // --- DOS + PE headers --------------------------------------------------- + if rd_u16(out, 0) != Some(0x5A4D) { + r.issues.push("missing 'MZ' DOS signature".into()); + return r; // nothing else is meaningful + } + let pe_off = match rd_u32(out, 0x3C) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + r.issues.push("truncated DOS header (no e_lfanew)".into()); + return r; + } + }; + if rd_u32(out, pe_off) != Some(0x0000_4550) { + r.issues + .push(format!("missing 'PE\\0\\0' signature at 0x{pe_off:X}")); + return r; + } + + let num_sections = match rd_u16(out, pe_off.wrapping_add(6)) { + Some(v) => v as u32, + None => { + r.issues.push("truncated COFF header".into()); + return r; + } + }; + let opt_hdr_size = rd_u16(out, pe_off.wrapping_add(20)).unwrap_or(0) as u32; + let opt = pe_off.wrapping_add(24); + let magic = match rd_u16(out, opt) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + r.issues.push("truncated optional header".into()); + return r; + } + }; + let is64 = match magic { + 0x20B => true, + 0x10B => false, + other => { + r.issues + .push(format!("bad optional-header magic 0x{other:X}")); + return r; + } + }; + + if num_sections == 0 || num_sections > 96 { + r.issues + .push(format!("implausible section count {num_sections}")); + } + + let size_of_image = rd_u32(out, pe_off.wrapping_add(80)).unwrap_or(0); + if size_of_image == 0 { + r.issues.push("SizeOfImage is zero".into()); + } + + // --- Section table ------------------------------------------------------ + let sec_table = opt.wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size); + let mut secs: Vec
= Vec::new(); + for i in 0..num_sections { + let base = sec_table.wrapping_add(i * 40); + // If the table runs past EOF the image is structurally broken. + let (vsize, va, raw_size, raw_ptr, chars) = match ( + rd_u32(out, base.wrapping_add(8)), + rd_u32(out, base.wrapping_add(12)), + rd_u32(out, base.wrapping_add(16)), + rd_u32(out, base.wrapping_add(20)), + rd_u32(out, base.wrapping_add(36)), + ) { + (Some(a), Some(b), Some(c), Some(d), Some(e)) => (a, b, c, d, e), + _ => { + r.issues + .push("section table extends past end of file".into()); + return r; + } + }; + // Raw data must lie within the file for compacted (disk-layout) output. + if raw_size != 0 { + let end = raw_ptr.wrapping_add(raw_size) as usize; + if end > file_len { + r.issues.push(format!( + "section #{i} raw data [0x{raw_ptr:X}..0x{end:X}] exceeds file size 0x{file_len:X}" + )); + } + } + secs.push(Section { + va, + vsize, + raw_ptr, + raw_size, + chars, + }); + } + + // --- Managed (CLR) detection ------------------------------------------ + // The COR20 (CLR) data directory, when present and non-zero, marks a managed + // assembly. Such images are dispatched through the CLR (via the COR20 header + // + BSJB metadata), not the native loader, so the native-loader heuristics + // below (zeroed EP stub, encrypted first import name) do NOT apply: CrackProof + // legitimately leaves a managed DLL's native EP and import strings in a state + // the native loader would reject, and that state is preserved here. + // Detect it before the EP / import checks so we can scope them to native + // images only. + let clr_rva = rd_u32( + out, + opt.wrapping_add(if is64 { 112 } else { 96 }) + .wrapping_add(14 * 8), + ) + .unwrap_or(0); + let is_managed = clr_rva != 0; + + // --- Native DLL relocatability ------------------------------------------ + // A native DLL is almost always loaded at a non-preferred base, so a + // missing base-relocation directory (DD[5]) is a guaranteed crash on + // rebase — exactly the failure mode produced when an unpacker wrongly + // applies the /FIXED-EXE fixup (zero BaseReloc + DllCharacteristics) to a + // DLL. Managed assemblies are exempt: the CLR rebases nothing through the + // native table, and their golden outputs legitimately carry no DD[5]. + let dd_base = opt.wrapping_add(if is64 { 112 } else { 96 }); + let chars_coff = rd_u16(out, pe_off.wrapping_add(22)).unwrap_or(0); + let is_dll = (chars_coff & 0x2000) != 0; + if is_dll && !is_managed { + let reloc_rva = rd_u32(out, dd_base.wrapping_add(5 * 8)).unwrap_or(0); + if reloc_rva == 0 { + r.issues.push( + "native DLL has no base relocation table (DD[5] is zero) — will crash when loaded at a non-preferred base" + .into(), + ); + } + } + + // --- Entry point -------------------------------------------------------- + // An entry RVA that does not resolve to a section, or whose target bytes are + // all zero, is a guaranteed access violation the instant the loader jumps to + // it. A zeroed/encrypted entry stub is the classic broken-unpack symptom. + let ep = rd_u32(out, pe_off.wrapping_add(40)).unwrap_or(0); + if ep == 0 { + // A DLL may legitimately have no entry point; an EXE never does. + if !is_dll { + r.issues.push("entry point RVA is zero".into()); + } + } else if !is_managed { + match rva_to_off(&secs, file_len, ep, 16) { + None => { + r.issues.push(format!( + "entry point RVA 0x{ep:X} does not map into any section" + )); + } + Some(off) => { + let stub = &out[off as usize..off as usize + 16]; + if stub.iter().all(|&b| b == 0) { + r.issues.push(format!( + "entry point at RVA 0x{ep:X} is all zeros (stub not recovered)" + )); + } else if stub.iter().all(|&b| b == 0xCC) { + // 16 bytes of int3 padding where the entry stub should be: + // the stub region was never recovered, the loader walks + // straight into a debug-break wall. + r.issues.push(format!( + "entry point at RVA 0x{ep:X} is all int3 padding (stub not recovered)" + )); + } + // The entry must live in an executable section. + let exec = secs.iter().any(|s| { + let span = s.vsize.max(s.raw_size); + ep >= s.va && ep < s.va.wrapping_add(span) && (s.chars & 0x2000_0000) != 0 + }); + if !exec { + r.issues.push(format!( + "entry point RVA 0x{ep:X} is not in an executable section" + )); + } + } + } + } + + // --- Import table ------------------------------------------------------- + // If an import directory is present, every descriptor's DLL name must be + // readable printable ASCII. Encrypted/garbage names mean import-string + // decryption failed, and the loader faults resolving them — checking only + // the first descriptor misses later ones still left as ciphertext. Skipped + // for managed assemblies (their import table is a CLR bootstrap stub the + // native loader doesn't resolve the same way). Note this no longer gates + // on NumberOfRvaAndSizes: a corrupt optional header shrinking that field + // must not silence the walk while a bogus import RVA still points at + // ciphertext. + if !is_managed { + let imp_rva = rd_u32(out, dd_base.wrapping_add(8)).unwrap_or(0); + if imp_rva != 0 { + match rva_to_off(&secs, file_len, imp_rva, 20) { + None => r.issues.push(format!( + "import directory RVA 0x{imp_rva:X} does not map into any section" + )), + Some(desc_off) => { + // 256 descriptors is far beyond any real import table; the + // cap keeps a corrupt, never-null table from walking on. + for i in 0..256u32 { + let d_off = desc_off.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(20)); + let name_rva = rd_u32(out, d_off.wrapping_add(12)).unwrap_or(0); + // name_rva == 0 is the terminating null descriptor (or + // a read past the table) — done. + if name_rva == 0 { + break; + } + match rva_to_off(&secs, file_len, name_rva, 1) { + None => r.issues.push(format!( + "import descriptor {i} DLL name RVA 0x{name_rva:X} does not map into any section" + )), + Some(noff) => { + if !looks_like_dll_name(out, noff) { + r.issues.push(format!( + "import descriptor {i} DLL name at RVA 0x{name_rva:X} is not readable ASCII (imports left encrypted?)" + )); + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + + // --- Managed (CLR) header + metadata ------------------------------------ + // For a managed assembly the COR20 (CLR) header and the BSJB MetaData stream + // it points at must survive unpacking intact, or the runtime rejects the + // image with BadImageFormatException ("Invalid COR20 header signature" / + // bad metadata) before any code runs. CrackProof copies both regions through + // verbatim; a unpacker that lets the .text dd8 pass scribble over them (they + // live inside .text) produces a structurally-valid-looking PE that the CLR + // still refuses to load. Validate: COR20 cb == 0x48, and the MetaData stream + // begins with the "BSJB" signature. + if is_managed { + match rva_to_off(&secs, file_len, clr_rva, 0x48) { + None => r.issues.push(format!( + "CLR (COR20) directory RVA 0x{clr_rva:X} does not map into any section" + )), + Some(coff) => { + let cb = rd_u32(out, coff).unwrap_or(0); + if cb != 0x48 { + r.issues.push(format!( + "COR20 header at RVA 0x{clr_rva:X} has cb 0x{cb:X} (expected 0x48) — CLR header corrupt" + )); + } else { + // MetaData RVA/size live at COR20 + 0x08 / + 0x0C. + let md_rva = rd_u32(out, coff.wrapping_add(8)).unwrap_or(0); + if md_rva != 0 { + match rva_to_off(&secs, file_len, md_rva, 4) { + None => r.issues.push(format!( + "CLR MetaData RVA 0x{md_rva:X} does not map into any section" + )), + Some(moff) => { + let sig = out.get(moff as usize..moff as usize + 4); + if sig != Some(b"BSJB") { + r.issues.push(format!( + "CLR MetaData at RVA 0x{md_rva:X} lacks 'BSJB' signature (metadata corrupt — managed image will not load)" + )); + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + + r +} + +/// True if the NUL-terminated string starting at `off` looks like a DLL name: +/// at least one byte, all printable ASCII up to the NUL, within a sane length. +fn looks_like_dll_name(d: &[u8], off: u32) -> bool { + let start = off as usize; + let mut end = start; + let limit = (start + 256).min(d.len()); + while end < limit && d[end] != 0 { + end += 1; + } + if end == start || end >= limit { + return false; // empty, or no NUL within a sane window + } + d[start..end].iter().all(|&b| (0x20..0x7F).contains(&b)) +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/mod.rs b/src/unpacker/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4b9c0a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +//! Pure, panic-free Crackproof unpacker core. No file I/O lives here. + +mod bytecode; +mod crc32; +pub mod dll; +pub mod exe; +pub mod integrity; +pub(crate) mod parallel; +pub(crate) mod primitives; +mod tables; + +pub use dll::{unpack_dll, unpack_dll_v}; +pub use exe::{UnpackError, unpack as unpack_exe, unpack_v as unpack_exe_v}; +pub use integrity::{IntegrityReport, check as check_integrity}; + +/// Maximum plausible PE `SizeOfImage` we are willing to allocate a zero buffer +/// for. Guards against a corrupt/crafted header requesting a multi-gigabyte +/// (or, as a sign-extended negative `i32`, multi-exabyte) allocation, which +/// would abort the process — an abort that `catch_unpack` below cannot trap. +/// Real protected binaries are far below this. +pub(crate) const MAX_IMAGE_SIZE: u64 = 1 << 30; // 1 GiB + +/// Run an unpack pipeline, converting any internal panic into a clean +/// [`UnpackError::Corrupt`] so the public API stays panic-free on any input +/// (truncated/garbled files chase offsets out of bounds). The default panic +/// hook is suppressed transiently so a trapped panic does not spill a +/// backtrace to stderr. +/// +/// Note: allocation *failures* abort the process and are NOT caught here; size +/// requests are bounds-checked against [`MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`] before allocating. +pub(crate) fn catch_unpack(f: F) -> Result, UnpackError> +where + F: FnOnce() -> Result, UnpackError>, +{ + // Hook suppression is skipped on wasm: the prebuilt std cannot unwind + // there, so a panic traps immediately — and the suppressed hook would + // hide the panic message, leaving a bare `unreachable` with no clue. + #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] + let prev = std::panic::take_hook(); + #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] + std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|_| {})); + let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(f)); + #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] + std::panic::set_hook(prev); + r.unwrap_or(Err(UnpackError::Corrupt)) +} + +/// Crackproof header magic stored in `keys[1]`/`info[1]`. +pub(crate) const MAGIC_KONN: u32 = 0x4E4E4F4B; // b"KONN" little-endian (= 1313754955) + +/// True if `magic` is the Crackproof magic this unpacker supports. +pub(crate) fn is_supported_magic(magic: u32) -> bool { + magic == MAGIC_KONN +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Kind { + Exe, + NativeDll, + ManagedDll, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +pub struct Detected { + pub kind: Kind, + pub magic: u32, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Content-based detection +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Derive the 8-element Crackproof key table from the header at offset 4096. +/// Returns `None` if the input is too short or doesn't have a valid PE signature. +fn key_table(input: &[u8]) -> Option<[u32; 8]> { + // Need at least 4128 bytes: the key-table loop below reads dwords up to + // offset 4124 (bytes 4124..4127). Guarding only `< 4096` would let a + // 4096..4127-byte PE (e.g. a 4 KiB stub) panic in `get_u32`. + if input.len() < 4128 { + return None; + } + // Validate PE signature. `checked_add`, not `+`: `usize` is 32-bit on + // wasm32, where an `e_lfanew` of 0xFFFF_FFFC..=0xFFFF_FFFF wraps the bound + // check, and the slice below then panics with start > end. `detect` runs on + // the folder-scan threads and (in the web app) on the main thread outside + // the disposable-worker isolation, so it must not panic on any input. + let e_lfanew = primitives::get_u32(input, 0x3C); + let pe_start = e_lfanew as usize; + if pe_start.checked_add(4).is_none_or(|end| end > input.len()) { + return None; + } + if &input[pe_start..pe_start + 4] != b"PE\0\0" { + return None; + } + // Derive 8 keys per the Crackproof header-key formula. + let mut keys = [0u32; 8]; + keys[0] = primitives::get_u32(input, 4096); + let mut k = keys[0]; + for i in 0u32..7 { + let cell = primitives::get_u32(input, 4100u32.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(4))); + keys[(i + 1) as usize] = k ^ cell; + k = i.wrapping_mul(i) ^ (k.wrapping_add(cell).wrapping_sub(i)); + } + Some(keys) +} + +/// Detect whether `input` is a Crackproof-protected binary and classify it. +/// Returns `None` if the magic doesn't match. +/// +/// Routing: `keys[1]` must be the Crackproof magic (`KONN`). +/// The PE IMAGE_FILE_DLL characteristic distinguishes EXE vs DLL; +/// the CLR data-directory RVA further distinguishes ManagedDll from NativeDll. +pub fn detect(input: &[u8]) -> Option { + let keys = key_table(input)?; + let magic = keys[1]; + // Anything whose magic doesn't match is left untouched rather than + // detected-then-errored, honoring the "anything that doesn't match is + // left untouched" contract. + if !is_supported_magic(magic) { + return None; + } + // Use the PE DLL characteristic to distinguish EXE from DLL. + // IMAGE_FILE_HEADER.Characteristics is at peOff+4+18; bit 0x2000 = IMAGE_FILE_DLL. + let pe_off = primitives::get_u32(input, 0x3C); + let chars_offset = pe_off.wrapping_add(4).wrapping_add(18); + if (chars_offset as usize) + .checked_add(2) + .is_none_or(|end| end > input.len()) + { + return None; + } + let chars = + (input[chars_offset as usize] as u16) | ((input[chars_offset as usize + 1] as u16) << 8); + let is_dll = (chars & 0x2000) != 0; + if !is_dll { + return Some(Detected { + kind: Kind::Exe, + magic, + }); + } + // DLL: determine managed vs native via CLR data-directory RVA. + // peOff + 24 = start of optional header. The data directories start at a + // magic-dependent offset within it: PE32 (0x10B) at +96, PE32+ (0x20B) at + // +112. Using the PE32+ offset on a PE32 image reads the wrong dword and + // can mis-flag a native DLL as managed. + // + // `get_u16`/`get_u32` index unchecked, so every read past the already- + // checked Characteristics word must be bounds-checked first: a truncated + // DLL (e.g. `e_lfanew` pointing at len-24) would otherwise panic here, + // and this detector runs on the folder scan threads where a panic aborts + // the whole run. + let opt_magic_off = pe_off.wrapping_add(24) as usize; + let b = input.get(opt_magic_off..opt_magic_off.checked_add(2)?)?; + let opt_magic = u16::from_le_bytes([b[0], b[1]]); + let dd_off: u32 = if opt_magic == 0x20B { 112 } else { 96 }; + // + 14*8 = IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR + let clr_rva_offset = pe_off + .wrapping_add(24) + .wrapping_add(dd_off) + .wrapping_add(14u32.wrapping_mul(8)); + if (clr_rva_offset as usize) + .checked_add(4) + .is_none_or(|end| end > input.len()) + { + return None; + } + let clr_rva = primitives::get_u32(input, clr_rva_offset); + let kind = if clr_rva != 0 { + Kind::ManagedDll + } else { + Kind::NativeDll + }; + Some(Detected { kind, magic }) +} + +/// Detect the file type and dispatch to the matching pipeline. +/// Returns the detected `Kind` together with the unpacked image bytes. +pub fn unpack_auto(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Kind, Vec), UnpackError> { + unpack_auto_v(input, false) +} + +/// Like [`unpack_auto`], but prints detailed `[N/9]` unpack-step progress to +/// stdout when `verbose` is true. Output bytes are identical regardless. +pub fn unpack_auto_v(input: &[u8], verbose: bool) -> Result<(Kind, Vec), UnpackError> { + let detected = detect(input).ok_or(UnpackError::NotCrackproof)?; + let out = match detected.kind { + Kind::Exe => unpack_exe_v(input, verbose)?, + Kind::NativeDll | Kind::ManagedDll => { + // Two Crackproof DLL layouts exist. The older one (the byte-identical + // DLL goldens) follows the pipeline in `dll.rs`. Newer builds protect + // DLLs with the EXE-style shell layout instead — `dll::unpack_dll` + // cannot parse them and errors. Try the DLL pipeline first; on + // failure, fall back to the EXE pipeline, which handles the new + // layout (including managed-DLL CLR metadata restore). The DLL-first + // order keeps the old-layout goldens byte-identical (the EXE + // pipeline "succeeds" on them but with different bytes). + match dll::unpack_dll_v(input, verbose) { + Ok(out) => out, + Err(dll_err) => match exe::unpack_v(input, verbose) { + Ok(out) => out, + // Surface the DLL-pipeline error, not the EXE one: for a + // genuinely corrupt DLL the DLL error is the more relevant + // diagnostic, and the EXE fallback is best-effort. + Err(_) => return Err(dll_err), + }, + } + } + }; + Ok((detected.kind, out)) +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/parallel.rs b/src/unpacker/parallel.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6e0a8a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/parallel.rs @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +//! Deterministic block-parallel fan-out for the section decrypt/decompress +//! loops. +//! +//! Each block writes a disjoint output span and reads only immutable input plus +//! snapshotted key tables, so distributing blocks across worker threads +//! produces byte-identical output regardless of thread count or scheduling. +//! +//! # Soundness +//! +//! This module contains **no `unsafe`**. The output buffer is carved into the +//! per-block spans with safe `split_at_mut` chains, so Rust itself guarantees +//! no two workers can hold aliasing `&mut` slices — an earlier version handed +//! every worker a whole-buffer `&mut [u8]` reconstructed from a raw pointer, +//! which is UB under Stacked/Tree Borrows even when the concrete writes never +//! overlap. The shared data the blocks read (AES key schedule, Huffman table) +//! is copied out by the caller before the fan-out and captured by the closure, +//! so no shared borrow of the output buffer is needed either. + +use std::sync::Mutex; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + +/// Worker-thread cap. `SENBEI_THREADS` overrides it (`1` forces the sequential +/// path); otherwise the host's available parallelism; otherwise 1. +pub(crate) fn thread_cap() -> usize { + if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("SENBEI_THREADS") + && let Ok(n) = v.trim().parse::() + && n >= 1 + { + return n; + } + std::thread::available_parallelism() + .map(|n| n.get()) + .unwrap_or(1) +} + +/// Run `f(i, span_base, span)` for every block `i`, fanning out across worker +/// threads when the spans are disjoint and worthwhile, else sequentially. +/// +/// `spans[i]` is the `[start, end)` region of `buf` block `i` writes. The +/// closure receives `span_base = spans[i].0` and the disjoint +/// `&mut buf[start..end]`; any shared data it needs must be captured by value +/// before the call. When the spans overlap (only possible on corrupt input), +/// the whole thing degrades to a sequential whole-buffer pass (`span_base = 0`, +/// `span = buf`), which preserves the deterministic last-writer-wins behavior +/// the pipeline had before parallelization. +/// +/// Returns the first `Err` any block produces; re-raises the first block panic +/// on the calling thread (so the pipeline's existing `catch_unpack` still +/// converts it to `UnpackError::Corrupt`). +pub(crate) fn parallel_for( + buf: &mut [u8], + spans: &[(usize, usize)], + min_per_thread: usize, + f: F, +) -> Result<(), E> +where + E: Send, + F: Fn(usize, usize, &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), E> + Sync, +{ + let n = spans.len(); + if n == 0 { + return Ok(()); + } + + // Verify the spans are in-bounds and mutually disjoint. Overlapping spans + // only arise from corrupt block descriptors; the sequential whole-buffer + // fallback handles them exactly as the pre-parallel pipeline did. + let mut sorted: Vec<(u64, u64)> = spans.iter().map(|&(s, e)| (s as u64, e as u64)).collect(); + let in_bounds = spans.iter().all(|&(s, e)| s <= e && e <= buf.len()); + let disjoint = in_bounds && spans_disjoint(&mut sorted); + + if !disjoint { + for i in 0..n { + f(i, 0, &mut *buf)?; + } + return Ok(()); + } + + // Carve the disjoint span pieces out of `buf` with safe splits. Rust's + // borrow checker proves the pieces never alias. + // + // Sort by the whole span, not just its start: `spans_disjoint` compares + // `(start, end)` tuples, so it accepts an empty span that shares a start + // with a non-empty one (`(100,100)` and `(100,200)`). Ordering by start + // alone would then carve them in input order, and a `(100,100)` arriving + // after `(100,200)` makes `s - base` underflow — a panic instead of the + // documented degrade-to-sequential fallback. + let mut order: Vec = (0..n).collect(); + order.sort_by_key(|&i| spans[i]); + let mut pieces: Vec> = Vec::new(); + pieces.resize_with(n, || None); + { + let mut rest: &mut [u8] = buf; + let mut base = 0usize; + for &i in &order { + let (s, e) = spans[i]; + let (_, tail) = rest.split_at_mut(s - base); + let (piece, tail2) = tail.split_at_mut(e - s); + pieces[i] = Some(piece); + rest = tail2; + base = e; + } + } + + let cap = thread_cap(); + let per = min_per_thread.max(1); + let workers = if cap > 1 && n >= per.saturating_mul(2) { + cap.min(n / per) + } else { + 1 + }; + + if workers <= 1 { + // Fully safe baseline: sequential on the current thread; panics and + // `Err`s propagate exactly as they did before parallelization. + for (i, piece) in pieces.into_iter().enumerate() { + f(i, spans[i].0, piece.unwrap())?; + } + return Ok(()); + } + + // Hand each span piece to exactly one worker through a shared iterator: + // the `&mut [u8]` is moved, never aliased. + let iter = Mutex::new(pieces.into_iter().enumerate()); + let stop = AtomicBool::new(false); + let first_err: Mutex> = Mutex::new(None); + let first_panic: Mutex>> = Mutex::new(None); + + std::thread::scope(|scope| { + for _ in 0..workers { + let iter = &iter; + let stop = &stop; + let first_err = &first_err; + let first_panic = &first_panic; + let f = &f; + scope.spawn(move || { + loop { + if stop.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { + break; + } + let next = iter.lock().unwrap().next(); + let Some((i, piece)) = next else { break }; + let span = piece.unwrap(); + let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + f(i, spans[i].0, span) + })); + match r { + Ok(Ok(())) => {} + Ok(Err(e)) => { + let mut slot = first_err.lock().unwrap(); + if slot.is_none() { + *slot = Some(e); + } + stop.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed); + break; + } + Err(panic) => { + let mut slot = first_panic.lock().unwrap(); + if slot.is_none() { + *slot = Some(panic); + } + stop.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed); + break; + } + } + } + }); + } + }); + + if let Some(panic) = first_panic.into_inner().unwrap() { + std::panic::resume_unwind(panic); + } + match first_err.into_inner().unwrap() { + Some(e) => Err(e), + None => Ok(()), + } +} + +/// True if the half-open spans are mutually disjoint. Spans are +/// `[write_base, write_base + max(compressed_len, decompressed_len))` so a block +/// whose decompressed output exceeds its compressed size is fully covered. A +/// conservative (larger) span can only push a borderline case onto the safe +/// sequential path, never the reverse, so it cannot change output. +pub(crate) fn spans_disjoint(spans: &mut [(u64, u64)]) -> bool { + spans.sort_unstable(); + for w in spans.windows(2) { + if w[1].0 < w[0].1 { + return false; + } + } + true +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + /// Review regression: an empty span sharing a start with a non-empty one + /// passes `spans_disjoint` (it genuinely overlaps nothing), so the carve + /// runs. Ordering the carve by start alone put `(100,100)` after + /// `(100,200)` — `s - base` then underflowed and panicked instead of doing + /// the work. Reachable from a corrupt descriptor chain whose block size is + /// negative and whose expected length is zero. + #[test] + fn carves_empty_span_sharing_a_start() { + let mut buf = vec![0u8; 512]; + // Non-empty span first in input order, empty span second: the order + // that used to underflow. + let spans = [(100usize, 200usize), (100, 100)]; + let seen: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + let r: Result<(), ()> = parallel_for(&mut buf, &spans, 1, |i, base, span| { + seen.lock().unwrap().push((i, base, span.len())); + for b in span.iter_mut() { + *b = 0xAB; + } + Ok(()) + }); + assert!(r.is_ok()); + let mut seen = seen.into_inner().unwrap(); + seen.sort_unstable(); + assert_eq!(seen, vec![(0, 100, 100), (1, 100, 0)]); + assert!(buf[100..200].iter().all(|&b| b == 0xAB)); + assert!(buf[..100].iter().all(|&b| b == 0)); + assert!(buf[200..].iter().all(|&b| b == 0)); + } +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/primitives.rs b/src/unpacker/primitives.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f003261 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/primitives.rs @@ -0,0 +1,2268 @@ +//! Shared crypto primitives and helper utilities. +//! +//! All functions here are `pub(crate)` so that both the EXE unpacker (`exe.rs`) +//! and the future DLL unpacker (`dll.rs`) can call them without duplication. +//! Each free function is self-contained: it takes the relevant byte buffer(s) +//! and parameters explicitly, with no coupling to the EXE `Unpacker` struct. + +use super::bytecode::{Op, OpsLut}; +use super::crc32; +use super::tables::{COLUMMIX1, COLUMMIX2, COLUMMIX3, COLUMMIX4, SBOX}; +use std::cell::RefCell; + +thread_local! { + /// Reusable scratch for `decompress`. A single unpack runs `decompress` + /// hundreds of times over small blocks; reusing one growable buffer avoids a + /// fresh allocation each call. Thread-local, so it stays correct (one buffer + /// per worker) under the parallel block fan-out. + static DECOMPRESS_SCRATCH: RefCell> = const { RefCell::new(Vec::new()) }; +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Byte-order accessors +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +pub(crate) fn get_u16(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> u16 { + let i = offset as usize; + u16::from_le_bytes([data[i], data[i + 1]]) +} + +pub(crate) fn get_u32(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> u32 { + let i = offset as usize; + u32::from_le_bytes([data[i], data[i + 1], data[i + 2], data[i + 3]]) +} + +pub(crate) fn get_u64(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> u64 { + let i = offset as usize; + u64::from_le_bytes([ + data[i], + data[i + 1], + data[i + 2], + data[i + 3], + data[i + 4], + data[i + 5], + data[i + 6], + data[i + 7], + ]) +} + +pub(crate) fn write_u16(data: &mut [u8], offset: u32, value: u32) { + let i = offset as usize; + let v = value as u16; + let b = v.to_le_bytes(); + data[i] = b[0]; + data[i + 1] = b[1]; +} + +pub(crate) fn write_u32(data: &mut [u8], offset: u32, value: u32) { + let i = offset as usize; + let b = value.to_le_bytes(); + data[i] = b[0]; + data[i + 1] = b[1]; + data[i + 2] = b[2]; + data[i + 3] = b[3]; +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Checked accessors (return Err instead of panicking on OOB) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[allow(dead_code)] +pub(crate) fn try_u32(d: &[u8], off: usize) -> Result { + d.get(off..off + 4) + .map(|s| u32::from_le_bytes(s.try_into().unwrap())) + .ok_or(super::UnpackError::OutOfBounds(off)) +} + +#[allow(dead_code)] +pub(crate) fn try_i32(d: &[u8], off: usize) -> Result { + try_u32(d, off).map(|v| v as i32) +} + +/// Checked copy: returns OutOfBounds if src or dst ranges exceed their respective slices. +pub(crate) fn try_copy_from_slice( + dst: &mut [u8], + dst_off: usize, + dst_len: usize, + src: &[u8], + src_off: usize, +) -> Result<(), super::UnpackError> { + let dst_end = dst_off + .checked_add(dst_len) + .ok_or(super::UnpackError::OutOfBounds(dst_off))?; + let src_end = src_off + .checked_add(dst_len) + .ok_or(super::UnpackError::OutOfBounds(src_off))?; + if dst_end > dst.len() { + return Err(super::UnpackError::OutOfBounds(dst_off)); + } + if src_end > src.len() { + return Err(super::UnpackError::OutOfBounds(src_off)); + } + dst[dst_off..dst_end].copy_from_slice(&src[src_off..src_end]); + Ok(()) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Locator helpers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Find the 4-byte v_val that follows the LAST occurrence of `48 EB 01 B9` +/// (REX.W jmp+1; mov ecx,imm32) plus any 0xCC padding. Used to locate +/// stage4's accum2 seed. Works across builds even when API-name anchors are +/// absent. +pub(crate) fn find_v_after_pad(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option { + let start = base as usize; + let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize; + if end > data.len() { + return None; + } + let sig = [0x48u8, 0xEB, 0x01, 0xB9]; + let slice = &data[start..end]; + // last occurrence + let mut last = None; + let mut i = 0usize; + while i + sig.len() <= slice.len() { + if slice[i..i + sig.len()] == sig { + last = Some(i); + } + i += 1; + } + let pos = last?; + // skip CCs after the `48 EB 01 B9` + let mut after = pos + sig.len(); + while after < slice.len() && slice[after] == 0xCC { + after += 1; + } + if after + 4 > slice.len() { + return None; + } + Some((start + after) as u32) +} + +/// Predict the 4 bytes that DecryptData5(va, size) would produce at va+0..va+4 +/// without mutating the buffer. The cipher's per-byte transform depends only +/// on the byte itself and the low 8 bits of (va+i), with no cross-byte state, +/// so each byte can be decrypted in isolation. Used to detect the EP/DD layout +/// offset before committing to the actual call. +pub(crate) fn trial_decrypt5_u32(data: &[u8], va: u32) -> u32 { + let mut out = [0u8; 4]; + for i in 0..4u32 { + let b3 = data[(va + i) as usize]; + let b = (va + i) as u8; + let b2 = b.wrapping_add(1); + let b4 = b3.rotate_left(2) ^ b2; + let b5 = b4.rotate_left(2) ^ b; + out[i as usize] = b5.rotate_left(2); + } + u32::from_le_bytes(out) +} + +/// Reproduce the LFSR keystream that decrypt_data6 XORs in. Used to +/// trial-decrypt candidate bytecode positions without mutating the buffer. +pub(crate) fn lfsr_keystream(out: &mut [u8]) { + let mut state: u32 = 1; + for byte in out.iter_mut() { + let mut b: u8 = 0; + for k in 0..8u32 { + b |= ((state & 1) << k) as u8; + state <<= 1; + if state & 0x8000 != 0 { + state ^= 0x8003; + } + } + *byte = b; + } +} + +/// Scan stage4/stage5 for the encrypted custom-decryptor bytecode block. The +/// raw byte at p+95 is used by decrypt_data6 as the iteration count. We trial- +/// decrypt that many bytes with the LFSR keystream and accept the first +/// position where the byte stream parses as a valid opcode sequence ending in +/// 195 (ret). +pub(crate) fn find_bytecode_offset(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option { + let start = base as usize; + let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize; + if end > data.len() { + return None; + } + let mut ks = [0u8; 256]; + lfsr_keystream(&mut ks); + // Scan forward from `start+16` on 16-byte boundaries relative to `start`. + // The bytecode block is positioned a fixed offset into stage4/stage5; the + // lowest parseable candidate is the real one (later ones are coincidental + // parses of trailing filler bytes that happen to map to valid opcodes). + // The enclosing buffer isn't necessarily 16-aligned to its absolute + // address in newer builds, so we anchor the stride to `start`. + let mut p = start + 16; + while p + 96 <= end { + let count = data[p + 95] as usize; + if count >= 8 && p + count <= end { + let mut buf = [0u8; 256]; + let take = count.min(256); + for i in 0..take { + buf[i] = data[p + i] ^ ks[i]; + } + if let Some(nops) = parse_bytecode_check(&buf[..take]) + && nops >= 4 + { + return Some(p as u32); + } + } + p += 16; + } + None +} + +/// Validate bytecode structure without allocating a `Vec` of ops. Returns +/// `Some(non_nop_op_count)` if the byte stream parses successfully as a valid +/// opcode sequence ending in 195 (ret), `None` otherwise. Allows non-trivial +/// bytecode filtering by op count. +pub(crate) fn parse_bytecode_check(buf: &[u8]) -> Option { + let mut i = 0usize; + let mut nops: usize = 0; + while i < buf.len() { + let b = buf[i]; + i += 1; + match b { + 4 | 44 | 52 => { + if i >= buf.len() { + return None; + } + i += 1; + nops += 1; + } + 144 => {} + 192 | 254 => { + if i >= buf.len() { + return None; + } + let mb = buf[i]; + i += 1; + let rm = mb & 7; + let mod_ = (mb >> 6) & 3; + let reg = (mb >> 3) & 7; + if mod_ != 3 || rm != 0 { + return None; + } + if reg > 1 { + return None; + } + if b == 192 { + if i >= buf.len() { + return None; + } + i += 1; + } + nops += 1; + } + 195 => return Some(nops), + _ => return None, + } + } + None +} + +/// Locate stage3's v4_val: the last non-zero dword in the buffer, anchored +/// by the `C3 CC CC CC` (ret + 3 int3) immediately before it. +pub(crate) fn find_v4_offset(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32) -> Option { + let start = base as usize; + let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize; + if end > data.len() || end < start + 4 { + return None; + } + // walk backwards looking for the first non-zero byte + let mut i = end; + while i > start && data[i - 1] == 0 { + i -= 1; + } + if i < start + 4 { + return None; + } + // v_val occupies the 4 bytes ending at i (rounded up to dword boundary) + let v_end = i; + let v_start = ((v_end + 3) & !3).saturating_sub(4); + // require that the 4 bytes preceding v_val match `C3 CC CC CC` + if v_start < start + 4 || data[v_start - 4..v_start] != [0xC3, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC] { + return None; + } + Some(v_start as u32) +} + +/// Scan a sub-buffer for an ASCII needle; return its absolute position. +pub(crate) fn find_str_pos(data: &[u8], base: u32, len: u32, needle: &[u8]) -> Option { + let start = base as usize; + let end = (base.saturating_add(len)) as usize; + if end > data.len() || needle.is_empty() { + return None; + } + data[start..end] + .windows(needle.len()) + .position(|w| w == needle) + .map(|rel| (start + rel) as u32) +} + +pub(crate) fn get_string_to_null(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> String { + let start = offset as usize; + if start >= data.len() { + return String::new(); + } + // Bounded: an unterminated run must never walk off the end of the buffer + // (panic) or scan unboundedly into unrelated data. + let limit = start.saturating_add(4096).min(data.len()); + let mut i = start; + while i < limit && data[i] != 0 { + i += 1; + } + String::from_utf8_lossy(&data[start..i]).into_owned() +} + +/// Read a PE section-name field: exactly 8 bytes, NOT necessarily +/// NUL-terminated (a full-width name like `.textbss` has no NUL at all). +/// Returns the name with trailing NULs stripped. Using `get_string_to_null` +/// here would run past the field into the VirtualSize/VirtualAddress dwords. +pub(crate) fn section_name(data: &[u8], offset: u32) -> String { + let start = offset as usize; + let Some(field) = data.get(start..start + 8) else { + return String::new(); + }; + let end = field.iter().position(|&b| b == 0).unwrap_or(8); + String::from_utf8_lossy(&field[..end]).into_owned() +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// AES primitives +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// One AES-CBC-like round over a 16-byte block in `d` at `pos`, using the +/// expanded key schedule stored in `d` at `key_offset`. Works entirely within +/// the single `d` buffer (both ciphertext and key schedule live there). +pub(crate) fn aes_round(d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, key_offset: u32, round: u32) { + let cm1 = &COLUMMIX1; + let cm2 = &COLUMMIX2; + let cm3 = &COLUMMIX3; + let cm4 = &COLUMMIX4; + let sbox = &SBOX; + + let mut n0 = get_u32(d, pos).swap_bytes() ^ get_u32(d, key_offset); + let mut n1 = + get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)).swap_bytes() ^ get_u32(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(4)); + let mut n2 = + get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(8)).swap_bytes() ^ get_u32(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(8)); + let mut n3 = + get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(12)).swap_bytes() ^ get_u32(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(12)); + + let mut r = 1u32; + while r < round { + let off = key_offset.wrapping_add(r.wrapping_mul(16)); + let a = get_u32(cm2, ((n3 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n2 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n0 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n1 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(d, off); + let b = get_u32(cm2, ((n0 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n1 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n3 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n2 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(d, off.wrapping_add(4)); + let c = get_u32(cm2, ((n1 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n0 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n2 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n3 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(d, off.wrapping_add(8)); + let e = get_u32(cm3, ((n1 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm2, ((n2 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n3 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n0 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(d, off.wrapping_add(12)); + n0 = a; + n1 = b; + n2 = c; + n3 = e; + r = r.wrapping_add(1); + } + + let s0 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n1 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s1 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n2 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s2 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n3 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s3 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n0 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + + let last = key_offset.wrapping_add(round.wrapping_mul(16)); + n0 = s0 ^ get_u32(d, last); + n1 = s1 ^ get_u32(d, last.wrapping_add(4)); + n2 = s2 ^ get_u32(d, last.wrapping_add(8)); + n3 = s3 ^ get_u32(d, last.wrapping_add(12)); + + write_u32(d, pos, n0.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4), n1.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(8), n2.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(12), n3.swap_bytes()); +} + +/// AES-CBC-like decryption over `size` bytes starting at `pos` in `d`. +/// The key schedule lives at `key_offset` within the same buffer `d`. +pub(crate) fn aes_decrypt(d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, size: u32, key_offset: u32) { + let mut prev = [0u8; 16]; + let mut cur = [0u8; 16]; + let round = get_u16(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(2)) as u32; + let blocks = size >> 4; + for i in 0..blocks { + let p = pos.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(16)); + let pi = p as usize; + cur.copy_from_slice(&d[pi..pi + 16]); + aes_round(d, p, key_offset.wrapping_add(4), round); + for j in 0..16 { + d[pi + j] ^= prev[j]; + } + prev = cur; + } +} + +/// [`aes_decrypt`] variant reading the key schedule from a separate snapshot +/// slice instead of the data buffer. `ks` is a snapshot of `d[key_offset..]` +/// taken by [`aes_schedule_snapshot`] (round count at `ks[2]`, round keys from +/// `ks[4]`), so the schedule extent is exactly right by construction. Used by +/// the parallel block fan-out, where each worker owns a disjoint `&mut` span +/// of the image and cannot read the schedule out of the shared buffer. +pub(crate) fn aes_decrypt_ks(ks: &[u8], d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, size: u32) { + let mut prev = [0u8; 16]; + let mut cur = [0u8; 16]; + let round = u16::from_le_bytes([ks[2], ks[3]]) as u32; + let sched = &ks[4..]; + let blocks = size >> 4; + for i in 0..blocks { + let p = pos.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(16)); + let pi = p as usize; + cur.copy_from_slice(&d[pi..pi + 16]); + aes_round_ks(sched, d, p, round); + for j in 0..16 { + d[pi + j] ^= prev[j]; + } + prev = cur; + } +} + +/// [`aes_round`] with the round keys in a separate slice (see +/// [`aes_decrypt_ks`]). Identical math; only the key source differs. +fn aes_round_ks(ks: &[u8], d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, round: u32) { + let cm1 = &COLUMMIX1; + let cm2 = &COLUMMIX2; + let cm3 = &COLUMMIX3; + let cm4 = &COLUMMIX4; + let sbox = &SBOX; + let k = |i: u32| get_u32(ks, i); + + let mut n0 = get_u32(d, pos).swap_bytes() ^ k(0); + let mut n1 = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)).swap_bytes() ^ k(4); + let mut n2 = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(8)).swap_bytes() ^ k(8); + let mut n3 = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(12)).swap_bytes() ^ k(12); + + let mut r = 1u32; + while r < round { + let off = r.wrapping_mul(16); + let a = get_u32(cm2, ((n3 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n2 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n0 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n1 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ k(off); + let b = get_u32(cm2, ((n0 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n1 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n3 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n2 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ k(off.wrapping_add(4)); + let c = get_u32(cm2, ((n1 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm3, ((n0 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n2 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n3 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ k(off.wrapping_add(8)); + let e = get_u32(cm3, ((n1 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm2, ((n2 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm1, ((n3 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ get_u32(cm4, (n0 & 0xFF) * 4) + ^ k(off.wrapping_add(12)); + n0 = a; + n1 = b; + n2 = c; + n3 = e; + r = r.wrapping_add(1); + } + + let s0 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n1 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s1 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n2 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s2 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n0 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n3 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + let s3 = (get_u32(sbox, ((n3 >> 24) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0xFF00_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n2 >> 16) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x00FF_0000) + | (get_u32(sbox, ((n1 >> 8) & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_FF00) + | (get_u32(sbox, (n0 & 0xFF) * 4) & 0x0000_00FF); + + let last = round.wrapping_mul(16); + n0 = s0 ^ k(last); + n1 = s1 ^ k(last.wrapping_add(4)); + n2 = s2 ^ k(last.wrapping_add(8)); + n3 = s3 ^ k(last.wrapping_add(12)); + + write_u32(d, pos, n0.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4), n1.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(8), n2.swap_bytes()); + write_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(12), n3.swap_bytes()); +} + +/// Snapshot the AES key schedule at `key_offset` for [`aes_decrypt_ks`]: +/// `d[key_offset .. key_offset + 4 + (round+1)*16]` where `round` is read from +/// the schedule header. Returns `None` when the header is truncated or the +/// round count is implausible (corrupt input — the same bytes would otherwise +/// drive reads past the buffer). +pub(crate) fn aes_schedule_snapshot(d: &[u8], key_offset: u32) -> Option> { + let base = key_offset as usize; + let round = u16::from_le_bytes([*d.get(base + 2)?, *d.get(base + 3)?]) as usize; + if round > 64 { + return None; + } + let end = base.checked_add(4 + (round + 1) * 16)?; + if end > d.len() { + return None; + } + Some(d[base..end].to_vec()) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Checksum primitives +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// CRC32-based checksum over a (offset, length) descriptor pair embedded in +/// `d` at `pos`. Returns `crc32(d[offset..offset+length]) ^ length`. +pub(crate) fn calculate_checksum(d: &[u8], pos: u32) -> u32 { + let offset = get_u32(d, pos); + let length = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)); + crc32::compute(&d[offset as usize..(offset + length) as usize]) ^ length +} + +/// CRC32 chained checksum. The (offset, length) descriptor at `pos` is read +/// from `d`; the bytes themselves are read from the separate `clean` buffer +/// (the original file image). `start` is the initial CRC accumulator. +pub(crate) fn calculate_checksum2(d: &[u8], clean: &[u8], pos: u32, start: u32) -> u32 { + let offset = get_u32(d, pos); + let length = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)); + crc32::append(start, &clean[offset as usize..(offset + length) as usize]) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Decompression (Huffman/LZ) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Huffman/LZ decompression operating entirely within a single `d` buffer. +/// Reads `s_size` bytes from `src`, writes `d_size` bytes to `dest`. +/// The Huffman table lives at `key_offset` within `d`. +/// +/// Returns `true` when exactly `d_size` bytes were written (full success), +/// `false` on any corruption-triggered early exit. The PE32 eighth-stage key +/// brute force uses this status to discriminate the correct key. +pub(crate) fn decompress( + d: &mut [u8], + src: u32, + mut dest: u32, + key_offset: u32, + s_size: u32, + d_size: u32, +) -> bool { + // Bound the scratch allocation: a corrupt descriptor could request a + // multi-gigabyte source size, and an allocation failure aborts the process + // (uncatchable). Real payloads are far below this. + if s_size as u64 > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return false; + } + DECOMPRESS_SCRATCH.with_borrow_mut(|buf| { + let mut bit_pos: i32 = 0; + let need = (s_size as usize).saturating_add(3); + if buf.len() < need { + buf.resize(need, 0); + } + let mut buf_off: u32 = 0; + let mut src_consumed: i32 = 0; + let mut pending: u32 = 0; + let mut written: u32 = 0; + let src_u = src as usize; + let s_size_u = s_size as usize; + // The bit-reader's final get_u32 may read up to 3 bytes past s_size; those + // must be zero. Reused scratch can hold stale bytes there, so zero them + // before copying the (exactly s_size) source over the head. + buf[s_size_u] = 0; + buf[s_size_u + 1] = 0; + buf[s_size_u + 2] = 0; + buf[..s_size_u].copy_from_slice(&d[src_u..src_u + s_size_u]); + + while (src_consumed as u32) < s_size && written < d_size { + let word = get_u32(&buf[..], buf_off) >> bit_pos; + let tab_addr = key_offset.wrapping_add((word & 0xFF).wrapping_mul(3)); + let mut tab = get_u16(d, tab_addr); + let bits: u8; + if (tab & 0x8000) != 0 { + tab &= 0x7FFF; + bits = d[tab_addr as usize + 2]; + } else { + let mut b2 = d[tab_addr as usize + 2]; + // A Huffman code longer than 32 bits cannot exist; a larger + // length byte comes from a corrupt table, and `1 << b2` would + // panic (debug) or wrap (release) on it. + if b2 >= 32 { + return false; + } + let mut mask: u32 = 1u32 << b2; + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + let mut idx = (tab & 0x7FFF) as u32 + if (word & mask) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + let mut t2 = get_u16(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(idx.wrapping_mul(3))); + // A corrupt table can form a non-terminal cycle; cap the walk so it + // fails instead of spinning forever. + let mut depth = 0u32; + while (t2 & 0x8000) == 0 { + depth += 1; + if depth > 64 { + return false; + } + mask <<= 1; + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + idx = (t2 & 0x7FFF) as u32 + if (word & mask) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + t2 = get_u16(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(idx.wrapping_mul(3))); + } + tab = t2 & 0x7FFF; + bits = b2; + } + bit_pos += bits as i32; + let advance = bit_pos / 8; + buf_off = buf_off.wrapping_add(advance as u32); + src_consumed += advance; + bit_pos %= 8; + + let mode = (tab as u32) & 0x300; + let payload = (tab as u32) & 0xFF; + let step: u32; + match mode { + 0 => { + step = 1; + d[dest as usize] = payload as u8; + } + 0x100 => { + step = 0; + if pending >= 256 { + // corrupt input: stop decompressing (diagnostics go to caller/log, not stdout) + return false; + } + pending = if pending == 0 { + payload + } else { + (pending << 8) | payload + }; + } + 0x200 => { + if pending == 0 { + pending = 1; + } + step = pending.wrapping_mul(payload); + if step.wrapping_add(written) > d_size { + return false; + } + // Run-fill replicates the unit just written before `dest`. A + // corrupt stream can emit one of these before anything has been + // written, so guard against reading before the buffer start + // (an unsigned underflow would index astronomically far OOB). + match payload { + 1 => { + if dest < 1 { + return false; + } + let v = d[(dest as usize) - 1]; + for k in 0..pending { + d[(dest + k) as usize] = v; + } + } + 2 => { + if dest < 2 { + return false; + } + let v = get_u16(d, dest.wrapping_sub(2)); + for k in 0..pending { + write_u16(d, dest.wrapping_add(k.wrapping_mul(2)), v as u32); + } + } + 4 => { + if dest < 4 { + return false; + } + let v = get_u32(d, dest.wrapping_sub(4)); + for k in 0..pending { + write_u32(d, dest.wrapping_add(k.wrapping_mul(4)), v); + } + } + _ => { + // Only unit widths 1/2/4 exist. Any other payload comes + // from a corrupt stream: previously this wrote nothing + // yet still counted `step` bytes as written, leaving + // stale-buffer holes that later stages treated as + // plaintext. Report corruption instead. + return false; + } + } + pending = 0; + } + _ => { + step = payload; + if written.wrapping_add(payload) > d_size + || pending.wrapping_add(payload) > written + { + return false; + } + let back = pending.wrapping_add(payload); + for k in 0..payload { + d[(dest + k) as usize] = d[(dest + k - back) as usize]; + } + pending = 0; + } + } + + dest = dest.wrapping_add(step); + written = written.wrapping_add(step); + if bits == 0 && step == 0 { + // Corrupt table: no input bits consumed and no output bytes + // written, so the loop condition can never advance — an + // infinite loop (and `catch_unpack` traps panics, not hangs). + // Every real symbol consumes ≥ 1 bit, so a valid stream can + // never hit this. + return false; + } + } + src_consumed += if bit_pos != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + // Mismatch in consumed/written sizes indicates corrupt input; the unpack + // result will then fail downstream checks. No stdout diagnostics here — + // the pure core stays I/O-free; surface errors via the caller/logfile. + let _ = src_consumed; + written == d_size + }) +} + +/// Walk the Huffman table at `key_offset` and snapshot its bytes for +/// [`decompress_tbl`]. The table is a forest of 256 root entries (3 bytes +/// each); non-terminal entries point at a child index pair. Returns `None` +/// when the table is truncated or self-referential past the buffer (corrupt +/// input — the same bytes would otherwise drive reads out of bounds). +pub(crate) fn huffman_table_snapshot(d: &[u8], key_offset: u32) -> Option> { + let mut visited = vec![false; 0x1_0000usize]; + let mut stack: Vec = (0..256).collect(); + let mut max_idx: u32 = 255; + while let Some(idx) = stack.pop() { + if idx >= 0x1_0000 || visited[idx as usize] { + continue; + } + visited[idx as usize] = true; + let off = key_offset as usize + idx as usize * 3; + if off + 3 > d.len() { + return None; + } + let t = get_u16(d, key_offset.wrapping_add(idx.wrapping_mul(3))); + if (t & 0x8000) == 0 { + let child = (t & 0x7FFF) as u32; + max_idx = max_idx.max(child).max(child.wrapping_add(1)); + stack.push(child); + stack.push(child.wrapping_add(1)); + } + } + let end = key_offset as usize + (max_idx as usize + 1) * 3; + if end > d.len() { + return None; + } + Some(d[key_offset as usize..end].to_vec()) +} + +/// [`decompress`] variant reading the Huffman table from a separate snapshot +/// slice (see [`huffman_table_snapshot`]) instead of the data buffer. Used by +/// the parallel block fan-out, where each worker owns a disjoint `&mut` span +/// and cannot read the table out of the shared image. Table reads are bounds +/// checked against the snapshot — past-the-end means corrupt table, reported +/// as `false` rather than a panic. +pub(crate) fn decompress_tbl( + tab: &[u8], + d: &mut [u8], + src: u32, + mut dest: u32, + s_size: u32, + d_size: u32, +) -> bool { + if s_size as u64 > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return false; + } + DECOMPRESS_SCRATCH.with_borrow_mut(|buf| { + // Table reads, bounds-checked against the snapshot. + let tab16 = |addr: usize| -> Option { + let b = tab.get(addr..addr + 3)?; + Some(u16::from_le_bytes([b[0], b[1]])) + }; + let tab8 = |addr: usize| -> Option { tab.get(addr + 2).copied() }; + + let mut bit_pos: i32 = 0; + let need = (s_size as usize).saturating_add(3); + if buf.len() < need { + buf.resize(need, 0); + } + let mut buf_off: u32 = 0; + let mut src_consumed: i32 = 0; + let mut pending: u32 = 0; + let mut written: u32 = 0; + let src_u = src as usize; + let s_size_u = s_size as usize; + buf[s_size_u] = 0; + buf[s_size_u + 1] = 0; + buf[s_size_u + 2] = 0; + buf[..s_size_u].copy_from_slice(&d[src_u..src_u + s_size_u]); + + while (src_consumed as u32) < s_size && written < d_size { + let word = get_u32(&buf[..], buf_off) >> bit_pos; + let tab_addr = ((word & 0xFF).wrapping_mul(3)) as usize; + let mut tab = match tab16(tab_addr) { + Some(t) => t, + None => { + return false; + } + }; + let bits: u8; + if (tab & 0x8000) != 0 { + tab &= 0x7FFF; + bits = match tab8(tab_addr) { + Some(b) => b, + None => return false, + }; + } else { + let mut b2 = match tab8(tab_addr) { + Some(b) => b, + None => return false, + }; + if b2 >= 32 { + return false; + } + let mut mask: u32 = 1u32 << b2; + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + let mut idx = (tab & 0x7FFF) as u32 + if (word & mask) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + let mut t2 = match tab16(idx as usize * 3) { + Some(t) => t, + None => { + return false; + } + }; + // A corrupt table can form a non-terminal cycle; cap the walk so it + // fails instead of spinning forever. + let mut depth = 0u32; + while (t2 & 0x8000) == 0 { + depth += 1; + if depth > 64 { + return false; + } + mask <<= 1; + b2 = b2.wrapping_add(1); + idx = (t2 & 0x7FFF) as u32 + if (word & mask) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + t2 = match tab16(idx as usize * 3) { + Some(t) => t, + None => { + return false; + } + }; + } + tab = t2 & 0x7FFF; + bits = b2; + } + bit_pos += bits as i32; + let advance = bit_pos / 8; + buf_off = buf_off.wrapping_add(advance as u32); + src_consumed += advance; + bit_pos %= 8; + + let mode = (tab as u32) & 0x300; + let payload = (tab as u32) & 0xFF; + let step: u32; + match mode { + 0 => { + step = 1; + d[dest as usize] = payload as u8; + } + 0x100 => { + step = 0; + if pending >= 256 { + return false; + } + pending = if pending == 0 { + payload + } else { + (pending << 8) | payload + }; + } + 0x200 => { + if pending == 0 { + pending = 1; + } + step = pending.wrapping_mul(payload); + if step.wrapping_add(written) > d_size { + return false; + } + // Run-fill replicates the unit just written before `dest` + // (see `decompress` for the underflow rationale). + match payload { + 1 => { + if dest < 1 { + return false; + } + let v = d[(dest as usize) - 1]; + for k in 0..pending { + d[(dest + k) as usize] = v; + } + } + 2 => { + if dest < 2 { + return false; + } + let v = get_u16(d, dest.wrapping_sub(2)); + for k in 0..pending { + write_u16(d, dest.wrapping_add(k.wrapping_mul(2)), v as u32); + } + } + 4 => { + if dest < 4 { + return false; + } + let v = get_u32(d, dest.wrapping_sub(4)); + for k in 0..pending { + write_u32(d, dest.wrapping_add(k.wrapping_mul(4)), v); + } + } + _ => { + return false; + } + } + pending = 0; + } + _ => { + step = payload; + if written.wrapping_add(payload) > d_size + || pending.wrapping_add(payload) > written + { + return false; + } + let back = pending.wrapping_add(payload); + for k in 0..payload { + d[(dest + k) as usize] = d[(dest + k - back) as usize]; + } + pending = 0; + } + } + + dest = dest.wrapping_add(step); + written = written.wrapping_add(step); + if bits == 0 && step == 0 { + return false; + } + } + src_consumed += if bit_pos != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }; + let _ = src_consumed; + written == d_size + }) +} +// Decrypt primitives (free-function wrappers) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// PE32 (32-bit) helpers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// PE32 shell-table locator. Walks the shell region (`info[6]`) for a dword +/// equal to `info[6]` followed by a plausible shell size, returning the table +/// base (`candidate = off - 0x88`) when `candidate+0x58` holds a valid pointer. +pub(crate) fn find_tbl_pe32(data: &[u8], info: &[u32; 8]) -> Option { + let shell = info[6]; + if (data.len() as u64) < 0x100 { + return None; + } + let hi = (shell as u64) + .saturating_add(0x3000) + .min(data.len() as u64 - 0x100) as u32; + let mut off = shell; + while off < hi { + if off as usize + 8 <= data.len() { + let candidate = off.wrapping_sub(0x88); + if candidate >= shell && get_u32(data, off) == info[6] { + let shell_size_val = get_u32(data, off.wrapping_add(4)); + if shell_size_val > 0x1000 && shell_size_val < 0x100000 { + let v58_off = candidate.wrapping_add(0x58); + if (v58_off as usize + 4) <= data.len() { + let v58 = get_u32(data, v58_off); + if v58 > 0 && (v58 as usize) < data.len() { + return Some(candidate); + } + } + } + } + } + off = off.wrapping_add(4); + } + None +} + +/// Locate an LFSR-encrypted bytecode block (decrypt_data6 form) in a region. +/// `start_off` is the byte offset to begin scanning at, `scan_backward` +/// controls direction. Returns the relative offset of the block. Includes full +/// opcode-walk validation of candidate blocks. +pub(crate) fn find_lfsr_block( + data: &[u8], + base: u32, + size: u32, + start_off: u32, + scan_backward: bool, +) -> Option { + if size < 96 { + return None; + } + let mut ks = [0u8; 128]; + lfsr_keystream(&mut ks); + let check = |scan_off: u32| -> bool { + let abs_off = base.wrapping_add(scan_off) as usize; + if abs_off + 96 > data.len() { + return false; + } + let sz = data[abs_off + 95] as usize; + if !(10..=95).contains(&sz) { + return false; + } + let mut decoded = [0u8; 95]; + for bi in 0..sz { + decoded[bi] = data[abs_off + bi] ^ ks[bi]; + } + // Full bytecode validation (shared with the stage4/5 locator): every + // opcode must decode with a valid ModR/M and the stream must REACH a + // RET (0xC3) as an opcode. The previous check only required a 0xC3 + // byte *anywhere* in the window and accepted a walk that ran off the + // end without hitting RET — a `0x04 0xC3` (ADD 0xC3) tail passed, so + // coincidental LFSR-shaped garbage was accepted as a decryptor block. + parse_bytecode_check(&decoded[..sz]).is_some() + }; + if scan_backward { + let hi = size - 96; + if hi >= start_off { + let mut scan_off = hi; + loop { + if check(scan_off) { + return Some(scan_off); + } + if scan_off == start_off { + break; + } + scan_off -= 1; + } + } + } else { + let hi = size - 95; + let mut scan_off = start_off; + while scan_off < hi { + if check(scan_off) { + return Some(scan_off); + } + scan_off += 1; + } + } + None +} + +/// Slots discovered in the eighthStage for the marker-less layout. +pub(crate) struct EighthSlots { + /// Absolute address of the file-data decryptor LFSR bytecode block. The + /// fileCS chain pointer is derived downstream as `file_lfsr - 0x58`. + pub file_lfsr: u32, + /// Absolute address of the compressedInfo (ptr,size) table pointer slot. + pub compressed_info_ptr: u32, +} + +/// Marker-independent eighthStage slot discovery (PE32+ branch). +/// +/// Newer Crackproof builds (e.g. some native/managed DLLs) omit the +/// `pm\0\0cm\0\0` and `00 00 00 40 01 00 00 00` markers that the older layout's +/// walk3/walk4/walk5 slot derivation relies on. Instead this discovers the +/// slots structurally: +/// * Scan the eighthStage for every LFSR (decrypt_data6) bytecode block. +/// * The file decryptor is the LFSR block whose `fileCS = lfsr - 0x58` holds +/// a pointer sitting just past `info[3]` (smallest positive distance). +/// * `compressedInfo` is the pointer slot whose 16-byte target, after a +/// trial `decrypt_data5`, parses as a plausible (src,sSize,dst,dSize) +/// descriptor. +/// +/// Returns `None` if no plausible file LFSR is found. `eighth_start`/`eighth_dsz` +/// bound the search region; `info3` is `info[3]`; `compress_data_offset` is +/// `(!u32(file_data,0x1080)) + 0x1000`; `file_data_len` is the protected file +/// length. +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +pub(crate) fn discover_eighth_slots( + data: &[u8], + eighth_start: u32, + eighth_dsz: u32, + info3: u32, + compress_data_offset: u32, + file_data_len: u32, +) -> Option { + // Collect all LFSR candidates (forward scan). + // + // Advance by 1 after each hit, NOT by 96. A false-positive LFSR match can sit + // just before the real file-decryptor block (observed on an il2cpp game + // assembly build, 2026-07-13: junk at rel=0x31C1, real block at 0x3210). + // Stepping by the LFSR body size then skips the real block and discovery + // fails. Byte-stepping is cheap: eighthStage is only a few KB. + let mut all_lfsrs: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut scan_off: u32 = 0; + while scan_off + 95 < eighth_dsz { + match find_lfsr_block(data, eighth_start, eighth_dsz, scan_off, false) { + Some(found) => { + all_lfsrs.push(found); + scan_off = found + 1; + } + None => break, + } + } + + // Pick the file LFSR: prefer the candidate whose fileCS pointer sits the + // smallest positive distance past info[3]. + let mut off_file_lfsr: Option = None; + let mut best_dist: Option = None; + for &lfsr_off in &all_lfsrs { + if lfsr_off < 0x58 { + continue; + } + let cs_off = lfsr_off - 0x58; + let cs_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(cs_off)); + if !(0x1000 < cs_val && (cs_val as usize) < data.len()) { + continue; + } + if cs_val < info3 { + continue; + } + let dist = cs_val - info3; + if best_dist.is_none_or(|b| dist < b) { + best_dist = Some(dist); + off_file_lfsr = Some(lfsr_off); + } + } + // Fallback: last LFSR with any in-image fileCS pointer. + if off_file_lfsr.is_none() { + for &lfsr_off in all_lfsrs.iter().rev() { + if lfsr_off < 0x58 { + continue; + } + let cs_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(lfsr_off - 0x58)); + if 0x1000 < cs_val && (cs_val as usize) < data.len() { + off_file_lfsr = Some(lfsr_off); + break; + } + } + } + let off_file_lfsr = off_file_lfsr?; + let off_file_cs = off_file_lfsr - 0x58; + + // Trial-decrypt to find compressedInfo: the pointer slot in the data area + // (between fileCS region start and the LFSR) whose target parses as a valid + // (src,sSize,dst,dSize) descriptor after a transient decrypt_data5. + let scan_from = off_file_lfsr.saturating_sub(0x400); + let mut off_compressed_info: Option = None; + let mut doff = scan_from; + while doff < off_file_lfsr { + if doff == off_file_cs { + doff += 4; + continue; + } + let ptr_val = get_u32(data, eighth_start.wrapping_add(doff)); + if !(0x1000 < ptr_val && (ptr_val as usize) < data.len().saturating_sub(16)) { + doff += 4; + continue; + } + // Predict decrypt_data5(ptr_val, 16) without mutating: each dword is + // position-keyed and independent, so trial_decrypt5_u32 per dword. + let src2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val); + let s_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 4); + let dst2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 8); + let d_sz2 = trial_decrypt5_u32(data, ptr_val + 12); + let src_file_off = src2.wrapping_add(compress_data_offset); + let valid = s_sz2 > 0 + && s_sz2 < 0x200000 + && (src_file_off as u64 + s_sz2 as u64) <= file_data_len as u64 + && dst2 >= 0x1000 + && (dst2 as u64 + d_sz2 as u64) <= data.len() as u64 + && d_sz2 >= s_sz2 + && d_sz2 < 0x200000; + if valid { + off_compressed_info = Some(doff); + break; + } + doff += 4; + } + let off_compressed_info = off_compressed_info?; + + Some(EighthSlots { + file_lfsr: eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_file_lfsr), + compressed_info_ptr: eighth_start.wrapping_add(off_compressed_info), + }) +} + +/// PE32 `.text` dd8 key-formula selection with a skip decision. The packer keys +/// the per-page XOR either with `page+1` or `0x8000*(page+1)`; the formula is +/// not recorded. Replays the dd8 page pass on a scratch copy of sample pages +/// (25/50/75% of `.text`) under each formula and counts how many positions +/// decode to `0xCC` (int3 padding). +/// +/// Returns `Some(true)` for the `0x8000*(page+1)` formula, `Some(false)` for +/// `page+1`, or `None` when `.text` must NOT be dd8-decrypted at all. The packer +/// dd8-encrypts `.text` on EXEs (so unpacking must replay it) but leaves a native +/// DLL's `.text` plaintext; replaying dd8 there scrambles ~1 byte per 16-byte +/// block. The decision: dd8 only *restores* int3 padding when `.text` was +/// genuinely encrypted, so apply it only when the chosen formula's whole-page +/// 0xCC count rises *clearly* above the no-dd8 baseline; otherwise skip. +/// +/// "Clearly" matters: dd8 XORs 255 positions per page with pseudo-random bytes, +/// so on an already-plaintext `.text` it manufactures ~1 spurious `0xCC` per +/// sampled page for free (255/256 expected). A bare `best > baseline` test is +/// therefore biased towards *applying* dd8 on exactly the inputs that must skip +/// it — and a wrongly-applied dd8 is silent: it scrambles ~1 byte per 16 with no +/// error and nothing downstream (not even `integrity::check`, which only reads +/// 16 bytes at the entry point) notices. The [`MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN`] floor below is +/// the PE32 counterpart of the margin+floor `select_dd8_shift` already applies +/// on PE32+ for the same failure mode. +pub(crate) fn select_dd8_formula_pe32(data: &[u8], text_off: u32, text_size: u32) -> Option { + let num_pages_total = text_size / 0x1000; + let mut sample_pages: Vec = Vec::new(); + for frac in [0.25f64, 0.5, 0.75] { + let pg = (num_pages_total as f64 * frac) as u32; + if pg > 0 && pg < num_pages_total { + sample_pages.push(pg); + } + } + if sample_pages.is_empty() && num_pages_total > 1 { + sample_pages.push(num_pages_total / 2); + } + let score = |big: bool| -> i64 { + let mut total = 0i64; + for &sp in &sample_pages { + let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize; + if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() { + continue; + } + let mut buf = [0u8; 0x1000]; + buf.copy_from_slice(&data[pg_off..pg_off + 0x1000]); + let pk = if big { + 0x8000u32.wrapping_mul(sp.wrapping_add(1)) + } else { + sp.wrapping_add(1) + }; + let mut k = pk; + let rk = k.rotate_right(15); + k = rk; + for bi in 1..256u32 { + let rk = k.rotate_right(15); + let ri = rk.wrapping_add(bi); + k = ri.wrapping_add(bi); + let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(ri & 0xF)) as usize; + if tidx < buf.len() { + buf[tidx] ^= k as u8; + } + } + total += buf.iter().filter(|&&b| b == 0xCC).count() as i64; + } + total + }; + let s_small = score(false); + let s_big = score(true); + // Baseline: whole-page 0xCC over the same sample pages with NO dd8. dd8 only + // rewrites 255 bytes per page, so comparing the chosen formula's whole-page + // 0xCC against this baseline reveals whether dd8 *restores* int3 padding + // (count rises -> .text was packer-encrypted, apply) or merely scrambles + // already-plaintext code (count falls -> native-DLL .text left intact, skip). + let mut baseline: i64 = 0; + for &sp in &sample_pages { + let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize; + if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() { + continue; + } + baseline += data[pg_off..pg_off + 0x1000] + .iter() + .filter(|&&b| b == 0xCC) + .count() as i64; + } + let big = s_big > s_small; + let best = s_small.max(s_big); + // Minimum net 0xCC gain over the baseline before dd8 is applied. Noise on an + // already-plaintext `.text` is ~1 manufactured 0xCC per sampled page (3 pages + // -> ~3); every corpus build that genuinely needs dd8 gains +154 or more + // (observed +154 and +312), and the one native DLL that must skip scores -18. + // A floor of 32 sits ~10x above the noise and ~5x below the smallest true + // positive, so it changes no existing decision. + const MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN: i64 = 32; + let apply = best.saturating_sub(baseline) >= MIN_DD8_NET_GAIN; + if std::env::var("SEL_DIAG").is_ok() { + eprintln!( + "SEL pe32 dd8 s_small={} s_big={} baseline={} gain={} big={} apply={}", + s_small, + s_big, + baseline, + best - baseline, + big, + apply + ); + } + // When no interior pages could be sampled (tiny .text) we cannot measure the + // effect; preserve the historical behavior of applying dd8. + if sample_pages.is_empty() || apply { + Some(big) + } else { + None + } +} + +/// Read a NUL-terminated byte string starting at `off`, bounded to 512 bytes. +/// Returns the raw bytes up to the terminator (excluding it). +fn read_cstr_bounded(data: &[u8], off: u32) -> Vec { + let start = off as usize; + if start >= data.len() { + return Vec::new(); + } + let limit = (start + 512).min(data.len()); + let mut end = start; + while end < limit && data[end] != 0 { + end += 1; + } + data[start..end].to_vec() +} + +fn align_up_u32(value: u32, alignment: u32) -> u32 { + ((value.wrapping_add(alignment - 1)) / alignment).wrapping_mul(alignment) +} + +fn align_up_u64(value: u64, alignment: u64) -> u64 { + value.div_ceil(alignment) * alignment +} + +#[derive(Clone)] +enum ImportFunc { + Ordinal(u32), + Name(u16, Vec), +} + +struct ImportDesc { + time_date: u32, + fwd_chain: u32, + dll_name: Vec, + iat_rva: u32, + functions: Vec, +} + +/// Return true when PE32 imports already sit in the original `.idata` layout +/// (so no relocation to `.kmiat` is needed). May write the IAT data directory +/// (pe+0xD8). +pub(crate) fn pe32_imports_already_match_idata_layout(data: &mut [u8], pe_header: u32) -> bool { + let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32; + let sec_table = pe_header.wrapping_add(24).wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size); + let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + let import_rva = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80)); + let import_size = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84)); + let len = data.len() as u32; + if !(import_rva > 0 && import_size > 0) { + return false; + } + for idx in 0..num_sections { + let sec_off = sec_table.wrapping_add(idx * 40); + if (sec_off as usize + 40) > data.len() { + return false; + } + if &data[sec_off as usize..sec_off as usize + 6] != b".idata" { + continue; + } + let sec_va = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(12)); + let sec_size = + get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(8)).max(get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(16))); + let sec_end = sec_va.wrapping_add(sec_size); + if !(sec_va <= import_rva + && import_rva < sec_end + && import_rva.wrapping_add(import_size) <= sec_end) + { + continue; + } + let first_oft = get_u32(data, import_rva); + let first_name = get_u32(data, import_rva.wrapping_add(12)); + let first_iat = get_u32(data, import_rva.wrapping_add(16)); + if !(sec_va <= first_oft + && first_oft < sec_end + && sec_va <= first_iat + && first_iat < sec_end) + { + return false; + } + if !(0x1000 < first_name && first_name < len) { + return false; + } + let dll_name = read_cstr_bounded(data, first_name); + let lower: Vec = dll_name.iter().map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect(); + if !lower.ends_with(b".dll") { + return false; + } + let mut iat_min = first_iat; + let mut iat_max = first_iat; + let mut idt_pos = import_rva; + while idt_pos.wrapping_add(20) <= len { + let oft_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos); + let name_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(12)); + let iat_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(16)); + if oft_rva == 0 && name_rva == 0 && iat_rva == 0 { + break; + } + if !(sec_va <= oft_rva && oft_rva < sec_end && sec_va <= iat_rva && iat_rva < sec_end) { + return false; + } + let mut thunk = iat_rva; + while thunk.wrapping_add(4) <= sec_end { + let tv = get_u32(data, thunk); + thunk = thunk.wrapping_add(4); + if tv == 0 { + break; + } + } + iat_min = iat_min.min(iat_rva); + iat_max = iat_max.max(thunk); + idt_pos = idt_pos.wrapping_add(20); + } + if iat_max > iat_min { + write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0xD8), iat_min); + write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0xDC), iat_max - iat_min); + } + return true; + } + false +} + +/// Rebuild PE32 import metadata (descriptors, lookup tables, names) into the +/// last section as `.kmiat`, leaving the loader-written IAT in place. Mutates +/// `data` (may grow it). +pub(crate) fn move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat(data: &mut Vec, pe_header: u32) { + const SECTION_SIZE: u32 = 0x7000; + let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32; + let opt_hdr = pe_header.wrapping_add(24); + let sec_table = opt_hdr.wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size); + let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + if num_sections == 0 { + return; + } + let import_rva = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80)); + let import_size = get_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84)); + let len = data.len() as u32; + if !(0x1000 < import_rva && import_rva < len && import_size > 0 && import_size < SECTION_SIZE) { + return; + } + + let mut descriptors: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut idt_pos = import_rva; + while idt_pos.wrapping_add(20) <= len { + let oft_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos); + let time_date = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(4)); + let fwd_chain = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(8)); + let name_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(12)); + let iat_rva = get_u32(data, idt_pos.wrapping_add(16)); + if oft_rva == 0 && name_rva == 0 && iat_rva == 0 { + break; + } + if !(0x1000 < name_rva && name_rva < len) { + break; + } + let dll_name = read_cstr_bounded(data, name_rva); + let thunk_rva = if 0x1000 < oft_rva && oft_rva < len { + oft_rva + } else { + iat_rva + }; + let mut functions: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut thunk_pos = thunk_rva; + while 0x1000 < thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4) && thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4) <= len { + let thunk_val = get_u32(data, thunk_pos); + if thunk_val == 0 { + break; + } + if thunk_val & 0x8000_0000 != 0 { + functions.push(ImportFunc::Ordinal(thunk_val & 0xFFFF)); + } else { + let hint = if thunk_val.wrapping_add(2) <= len { + get_u16(data, thunk_val) + } else { + 0 + }; + let func_name = if thunk_val.wrapping_add(2) < len { + read_cstr_bounded(data, thunk_val.wrapping_add(2)) + } else { + Vec::new() + }; + functions.push(ImportFunc::Name(hint, func_name)); + } + thunk_pos = thunk_pos.wrapping_add(4); + } + descriptors.push(ImportDesc { + time_date, + fwd_chain, + dll_name, + iat_rva, + functions, + }); + idt_pos = idt_pos.wrapping_add(20); + } + if descriptors.is_empty() { + return; + } + + for desc in &mut descriptors { + let lower: Vec = desc + .dll_name + .iter() + .map(|b| b.to_ascii_lowercase()) + .collect(); + if lower.starts_with(b"api-ms-win-crt-") { + desc.dll_name = b"ucrtbase.dll".to_vec(); + } else { + desc.dll_name = lower; + } + } + descriptors.sort_by_key(|d| d.iat_rva); + + let last_sec = sec_table.wrapping_add((num_sections - 1) * 40); + let kmiat_rva = get_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(12)); + // A zero last-section VA means a corrupt section table: building .kmiat at + // RVA 0 would zero the DOS/PE headers and emit a structurally broken image + // with no error. Bail and keep the original import table. + if kmiat_rva == 0 { + return; + } + // Grow the image when .kmiat overruns it, but cap the growth: a corrupt VA + // could otherwise request a multi-gigabyte allocation, which aborts the + // process (uncatchable). Use u64 math so a near-u32::MAX VA cannot wrap the + // end calculation the way the previous wrapping/plain-add mix could. + let kmiat_end = kmiat_rva as u64 + SECTION_SIZE as u64; + if kmiat_end > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return; + } + if kmiat_end > data.len() as u64 { + data.resize(kmiat_end as usize, 0); + } + // Zero the .kmiat region. + for b in &mut data[kmiat_rva as usize..kmiat_end as usize] { + *b = 0; + } + + let idt_size = (descriptors.len() as u32 + 1) * 20; + let oft_start = kmiat_rva; + let mut idt_rva = oft_start; + for desc in &descriptors { + idt_rva = idt_rva.wrapping_add((desc.functions.len() as u32 + 1) * 4); + } + idt_rva = align_up_u32(idt_rva.wrapping_add(0x2C), 4); + + // Size check: compute the final name_pos and bail if it overruns .kmiat. + let mut name_pos_check = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idt_size); + for desc in &descriptors { + name_pos_check = name_pos_check.wrapping_add(desc.dll_name.len() as u32 + 1); + for func in &desc.functions { + if let ImportFunc::Name(_, fname) = func { + name_pos_check = name_pos_check.wrapping_add(2 + fname.len() as u32 + 1); + } + } + } + if name_pos_check > kmiat_rva.wrapping_add(SECTION_SIZE) { + // Section too small; keep existing import table untouched. + return; + } + + let mut oft_pos = oft_start; + let mut name_pos = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idt_size); + for (idx, desc) in descriptors.iter().enumerate() { + let idt_entry = idt_rva.wrapping_add(idx as u32 * 20); + let current_oft = oft_pos; + write_u32(data, idt_entry, current_oft); + write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(4), desc.time_date); + write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(8), desc.fwd_chain); + let dll_name_pos = name_pos; + write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(12), dll_name_pos); + write_u32(data, idt_entry.wrapping_add(16), desc.iat_rva); + + let dnp = dll_name_pos as usize; + data[dnp..dnp + desc.dll_name.len()].copy_from_slice(&desc.dll_name); + data[dnp + desc.dll_name.len()] = 0; + name_pos = name_pos.wrapping_add(desc.dll_name.len() as u32 + 1); + + for func in &desc.functions { + match func { + ImportFunc::Ordinal(ord) => { + write_u32(data, oft_pos, 0x8000_0000 | ord); + } + ImportFunc::Name(hint, fname) => { + let hint_name_rva = name_pos; + write_u32(data, oft_pos, hint_name_rva); + write_u16(data, hint_name_rva, *hint as u32); + let fp = (hint_name_rva + 2) as usize; + data[fp..fp + fname.len()].copy_from_slice(fname); + data[fp + fname.len()] = 0; + name_pos = name_pos.wrapping_add(2 + fname.len() as u32 + 1); + } + } + oft_pos = oft_pos.wrapping_add(4); + } + write_u32(data, oft_pos, 0); + oft_pos = oft_pos.wrapping_add(4); + } + // Null-terminator IDT entry (20 zero bytes) after the last descriptor. + let term = idt_rva.wrapping_add(descriptors.len() as u32 * 20) as usize; + for b in &mut data[term..term + 20] { + *b = 0; + } + + let ls = last_sec as usize; + data[ls..ls + 8].copy_from_slice(b".kmiat\x00\x00"); + write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(8), SECTION_SIZE); + write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(16), SECTION_SIZE); + write_u32(data, last_sec.wrapping_add(36), 0xE000_0060); + write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x80), idt_rva); + write_u32(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(0x84), idt_size); + write_u32( + data, + pe_header.wrapping_add(80), + kmiat_rva.wrapping_add(SECTION_SIZE), + ); +} + +/// Convert the unpacked RVA-addressed image back to a compact PE file layout +/// (headers at 0x400, sections packed consecutively, FileAlignment 0x200). +/// Returns `None` if the accumulated output size wraps or exceeds +/// [`super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`]: the final allocation is sized from header-derived +/// section data, and an uncapped `vec![0; n]` from a corrupt header would abort +/// the process (which `catch_unpack` cannot trap). +pub(crate) fn compact_memory_image_to_pe(data: &[u8], pe_header: u32) -> Option> { + const FILE_ALIGNMENT: u32 = 0x200; + const HEADER_SIZE: u32 = 0x400; + let opt_hdr_size = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(20)) as u32; + let opt_hdr = pe_header.wrapping_add(24); + let sec_table = opt_hdr.wrapping_add(opt_hdr_size); + let num_sections = get_u16(data, pe_header.wrapping_add(6)) as u32; + + struct SecLayout { + sec_off: u32, + va: u32, + vsize: u32, + raw_ptr: u32, + raw_size: u32, + } + + let mut raw_cursor: u64 = HEADER_SIZE as u64; + let mut raw_layout: Vec = Vec::new(); + for idx in 0..num_sections { + let sec_off = sec_table.wrapping_add(idx * 40); + let vsize = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(8)); + let va = get_u32(data, sec_off.wrapping_add(12)); + let sd_start = va as usize; + let sd_end = if (va.wrapping_add(vsize) as usize) <= data.len() { + va.wrapping_add(vsize) as usize + } else { + data.len() + }; + let section_data: &[u8] = if sd_start <= sd_end && sd_start <= data.len() { + &data[sd_start..sd_end] + } else { + &[] + }; + + let mut last_nonzero: i64 = -1; + for pos in (0..section_data.len()).rev() { + if section_data[pos] != 0 { + last_nonzero = pos as i64; + break; + } + } + let meaningful = if last_nonzero >= 0 { + (last_nonzero + 1) as u32 + } else { + 0 + }; + let mut raw_size = if meaningful != 0 { + align_up_u32(meaningful, FILE_ALIGNMENT) + } else { + 0 + }; + if vsize != 0 && raw_size == 0 { + raw_size = FILE_ALIGNMENT; + } + raw_size = raw_size.min(align_up_u32(section_data.len() as u32, FILE_ALIGNMENT)); + + let raw_ptr = if raw_size != 0 { raw_cursor as u32 } else { 0 }; + raw_layout.push(SecLayout { + sec_off, + va, + vsize, + raw_ptr, + raw_size, + }); + if raw_size != 0 { + // Accumulate in u64 and cap: section sizes are header-derived, and + // a corrupt table could otherwise wrap raw_cursor (small alloc, + // huge recorded raw_ptrs → OOB panic) or request an abort-sized + // allocation. + raw_cursor = align_up_u64(raw_cursor + raw_size as u64, FILE_ALIGNMENT as u64); + if raw_cursor > super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE { + return None; + } + } + } + + let mut compact = vec![0u8; raw_cursor as usize]; + let hdr_copy = (HEADER_SIZE as usize).min(data.len()); + compact[..hdr_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[..hdr_copy]); + write_u32(&mut compact, opt_hdr.wrapping_add(36), FILE_ALIGNMENT); + write_u32(&mut compact, opt_hdr.wrapping_add(60), HEADER_SIZE); + + for sl in &raw_layout { + write_u32(&mut compact, sl.sec_off.wrapping_add(16), sl.raw_size); + write_u32(&mut compact, sl.sec_off.wrapping_add(20), sl.raw_ptr); + if sl.raw_size != 0 { + let sd_start = sl.va as usize; + let sd_end = if (sl.va.wrapping_add(sl.vsize) as usize) <= data.len() { + sl.va.wrapping_add(sl.vsize) as usize + } else { + data.len() + }; + let section_data: &[u8] = if sd_start <= sd_end { + &data[sd_start..sd_end] + } else { + &[] + }; + let copy_size = (sl.raw_size as usize).min(section_data.len()); + let rp = sl.raw_ptr as usize; + compact[rp..rp + copy_size].copy_from_slice(§ion_data[..copy_size]); + } + } + Some(compact) +} + +/// decrypt_data3: XOR+rotate cipher. Reads/writes dwords in `d` starting at +/// the address stored at `d[pos]`, for `d[pos+4]>>2` words. `shift` is the +/// right-rotate amount (19 or 21 depending on caller). +pub(crate) fn decrypt_data3(d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, mut key: u32, shift: u32) { + let base_addr = get_u32(d, pos); + let length = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)); + let words = length >> 2; + for i in 0..words { + let off = base_addr.wrapping_add(i.wrapping_mul(4)); + let v = get_u32(d, off) ^ key; + key = key.wrapping_add(i); + let rotated = v.rotate_right(shift); + write_u32(d, off, rotated.wrapping_sub(i)); + } +} + +/// decrypt_data1 (called `decrypt_data` in the original): decode the 8-dword +/// info header from `file_data` at offset 4096 and write results into `info`. +pub(crate) fn decrypt_data1(file_data: &[u8], info: &mut [u32; 8]) { + info[0] = get_u32(file_data, 4096); + let mut k = get_u32(file_data, 4096); + for i in 0..7u32 { + let off = i.wrapping_mul(4).wrapping_add(4); + let cell = get_u32(file_data, 4096u32.wrapping_add(off)); + info[(i + 1) as usize] = k ^ cell; + k = i.wrapping_mul(i) ^ (k.wrapping_add(cell).wrapping_sub(i)); + } +} + +/// decrypt_data6: LFSR XOR decryption of a bytecode block at `pos` in `d`. +/// The block length is read from `d[pos + 95]`. +pub(crate) fn decrypt_data6(d: &mut [u8], pos: u32) { + let len = d[(pos + 95) as usize] as usize; + // The keystream is exactly `lfsr_keystream`'s — generate it once (len is a + // byte, so 256 always covers it) instead of keeping a second copy of the + // LFSR that a future poly fix would have to update separately. + let mut ks = [0u8; 256]; + lfsr_keystream(&mut ks); + let pos = pos as usize; + for i in 0..len { + d[pos + i] ^= ks[i]; + } +} + +/// decrypt_data7: nibble-swap + key-rolling byte cipher applied to a +/// null-terminated string in `d` starting at `pos`. +pub(crate) fn decrypt_data7(d: &mut [u8], pos: u32, mut key: u8) { + let mut i: u32 = 0; + loop { + let idx = (pos + i) as usize; + if d[idx] == 0 { + break; + } + let mut b = d[idx]; + b = b.rotate_right(4); + b = b.wrapping_sub(key); + if b == 0 { + b = 0u8.wrapping_sub(key); + } + d[idx] = b; + key = key.wrapping_add(67); + i += 1; + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Higher-level composite: AES + decrypt3 + optional bytecode + decompress +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Decrypt and optionally decompress a stage payload descriptor. +/// `pos` points to a (src, src_len, dest, dest_len) quad of dwords in `d`. +/// - AES-decrypts `src..src+src_len` using key at `key3_offset` +/// - XOR+rotate-decrypts with `decrypt_data3(pos, key, 19)` +/// - Applies optional custom `ops` bytecode per-byte +/// - If `src_len != dest_len`, Huffman/LZ-decompresses `src..` → `dest..` +/// +/// Returns the decompression success status (always `true` when no +/// decompression was needed). The PE32 eighth-stage key search relies on this. +pub(crate) fn decrypt_and_decompress_data( + d: &mut [u8], + pos: u32, + key: u32, + key1_offset: u32, + key3_offset: u32, + ops: Option<&[Op]>, +) -> bool { + let src = get_u32(d, pos); + let src_len = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(4)); + aes_decrypt(d, src, src_len, key3_offset); + decrypt_data3(d, pos, key, 19); + if let Some(ops) = ops + && src_len != 0 + { + OpsLut::new(ops).map_region(d, src as usize, src_len as usize); + } + let dest = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(8)); + let dest_len = get_u32(d, pos.wrapping_add(12)); + if src_len != dest_len { + return decompress(d, src, dest, key1_offset, src_len, dest_len); + } + true +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// dd8 page-XOR shift selection. +// +// The packer scrambles ~1 byte per 16-byte block of .text via decrypt_data8, +// keyed by `page_idx << shift` (absolute page index = text_va >> 12). Observed +// shifts are 0 and 15. The shift is NOT stored in any header/config field: +// two otherwise-unrelated builds can carry byte-identical config-version stamps +// (0x40327253) yet require different shifts, so the only reliable discriminator +// is the .text content itself. +// +// Detection scoring formula: for each candidate shift, replay decrypt_data8 +// across a few sample pages (25/50/75% of .text) and count how many of the 255 +// mutated positions become 0xCC — the MSVC int3 padding byte. The correct shift +// hits int3 pads disproportionately often (~3-10x the baseline), so the +// highest-scoring shift wins. If neither shift clears 2x the baseline, .text +// is already plaintext → skip (return 99). +// +// This replaces an earlier entry-stub oracle that matched the 14 fixed CRT-stub +// bytes at the AEP. That oracle false-positived on a newer EXE-64 build: dd8 +// corrupted only the call rel32 (bytes 5-8, the wildcard region), so the stub +// matched under BOTH shifts and the selector defaulted to 0 when the truth was +// 15. The 0xCC statistic samples hundreds of positions per page and is not +// fooled by a stub whose fixed bytes happen to survive. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +pub(crate) fn select_dd8_shift(data: &[u8], text_va: u32, text_size: u32, _info3: u32) -> u32 { + if text_size < 0x1000 { + return 0; + } + let text_off = text_va as usize; + let num_pages_total = text_size >> 12; + + // Sample pages at 25/50/75% of .text, falling back to the midpoint for tiny + // sections. + let mut sample_pages: Vec = Vec::new(); + for frac in [0.25f64, 0.5, 0.75] { + let pg = (num_pages_total as f64 * frac) as u32; + if pg > 0 && pg < num_pages_total { + sample_pages.push(pg); + } + } + if sample_pages.is_empty() && num_pages_total > 1 { + sample_pages.push(num_pages_total / 2); + } + if sample_pages.is_empty() { + return 0; + } + + let none_hits = score_dd8_baseline(data, text_off, &sample_pages); + let s0 = score_dd8_shift(data, text_off, text_va, &sample_pages, 0); + let s15 = score_dd8_shift(data, text_off, text_va, &sample_pages, 15); + let mut best_score = none_hits; + let mut best_shift = 99u32; // 99 == skip dd8 + for (shift, hits) in [(0u32, s0), (15u32, s15)] { + if hits > best_score { + best_score = hits; + best_shift = shift; + } + } + // Require a clear 2x margin over the already-plaintext baseline AND an + // absolute floor. The 2x test alone + // trips on noise when the counts are tiny: an external-companion DLL whose + // .text is already plaintext scores s15=4 vs none=1 — a spurious 4x — and + // gets dd8 wrongly applied, corrupting ~1 byte per 16. Across the whole + // golden corpus every build that genuinely needs dd8 scores >= 10 (lowest + // observed scores at 10-12; up to 107), so a floor of 8 rejects the noise + // while keeping every golden's shift selection unchanged. + const MIN_DD8_HITS: u32 = 8; + if best_shift != 99 && (best_score < none_hits * 2 || best_score < MIN_DD8_HITS) { + best_shift = 99; + } + if std::env::var("SEL_DIAG").is_ok() { + eprintln!( + "SEL dd8 best_shift={} s0={} s15={} none_hits={} samples={:?}", + best_shift, s0, s15, none_hits, sample_pages + ); + } + best_shift +} + +// Baseline: count int3 pads already present at the first byte of each 16-byte +// block, i.e. the positions dd8 would target if its in-block offset were 0. +fn score_dd8_baseline(data: &[u8], text_off: usize, sample_pages: &[u32]) -> u32 { + let mut hits = 0u32; + for &sp in sample_pages { + let pg_off = text_off + (sp as usize) * 0x1000; + if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() { + continue; + } + for bi in 1..256usize { + if data[pg_off + bi * 16] == 0xCC { + hits += 1; + } + } + } + hits +} + +// Replay decrypt_data8 on each sample page under `shift` and count how many of +// the 255 mutated positions decode to 0xCC. +fn score_dd8_shift( + data: &[u8], + text_off: usize, + text_va: u32, + sample_pages: &[u32], + shift: u32, +) -> u32 { + let abs_base = text_va >> 12; + let mut hits = 0u32; + for &sp in sample_pages { + let pg_off = text_off + (sp as usize) * 0x1000; + if pg_off + 0x1000 > data.len() { + continue; + } + let abs_page = abs_base.wrapping_add(sp); + let mut key = abs_page << shift; + for bi in 0..256u32 { + let mixed = key.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(bi); + key = mixed.wrapping_add(bi); + if bi == 0 { + continue; + } + let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(mixed & 0xF)) as usize; + if tidx < 0x1000 { + let mutated = data[pg_off + tidx] ^ (key as u8); + if mutated == 0xCC { + hits += 1; + } + } + } + } + hits +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Tests +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn aes_ks_variant_matches_single_buffer() { + // Random-ish key schedule at ko and data block; both variants must + // produce identical output. + let ko: usize = 0x40; + let mut d = vec![0u8; 0x400]; + let mut x: u32 = 0x12345678; + for b in d.iter_mut() { + x = x.wrapping_mul(1664525).wrapping_add(1013904223); + *b = (x >> 24) as u8; + } + d[ko + 2] = 10; // round count = 10 + d[ko + 3] = 0; + let snap = aes_schedule_snapshot(&d, ko as u32).expect("snapshot"); + + let mut a = d.clone(); + aes_decrypt(&mut a, 0x100, 0x80, ko as u32); + let mut b = d.clone(); + aes_decrypt_ks(&snap, &mut b, 0x100, 0x80); + if a != b { + let idx = (0..a.len()).find(|&i| a[i] != b[i]).unwrap(); + panic!( + "first diff at {idx:#x}: a={:02x} b={:02x}\n a[..]: {:02x?}\n b[..]: {:02x?}", + a[idx], + b[idx], + &a[idx..idx + 16], + &b[idx..idx + 16] + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn dtbl_variant_matches_single_buffer() { + // Real table + real compressed block lifted from an actual unpack is + // covered by the golden suite; here we just check a trivial stream: + // build a table where every byte is a literal (mode 0, 8 bits), then + // a source stream of N bytes should expand to N identical bytes. + let ko: usize = 0x100; + let mut d = vec![0u8; 0x1000]; + for e in 0..256usize { + let off = ko + e * 3; + let sym = 0x8000u16 | (e as u16 & 0xFF); // terminal, mode 0, payload=e + d[off] = (sym & 0xFF) as u8; + d[off + 1] = (sym >> 8) as u8; + d[off + 2] = 8; // 8 bits per symbol + } + // Source: 16 bytes 0x00..0x0F at src. + let src = 0x600u32; + for i in 0..16u32 { + d[(src + i) as usize] = i as u8; + } + let snap = huffman_table_snapshot(&d, ko as u32).expect("table snapshot"); + + let mut a = vec![0u8; 0x1000]; + a[..d.len()].copy_from_slice(&d); + assert!(decompress(&mut a, src, 0x800, ko as u32, 16, 16)); + let mut b = d.clone(); + assert!(decompress_tbl(&snap, &mut b, src, 0x800, 16, 16)); + assert_eq!(&a[0x800..0x810], &b[0x800..0x810]); + assert_eq!(&b[0x800..0x810], &(0u8..16).collect::>()[..]); + } + + /// Task 4.1 regression: build a synthetic buffer whose valid bytecode block + /// sits PAST `len` but within `len*2`. Assert that the smaller window misses + /// it and the doubled window finds it. + #[test] + fn bytecode_locate_double_window_retry() { + // We place the block at offset (base + len + 16) which is inside + // the len*2 window but outside the len window. + let base: u32 = 0; + let len: u32 = 256; + // Block sits at base + len + 16 = 272, aligned to 16. + let block_pos: usize = (base + len + 16) as usize; // 272 + + // The buffer must be large enough for the block (block_pos + 96 bytes). + let buf_len = block_pos + 256; + let mut buf = vec![0u8; buf_len]; + + // Build a valid plaintext op stream: + // [4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 195] (4 ADD-AL ops then RET) + // Padded to 10 bytes total; count >= 8. + let count: usize = 10; + let mut plain = [0u8; 256]; + plain[0] = 4; + plain[1] = 0; + plain[2] = 4; + plain[3] = 0; + plain[4] = 4; + plain[5] = 0; + plain[6] = 4; + plain[7] = 0; + plain[8] = 195; // ret + + // Compute the LFSR keystream and XOR the first `count` bytes to get the + // encrypted representation that the scanner would decrypt back. + let mut ks = [0u8; 256]; + lfsr_keystream(&mut ks); + for i in 0..count { + buf[block_pos + i] = plain[i] ^ ks[i]; + } + // Raw count byte at block_pos+95 (outside the XOR range since count=10 < 95). + buf[block_pos + 95] = count as u8; + + // Verify our construction: find_bytecode_offset with len should NOT find it. + assert_eq!( + find_bytecode_offset(&buf, base, len), + None, + "smaller window should not find the block" + ); + + // The doubled window should find it at block_pos. + assert_eq!( + find_bytecode_offset(&buf, base, len.saturating_mul(2)), + Some(block_pos as u32), + "doubled window should locate the block" + ); + } + + /// Review regression: a run-fill token with a unit width other than 1/2/4 + /// comes from a corrupt stream and must report failure — previously it + /// wrote nothing yet still counted the bytes as written, leaving stale + /// holes that later stages treated as plaintext. + #[test] + fn decompress_rejects_unknown_run_fill_width() { + // Huffman table at key_offset 0, entry 0: terminal symbol with + // mode 0x200 (run-fill), payload 3 (invalid width), code length 8. + let mut d = vec![0u8; 0x100]; + let sym: u16 = 0x8000 | 0x203; + d[0..2].copy_from_slice(&sym.to_le_bytes()); + d[2] = 8; + // All-zero source -> symbol index 0 -> the invalid run-fill. + assert!(!decompress(&mut d, 0x40, 0x80, 0, 4, 3)); + } + + /// Control for the above: a width-1 run-fill is legal and succeeds. + #[test] + fn decompress_accepts_width1_run_fill() { + let mut d = vec![0u8; 0x100]; + d[0x7F] = 0x5A; // unit to replicate + let sym: u16 = 0x8000 | 0x201; + d[0..2].copy_from_slice(&sym.to_le_bytes()); + d[2] = 8; + assert!(decompress(&mut d, 0x40, 0x80, 0, 4, 3)); + assert_eq!(&d[0x80..0x83], &[0x5A, 0x5A, 0x5A]); + } + + /// Seed the first `count` dd8-targeted positions of each sampled page with + /// the byte that decodes to `0xCC` under the `page+1` formula — i.e. an + /// encrypted `.text` whose plaintext is int3 padding. Positions whose key + /// byte would make the *ciphertext* itself `0xCC` are skipped so the + /// fixture contains no `0xCC` at all and every post-dd8 `0xCC` is a genuine + /// gain over a zero baseline. + fn seed_dd8_int3(data: &mut [u8], text_off: u32, pages: &[u32], count: u32) { + for &sp in pages { + let pg_off = (text_off + sp * 0x1000) as usize; + let mut k = sp.wrapping_add(1); + k = k.rotate_right(15); + let mut planted = 0u32; + for bi in 1..256u32 { + let ri = k.rotate_right(15).wrapping_add(bi); + k = ri.wrapping_add(bi); + if planted >= count { + continue; + } + let ct = 0xCCu8 ^ (k as u8); + if ct == 0xCC { + continue; + } + let tidx = (bi.wrapping_mul(16).wrapping_add(ri & 0xF)) as usize; + data[pg_off + tidx] = ct; + planted += 1; + } + } + } + + /// Review regression: a near-plaintext `.text` must NOT be dd8-decrypted. + /// dd8 XORs 255 positions per page with pseudo-random bytes, so it + /// manufactures a few `0xCC` for free — under the old bare + /// `best > baseline` test any positive gain was enough to "apply" dd8 and + /// scramble ~1 byte per 16 of a native DLL's already-plaintext code, + /// silently (nothing downstream, including the integrity check, notices). + /// Here the gain is real but small; the floor must still reject it. + #[test] + fn pe32_dd8_skips_text_whose_gain_is_only_noise_sized() { + let text_off: u32 = 0x1000; + let text_size: u32 = 8 * 0x1000; + let mut data = vec![0u8; (text_off + text_size) as usize]; + seed_dd8_int3(&mut data, text_off, &[2, 4, 6], 5); + assert!( + !data.contains(&0xCC), + "fixture must have a zero 0xCC baseline" + ); + assert_eq!( + select_dd8_formula_pe32(&data, text_off, text_size), + None, + "a gain this small is indistinguishable from dd8's own noise" + ); + } + + /// Control for the above: a `.text` whose dd8 pass restores a large amount + /// of int3 padding clears the floor and is decrypted. Same fixture shape, + /// only the amount of restored padding differs. + #[test] + fn pe32_dd8_applies_when_padding_is_restored() { + let text_off: u32 = 0x1000; + let text_size: u32 = 8 * 0x1000; + let mut data = vec![0u8; (text_off + text_size) as usize]; + seed_dd8_int3(&mut data, text_off, &[2, 4, 6], 255); + assert_eq!( + select_dd8_formula_pe32(&data, text_off, text_size), + Some(false), + "encrypted .text must be decrypted with the page+1 formula" + ); + } + + /// Review regression: a zero last-section VA (corrupt section table) must + /// bail instead of building .kmiat at RVA 0 — the old code zeroed + /// `[0, 0x7000)`, wiping the DOS/PE headers, and returned the broken image + /// as a success. A near-2 GiB VA must likewise refuse to grow the image + /// past [`super::MAX_IMAGE_SIZE`]. + #[test] + fn kmiat_bogus_section_va_bails_without_wiping_headers() { + for last_sec_va in [0u32, 0x5000_0000] { + let pe: u32 = 0x80; + let mut data = vec![0xAAu8; 0x8000]; + // COFF header: 1 section, optional header size 0xE0 (PE32). + write_u16(&mut data, pe + 6, 1); + write_u16(&mut data, pe + 20, 0xE0); + // Import directory at pe+0x80: one descriptor + null terminator. + write_u32(&mut data, pe + 0x80, 0x1100); + write_u32(&mut data, pe + 0x84, 0x28); + write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100, 0x1200); // OFT rva + write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100 + 12, 0x1300); // name rva + write_u32(&mut data, 0x1100 + 16, 0x1400); // IAT rva + for b in &mut data[0x1100 + 20..0x1100 + 40] { + *b = 0; // null terminator descriptor + } + data[0x1300..0x1300 + 13].copy_from_slice(b"KERNEL32.dll\0"); + write_u32(&mut data, 0x1200, 0x1500); // thunk -> hint/name + write_u32(&mut data, 0x1204, 0); // thunk terminator + data[0x1500..0x1502].copy_from_slice(&0u16.to_le_bytes()); + data[0x1502..0x1502 + 12].copy_from_slice(b"ExitProcess\0"); + // Section table at pe+24+0xE0 = 0x178; VA field at +12. + write_u32(&mut data, 0x178 + 12, last_sec_va); + + let head_before: Vec = data[..0x400].to_vec(); + let len_before = data.len(); + move_pe32_imports_to_kmiat(&mut data, pe); + assert_eq!( + data.len(), + len_before, + "VA 0x{last_sec_va:08X}: image must not grow" + ); + assert_eq!( + &data[..0x400], + &head_before[..], + "VA 0x{last_sec_va:08X}: headers must be untouched" + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/src/unpacker/tables.rs b/src/unpacker/tables.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04dcc9b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unpacker/tables.rs @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +//! AES inverse tables (inverse S-box + InvMixColumns "Td" T-tables), generated +//! at compile time from GF(2^8) arithmetic rather than embedded as a transcribed +//! blob. These are the standard AES *decryption* tables — not proprietary data — +//! so we derive them. The generated bytes are verified byte-identical to the +//! original hand-transcribed arrays (CRC32-locked in the test at the bottom). +//! +//! Each table is 1024 bytes = 256 u32 little-endian, read by +//! `primitives::aes_round` via `get_u32(&TABLE, x * 4)`. The byte layout matches +//! the original exactly, so `aes_round` is unchanged: +//! SBOX[x] = invsbox(x) broadcast to 4 bytes +//! COLUMMIX1[x] = [0b*s, 0d*s, 09*s, 0e*s], s = invsbox(x) (Td0, this byte order) +//! COLUMMIX2/3/4 = COLUMMIX1's 4-byte group rotated left by 1 / 2 / 3 bytes +//! +//! Generated the same way as the existing `const fn` CRC-table generation in +//! `crc32.rs`. + +/// GF(2^8) multiply with the AES reduction polynomial (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1). +const fn gf_mul(mut a: u8, mut b: u8) -> u8 { + let mut p: u8 = 0; + let mut i = 0; + while i < 8 { + if b & 1 != 0 { + p ^= a; + } + let hi = a & 0x80; + a <<= 1; + if hi != 0 { + a ^= 0x1B; + } + b >>= 1; + i += 1; + } + p +} + +/// The AES inverse S-box, derived from the multiplicative inverse in GF(2^8) +/// followed by inverting the forward S-box's affine transform. +const fn inv_sbox() -> [u8; 256] { + // Multiplicative inverse: inv[a] = b such that a*b == 1 (inv[0] stays 0). + let mut inv = [0u8; 256]; + let mut a = 1usize; + while a < 256 { + let mut b = 1usize; + while b < 256 { + if gf_mul(a as u8, b as u8) == 1 { + inv[a] = b as u8; + break; + } + b += 1; + } + a += 1; + } + // Forward S-box: affine transform over the inverse. + let mut sb = [0u8; 256]; + let mut i = 0usize; + while i < 256 { + let mut x = inv[i]; + let mut s = inv[i]; + let mut r = 0; + while r < 4 { + s = s.rotate_left(1); + x ^= s; + r += 1; + } + sb[i] = x ^ 0x63; + i += 1; + } + // Inverse S-box is the inverse permutation of the forward S-box. + let mut isb = [0u8; 256]; + let mut i = 0usize; + while i < 256 { + isb[sb[i] as usize] = i as u8; + i += 1; + } + isb +} + +/// The five generated tables (each 1024 bytes = 256 u32 LE). +struct AesTables { + cm1: [u8; 1024], + cm2: [u8; 1024], + cm3: [u8; 1024], + cm4: [u8; 1024], + sbox: [u8; 1024], +} + +/// Build all five tables in one compile-time pass. +const fn build_tables() -> AesTables { + let isb = inv_sbox(); + let mut cm1 = [0u8; 1024]; + let mut cm2 = [0u8; 1024]; + let mut cm3 = [0u8; 1024]; + let mut cm4 = [0u8; 1024]; + let mut sbox = [0u8; 1024]; + let mut x = 0usize; + while x < 256 { + let s = isb[x]; + // SBOX: invsbox(x) broadcast to all four lanes. + let mut j = 0; + while j < 4 { + sbox[x * 4 + j] = s; + j += 1; + } + // COLUMMIX1 lane bytes; CM2/3/4 are byte-rotations of the same four. + let b = [ + gf_mul(0x0b, s), + gf_mul(0x0d, s), + gf_mul(0x09, s), + gf_mul(0x0e, s), + ]; + let mut j = 0; + while j < 4 { + cm1[x * 4 + j] = b[j]; + cm2[x * 4 + j] = b[(j + 1) % 4]; + cm3[x * 4 + j] = b[(j + 2) % 4]; + cm4[x * 4 + j] = b[(j + 3) % 4]; + j += 1; + } + x += 1; + } + AesTables { + cm1, + cm2, + cm3, + cm4, + sbox, + } +} + +const TABLES: AesTables = build_tables(); + +pub static COLUMMIX1: [u8; 1024] = TABLES.cm1; +pub static COLUMMIX2: [u8; 1024] = TABLES.cm2; +pub static COLUMMIX3: [u8; 1024] = TABLES.cm3; +pub static COLUMMIX4: [u8; 1024] = TABLES.cm4; +pub static SBOX: [u8; 1024] = TABLES.sbox; + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + /// Lock the generated tables to the original hand-transcribed bytes. The + /// CRC32 oracles were computed from the previously-committed `tables.rs` + /// arrays; any drift in the generator (or the GF math) fails here before it + /// can reach the byte-identical corpus goldens. + #[test] + fn generated_tables_match_committed_bytes() { + assert_eq!(COLUMMIX1.len(), 1024); + assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX1), 0x7e8d_5d5f); + assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX2), 0xfcc4_acfc); + assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX3), 0x637a_f0cd); + assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&COLUMMIX4), 0x1e7b_c381); + assert_eq!(super::super::crc32::compute(&SBOX), 0x10fd_6dc1); + // Spot-check the first dword of each (matches the original first row). + assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX1[..4], &[0x50, 0xa7, 0xf4, 0x51]); + assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX2[..4], &[0xa7, 0xf4, 0x51, 0x50]); + assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX3[..4], &[0xf4, 0x51, 0x50, 0xa7]); + assert_eq!(&COLUMMIX4[..4], &[0x51, 0x50, 0xa7, 0xf4]); + assert_eq!(&SBOX[..4], &[0x52, 0x52, 0x52, 0x52]); + } +} diff --git a/tests/common/mod.rs b/tests/common/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b598c3f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/common/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +//! Shared test fixtures. +#![allow(dead_code)] + +use std::path::PathBuf; + +/// Path to `senbei/samples` — the user-managed corpus dropped in by hand. +/// Git-ignored except its README; tests here run against whatever is present. +pub fn samples_dir() -> PathBuf { + PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("samples") +} diff --git a/tests/job.rs b/tests/job.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8fb8a9c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/job.rs @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +use senbei::job::{default_out_root_for_file, out_name}; +use std::path::Path; + +#[test] +fn out_name_inserts_unpack_before_last_dot() { + assert_eq!(out_name(Path::new("foo.exe")), Path::new("foo.unpack.exe")); + assert_eq!( + out_name(Path::new("a/b/bar.dll")), + Path::new("a/b/bar.unpack.dll") + ); + assert_eq!(out_name(Path::new("x.y.dll")), Path::new("x.y.unpack.dll")); +} + +#[test] +fn out_name_no_dot_appends_unpack() { + assert_eq!(out_name(Path::new("nodot")), Path::new("nodot.unpack")); +} + +#[test] +fn default_out_root_for_file_is_parent_unpack() { + assert_eq!( + default_out_root_for_file(Path::new("a/b/foo.exe")), + Path::new("a/b/unpack") + ); +} + +#[test] +fn default_out_root_for_file_cwd_when_no_parent() { + let p = default_out_root_for_file(Path::new("foo.exe")); + assert_eq!(p, Path::new(".").join("unpack")); +} diff --git a/tests/logfile.rs b/tests/logfile.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8250ea --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/logfile.rs @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +use senbei::logfile::{Log, local_stamp_compact, local_stamp_display}; + +#[test] +fn local_stamp_compact_matches_shape() { + let s = local_stamp_compact(); + // YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS → 15 chars, digit groups around dash + assert_eq!(s.len(), 15, "got {s}"); + assert_eq!(&s[8..9], "-"); + assert!(s.as_bytes().iter().enumerate().all(|(i, b)| { + if i == 8 { + *b == b'-' + } else { + b.is_ascii_digit() + } + })); +} + +#[test] +fn local_stamp_display_matches_shape() { + let s = local_stamp_display(); + // YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS → 19 chars + assert_eq!(s.len(), 19, "got {s}"); + assert_eq!(&s[4..5], "-"); + assert_eq!(&s[7..8], "-"); + assert_eq!(&s[10..11], " "); + assert_eq!(&s[13..14], ":"); + assert_eq!(&s[16..17], ":"); +} + +#[test] +fn log_writes_timestamped_file_in_target_dir() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let log = Log::create(td.path()).unwrap(); + log.step("hello"); + let path = log.path().to_path_buf(); + drop(log); + assert!(path.starts_with(td.path())); + let name = path.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy(); + assert!( + name.starts_with("senbei-") && name.ends_with(".log"), + "unexpected log name: {name}" + ); + // senbei-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.log + let core = name.trim_start_matches("senbei-").trim_end_matches(".log"); + assert_eq!(core.len(), 15, "stamp in name: {name}"); + assert!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap().contains("hello")); +} diff --git a/tests/run_log.rs b/tests/run_log.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a909e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/run_log.rs @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +use senbei::job; +use std::path::Path; + +fn list_logs(dir: &Path) -> Vec { + std::fs::read_dir(dir) + .into_iter() + .flatten() + .filter_map(|e| e.ok()) + .map(|e| e.path()) + .filter(|p| { + p.file_name() + .and_then(|n| n.to_str()) + .map(|n| n.starts_with("senbei-") && n.ends_with(".log")) + .unwrap_or(false) + }) + .collect() +} + +#[test] +fn run_file_no_log_creates_no_logfile() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let input = td.path().join("not_crackproof.bin"); + std::fs::write(&input, b"not a pe").unwrap(); + let out = td.path().join("out"); + let s = job::run_file_v(&input, Some(&out), 2, false, true).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(s.errors, 1); + // With no_log, no senbei-*.log under out (even if the dir was created). + assert!(list_logs(&out).is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn run_file_writes_log_under_out_with_header_footer() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let input = td.path().join("not_crackproof.bin"); + std::fs::write(&input, b"not a pe").unwrap(); + let out = td.path().join("out"); + let s = job::run_file_v(&input, Some(&out), 2, false, false).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(s.errors, 1); + let logs = list_logs(&out); + assert_eq!(logs.len(), 1, "expected one log under out, got {logs:?}"); + let text = std::fs::read_to_string(&logs[0]).unwrap(); + assert!(text.contains("Senbei "), "header version: {text}"); + assert!(text.contains("started "), "{text}"); + assert!(text.contains("input "), "{text}"); + assert!(text.contains("out "), "{text}"); + assert!(text.contains("ERR "), "{text}"); + assert!(text.contains("done in "), "{text}"); + assert!(text.contains("summary:"), "{text}"); +} + +#[test] +fn run_file_default_out_root_is_parent_unpack() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + let input = td.path().join("not_crackproof.bin"); + std::fs::write(&input, b"not a pe").unwrap(); + let _ = job::run_file_v(&input, None, 2, false, false).unwrap(); + let unpack = td.path().join("unpack"); + assert!(unpack.is_dir()); + assert_eq!(list_logs(&unpack).len(), 1); + // log must NOT be next to input's parent root without unpack + assert!(list_logs(td.path()).is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn run_folder_log_lives_under_out_not_root() { + let td = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap(); + // empty tree: 0 candidates still creates log under unpack + let s = job::run_folder_v(td.path(), None, 2, false, false).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(s.unpacked, 0); + let unpack = td.path().join("unpack"); + assert!(unpack.is_dir()); + assert_eq!(list_logs(&unpack).len(), 1); + assert!( + list_logs(td.path()).is_empty(), + "log must not sit on input root" + ); + let text = std::fs::read_to_string(&list_logs(&unpack)[0]).unwrap(); + assert!(text.contains("done in ")); + assert!(text.contains("summary:")); +} diff --git a/tests/samples.rs b/tests/samples.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7adf8fe --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/samples.rs @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +//! Corpus test over the user-managed `senbei/samples` folder. +//! +//! Drop real Crackproof `*.exe` / `*.dll` inputs in there (and/or il2cpp +//! `*.dat` metadata blobs), optionally alongside a byte-exact golden named +//! `.golden.`. Each input is processed and classified: +//! +//! - golden present, bytes identical -> pass (silent) +//! - golden present, bytes differ -> FAIL (the test fails) +//! - no golden -> WARNING (printed; needs a manual check) +//! +//! Inputs go through [`senbei::job::unpack_bytes`], the same routing the CLI +//! uses, **not** `unpack_auto` directly. That matters: `unpack_auto` alone +//! cannot reach the external-companion layout, whose stub is meaningless +//! without its `._` payload — a corpus wired to `unpack_auto` silently +//! covers none of the splice / export-overlay / TLS-restore code, nor the +//! marker-less "new layout" those builds use. A `._` sibling in the +//! samples folder is picked up automatically, exactly as it is on disk. +//! +//! An input whose bytes carry the il2cpp metadata magic is routed through +//! [`senbei::metadata::deobfuscate`] instead, giving the method-token remap +//! real-world coverage (its unit tests only build synthetic layouts). +//! +//! The folder is git-ignored (see `senbei/samples/README.md`), so the set of +//! samples is whatever happens to be on the machine. An empty/absent folder is +//! a no-op pass. + +mod common; +use common::samples_dir; +use std::path::Path; + +/// An input is a `.exe`/`.dll`/`.dat` whose name doesn't carry the `.golden.` +/// marker — those are goldens, not inputs. External companions (`._`) +/// have extension `_` and are therefore never inputs in their own right; they +/// are consumed by their base module. +fn is_input(path: &Path) -> bool { + let Some(ext) = path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) else { + return false; + }; + let ext = ext.to_ascii_lowercase(); + if ext != "exe" && ext != "dll" && ext != "dat" { + return false; + } + // Reject goldens like `foo.golden.exe`. + !path + .file_name() + .and_then(|n| n.to_str()) + .map(|n| n.to_ascii_lowercase().contains(".golden.")) + .unwrap_or(false) +} + +/// Golden path for an input: `.golden.` next to it. +fn golden_for(input: &Path) -> std::path::PathBuf { + let ext = input.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()).unwrap_or(""); + let stem = input.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or(""); + input.with_file_name(format!("{stem}.golden.{ext}")) +} + +/// External-companion path for an input: `._` next to it, +/// matching what the CLI looks for on disk. +fn companion_for(input: &Path) -> Option { + let name = input.file_name()?; + let mut n = name.to_os_string(); + n.push("._"); + let p = input.with_file_name(n); + p.is_file().then_some(p) +} + +#[test] +fn samples_unpack_against_goldens() { + let dir = samples_dir(); + // An absent/empty corpus fails only when explicitly required — a green + // run that unpacked nothing hides every unpack regression, but on public + // CI there is no corpus at all (binaries are never committed), so the + // gate is opt-in via SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES rather than implied by CI. + // Locally the corpus is the user-managed samples/ folder (see + // samples/README.md). + let require = std::env::var_os("SENBEI_REQUIRE_SAMPLES").is_some(); + if !dir.is_dir() { + assert!( + !require, + "samples: {} does not exist — corpus required (CI)", + dir.display() + ); + eprintln!("samples: {} does not exist, nothing to test", dir.display()); + return; + } + + let mut inputs: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&dir) + .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("read {}: {e}", dir.display())) + .filter_map(|e| e.ok().map(|e| e.path())) + .filter(|p| p.is_file() && is_input(p)) + .collect(); + inputs.sort(); + + if inputs.is_empty() { + assert!( + !require, + "samples: no .exe/.dll inputs in {} — corpus required (CI)", + dir.display() + ); + eprintln!("samples: no .exe/.dll inputs in {}", dir.display()); + return; + } + + let mut passed = 0usize; + let mut warnings: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut failures: Vec = Vec::new(); + + for input in &inputs { + let name = input.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy().to_string(); + let bytes = match std::fs::read(input) { + Ok(b) => b, + Err(e) => { + failures.push(format!("{name}: read error: {e}")); + continue; + } + }; + + let got = if senbei::metadata::is_metadata(&bytes) { + // il2cpp metadata: method-token de-obfuscation, no PE pipeline and + // no integrity check (the output is not a PE image). + match senbei::metadata::deobfuscate(&bytes) { + Ok((out, _report)) => out, + Err(e) => { + failures.push(format!("{name}: de-obfuscation failed: {e}")); + continue; + } + } + } else { + // Splice in the external companion when one sits next to the input, + // then run the CLI's routing (which also overlays the stub's export + // table and TLS directory for spliced inputs). + let companion = match companion_for(input) { + Some(p) => match std::fs::read(&p) { + Ok(b) => Some(b), + Err(e) => { + failures.push(format!("{name}: companion read error: {e}")); + continue; + } + }, + None => None, + }; + let image = match senbei::job::unpack_bytes(&bytes, companion.as_deref()) { + Ok(img) => img, + Err(e) => { + failures.push(format!("{name}: unpack failed: {e:?}")); + continue; + } + }; + // The static integrity check is a second, golden-independent gate: + // it catches an output that is structurally plausible but would + // crash at runtime (0xC0000005) even when a stale golden still + // byte-matches. (Goldens are byte comparisons only — "matches + // golden" ≠ runs.) + if !image.integrity.ok() { + failures.push(format!( + "{name}: integrity check failed: {}", + image.integrity.issues.join("; ") + )); + continue; + } + image.bytes + }; + + let golden = golden_for(input); + if !golden.exists() { + warnings.push(format!( + "{name}: unpacked OK ({} bytes) but no golden ({}) — MANUAL CHECK", + got.len(), + golden.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy() + )); + continue; + } + + let want = match std::fs::read(&golden) { + Ok(b) => b, + Err(e) => { + failures.push(format!("{name}: golden read error: {e}")); + continue; + } + }; + + if got.len() != want.len() { + failures.push(format!( + "{name}: length differs: got {} want {}", + got.len(), + want.len() + )); + continue; + } + if let Some((i, (a, b))) = got.iter().zip(&want).enumerate().find(|(_, (a, b))| a != b) { + failures.push(format!( + "{name}: first diff at 0x{i:X}: got {a:02X} want {b:02X}" + )); + continue; + } + passed += 1; + } 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Remote Network Interaction; Use with the GNU General Public License. + + Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, if you modify the +Program, your modified version must prominently offer all users +interacting with it remotely through a computer network (if your version +supports such interaction) an opportunity to receive the Corresponding +Source of your version by providing access to the Corresponding Source +from a network server at no charge, through some standard or customary +means of facilitating copying of software. This Corresponding Source +shall include the Corresponding Source for any work covered by version 3 +of the GNU General Public License that is incorporated pursuant to the +following paragraph. + + Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have +permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed +under version 3 of the GNU General Public License into a single +combined work, and to convey the resulting work. 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If the Program does not specify a version number of the +GNU Affero General Public License, you may choose any version ever published +by the Free Software Foundation. + + If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future +versions of the GNU Affero General Public License can be used, that proxy's +public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you +to choose that version for the Program. + + Later license versions may give you additional or different +permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any +author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a +later version. + + 15. Disclaimer of Warranty. + + THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY +APPLICABLE LAW. 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Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16. + + If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided +above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, +reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates +an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the +Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a +copy of the Program in return for a fee. + + END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS + + How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs + + If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest +possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it +free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. + + To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest +to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively +state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least +the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. + + + Copyright (C) + + This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published + by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU Affero General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License + along with this program. If not, see . + +Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. + + If your software can interact with users remotely through a computer +network, you should also make sure that it provides a way for users to +get its source. For example, if your program is a web application, its +interface could display a "Source" link that leads users to an archive +of the code. There are many ways you could offer source, and different +solutions will be better for different programs; see section 13 for the +specific requirements. + + You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, +if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. +For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU AGPL, see +. + diff --git a/web/README.md b/web/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c284174 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# Senbei web + +Senbei running in the browser: the unpacker core compiled to WebAssembly, +wrapped in a small static page. Everything is client-side — files are read +into the page, unpacked locally, and offered back as downloads. Nothing is +uploaded; there is no server component. + +## Features + +- A legal notice is shown as a blocking dialog on page open; the tool is + unusable until it is acknowledged. +- Dropped files land in a file list, not unpacked immediately: review the + batch, remove mistakes, then press **Unpack**. A module and its `._` + companion can be dropped in any order (or in separate drops) — companions + auto-pair by name (`Foo.dll._` → `Foo.dll`) and show as a badge on the + module's row; removing a module removes its companion too. +- Rows show state at a glance: black while staged, an animated blue bar + while unpacking, green on success (with a download button) and red on + failure. +- Drop one or more protected `.exe` / `.dll` modules → get `.unpack.*` + downloads. +- Drop an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat` → de-obfuscated + `global-metadata.unpack.dat` (only when tokens actually change). +- Each output passes the same static integrity check as the CLI; suspect + outputs are flagged with the specific defects found. + +## Architecture notes + +- Every unpack runs in a **disposable Web Worker** (fresh wasm instance per + file): the UI stays responsive on 100 MB+ modules, and a wasm trap is + isolated to that worker. +- **Why workers matter for correctness:** the DLL-first routing probe relies + on `catch_unwind` to reject EXE-shell-layout DLLs, and panics cannot be + caught in WebAssembly — the probe traps the whole call. When a DLL unpack + traps, the app retries once in a new worker with the forced-EXE pipeline + (`unpack_file_force_exe`), reproducing the CLI's dll-first/exe-fallback + outcome. Spliced companion inputs skip the probe entirely (they are always + EXE-shell layout), exactly like the CLI. +- Rust panic messages are forwarded to the browser console + (`console_error_panic_hook`) — check devtools when reporting an issue. + +## Building + +Requires a Rust toolchain (`rust-toolchain.toml` in the repo root pins one, +including the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target) and +[wasm-pack](https://rustwasm.github.io/wasm-pack/installer/). + +```cmd +cd web +wasm-pack build --target web --release +``` + +This produces `web/pkg/` (git-ignored). Then serve the `web/` directory with +any static file server and open `index.html`: + +```cmd +python -m http.server -d web 8000 +:: -> http://localhost:8000 +``` + +(Opening `index.html` via `file://` won't work — ES modules require HTTP.) + +## Layout + +``` +web/ +├── Cargo.toml senbei-web cdylib crate (depends on the senbei lib) +├── src/lib.rs #[wasm_bindgen] bindings: detect / unpack_file / +│ unpack_file_force_exe / deobfuscate_metadata +├── index.html the page +├── app.js dropzone, file list, worker orchestration, downloads +├── worker.js one-shot unpack worker (fresh wasm instance per file) +├── style.css +└── pkg/ wasm-pack output (git-ignored) +``` diff --git a/web/app.js b/web/app.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5c9df6 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/app.js @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +import init, { detect, deobfuscate_metadata } from './pkg/senbei_web.js'; + +const dropzone = document.getElementById('dropzone'); +const picker = document.getElementById('picker'); +const fileList = document.getElementById('files'); +const actions = document.getElementById('actions'); +const unpackBtn = document.getElementById('unpack-btn'); +const clearBtn = document.getElementById('clear-btn'); +const legalOverlay = document.getElementById('legal-overlay'); +const legalAccept = document.getElementById('legal-accept'); +const legalLink = document.getElementById('legal-link'); + +await init(); + +// --- Legal gate: the page is unusable until the notice is acknowledged. --- +legalAccept.addEventListener('click', () => legalOverlay.remove()); +legalLink.addEventListener('click', (e) => { + e.preventDefault(); + if (!document.getElementById('legal-overlay')) { + document.body.appendChild(legalOverlay); + } +}); + +// --- File list: one row per module. Companions (`X._`) never get their own --- +// --- row once their base module `X` is present — they show as a badge on --- +// --- the base row. Rows are black while staged, show an animated blue --- +// --- progress bar while unpacking, and turn green (success) or red --- +// --- (failure) at the end; success rows gain a download button. --- + +// --- Row DOM is updated INCREMENTALLY: rows are created once and patched --- +// --- in place. Rebuilding the list on every change would restart the --- +// --- entrance animation of every row and reset the unpack shimmer. --- + +/** name -> { + * file: File, + * kind: string|undefined, // detect() result; undefined for `._` files + * state: 'staged'|'working'|'ok'|'err', + * bytes: Uint8Array|null, // unpacked output (state 'ok') + * note: string, // status line (kind, suspect issues, error) + * suspect: boolean, + * } */ +const files = new Map(); + +/** name -> row
  • element (companions merged into their base have none) */ +const rowEls = new Map(); + +const KIND_LABEL = { + exe: 'protected EXE', + 'native-dll': 'protected native DLL', + 'managed-dll': 'protected managed DLL', + metadata: 'il2cpp metadata', +}; + +const COMPANION_SVG = + ''; + +const DOWNLOAD_SVG = + ''; + +dropzone.addEventListener('click', () => picker.click()); +dropzone.addEventListener('keydown', (e) => { + if (e.key === 'Enter' || e.key === ' ') picker.click(); +}); +picker.addEventListener('change', () => { + stageFiles(picker.files); + picker.value = ''; +}); +dropzone.addEventListener('dragover', (e) => { + e.preventDefault(); + dropzone.classList.add('over'); +}); +dropzone.addEventListener('dragleave', () => dropzone.classList.remove('over')); +dropzone.addEventListener('drop', (e) => { + e.preventDefault(); + dropzone.classList.remove('over'); + stageFiles(e.dataTransfer.files); +}); + +async function stageFiles(list) { + // Snapshot synchronously: `picker.files` and `dataTransfer.files` are LIVE + // lists — clearing the picker or returning from the drop event empties + // them, so an await before this point silently drops every file after the + // first. + const snapshot = [...list]; + for (const file of snapshot) { + // Detection only needs the file header (key table at offset 4096 plus + // the PE header fields); read a small slice, not the whole file. + const head = new Uint8Array(await file.slice(0, 65536).arrayBuffer()); + // Companions are ciphertext fragments; detect() only makes sense on the + // base module, so skip it for `._` files. + const kind = file.name.endsWith('._') ? undefined : detect(head); + const old = files.get(file.name); + files.set(file.name, { + file, + kind, + state: 'staged', + bytes: null, + note: '', + suspect: false, + }); // same name re-dropped: replace + // A re-dropped file restarts as staged; drop any stale row/output. + if (old) removeRow(file.name, true); + } + render(); +} + +/** Insert `.unpack` before the final extension: `app.exe` -> `app.unpack.exe`. */ +function outName(name) { + const dot = name.lastIndexOf('.'); + return dot > 0 ? `${name.slice(0, dot)}.unpack${name.slice(dot)}` : `${name}.unpack`; +} + +function statusText(name, entry) { + if (name.endsWith('._')) { + return `companion — needs ${name.slice(0, -2)}`; + } + switch (entry.state) { + case 'staged': + return entry.kind === undefined + ? 'not recognized — will be skipped' + : KIND_LABEL[entry.kind] ?? entry.kind; + case 'working': + return 'unpacking…'; + case 'ok': + case 'err': + return entry.note; + } +} + +function buildRow(name) { + const li = document.createElement('li'); + li.className = 'file staged'; + li.dataset.name = name; + + const bar = document.createElement('div'); + bar.className = 'bar'; + li.appendChild(bar); + + const row = document.createElement('div'); + row.className = 'row'; + + const label = document.createElement('span'); + label.className = 'name'; + label.textContent = name; + row.appendChild(label); + + const badge = document.createElement('span'); + badge.className = 'badge companion'; + badge.innerHTML = COMPANION_SVG; + badge.hidden = true; + row.appendChild(badge); + + const status = document.createElement('span'); + status.className = 'status'; + row.appendChild(status); + + const dl = document.createElement('a'); + dl.className = 'dl'; + dl.innerHTML = DOWNLOAD_SVG; + dl.hidden = true; + row.appendChild(dl); + + const rm = document.createElement('button'); + rm.type = 'button'; + rm.className = 'remove'; + rm.textContent = '×'; + rm.title = `Remove ${name}`; + rm.addEventListener('click', () => { + // A companion belongs to its base module: removing the base removes the + // companion too. + files.delete(name); + if (!name.endsWith('._')) files.delete(`${name}._`); + render(); + }); + row.appendChild(rm); + + li.appendChild(row); + return li; +} + +function updateRow(li, name, entry) { + const isCompanion = name.endsWith('._'); + li.className = + `file ${entry.state}` + (entry.suspect && entry.state === 'ok' ? ' suspect' : ''); + + const badge = li.querySelector('.badge'); + const hasCompanion = isCompanion || files.has(`${name}._`); + badge.hidden = !hasCompanion; + if (hasCompanion) { + badge.title = isCompanion + ? 'external companion (._)' + : `companion loaded: ${name}._`; + } + + li.querySelector('.status').textContent = statusText(name, entry); + + const dl = li.querySelector('.dl'); + const downloadable = entry.state === 'ok' && entry.bytes; + dl.hidden = !downloadable; + if (downloadable) { + if (dl._bytesFor !== entry.bytes) { + if (dl.href) URL.revokeObjectURL(dl.href); + dl.href = URL.createObjectURL( + new Blob([entry.bytes], { type: 'application/octet-stream' }), + ); + dl._bytesFor = entry.bytes; + } + dl.download = outName(name); + dl.title = `Download ${outName(name)}`; + } +} + +function removeRow(name, instant) { + const li = rowEls.get(name); + if (!li) return; + rowEls.delete(name); + // Release the download blob. Object URLs are roots: without this an unpacked + // 100 MB image stays resident for the life of the page every time a row is + // removed or the list is cleared. + const dl = li.querySelector('.dl'); + if (dl?.href) { + URL.revokeObjectURL(dl.href); + dl.removeAttribute('href'); + dl._bytesFor = null; + } + if (instant) { + li.remove(); + return; + } + // Fade AND collapse: without the height/margin transition the rows below + // would hold position during the fade and then snap up on removal. The + // end state must be inline too — an inline start value would otherwise + // beat the stylesheet's `.leaving { max-height: 0 }`. + li.style.maxHeight = `${li.offsetHeight}px`; + void li.offsetHeight; // reflow: give the transition a concrete start value + li.classList.add('leaving'); + li.style.maxHeight = '0px'; + setTimeout(() => li.remove(), 230); +} + +function render() { + // Create/update rows in Map order; companions whose base is staged merge + // into the base row (no row of their own). + const wanted = []; + for (const [name] of files) { + if (name.endsWith('._') && files.has(name.slice(0, -2))) continue; + wanted.push(name); + } + const wantedSet = new Set(wanted); + + // Removals first: departed rows are marked leaving (and dropped from + // rowEls) BEFORE the ordering loop, so the loop treats them as transparent + // and never reorders siblings around them (that would snap, not slide). + for (const name of [...rowEls.keys()]) { + if (!wantedSet.has(name)) removeRow(name, false); + } + + // In-place ordering: only rows that are out of position are moved, so + // running animations (entrance, shimmer) are never restarted by a render. + // Rows mid-leave-animation (no longer in rowEls) are skipped and keep + // their spot — reordering siblings around them would make them snap + // instead of sliding with the collapse. + let cursor = fileList.firstChild; + for (const name of wanted) { + let li = rowEls.get(name); + if (!li) { + li = buildRow(name); + rowEls.set(name, li); + } + updateRow(li, name, files.get(name)); + while (cursor && !rowEls.has(cursor.dataset.name)) { + cursor = cursor.nextSibling; + } + if (li === cursor) { + cursor = cursor.nextSibling; + } else { + fileList.insertBefore(li, cursor); + } + } + + const unpackable = [...files].some( + ([name, e]) => + !name.endsWith('._') && e.kind !== undefined && e.state === 'staged', + ); + unpackBtn.disabled = !unpackable; + actions.hidden = files.size === 0; +} + +clearBtn.addEventListener('click', () => { + files.clear(); + render(); +}); + +/** + * Run one unpack in a disposable Web Worker (fresh wasm instance per call — + * see worker.js). Buffers are transferred, so the inputs are neutered on the + * main thread afterwards; callers re-read from the File for a retry. + */ +function runUnpack(inputBytes, compBytes, forceExe) { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + const w = new Worker('worker.js', { type: 'module' }); + w.onmessage = (e) => { + w.terminate(); + resolve(e.data); + }; + w.onerror = (e) => { + w.terminate(); + resolve({ ok: false, trap: true, message: e.message || 'worker error' }); + }; + const transfer = [inputBytes.buffer, ...(compBytes ? [compBytes.buffer] : [])]; + w.postMessage({ input: inputBytes, companion: compBytes ?? null, forceExe }, transfer); + }); +} + +async function unpackModule(name, entry) { + const compEntry = files.get(`${name}._`); + const read = (f) => f.arrayBuffer().then((b) => new Uint8Array(b)); + + let input = await read(entry.file); + let comp = compEntry ? await read(compEntry.file) : undefined; + let r = await runUnpack(input, comp, false); + + if (!r.ok && r.trap && entry.kind !== 'exe') { + // The DLL-routing probe trapped (panics can't be caught in wasm). Retry + // once with the forced-EXE pipeline in a fresh worker — this mirrors the + // CLI's dll-first/exe-fallback outcome for EXE-shell-layout DLLs. + input = await read(entry.file); + comp = compEntry ? await read(compEntry.file) : undefined; + r = await runUnpack(input, comp, true); + } + + if (!r.ok) { + entry.state = 'err'; + entry.note = r.trap + ? 'unpack failed (internal trap) — this Crackproof layout may be unsupported' + : r.message; + return; + } + entry.state = 'ok'; + entry.bytes = r.bytes; + entry.suspect = r.suspect; + entry.note = + (r.companion ? 'spliced from ._ companion; ' : '') + + `kind: ${r.kind}` + + (r.suspect ? ` — SUSPECT: ${r.issues.join('; ')}` : ''); +} + +unpackBtn.addEventListener('click', async () => { + unpackBtn.disabled = true; + clearBtn.disabled = true; + try { + for (const [name, entry] of files) { + if (name.endsWith('._') || entry.state !== 'staged') continue; + + if (entry.kind === undefined) { + entry.state = 'err'; + entry.note = 'not recognized as Crackproof-protected — skipped'; + render(); + continue; + } + + entry.state = 'working'; + render(); + try { + if (entry.kind === 'metadata') { + const bytes = new Uint8Array(await entry.file.arrayBuffer()); + const r = deobfuscate_metadata(bytes); + if (r.remapped === 0) { + entry.state = 'err'; + entry.note = `metadata already clean (v${r.version}, ${r.methods} methods) — nothing to do`; + } else { + entry.state = 'ok'; + entry.bytes = r.bytes; + entry.note = `${r.remapped}/${r.methods} method tokens remapped across ${r.modules} modules`; + } + } else { + await unpackModule(name, entry); + } + } catch (e) { + entry.state = 'err'; + entry.note = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e); + } + render(); + } + } finally { + clearBtn.disabled = false; + render(); + } +}); diff --git a/web/index.html b/web/index.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59e9c2c --- /dev/null +++ b/web/index.html @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ + + + + + +Senbei — static Crackproof unpacker + + + + + +
    +
    +

    Senbei web

    + + + +
    +

    + Static unpacker for Crackproof-protected PE files, running entirely in + your browser. No file ever leaves your device. +

    + +
    +

    Drop files here or click to browse

    +

    + Protected .exe / .dll modules, optional + ._ companions, or an il2cpp + global-metadata.dat. +

    + +
    + +
      + + + +
      +

      Legal notice · + Senbei is free software under the AGPL-3.0 license.

      +
      +
      + + + diff --git a/web/src/lib.rs b/web/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b98583 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +//! WebAssembly bindings for the senbei unpacker core. +//! +//! Everything here is I/O-free: the browser hands in file bytes and gets +//! unpacked file bytes back. No network, no filesystem, no uploads. + +use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*; + +/// Install a panic hook that forwards Rust panic messages to the browser +/// console (and to the JS error), instead of a bare `unreachable` trap. +#[wasm_bindgen(start)] +pub fn init_panic_hook() { + console_error_panic_hook::set_once(); +} + +/// Result of unpacking one protected module. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub struct UnpackResult { + kind: String, + bytes: Vec, + suspect: bool, + issues: Vec, + companion: bool, +} + +#[wasm_bindgen] +impl UnpackResult { + /// Detected module kind: `"exe"`, `"native-dll"`, or `"managed-dll"`. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn kind(&self) -> String { + self.kind.clone() + } + + /// The unpacked image bytes. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn bytes(&self) -> Vec { + self.bytes.clone() + } + + /// True when the static integrity check flagged the output as likely + /// broken at runtime. The bytes are still the best available. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn suspect(&self) -> bool { + self.suspect + } + + /// Human-readable integrity defects (empty when the check is clean). + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn issues(&self) -> Vec { + self.issues.clone() + } + + /// True when the input was spliced from an external-companion (`._`) + /// payload. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn companion(&self) -> bool { + self.companion + } +} + +/// Result of de-obfuscating an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat`. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub struct MetadataResult { + bytes: Vec, + version: u32, + methods: usize, + remapped: usize, + modules: usize, +} + +#[wasm_bindgen] +impl MetadataResult { + /// The (possibly rewritten) metadata bytes. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn bytes(&self) -> Vec { + self.bytes.clone() + } + + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn version(&self) -> u32 { + self.version + } + + /// Total method-definition entries in the metadata. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn methods(&self) -> usize { + self.methods + } + + /// Method tokens actually rewritten (0 means the input was already + /// de-obfuscated and the bytes are unchanged). + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn remapped(&self) -> usize { + self.remapped + } + + /// Modules (images) owning at least one method. + #[wasm_bindgen(getter)] + pub fn modules(&self) -> usize { + self.modules + } +} + +fn kind_str(kind: senbei::unpacker::Kind) -> &'static str { + match kind { + senbei::unpacker::Kind::Exe => "exe", + senbei::unpacker::Kind::NativeDll => "native-dll", + senbei::unpacker::Kind::ManagedDll => "managed-dll", + } +} + +/// Classify a file's bytes without unpacking. +/// +/// Returns `"exe"`, `"native-dll"`, `"managed-dll"`, `"metadata"` (an il2cpp +/// `global-metadata.dat`), or `undefined` for anything unrecognized. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub fn detect(input: &[u8]) -> Option { + if senbei::metadata::is_metadata(input) { + return Some("metadata".to_string()); + } + senbei::unpacker::detect(input).map(|d| kind_str(d.kind).to_string()) +} + +/// Unpack a protected module. +/// +/// `input` is the protected `.exe`/`.dll`; `companion` is the optional +/// `._` external-companion payload (pass `null`/`undefined` when there +/// is none). Throws a string error when the input is not a supported +/// Crackproof file or is corrupt. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub fn unpack_file( + input: &[u8], + companion: Option>, +) -> Result { + let r = senbei::job::unpack_bytes(input, companion.as_deref()) + .map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?; + Ok(UnpackResult { + kind: kind_str(r.kind).to_string(), + bytes: r.bytes, + suspect: !r.integrity.ok(), + issues: r.integrity.issues, + companion: r.companion, + }) +} + +/// De-obfuscate the method tokens of an il2cpp `global-metadata.dat`. +/// +/// The transform is idempotent: an already-clean metadata comes back +/// byte-identical with `remapped == 0`. Throws a string error for non-metadata +/// input, an unsupported format version, or a malformed layout. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub fn deobfuscate_metadata(data: &[u8]) -> Result { + let (bytes, report) = + senbei::metadata::deobfuscate(data).map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?; + Ok(MetadataResult { + bytes, + version: report.version, + methods: report.methods, + remapped: report.remapped, + modules: report.modules, + }) +} + +/// Unpack a protected module, forcing the EXE pipeline (no DLL-pipeline +/// probe). See [`senbei::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe`] for why the web app +/// needs this recovery path. +#[wasm_bindgen] +pub fn unpack_file_force_exe( + input: &[u8], + companion: Option>, +) -> Result { + let r = senbei::job::unpack_bytes_force_exe(input, companion.as_deref()) + .map_err(|e| JsError::new(&e.to_string()))?; + Ok(UnpackResult { + kind: kind_str(r.kind).to_string(), + bytes: r.bytes, + suspect: !r.integrity.ok(), + issues: r.integrity.issues, + companion: r.companion, + }) +} diff --git a/web/style.css b/web/style.css new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a2da81 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/style.css @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@ +:root { + color-scheme: dark; + --bg: #14161a; + --panel: #1d2026; + --black: #0c0e11; + --border: #2e323b; + --text: #e4e7ec; + --dim: #9aa3b0; + --accent: #e8b64c; + --blue: #3b82f6; + --blue-deep: #1d4ed8; + --ok: #1e6b34; + --ok-bright: #6fcf7c; + --err: #7a2828; + --err-bright: #e06c6c; + --warn: #e8b64c; +} + +* { box-sizing: border-box; } + +/* display rules below (inline-flex etc.) would otherwise beat the hidden + attribute's UA display:none — the badge/download icons must stay hidden. */ +[hidden] { display: none !important; } + +body { + margin: 0; + background: var(--bg); + color: var(--text); + font: 16px/1.55 system-ui, "Segoe UI", sans-serif; +} + +main { + max-width: 720px; + margin: 0 auto; + padding: 2.5rem 1.25rem 3rem; +} + +.topbar { + display: flex; + align-items: center; + justify-content: space-between; +} + +h1 { margin-bottom: 0.25rem; } + +.tag { + font-size: 0.45em; + vertical-align: super; + color: var(--accent); + letter-spacing: 0.08em; +} + +.github-link { + color: var(--dim); + transition: color 0.2s, transform 0.2s; +} + +.github-link:hover { + color: var(--text); + transform: scale(1.12); +} + +.lede { color: var(--dim); } +.lede strong { color: var(--text); } + +/* --- legal modal --- */ + +#legal-overlay { + position: fixed; + inset: 0; + z-index: 10; + display: flex; + align-items: center; + justify-content: center; + padding: 1.25rem; + background: rgba(10, 11, 13, 0.82); + backdrop-filter: blur(3px); + animation: fadeIn 0.25s ease-out; +} + +.legal-box { + max-width: 560px; + max-height: 85vh; + overflow-y: auto; + padding: 1.75rem 2rem; + background: var(--panel); + border: 1px solid var(--border); + border-radius: 12px; + animation: popIn 0.3s cubic-bezier(0.2, 1.4, 0.4, 1); +} + +.legal-box h2 { margin-top: 0; } +.legal-box p { color: var(--dim); font-size: 0.95rem; } +.legal-box strong { color: var(--text); } + +button { + font: inherit; + padding: 0.55rem 1.2rem; + border: 1px solid var(--accent); + border-radius: 8px; + background: var(--accent); + color: #14161a; + font-weight: 600; + cursor: pointer; + transition: transform 0.15s, box-shadow 0.15s, opacity 0.15s; +} + +button:not(:disabled):hover { + transform: translateY(-1px); + box-shadow: 0 3px 12px rgba(232, 182, 76, 0.25); +} + +button:not(:disabled):active { transform: translateY(0); } + +button:disabled { + opacity: 0.45; + cursor: default; +} + +button.secondary { + background: transparent; + color: var(--dim); + border-color: var(--border); +} + +button.secondary:not(:disabled):hover { + box-shadow: none; + color: var(--text); +} + +#legal-accept { width: 100%; margin-top: 0.5rem; } + +/* --- dropzone --- */ + +#dropzone { + margin: 1.5rem 0; + padding: 2.25rem 1.5rem; + text-align: center; + background: var(--panel); + border: 2px dashed var(--border); + border-radius: 12px; + cursor: pointer; + transition: border-color 0.2s, background 0.2s, transform 0.2s; +} + +#dropzone:hover, #dropzone:focus-visible { + border-color: var(--accent); + outline: none; +} + +#dropzone.over { + border-color: var(--accent); + background: #232730; + transform: scale(1.01); + animation: pulse 1s ease-in-out infinite; +} + +#dropzone p { margin: 0.25rem 0; } +.hint { color: var(--dim); font-size: 0.9rem; } +code { + background: var(--bg); + padding: 0.1em 0.35em; + border-radius: 4px; + font-size: 0.9em; +} + +/* --- file list --- */ + +#files { + list-style: none; + margin: 0 0 0.75rem; + padding: 0; +} + +.file { + position: relative; + margin-bottom: 0.45rem; + border: 1px solid var(--border); + border-radius: 8px; + overflow: hidden; + background: var(--black); /* staged */ + transition: background-color 0.5s ease; + animation: slideIn 0.25s ease-out; +} + +.file.leaving { + opacity: 0; + transform: translateX(12px); + margin-bottom: 0; + border-width: 0; + transition: + opacity 0.13s ease-in, + transform 0.13s ease-in, + max-height 0.17s ease-in 0.03s, + margin-bottom 0.17s ease-in 0.03s, + border-width 0.17s ease-in 0.03s; +} + +.file .bar { + position: absolute; + inset: 0; + opacity: 0; + transition: opacity 0.3s; +} + +.file.working { background: var(--black); } + +/* The gradient's left and right edge colors match, so the 200%-sized image + tiles seamlessly and the position loop has no visible restart. */ +.file.working .bar { + opacity: 1; + background: linear-gradient( + 100deg, + var(--blue-deep) 0%, + var(--blue) 25%, + #7fb3ff 50%, + var(--blue) 75%, + var(--blue-deep) 100% + ); + background-size: 200% 100%; + animation: shimmer 1.6s linear infinite; +} + +.file.ok { background: var(--ok); } +.file.ok.suspect { background: #6b5a1e; } +.file.err { background: var(--err); } + +.file .row { + position: relative; + display: flex; + align-items: center; + gap: 0.6rem; + padding: 0.55rem 0.85rem; +} + +.file .name { + overflow-wrap: anywhere; + font-weight: 600; +} + +.file.working .name { color: #fff; } +.file.ok .name, .file.err .name { color: #fff; } + +.badge.companion { + flex: none; + display: inline-flex; + align-items: center; + padding: 0.15rem 0.35rem; + border-radius: 5px; + background: rgba(59, 130, 246, 0.18); + color: #7fb3ff; +} + +.file.ok .badge.companion, +.file.err .badge.companion, +.file.working .badge.companion { + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.15); + color: #fff; +} + +.file .status { + flex: 1; + text-align: right; + font-size: 0.85rem; + color: var(--dim); + overflow-wrap: anywhere; +} + +.file.ok .status { color: #cfe9d5; } +.file.ok.suspect .status { color: #f0e3b2; } +.file.err .status { color: #f0c8c8; } +.file.working .status { color: #dbe7ff; } + +.file .dl { + flex: none; + display: inline-flex; + align-items: center; + justify-content: center; + width: 1.9rem; + height: 1.9rem; + border-radius: 6px; + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.16); + color: #fff; + transition: background 0.15s, transform 0.15s; + animation: popIn 0.3s cubic-bezier(0.2, 1.4, 0.4, 1); +} + +.file .dl:hover { + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.32); + transform: scale(1.1); +} + +.file .remove { + flex: none; + padding: 0.1rem 0.55rem; + background: transparent; + border: 1px solid var(--border); + border-radius: 6px; + color: var(--dim); + font-weight: 400; +} + +.file .remove:hover { + color: var(--err-bright); + border-color: var(--err-bright); + box-shadow: none; + transform: none; +} + +.file.ok .remove, +.file.err .remove, +.file.working .remove { + border-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.3); + color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.75); +} + +.file.ok .remove:hover, +.file.err .remove:hover { + color: #fff; + border-color: #fff; +} + +.actions { + display: flex; + gap: 0.6rem; + animation: fadeIn 0.25s ease-out; +} + +footer { + margin-top: 2rem; + color: var(--dim); + font-size: 0.85rem; +} +footer a { color: var(--dim); } + +/* --- animations --- */ + +@keyframes fadeIn { + from { opacity: 0; } + to { opacity: 1; } +} + +@keyframes popIn { + from { opacity: 0; transform: scale(0.85); } + to { opacity: 1; transform: scale(1); } +} + +@keyframes slideIn { + from { opacity: 0; transform: translateY(-6px); } + to { opacity: 1; transform: translateY(0); } +} + +@keyframes shimmer { + from { background-position: 0 0; } + to { background-position: -200% 0; } +} + +@keyframes pulse { + 0%, 100% { box-shadow: 0 0 0 0 rgba(232, 182, 76, 0.25); } + 50% { box-shadow: 0 0 0 6px rgba(232, 182, 76, 0); } +} + +@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) { + *, *::before, *::after { + animation-duration: 0.01ms !important; + animation-iteration-count: 1 !important; + transition-duration: 0.01ms !important; + } +} diff --git a/web/worker.js b/web/worker.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..439d0a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/worker.js @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// One-shot unpack worker: each unpack runs in a fresh worker with its own +// wasm instance. Two reasons: +// +// 1. UI stays responsive — unpacking a 100 MB+ module blocks for seconds. +// 2. Trap isolation — the senbei DLL-first routing probe relies on +// catch_unwind to reject EXE-shell-layout DLLs, and panics cannot be +// caught in WebAssembly: the probe traps the whole call. A trap kills +// this worker's message handler, which the main thread observes and +// retries with the forced-EXE pipeline in a NEW worker (the trapped +// instance is never reused). That reproduces the CLI's +// dll-first/exe-fallback routing without a catchable panic. + +import init, { unpack_file, unpack_file_force_exe } from './pkg/senbei_web.js'; + +let ready = null; + +self.onmessage = async (e) => { + const { input, companion, forceExe } = e.data; + try { + ready ??= init(); + await ready; + const r = forceExe + ? unpack_file_force_exe(input, companion ?? undefined) + : unpack_file(input, companion ?? undefined); + const bytes = r.bytes; + self.postMessage( + { + ok: true, + kind: r.kind, + suspect: r.suspect, + issues: r.issues, + companion: r.companion, + bytes, + }, + [bytes.buffer], + ); + } catch (err) { + const trap = err instanceof WebAssembly.RuntimeError; + self.postMessage({ ok: false, trap, message: String(err?.message ?? err) }); + } +};